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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis seeks to provide a deeper understanding of public attitudes to inheritance 
in contemporary Scottish society, with particular regard to perceptions of parental 
obligation in an era of increased family diversity. The cornerstone of the thesis is an 
empirical study conducted in 2014 against the backdrop of the Scottish Law 
Commission’s (SLC) 2009 succession law reform proposals that would seriously 
curtail children’s inheritance rights. 
 
The thesis begins by contextualising the empirical study. It explains the current law of 
succession as it relates to provision for adult partners and children and examines the 
SLC’s proposed reforms. It argues that the SLC’s proposals to further bolster the 
spouse’s position at the expense of the deceased’s children are not supported by 
public opinion. Through analysis of a range of other empirical studies it demonstrates 
that public opinion supports continued recognition of children in succession law, 
particularly in reconstituted families. 
 
The second part of the thesis explains how the empirical study was planned and 
executed before detailing the methodological approach used to analyse the data. 
Having established the methodological framework, the thesis then discusses the key 
research findings, focusing primarily on the parent-child relationship. Firstly, it 
explores the obligations parents are considered to owe their children, addressing how 
these obligations can be reconciled with conceptions of testamentary freedom. 
Secondly, it examines whether parental duty is viewed differently when the 
deceased’s surviving spouse is not his children’s other parent and, thirdly, it asks what 
duty, if any, the deceased owes his stepchildren. While the parent-child relationship is 
the main focus of this thesis, the SLC also proposed reforms to the inheritance 
entitlements of half-siblings and these proposals are examined in the context of 
broader discussion on reconstituted families.  
 
The thesis concludes by arguing that, while the SLC rightly identifies social change as 
a ground for law reform, its proposed reforms fail to adequately reflect social norms 
in the context of the parent-child relationship. This is because the proposed reforms 
do not correspond to the societal changes identified: whereas the SLC acknowledges 
 3 
the rise in the number of reconstituted families, the reforms do not adequately 
consider how these families can be better served by succession law. Instead, 
confronted with increased family diversity, the SLC opts for simplicity, privileging 
the spouse ahead of all others regardless of the effect this will have on children in 
reconstituted families.  
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Introduction 
1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine succession law in the context of family 
obligation and the construction of kinship. Succession law has long acted as a 
bellwether of societal mores, reflecting shifts in social values and aspirations. Indeed, 
in his Principles of the Law of Scotland, Bell
1
 observed that “no department of 
municipal law is more intimately connected with the state of society than that which 
relates to the rights of heir, and the rules of descent.”2 While the absoluteness of such 
an assertion may today be contested, it is nonetheless true that the rules of succession 
continue to provide a normative, state-sanctioned view of how a family ought to 
function, prescribing both the categories of individuals to whom we owe the greatest 
responsibility and the extent of that responsibility. In this sense, inheritance can be 
viewed as a process that not only reflects families but also constitutes them.
3
 Despite 
this, succession law has long languished below the horizon of public interest, 
perpetually overshadowed by laws governing transactions that feature more 
prominently in our everyday lives. In the minds of many, succession law exists purely 
as a formula for distributing an individual’s estate and little consideration is given to 
what the interplay of money, power and relationships—an interplay that it almost 
inevitably begets—reveals about how we understand families to work. 
 
This widespread indifference to succession law may, however, be set to change as 
several disparate factors converge to drive inheritance further up the public and 
political agenda in Scotland. Firstly, while Scots succession law is firmly rooted in 
ties of consanguinity and affinity,
4
 the rise of “blended” families5 and open 
                                                        
1
 George Joseph Bell is one of Scotland’s institutional writers. In Scotland “institutional writers” is a 
term of art and “signifies a small group of writers whose works … are regarded as formal sources of 
Scots law” (Fergus, TD and Maher, G, “Sources of Law (General and Historical), Legal Method and 
Law Reform”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Vol 22 (1987) para 534). 
2
 Bell, GJ, Principles of the Law of Scotland (4th edition, 1839) repr. 2010, Edinburgh Legal Education 
Trust, Old Studies in Scots Law, vol 1, 3.2.1637. 
3
 Finch, J and Mason J, Passing on: Kinship and Inheritance in England (Routledge, 2000), 2. 
4
 Consanguinity (blood ties) and affinity (marriage-based ties) are the ties traditionally recognised as 
creating family relationships between individuals (Sutherland, E E, “Child and Family Law”, in The 
Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Vol 3 Reissue (2004), para 69). 
5
 The term “blended” family has no legal meaning but is commonly used either simply as a synonym 
for the term stepfamily or to describe a specific category of stepfamilies, those with a common child 
(see, for example, discussion in Juby, H, Le Bourdais, C and Marcil-Gratton, N, “A Step Further: 
Parenthood in Blended Families,” 2001 conference presentation available at 
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cohabitation means the same can no longer be said of contemporary families. 
Secondly, while governments have long sought to prescribe what happens to a 
defunct’s property, the sharp rise in home ownership in the latter half of the twentieth 
century means that inheritance is no longer viewed as the preserve of the landed 
gentry, but instead as a question that concerns the “ordinary citizen.”6 Thirdly, while 
life expectancy has undoubtedly risen in Scotland,
7
 people worldwide are living 
longer with multiple chronic medical conditions.
8
 Thus, at a time when more people 
are in a position to leave a bequest, they are also being called upon to pay for care 
during their extended old age.
9
 Finally, rising social and economic inequality in 
Scotland
10
 is a growing cause for concern and has led to renewed calls for increases in 
taxation on wealth transfers
11
 made either on death or inter vivos.
12
 Together these 
factors have conspired to allow succession law to at least partially shed its reputation 
as a highly impersonal and unrelatable area of the law. 
 
These factors are not exclusive to the Scottish socio-demographic landscape and, 
consequently, a number of jurisdictions have undertaken reviews of their succession 
                                                                                                                                                              
https://sociology.uwo.ca/research/aging_and_the_life_course/family_transformation_social_cohesion/p
apers/Gratton-PAA_Paper.pdf . All websites cited in this thesis were accessed in May or June 2017.   
6
 Finch and Mason (2000), 1. 
7
 Scottish Government “Health of Scotland’s Population – Life Expectancy”, available at 
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Health/TrendLifeExpectancy.  
8
 According to the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013, the increase in life expectancy in most 
country-specific estimates is greater than the increase in Healthy Life Expectancy. (“Global, regional, 
and national disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) for 306 diseases and injuries and healthy life 
expectance (HALE) for 188 countries 1990-2013: quantifying the epidemiological transition,” (2015) 
386 The Lancet 2145). A similar point is made by the Scottish government which states that while boys 
born in 2014 can be expected to live to 77.4 years on average, only 60.3 of these will be in a “healthy” 
state (n 7).  
9 This debate on funding social care has been reignited by the Conservative Party Manifesto 
which advocates all assets above a “capital floor” of £100,000 being made being available to meet 
care costs for people receiving care both in a care home and care at home (The Conservative and 
Unionist Party Manifesto 2017, 65, available at https://s3.eu-west-
2.amazonaws.com/manifesto2017/Manifesto2017.pdf ) Currently, the value of an individual’s 
home is not available to meet care costs for those receiving care at home. 
10
 Tracking the rise and fall of income equality, and wider social inequality, is highly complex. 
Nevertheless, while the various indices are subject to academic debate, it can be agreed that there is at 
the very least a perception of growing inequality. In terms of income inequality the Scottish 
Government found that, while there has been very little change since 1998/99, the current rate of 
relative poverty is higher than the 2010/11 level (Scottish Government, Poverty and Income Inequality 
in Scotland: 2013/2014, Executive Summary, available at 
http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2015/06/7453. 
11
 For a dispassionate review of this highly-charged subject see Mirrlees J et al, Tax by Design, (Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
12
 While this final point has undoubtedly generated significant interest in succession amongst members 
of the Scottish public, it is properly a question of tax law and, as such, is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
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laws, as discussed briefly in Chapter 1. For its part, the Scottish Law Commission 
(SLC) tabled a Report on Succession in 2009 (the 2009 Report), proposing a number 
of amendments to the current law.
13
 The 2009 Report included a draft Bill designed to 
implement the recommendations. The Scottish Government did not, however, table 
the draft Bill wholesale but instead selected certain elements to form the basis of its 
Succession (Scotland) Bill 2015, which received royal assent on 3 March 2016.
14
 By 
the Scottish Government’s own admission, the new Act addresses “mainly technical 
recommendations relating to jurisdiction and choice of law; wills and survivorship; 
and rights of succession in limited circumstances.”15 It does not, in other words, 
address the questions raised by the socio-demographic shifts mentioned in the 
previous paragraph or the more general issues addressed by this thesis. These 
remaining—and far more controversial—questions were instead the subject of a 
second consultation process in 2015.
16
 No further legislation has yet been tabled. This 
thesis will engage with the law reform process and ask whether the direction favoured 
by the SLC best reflects both public attitudes and wider policy aims.  
 
Although the law reform process considered, among other questions, the rights of 
spouses and of cohabitants, this thesis will focus on those proposals that relate to 
inheritance as between parent and child. I chose this focus for two principal reasons. 
Firstly, the parent-child relationship remains an under-examined area of the law when 
compared to the spousal relationship and, in particular, when compared to the 
relationship between cohabitants. Secondly, and more importantly, the parent-child 
relationship was an obvious choice because it will be the most dramatically affected 
by the proposed reforms. As will be discussed below, the proposed reforms 
undermine the status and protection that the law of succession has long afforded the 
parent-child relationship and, crucially, do so without adequately having considered 
the impact that reform will have on those living in non-nuclear family arrangements. 
 
                                                        
13
 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Succession (Scot Law Com No 215, 2009).  
14
 Succession (Scotland) Act 2016. 
15
 Scottish Parliament, Succession (Scotland) Bill, Stage 1 scrutiny by the Delegated Powers and Law 
Reform Committee, available at 
 http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/CurrentCommittees/90964.aspx . 
16
 Scottish Government, Consultation on the Law of Succession (2015), available at 
http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2015/06/7518/downloads.    
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While it cannot be said that the SLC proposals have not been subject to consultation 
or a prolonged period of reflection (the SLC first tried to update succession law in 
1990),
17
 there has been a lack of meaningful engagement with the most controversial 
questions. In an attempt to remedy this, I designed and carried out an empirical study 
into public attitudes towards inheritance, with particular regard to the parent-child 
relationship. Much of the discussion in this thesis will be anchored in the findings of 
my research project but, before exploring the core themes, the remainder of this 
introductory chapter will trace the development of current family protection measures 
and contextualise them within the existing legislative framework. It will then provide 
an explanation of the proposed reforms as they affect the parent-child relationship 
before concluding with an overview of the structure of the remainder of the thesis. 
 2 Legal rights 
 
The Scots law of succession is contained in both common law and statute, with the 
Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 (the 1964 Act) providing the majority of the current 
rules of succession relating to intestate succession. The proposed reforms will 
structurally link testate succession and intestate succession but, as they presently exist 
as two entirely distinct regimes,
18
 they will be considered separately in this 
Introduction, beginning with testate succession. The reform proposals for testate 
succession primarily affect the “legal rights” of spouses and children, with radical 
reform being suggested in relation to the latter group’s rights. 
 
Scots law recognises the principle of testamentary freedom and Scottish testators can 
generally dispose of their property as they see fit. There is, however, an important 
exception to this freedom in the form of legal rights. Legal rights are a “species of 
family protection”19 that benefit the deceased’s surviving spouse (or civil partner)20 
and children and have been a feature of Scots law “virtually since time 
immemorial.”21 Legal rights are enforceable against both testate and intestate estates 
                                                        
17
 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Succession (Scot Law Com No 124, 1990), henceforth the 
1990 Report. 
18
 With the caveat that, as will be explained forthwith, legal rights apply to both testate and intestate 
succession. 
19Meston, M M, “Wills and Succession”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Vol 
25 (1989) para 772. 
20
 Henceforth, unless the context dictates otherwise, “spouse” refers to both spouses and civil partners. 
21
 Hiram, H, The Scots Law of Succession (2
nd
 edition, Tottel Publishing, 2007) at para 3.2. 
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and do not require any judicial declaration of their existence, although they are not 
applied automatically.
22
 This means that an eligible party must both know of the 
existence of the entitlement and, in the case of testate succession, be prepared to go 
against the testator’s wishes and make a claim. 
 
Legal rights is a term of art in Scots succession law, and encompasses both the 
spouse’s entitlement (the jus relicti or jus relictae)23 and the children’s right (legitim 
or the bairn’s part)24 to a share of the deceased’s moveable property. Legal rights arise 
at common law, although there is some dispute as to whether the children’s right and 
the spouse’s right share the same origins, and indeed as to what those origins are. 
With regard to the theoretical origins, Stair contends that the jus relictae flows from 
the spouses’ co-ownership of the common marital fund25 (discussed in Chapter 3) 
while holding the bairn’s part to flow “from that natural obligation of parents to 
provide for their children.”26 In contrast, Erskine argues that both the jus relictae and 
legitim flow from the interest the respective parties have in the common marital 
fund,
27
 although he concedes that the children’s interest in that fund flows from the 
law of nature, as opposed to the spouses’ interests which stem from their marriage 
contract:
28
  
 
But it must be attended to, that by the law of nature itself, children have a 
right, upon their first existence, to some share at least of the goods which 
formerly belonged in common to their two parents …. Where therefore there 
is issue of the marriage, the share which, on its dissolution, falls to the 
children, descends to them in consequence of that natural right, without 
destroying the notion of a communion of goods. 
 
                                                        
22
 Ibid at para 3.25. 
23
 The jus relicti is the widower’s right, while the jus relictae is the widow’s right. Both rights afford 
identical protection although the jus relicti did not exist at common law but was introduced by statute 
in the Married Women’s Property Act 1881 s.6.   
24 Although the term legitim suggests Roman origins, it is widely considered to flow from an attempt 
at “a Latinised re-branding” of what was traditionally known as the bairn’s part. (Reid, KGC, “Intestate 
Succession” in Reid, KGC, De Waal, MJ and Zimmermann, R (eds), Comparative Succession Law, 
Volume II: Intestate Succession (Oxford University Press, 2015), 374. 
25
 Stair, Institutions, 3.8.43. 
26
 Ibid at 3.8.44. 
27
 Erskine, Institute, 3.9.15. 
28 Ibid. 
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With regard to jurisdictional parentage, commentators traditionally cited Roman law 
as the source of legal rights,
29
 although such a view is now widely refuted,
30
 with 
commentators instead citing customary law as their probable source.
31
 Regardless, 
there is no doubt that legal rights are “among the most ancient in Scots common 
law,”32 being present in the Regiam Majestatem, a seminal Scottish legal text dating 
back to the early fourteenth century.
33
 Furthermore, irrespective of whether legal 
rights are more correctly classified as a “natural obligation” or as an interest in 
common property, both views continue to pervade contemporary discourse, as will be 
shown in subsequent chapters. 
 
Despite their importance, the 1964 Act does not define legal rights, stating merely that 
legal rights are to be interpreted as meaning jus relicti, jus relictae and legitim,
34
 
terms which are not themselves explained but which rely on the jurisprudence of the 
common law.
35
 The definition provided by Erskine reads as follows:
 36
 
 
If one, upon his death, leave a widow and no children, the goods in 
communion divide into two equal parts; of which one goes to the widow, and 
the other is the dead’s part…If the deceased has left children, one or more, but 
no widow, the testament is also bipartite; for the children get one half as 
legitim, the other half is dead’s part, which, if it be not actually tested upon, 
goes also to the children in the character of next of kin. If he leave both widow 
and children, though all his children should have been of a former marriage, 
the division is tripartite; the widow takes one-third by herself; another third 
goes to the children equally among them as legitim, and the remaining third is 
the dead’s part. 
 
What is immediately striking about the definition is that it places the spouse and the 
children on an equal footing: both are recognised as having a legitimate claim on the 
deceased’s estate. Legal rights are of course only exigible against the moveable estate 
and, depending on the composition of the estate, may be worth very little. 
                                                        
29
 Gardner, J, “The origin and nature of the legal rights of spouses and children in the Scottish law of 
succession” (1928) 40 Juridical Review 72 at 86. 
30
 Reid (2015), 374; Sellar, WDH, “Succession Law in Scotland – A Historical Perspective” in Reid, 
KGC, de Waal MJ and Zimmermann, R (eds), Exploring the Law of Succession (Edinburgh University 
Press, 2007), 60.  
31
 Sellar (2007), 60.  
32
 Ibid, 59. 
33
 Reid (2015), 374. 
34
 Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 s.36(1). 
35
 Section 131 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 extends legal rights to civil partners. 
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Nevertheless, in the context of testate succession, the law historically recognises the 
deceased’s duty to provide some minimal protection for her children as being of equal 
importance to her duty to provide some minimal protection for her spouse.
37
  
 
While also exigible in cases of intestate succession, it has been argued that legal rights 
are not the most effective way of ensuring the protection of children and spouses. 
Indeed, Kenneth Reid has argued that legal rights simply provide further entitlement 
to “two groups of relatives who are already provided for under the Act and who could 
have been given still more…by an extension of statutory entitlements.”38 
Nevertheless, despite his misgivings, Reid concedes that retaining legal rights “may 
be justified as providing protection against disinheritance”39 in the context of testate 
succession. The merits of continuing to provide children with a protection against 
disinheritance, particularly given the changing shape of the modern family, is the 
question that lies at the heart of this thesis. 
3 Intestate succession and prior rights 
 
Where the deceased has no will, has not disposed fully of her estate, or where part or 
all of her will is invalid, the estate is fully or partially intestate. In such cases, the 
intestacy rules set down in the 1964 Act apply in full.
40
 Section 2 of the 1964 Act 
establishes the succession rights of different classes of person to the intestate state, 
ranked in order of preference. Succession by one class of heir precludes succession by 
heirs of a remoter class
41
 and Scots law allows unlimited rights of representation.
42
 
Simply put, representation means that children (or remoter issue) of a predeceasing 
member of a class can inherit in the place of their predeceased parent (or remoter 
ancestor).
43
  
 
                                                        
37
 Where a choice between the masculine and feminine third person pronoun reasonably presents, this 
chapter uses the feminine pronoun. Chapter 1 will use the masculine pronoun, and subsequent chapters 
will alternate accordingly. 
38
 Reid (2015), 391. While this observation is certainly true, the comment belies the fact that the very 
high level of prior rights (discussed below) means that the children’s statutory entitlement is often 
worthless. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 1964 Act s.1(1)(a). 
41
 Reid (2015), 389. 
42
 1964 Act s.5. 
43
 For example, if the deceased dies leaving only a sister and the children of a second predeceased 
sister, the children take the half of the estate that would have fallen to their mother. 
 17 
The order of succession has remained largely unchanged throughout history, with one 
significant exception: prior to the 1964 Act, the spouse was not an heir on intestacy.
44
 
Instead, a spouse was entitled only to the jus relictae/relicti and a second (now 
obsolete) right known as terce, a usufruct
45
 of a third of the heritable estate.
46
 This 
could result in considerable hardship for the surviving spouse and, furthermore, was 
increasingly out of touch with societal values which accorded greater importance to 
equality between spouses.
47
 In recognition of changed societal mores, the 1964 Act 
took the long overdue step of breaking “the link between blood ties and heirship by 
making the surviving spouse an heir, entitled to succeed where there are no issue, 
siblings, or parents, and in preference to the deceased’s uncles and aunts, 
grandparents or remoter ascendants.”48 While there can be no question that the failure 
to recognise the spouse as a key member of the deceased’s family was an anomaly 
that stood uncorrected for far too long, it must now be asked whether the balance has 
tilted too far in favour of the spouse at the expense of children, and in particular those 
children whose parents have re-partnered.
49
 
 
To suggest that the balance may have swung too far may seem an unusual assertion 
given that section 2 of the 1964 Act states that children inherit ahead of any other 
class of relative. However, as has often been observed, the list of heirs set out in the 
Act is misleading.
50
 This is because section 1(2) of the 1964 Act stipulates that 
“nothing in this Part of this Act shall affect legal rights or the prior rights of a 
surviving spouse [or civil partner].”51 In other words, any claim on an intestate estate 
by an heir under section 2 could be defeated either by a spouse’s or child’s claim for 
legal rights and/or a spouse’s claim for prior rights, with prior rights taking 
precedence where there are insufficient funds to satisfy both.
52
 Whereas legal rights 
are exigible against the moveable estate only, prior rights are payable from both the 
heritable and the moveable estate. It has thus been observed that, “in the hierarchy of 
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entitlements… prior rights stand right at the very top.”53 Indeed, they are so extensive 
that in most cases they will exhaust the entire estate, leaving nothing for the children 
(or indeed any other relative). It is for this reason that Lord Guest described the effect 
of prior rights as “the widow scoops the pool”54 
 
Before considering the impact of prior rights on children’s inheritance rights, two 
points bear emphasising. Firstly, prior rights apply only to intestate estates and 
operate entirely independently of legal rights. A spouse may claim both prior rights 
and legal rights upon intestacy, but only legal rights are available in cases of testate 
succession. This means that a spouse may be better off were her husband to die 
intestate than were he to die testate.
55
 This is an unremarkable assertion in itself but is 
key to illustrating that, while the law favours spouses above all others upon intestacy, 
in a contest between testamentary freedom and spousal protection, testamentary 
freedom reigns supreme. Secondly, unlike legal rights, prior rights have no origins in 
the common law but are a creature of statute born of a need to respond to changing 
social mores. The first statutory protection for spouses was introduced by the Intestate 
Husband’s Estate (Scotland) Act 1911 which provided widows with a statutory legacy 
of £500 where no issue survived. Crucially, the 1911 Act also established the 
hierarchy that remains in force today: the statutory legacy was distributed first, 
followed by legal rights and then the free estate.
56
 The 1964 Act then introduced prior 
rights proper, establishing the housing right,
57
 the right to furniture and plenishings
58
 
and the monetary right.
59
 The maximum value of the three prior rights is revised 
periodically by the Secretary of State
60
 and, until 2005, the increases were generally 
modest.
61
 In 2005, however, the value of the housing element was increased by 250%, 
and then again in 2011 by a further 150%.
62
 The values currently stand at £473,000 
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(housing right),
63
 £29,000 (furniture right) and £50,000 (monetary right),
64
 the latter 
depending on whether issue also survive the intestate.  
 
The result of having fixed the maximum values of prior rights at such high levels is 
that Scottish children are likely to inherit “little or nothing” from a married parent 
who is intestate.
65
 In those cases where the surviving spouse is also the children’s 
other parent this is largely uncontroversial since research consistently shows that 
children have no expectation of inheriting where the second parent is still alive.
66
 The 
same cannot, however, be said when the deceased has remarried. In such instances 
concern is regularly expressed that the second spouse cannot be relied upon to 
subsequently provide for the intestate’s children.67 Given that divorce and remarriage 
are more likely than they were at the time the 1964 Act was introduced,
68
 the increase 
in the value of prior rights has particular consequences. Today, in many instances the 
competition for the deceased’s estate is not simply competition between a surviving 
spouse and the children, but “between a first family (represented by issue) and a 
second family (represented by the surviving spouse).”69  
 
Concern expressed by commentators about the total exclusion of children
70
 should not 
be interpreted as a call to place children and spouses on an equal footing. As will be 
acknowledged in Chapters 5 and 6, there are, in many cases, good reasons for 
providing the spouse with the majority of the estate.  Certainly, the stated policy 
objective of allowing the spouse to remain in the couple’s home is sound71 and, 
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unsurprisingly, enjoys widespread public support.
72
 However, one of the features of 
society that has changed since the introduction of the 1964 Act is “the modern 
tendency for everything—house, contents, even money in the bank—to be owned 
together.”73 In the context of intestate succession, this means that “whereas a widow 
in 1964 might have had to use her prior rights to claim 100 per cent of the house and 
contents, her modern counterpart will probably need to inherit only a half share.”74 In 
this context, the incessant drive to increase the value of prior rights seems somewhat 
surprising.  
 
It is an anomaly that can in part be explained by asking who the Scottish law 
reformers perceive to be the primary beneficiaries of prior rights. There can be no 
doubt that women were the primary beneficiaries of the 1964 reforms: in previous 
generations gender and pay inequity were such that many women were financially 
dependent on their husbands,
75
 a reality that risked unleashing devastating 
consequences when a husband died intestate and the estate passed to a relative of the 
husband rather than the widow. Without minimising the gender inequality that still 
exists in Scotland today,
76
 it is not clear that the situation is the same as it was in 
1964. Most couples today own their house together and so the full value of the prior 
right will rarely be used in meeting the policy objective of allowing the spouse to 
remain in the home. Furthermore, it is equally unclear that the poverty many women 
experience today would be alleviated by attaching a higher value to the housing 
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right.
77
 Yet, despite this—and although the proposals are gender neutral—the rhetoric 
in the 2009 Report almost always appears to envisage a widow.
78
 This is unfortunate 
as any call for a reduction in the spouse’s share risks being perceived as reactionary 
and antithetical to women’s interests. 
 
Not only does this tendency divert the focus of the debate, it is also misleading. While 
the reform proposals are indirectly framed as benefiting vulnerable women from a life 
of penury, they in fact appear to have been written with the wealthiest sectors of 
society in mind. Although the SLC stated in 1990 that it was more important for the 
rules on intestate succession to be “suitable for small and medium sized estates 
than…very large estates,”79 its current proposals (and the current law) appear to 
depart from this objective. Placing the housing value of prior rights at £473,000 when 
the average confirmed estate was £196,343 in 2013-2014
80
 suggests that the law 
reformers envisage not only a widow, but a wealthy widow, as only the wealthiest 
surviving spouses require the protection afforded by such a high entitlement. Indeed, 
even at the 2005 level of £300,000 for the housing right, only 2% of intestate estates 
would have devolved on the children, or indeed anyone other than the surviving 
spouse.
81
 Thus, contrary to the SLC’s intention to provide rules suitable for the 
“average” family, today’s rules are most suitable for the wealthiest in society, as it is 
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only in very wealthy families that both the children and the spouse can inherit on 
intestacy. This situation will be exacerbated under the proposed reforms.  
4 The reform process 
 
Succession law will, at some point, affect us all and there is therefore merit in 
ensuring that the provisions relating to how a deceased’s estate is distributed are 
broadly acceptable to the general population. Of course, as succession law is “not the 
kind of question which leads to popular agitation,”82 any change tends to be reactive 
rather than proactive. Certainly, by the time the review that resulted in the 1964 Act 
was launched, the then current regime was held to be “utterly out of touch with 
reality.”83 While the gap between the current regime and societal expectation may not 
be as egregious as it was prior to 1964, the SLC is right to state that a review of the 
legislation is necessary given the “significant changes in Scottish society and in the 
way in which people live”84 over the past fifty years.  
 
In the introductory comments to its 2009 Report, the SLC made it abundantly clear 
that, while a desire to simplify what has long been seen as complex and unwieldy 
legislation motivated some of the proposed changes, social change was the primary 
driver behind the reform process: 
85
 
 
Since our last examination of succession, there have been significant changes in 
Scottish society and in the way in which people live….However, in our view the law 
has not kept pace with all the changes which are occurring. For instance, many more 
people are cohabiting, either in same-sex relationships or opposite-sex relationships. 
Step-families are becoming more common. People are living much longer so that 
many children are middle-aged or older when their parents die, leading to difficult 
questions about the protection to be afforded to children who are adults at the time of 
the parent’s death. And wealth is more widely distributed, particularly through 
increased ownership of heritable property. 
 
With the exception of the assertion on wealth distribution,
86
 the SLC’s observations 
are unremarkable and the subject of general consensus. However, as will be addressed 
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throughout this thesis, the degree to which the proposed reforms respond to the 
highlighted changes is less than clear. For example, while the rise of stepfamilies is 
cited as an example of change, the 2009 Report pays scant attention to this shift. 
Equally surprising, while no fundamental shift in the nature of the parent-child 
relationship is cited as a reason for reform, some of the most important changes 
advocated by the Report serve to minimise the importance accorded to that 
relationship.
87
  
 
The 2009 Report focused its reform proposals on two main areas: the distribution of 
intestate estates and the protection of close relatives from disinheritance by the 
deceased.
88
 Although these are presented as two entirely separate matters they are, as 
will be explained, intrinsically linked. With regard to intestate estates, three main 
changes are proposed. Firstly, spouses are to be moved ahead of parents and siblings 
in the order of succession;
89
 secondly, legal rights are to be removed or curtailed;
90
 
and, thirdly prior rights are to be consigned to history, replaced with a “threshold 
sum” payable to the spouse which will take priority over all other claims. The 
“threshold sum” model means that the spouse will be entitled to the whole of the 
estate, where it is worth less than the specified amount. While the SLC was 
persuaded
91
 that the amount of the threshold sum is a matter for the Scottish 
Parliament to decide,
92
 it seems equally clear that this amount will not be low. In its 
recent consultation, the Scottish Government sought views on values for the threshold 
sum ranging from £335,000 to £650,000.
93
 Furthermore, whereas under the current 
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system the children inherit the free estate after payment of prior rights and legal 
rights, the SLC proposals suggest that any remainder following payment of the 
threshold sum be split equally between the spouse and children.
94
 It is not clear which 
of the social “developments” that underpin the reform process militate in favour of 
such change.  
 
The second area of reform identified by the SLC is testate succession and,  
more specifically, protection against disinheritance. As outlined above, Scotland is 
unusual amongst English speaking countries in offering children a degree of 
protection as an automatic entitlement. In England and Wales, for example, no such 
protection exists and children must make a claim based on the deceased not having 
made “reasonable financial provision”95 for them.96 It is clear that the SLC has long 
favoured ending legal protection for non-dependent children,
97
 although it has equally 
long acknowledged that this will be a highly controversial move, describing it as 
“one of the most fundamental and difficult questions in this whole review of 
succession law.”98  Given the sensitivity of the topic, and the lack of consensus 
among SLC consultees, the Commissioners held that the question was for Parliament 
to decide
99
 and submitted two options for consideration in its Report.  
 
The first option is presented as a “fixed legal share” for all children.100 While this 
suggests that children will receive a clear, fixed percentage the descriptor is, on closer 
examination, somewhat deceptive. Children, it is explained, will not receive a fixed 
share of the estate, but a fixed share of what they would have received had the parent 
died intestate. By linking the testate regime to the intestate regime—which will 
operate on the entire estate and will no longer distinguish between heritable and 
moveable property—the reforms mean that children may potentially receive more 
than under the existing system, where their claim is limited to the moveable estate. 
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However, as discussed above, in the vast majority of cases, children will receive 
nothing on intestacy and so, the fixed legal share will, in most cases, entitle children 
to a fixed share of nothing.  
 
The second option, the option the SLC appeared to favour in both its Reports, 
proposes a right for a dependent child to receive a capital sum payment from the 
deceased’s estate. Again this is less generous than it first appears, as any estate 
passing to a person who owes the child an obligation of aliment would be exempt. 
Given that in many cases the surviving spouse (assuming the surviving spouse is the 
main beneficiary) will owe the child an obligation of aliment, claims by dependent 
children are likely to be rare.
101
  
 
What is striking about this proposal is that it shifts the criterion used to determine 
children’s eligibility from status to need. While many Scottish commentators argue 
that to do so would be to “deny children legal recognition as family members,”102 
some commentators from other jurisdictions, and the SLC, have made the case for a 
needs-based approach. For example, in rehearsing arguments in favour of abolishing a 
fixed legal share for children, the SLC noted that children tend to be middle aged 
when their parents die and “therefore do not require substantial assets to set them up 
in life.”103 Similarly, in the context of family provision claims, Conway argues that 
a distinction can be drawn between “infants and minors where there is a clear 
element of financial dependency which transcends the death of a parent…[and]… 
independent adult children who are (or should be) capable of providing for 
themselves and were not financially reliant on their parent before the latter’s 
death.”104 
 
However, as will be discussed throughout this thesis, while inheritance can clearly 
deliver a significant financial windfall to adult children, financial gain is often 
secondary to the symbolic importance of an inheritance as a reaffirmation of the 
parent-child relationship. Furthermore, as is also discussed later in this thesis, there is 
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nothing to suggest that Scottish parents are perturbed by the limitation on their 
testamentary freedom that legal rights impose. Of course, decisions as to which 
relationships are worthy of state protection rest on factors other than public opinion or 
the expressive function of a statute, and wider public policy considerations must also 
be taken into consideration.   
 
In some instances, these policy considerations are both obvious and compelling: 
although beyond the scope of this thesis, it would not be unreasonable to argue that, 
despite public preference, consideration should be given to the potential impact of 
inheritance tax on social equity and wealth redistribution. Similarly, while many 
people would prefer an estate to devolve to anyone other than the Crown,
105
 there are 
clear public policy reasons for imposing a cut off in intestacy statutes, not least given 
that tracing relatives is often costly and time consuming.
106
 In contrast, the public 
policy reasons for limiting the availability of legal shares to dependent children are 
not evident. This is because the share of the testate estate that would have devolved to 
the adult child would not instead be used to advance the public interest, rather it 
would simply be available to the testator to dispose of as he saw fit.
107
  
 
At best, by excluding adult children, it could be argued that the state is expressing the 
view that adult children should be independent, but this rather ungenerous view also 
risks communicating that those who are in financially straitened circumstances only 
have themselves to blame. Furthermore, a shift to a needs-based system would 
entirely disregard the emotional aspect of the parent-child relationship and reduce a 
life-long relationship to one that ends, generally speaking, at the age of majority. In 
the absence of a compelling public policy ground to justify change, there is little 
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reason to introduce such radical change and displace public preference by excluding 
adult children. 
 
5 Proposed structure 
 
Struck both by the apparent hostility the SLC displayed towards adult children, and 
by the seeming disconnect between the proposed reforms and the changing nature of 
modern families, I developed the research project to explore the parent-child 
relationship further. The project was anchored in the two main areas of reform 
identified by the SLC: the distribution of intestate estates and the proposed changes to 
legal rights, with a specific focus on the parent-child relationship. In particular, it 
focused on attitudes towards parental responsibility and obligation in the context of 
remarriage and stepfamilies. 
 
In order to place the project in a wider international context, Chapter 1 provides an 
overview of recent succession law reform processes undertaken in England, Canada 
and Australia and highlights the main findings of the principal empirical studies 
carried out in recent years in the UK and, in one instance, Australia. Chapter 2 then 
describes the methodological approach adopted for the study, explaining why a 
qualitative study was chosen over a quantitative study and setting out the framework 
that was employed for analysing the data. 
 
Exploration of the parent-child relationship begins in Chapter 3 with an overview of 
the historical origins of the law of parent and child, and analysis of the research 
findings then begins in Chapter 4. Chapters 4 to 7 analyse perceptions of obligation 
and expectation in the parent-child relationship, focusing on different “types” of 
family unit. Chapter 4 considers intact families,
108
 while Chapters 5 to 7 consider 
complex families. Specifically, Chapter 5 addresses the first family/second family 
                                                        
108
 An “intact family” is a term used in Canadian literature to refer to families comprising a couple, 
with children, whose children were all born or adopted during the current union 
(http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-650-x/89-650-x2012002-eng.htm). While acknowledging the 
inherently political nature of language, the term is used here as a neutral, convenient handle, and 
implies no judgement. 
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dynamic
109
 while Chapters 6 and 7 consider stepfamilies. As part of the examination 
of stepfamily relationships, Chapters 6 and 7 also consider the entitlement of half-
siblings, another important relationship in the anatomy of the modern family.  
Conscious that the SLC privileged a “simplifying instinct”110 throughout its Report, 
consideration is also given to more nuanced options that have been considered in 
other jurisdictions to see if they could inform the Scottish debate. 
 
The thesis will conclude that the proposed reforms do not adequately reflect 
contemporary understandings of parental obligation and that a more nuanced 
approach is required, particularly with regard to complex families. 
  
                                                        
109
 This term is used to describe families where one (or both) of the parents have formed a second, or 
subsequent, relationship. This definition of the first family/second family dynamic is based on the 
definition used in Norrie (2008) 77 at 80 and cited in the 2009 Report at para 2.29. In Norrie’s 
definition, the second family is said to be represented by the second (or subsequent) spouse, 
presumably as only spouses automatically benefit on intestacy. However, in this study, no distinction is 
made between second (or subsequent) spouses or second (or subsequent) cohabitants.  
110
 Norrie (2008) at 78-79. 
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Chapter 1: An overview of legislative reform and empirical 
studies in other jurisdictions 
1.1 Introduction 
 
As was explained in the Introduction, an empirical research project lies at the heart of 
this thesis. Consequently, before undertaking it, I conducted a literature review of 
other significant empirical studies on inheritance in order to ascertain what 
information was available and where gaps in knowledge persisted. Unfortunately, 
only a very limited number of Scottish studies were available for consultation. The 
Scottish Consumer Council (SCC) undertook a quantitative study in 2006 to measure 
the public’s understanding of succession law;111 it did not, however, measure attitudes 
towards, or expectations of, succession law. For its part, the SLC has commissioned 
two studies. In 1986, as part of the reform process that led to the publication of the 
1990 Report, a quantitative opinion survey was carried out.
112
 While the SLC relied 
on some of the findings of the 1986 survey in its 2009 Report, it also commissioned a 
second survey in 2005 to inform the current reform process.
113
 
 
All three Scottish surveys have been quantitative and, as discussed below,
114
 provided 
only incomplete attitudinal information: the SCC study did not set out to address 
public attitudes while the two SLC studies suffered from some serious shortcomings. 
As a result, attention was turned to studies conducted in other jurisdictions. In contrast 
to the dearth of available studies in Scotland, three key empirical studies have been 
conducted on inheritance in England and Wales,
115
 one of which included Scottish 
participants.
116
 The three studies contained qualitative components and engaged in 
detail with many of the issues flowing from the SLC’s proposed reforms. All three 
were invaluable both in helping me design my own study and in contextualising my 
findings. 
                                                        
111
 O’Neill, S, Wills and Awareness of Inheritance Rights in Scotland (Scottish Consumer Council, 
2006), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090724135150/http:/scotcons.demonweb.co.uk/publicatio
ns/reports/reports06/rp10wrep.pdf.  
112
 Scottish Law Commission, Consultative Memorandum on Intestate Succession and Legal Rights 
(CM No. 69, 1986), Appendix II (henceforth the 1986 Survey). 
113
 Scottish Executive, Attitudes Towards Succession Law: Findings of a Scottish Omnibus Survey 
(Scottish Executive Social Research, 2005), (henceforth the 2005 Survey). 
114
 See 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 
115
 Finch and Mason (2000); Humphrey et al. (2010); and Rowlingson and McKay (2005). 
116
 Rowlingson and McKay (2005). 
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As part of their exploration of family obligation, all three studies also gave at least 
some consideration to competition between the state and the family with regard to 
elder care costs, an area I intended to address. In the course of my preliminary 
research, I also discovered a large Australian study on attitudes to financial assets and 
intergenerational transfers: the comprehensive nature of the study, the apparent 
cultural similarities between Scotland and Australia, and the recency of the data led 
me to include it in my literature review. 
 
Finally, in recent years, a number of other jurisdictions have also undertaken 
succession law reform processes. Consideration was given to some of these in order 
to determine whether lessons could be learned from the way in which other 
jurisdictions approach complex family dynamics in succession law.
117
 Shared legal 
history, recent legislative activity and ostensibly similar cultural norms
118
 made 
England, Canada and Australia obvious choices, without diminishing the value of 
lessons that could be learned from other jurisdictions were a more comprehensive 
future study to be undertaken.  
 
The purpose of this short chapter is therefore two-fold: firstly, it will give a very brief 
overview of some recent reform processes in England, Canada and Australia; and, 
secondly, it will highlight the main findings of the principal empirical studies carried 
out in recent years in the UK and, in one instance, in Australia. In each section, I will 
briefly explain the relevance of the selected reform proposals, or highlighted elements 
of the empirical study, to my own study. This will allow the findings of my own 
empirical project to be contextualised against a broader backdrop of evidence. 
1.2 International reform processes 
1.2.1 England and Wales 
 
                                                        
117
 It goes without saying that legal traditions vary between jurisdictions, however lessons can still be 
learned with regard to the ways in which other jurisdictions approach universal questions relating to the 
human experience (love, family, obligation). 
118
 Relevant cultural norms might include a shared commitment to gender equality, a recognition of 
non-economic contributions to the accumulation of household wealth and a view of property as a 
source of retirement income, in part due to the recent boom in housing wealth. 
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Succession law reform was included in the Tenth Programme of Law Reform of the 
Law Commission for England and Wales (the Law Commission), at the request of 
both the Ministry of Justice and other stakeholders.
119
 The Law Commission began 
work on a review of the law relating to intestacy and family provision in 2008 and, in 
2011, published a report with recommendations and draft legislation (the 2011 
Report).
120
 The majority of the Commission’s recommendations were accepted and 
incorporated into the Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014.121 
 
Many of the English reforms are beyond the scope of this thesis but significant 
overlap nonetheless exists between the questions examined in England and those 
addressed in Scotland. Most obviously, the spouse’s entitlement emerged as the 
“principal focus” of the debate in England and Wales,122 as it has in Scotland. This 
was unsurprising as it had been a long-standing and controversial area of reform. In 
1989 the Law Commission published a report making two major recommendations, 
one of which was that the surviving spouse of an intestate should receive the entire 
estate.
123
 However, in much the same way as the SLC’s 1990 recommendations on 
spouses were not enacted, the Law Commission’s 1989 recommendation on surviving 
spouses equally failed to pass legislative muster. The Law Commission was clear that 
this was due to concern that children of the deceased, “particularly those from a 
relationship other than the marriage to the surviving spouse” would be prejudiced.124 
Consequently, the Law Commission identified complex families as a key area for 
examination in its 2011 Report.
125
 
 
As part of the reform process the Law Commission sought to investigate public 
attitudes towards intestacy and family provision. Cognisant of the lack of “up-to-date, 
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 The Law Commission, Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on Death (Consultation Paper No 
191, 2008) at para 1.11, henceforth Consultation Paper 191.  
120
 The Law Commission, Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on Death (Law Com No 331, 2011) 
at para 1.6. 
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and Zimmermann, R. (eds), Comparative Succession Law, Volume II: Intestate Succession (Oxford 
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statistically significant” evidence,126 the Law Commission asked the National Centre 
for Social Research (NatCen) to carry out a large-scale public opinion research 
project.
127
 The project was conducted under the leadership of Professor Gillian 
Douglas (Cardiff University) and Alun Humphrey of NatCen.
128
 The Commission 
“attached great importance” to the empirical data although did not “invariably” regard 
it as “determinative of policy.”129 This is entirely understandable, as the intricacies of 
succession legislation cannot simply be decided by opinion poll. However, the 
resulting legislation has been met with some criticism as, rather than addressing 
concerns raised in the NatCen study (and several other studies), it has arguably moved 
England’s legal position even further out of step with public opinion than was 
originally the case.
130
 
 
Prior to the reform, English law provided that, in cases of intestacy where the 
deceased left issue, the spouse was entitled to a statutory legacy of £250,000 and a life 
interest in half of the remainder of the estate.
131
 Under the 2014 provisions, however, 
the spouse takes half of the balance absolutely, rather than for life.
132
 Although such a 
move may have little practical consequence—as in most cases of intestacy since the 
1925 reforms a surviving spouse has inherited the whole estate
133—this small change 
nonetheless moves the English legislative framework even closer to a “spouse takes 
all” model. It is a surprising shift given that one of the clearest messages to emerge 
from the NatCen study was that provision should be made for the deceased’s children, 
particularly where the surviving spouse is not their other parent.
134
 Beyond the Law 
Commission’s commitment to simplicity,135 little explanation is given as to why no 
attempt was made to find a more satisfactory solution to a question that has plagued 
law reformers for over 25 years. 
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 Ibid at para 1.32. 
127
 Humphrey et al. (2010), henceforth the NatCen study. 
128
 Ibid at para 1.33. 
129
 Ibid at para 1.34. 
130
 Kerridge (2015), 338. 
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 Administration of Estates Act 1925 s.46(1)(i)(2). 
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 Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014 s.1(1) and (2) amend s.46 of the 1925 Act to this effect. 
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 Kerridge (2015), 333. This is because most estates are worth less than the statutory legacy. Indeed, 
fewer than 2% of intestate estates exceed the value of the higher level of statutory legacy (Law Com 
No 331 at para 1.85). 
134
 NatCen study (2010), 83. 
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 2011 Report at para 1.86. 
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Resistance to providing for the deceased’s children may, in part, reside in the fear that 
to do so would be to support a reactionary world order. As Kerridge observed, “ever 
since 1925, ‘progress’ seems to have dictated that spouses should get more,”136 and, 
as “spouse” often appears to be understood as “wife,”137 spousal preference can 
readily be aligned with progressive feminist values. While the 1925 reforms were 
necessary to correct the vulnerable position in which the then law placed spouses, in 
an age where many spouses are equal financial partners—and where many people 
have more than one family—it is not clear why any move to bolster the child’s 
position should risk being automatically dismissed as “old-fashioned.”138 Beyond a 
desire to appear progressive, some commentators also posit that the spouse-centred 
approach may reflect a “subconscious desire by government” to keep property in the 
possession of the older generation as a means of ensuring people can fund their 
retirement and aged care.
139
 
 
Unlike Scots law, English law recognises “no rule of automatic succession or forced 
heirship.”140 However, the effects of unfettered testamentary freedom are tempered by 
allowing the court to modify a will
141
 if it is satisfied that reasonable financial 
provision has not been made for certain classes of individuals.
142
 The current rules are 
set down in the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (the 
1975 Act) and all children, including adult children, are among those entitled to make 
a claim.  
 
The limits of testamentary freedom and family obligation in English law have been 
the focus of considerable media and academic commentary in recent years due to a 
claim made under the 1975 Act that resulted in a decade-long legal battle.
143
 The facts 
of the case are well-known: Heather Ilott and her mother, Mrs. Jackson, had been 
estranged since 1978 when, aged 17, Heather left home to live with her boyfriend of 
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 Kerridge (2015), 333.  
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 See Intro, p21. 
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 Kerridge (2015), 335. 
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 Ibid, 340.  
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 Ilott v The Blue Cross and others [2017] UKSC 17 at para 1. 
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 Section 1 of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 also provides that the 
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whom Mrs. Jackson disapproved. Despite various attempts over the years, no 
reconciliation between mother and daughter was reached. As a result, when Mrs. 
Jackson wrote her last will in 2002 she made no provision for her daughter and 
instead bequeathed her estate, worth approximately £486,000 to charities with which 
she had no particular connection.
144
  
 
Mrs. Ilott, who lived in straitened circumstances, made an application for an order 
under section 2 of the 1975 Act and was awarded £50,000 by a District judge. Mrs. 
Ilott believed the award was too low and appealed the judge’s ruling. There followed 
a series of appeals and cross appeals
145
 and, in 2015, the Court of Appeal increased 
Mrs. Ilott’s award to approximately £163,000.146 In March 2017, however, the 
Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal’s decision and reinstated the original 
award.
147
 
 
The unanimous judgment, delivered by Lord Hughes, focused on the two errors of 
principle the Court of Appeal alleged the District judge had made.
148
 While the 
alleged errors do not relate to the themes at issue in this thesis, insofar as wills 
variation is not a feature of Scots law, the case undoubtedly raised “some profound 
questions”149 about family obligation and testamentary freedom. The Court of Appeal 
reflected on matters such as whether an estrangement should deprive a potential 
claimant of an award
150
 and whether testamentary freedom should take precedence 
over the needs of a claimant,
151
 while the Supreme Court asked, inter alia, whether it 
is in the public interest to provide family members with awards so that the burden of 
maintenance does not fall upon the state.
152
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These and other factors were raised by Lady Hale in her supplementary judgment 
where she lamented the “unsatisfactory state of the present law.”153 Pointing out that 
“a respectable case”154 could be made for at least three different outcomes under 
English law in Ilott, she expressed “regret” that the Law Commission had not 
considered some of the fundamental principles underlying such claims in its review of 
intestacy and family provision in English law.
155
 These principles will be considered 
in detail throughout this thesis. 
 
1.2.2 British Columbia, Canada 
 
Succession law in Canada is an area of provincial and territorial jurisdiction.
156
 In 
recent years, a number of Canadian provinces have undertaken succession law reform, 
but the unique approach adopted by British Columbia singles it out as worthy of 
attention. The British Columbia Law Institute (BCLI) initiated its Succession Law 
Reform Project in 2003, issuing its final report in 2006.
157
 Legislation was enacted in 
2009 and came into force in 2014.
158
 The Wills Estates and Succession Act (WESA) 
consolidated a “forest of statutes”159 and introduced both substantive and procedural 
reform.  
 
British Columbia adheres to the principle of testamentary freedom and no fixed share 
is reserved for spouses or children in testate succession. However, statutory 
provisions have long allowed certain parties to seek relief against a will. The family 
relief provisions in BC differ from the dependants’ relief statutes in force in most 
other provinces and territories in that they impose no restrictions on the ability of 
adult non-spousal claimants to apply for relief.
160
 Whereas most Canadian 
jurisdictions require an adult claimant other than a surviving spouse to demonstrate 
“an inability to be self-supporting due to illness or mental or physical disability”161 in 
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order to displace the terms of a will, no such requirement operates in BC. Instead, 
WESA (as did the Wills Variation Act before it)
162
 simply states that the court may 
order such provision as “it thinks adequate, just and equitable in the 
circumstances.”163 
 
In Tataryn v Tataryn Estate,
164
 the Supreme Court of Canada provided guidance on 
the factors that a court should consider when interpreting the “adequate, just and 
equitable” test. Tataryn will be discussed in some detail as it articulates a powerful 
conception of a deceased’s moral obligation to his surviving family members, the 
same obligation that, arguably, justifies the continued existence of a fixed legal share 
for children in Scotland.  
 
Alex and Mary Tataryn were married for 43 years and together amassed an estate 
valued at $315,254. The estate was held in Mr. Tataryn’s name at the time of his 
death. The couple had two children, John and Edward, but Mr. Tataryn had disliked 
John from the time he was six years of age. He did not wish to leave any of his estate 
to John and he feared that if he left any of his estate to his wife in her own right, she 
would pass it on to John on her death. Consequently, he granted his wife a liferent in 
the matrimonial home and made her the beneficiary of a discretionary trust. When she 
died everything in Mr. Tataryn’s estate was to pass to Edward. Upon his death, Mrs. 
Tataryn was shocked to discover that her husband had left everything to her son 
Edward and both she and the disinherited son, John, claimed against the estate under 
the Wills Variation Act. The case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
 
In delivering the judgment of the court, McLachlin J, as she then was, had no 
difficulty in explicitly rejecting an entirely needs-based approach to wills variation. 
Instead, the court held that both legal norms and “moral obligations” must be taken 
into consideration when determining what constitutes “adequate, just and equitable” 
provision in the circumstances of a particular case. The court ruled that the “first 
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consideration” in determining a wills variation case must be the legal responsibilities 
the testator incurred during his lifetime, as these obligations provide an “important 
indication of the content of the legal obligation to provide ‘adequate, just and 
equitable’ maintenance and support which is enforced after death.” Next, McLachlin J 
held, the court should turn to the testator’s moral duties towards his spouse and 
children. 
 
It is noteworthy that in this important ruling the Supreme Court of Canada displayed 
no wariness of broaching the potentially thorny question of moral obligation. This 
was not because the court was insensitive to differing conceptions of moral obligation 
in a pluralistic society, but because it held that the “uncertainty” as to society’s 
common understanding of this particular moral obligation was not “so great as has 
been sometimes thought.” Thus, the court readily concluded that “while the moral 
claim of independent adult children may be more tenuous” than the claim of a spouse 
or dependent child, some provision should be made for adult children “if the size of 
the estate permits and in the absence of circumstances which negate the existence of 
such an obligation.”165  
 
In spite of the court’s clear recognition of a parent’s moral duty, it also recognised the 
importance of “testamentary autonomy.” Indeed, it stated that any moral duty ascribed 
to the testator should be “assessed in the light of the deceased’s legitimate concerns.” 
Thus, although characterising Mr. Tataryn’s dislike of his son as “obsessional,” the 
court still showed some deference to his testamentary freedom by altering the will in 
such a way that his “favoured” son still received the larger share of the estate.  
 
Finally, it should also be noted that the biggest “winner” in the case was Mr. 
Tataryn’s wife. Both brothers were awarded an immediate gift of $10,000 and, upon 
Mrs. Tataryn’s death, (unequal) shares in a rental property. The remainder of the 
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estate was, rightly, granted outright to Mrs. Tataryn. This judgment illustrates that a 
deceased’s moral duty to his children can be recognised without undermining his 
equally important moral duty to his spouse. 
 
Despite the BC model’s “many defenders,”166  the British Columbia law reform 
process sought to bring dependants’ relief provisions into line with those in other 
provinces. The recommendation was, however, rejected and the “adequate, just and 
equitable” language was transposed from the Wills Variation Act and enshrined in 
section 60 of WESA. The House, sitting as a Committee of the Whole,
167
 adopted 
section 60 with no debate
168
 and no evidence of the controversy that surrounds the 
topic in the UK. 
 
In keeping with both the BCLI recommendations and trends in other jurisdictions, 
WESA also improved the position for spouses on intestacy. The new legislation 
increases the “preferential share,” applicable where the deceased leaves a spouse and 
issue, from $65,000 to $300,000
169
 and allows the spouse to take half of the balance 
of the estate,
170
 regardless of whether the deceased also has issue.
171
 The law 
reformers mitigated the effect of this increase—still modest compared to Scottish 
standards—on complex families by setting a lower preferential share for surviving 
spouses who are not also the other parent of the deceased’s children.172 What is 
striking about the British Columbia reform is that it did not appear to engender the 
angst that such a discussion has unleashed in the UK. The BCLI Report was clear that 
the objective of such a provision was to allow the law to reflect the “prevalence of 
mixed families”173 and plainly considered the judiciousness of such a suggestion to be 
self-evident. Parliament was equally unperturbed and the matter gave rise to only very 
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limited discussion, with no suggestion that the reform was unduly harsh for the 
surviving spouse.
174
  
1.2.3 Victoria, Australia 
 
As in Canada, succession law in Australia is a question of state and territorial 
competence. Nevertheless, in 1995
175
 the Uniform Succession Laws Project was 
launched to develop “common rules acceptable to all jurisdictions.”176 Thus far, only 
New South Wales (NSW) and Tasmania have implemented the reforms, although the 
rest of Australia is expected to follow.
177
 Victoria is the most recent state to have 
examined succession law, with the Attorney-General having mandated the Victorian 
Law Reform Commission (the Commission) to undertake a review of succession law 
in 2012.
178
 The Commission published its Report in 2013, recommending the 
adoption of many of the proposals set out by the National Committee for Uniform 
Succession Laws.  
 
Victoria instigated a review of its succession laws for familiar reasons: a desire to 
ensure that the law operated “in accordance with community expectations;”179 the 
need to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; and a wish to reflect socio-demographic 
changes.
180
 While the first socio-demographic factor cited—complex family 
structures—is mentioned in all of the studies under discussion in this chapter, the 
Commission also placed a second factor, longer life spans, front and centre of its 
Report. In doing so the Commission thrust the link between aged care, inheritance and 
family to the fore, rather than side-stepping it as the SLC and the Law Commission of 
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England and Wales have done. While no Law Commission report can examine all 
questions that potentially flow from succession law, the interplay between aged care 
and inheritance is increasingly evident and it is commendable that the Victorian Law 
Commission confronted it head on. 
 
The effect of increased longevity has an impact on both the bequeather and the 
potential beneficiary. With regard to the bequeather, the Commission addressed 
concerns about individuals becoming more vulnerable as they age and consequently at 
greater risk of being subject to undue influence from potential beneficiaries.
181
 This is 
a topic that was also raised both in the BCLI Report
182
 and by several participants in 
my research project.
183
 However, while it is worthy of further consideration, it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. With regard to potential beneficiaries, the 
Commission considered how inheritance is being “transformed from financial 
assistance that helps the children establish themselves in life into the guarantee of a 
financially secure retirement.”184 This in turn raises two questions: firstly, whether 
potential beneficiaries are relying on an anticipated inheritance instead of planning for 
retirement;
185
 and secondly, whether people have the right to conserve resources to 
provide for their children rather than using them to pay for care costs. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the Commission’s Report also addressed the question of spousal 
entitlement. Under the legislation in force at the time the Commission’s Report was 
written, the partner of an intestate who left a child (or other issue) was entitled to the 
whole of the intestate’s residuary estate if it was worth less than $100,000, and 
$100,000 plus one third of the balance where it was worth more than $100,000.
186
 The 
Commission recommended that the statutory legacy be raised to $350,000 
(approximately £197,000), an amount that is again significantly lower than the 
proposed threshold sum in Scotland.  
 
While the Victorian approach to the value of the statutory legacy conforms to that 
adopted in British Columbia, the Commission recommended an alternative approach 
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to distributing intestate estates in the context of complex families. Whereas British 
Columbia favoured a lower preferential share (statutory legacy) where the surviving 
spouse was not also the other parent of the deceased’s children, the Commission, 
following the recommendation of the National Committee for Uniform Succession 
Laws, recommended simply removing the children’s entitlement where the surviving 
spouse was the other parent of all of the deceased’s children. It was reasoned that this 
would avoid “unnecessary complexity, given that those children could expect to 
inherit from their other parent in later life.”187 In other words, although a different 
approach is adopted, Victoria, like British Columbia, did not hesitate to acknowledge 
that the deceased’s responsibilities vary depending on whether he is a member of one 
or more family units.  
 
The Report made two further recommendations that are of interest to this thesis. 
Firstly, the Commission recommended limiting the categories of next of kin who are 
entitled to inherit on intestacy.
188
 Under the legislation then in force, Victoria, like 
Scotland, imposed no limit on those who were entitled to inherit. Victoria was the 
only Australian state not to limit next of kin on intestacy and the Commission 
recommended bringing Victorian law on this matter into line with the rest of Australia 
by ending entitlement to inherit on intestacy at first cousins.
189
  
 
Finally, as in England and Wales, the Victorian model does not provide automatic 
entitlements for spouses or children in testate succession, relying instead on a form of 
dependants’ relief provisions. Prior to the reform process, the Victorian provisions 
were very generous and any person was able to apply for a court order to redistribute 
an estate in their favour.
190
  Although the Commission moved to restrict the categories 
of those eligible to seek variation of a will, it nonetheless included stepchildren as a 
category of eligible claimants in its proposed legislation.
191
 On this point, the 
Commission noted that “step-parents may also have a responsibility to provide for 
their stepchildren, where the relationship is akin to a parent-child relationship or 
where the step-parent’s estate was largely derived from the stepchild’s natural 
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parent.”192 Interestingly, another argument advanced in favour of including 
stepchildren as eligible family provision applicants was that it would encourage step-
parents to provide for their stepchildren so as to avoid litigation.
193
  
 
1.3 The Scottish Empirical Studies 
1.3.1 The Scottish Consumer Council Study 
 
The Scottish Consumer Council (SCC) carried out a comparatively small-scale study 
entitled “Wills and Awareness of Inheritance Rights in Scotland.”194 The study 
commissioned TSN system 3 to conduct the survey as part of an omnibus poll. A 
sample of 1009 adults was surveyed and the findings were published in 2006.
195
 The 
SCC was motivated to study the question due to concern that people were unaware of 
the unintended consequences of their decision not to make a will.
196
 The study 
therefore sought to test public knowledge of intestacy provisions with a view to 
providing a “useful baseline for future work in raising public awareness.”197 
Consequently, the questions were based not on what the law should do but on what it 
does do. The study did not seek to make policy suggestions but was nevertheless 
taken into consideration by the SLC in its deliberations.
198
 
 
The research focused primarily on cohabitants and the succession rights of children 
within non-traditional family structures. In relation to the latter group, the survey 
noted that only 50% of respondents knew that the stepchildren of a deceased person 
have fewer rights than their own children.
199
 It cited this as cause for particular 
concern as three-quarters of respondents with children in their household were found 
not have a will.
200
 While making no recommendation, the SCC points out that “in the 
increasingly common situation where a cohabiting couple live with children who are 
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the stepchildren of one or both partners” the lack of will could make the situation for 
the surviving partner even more difficult.
201
  
1.3.2 The 2005 Succession Opinion Survey 
 
The most important study for the purposes of the current Scottish reform process was 
undoubtedly the 2005 Omnibus Survey commissioned on behalf of the Scottish Law 
Commission
202
 (the 2005 Survey). The study was quantitative in nature and 
comprised 1008 interviews with a representative sample of the Scottish population.
203
 
While the overarching aim of the survey was to “explore attitudes among Scottish 
adults towards the law of succession,” two specific goals were identified.204 Firstly, 
the researchers sought to “test the level of public agreement” with the SLC’s 1990 
recommendations; and, secondly they looked to explore attitudes on three key 
questions, namely intestacy, protection from disinheritance and cohabiting couples.
205
 
Given the scope of this thesis, only the questions relating to disinheritance and 
intestacy will be considered in this section, beginning with those relating to intestacy. 
 
Participants were asked five questions relating to intestacy and, while the questions 
are not inherently without merit, they almost entirely disregarded the thorny topic of 
competition between first families and second families, focusing instead on division 
between a surviving parent and their children. This is regrettable as it is well 
established that a parent inheriting ahead of his own children rarely engenders conflict 
due to the “reasonable expectation” of the children that they will inherit when the 
second parent dies.
206
 Nevertheless, the researchers stuck steadfastly to the nuclear 
family stereotype when exploring competition between spouses and children. 
Question two asked participants whether they agreed that the spouse should receive 
everything (and the children nothing) no matter how large the estate, and question 
three asked whether the children should receive a half-share of any amount over the 
threshold sum.
207
 Forty-six percent agreed with the first statement
208
 while sixty-
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seven percent agreed with the second statement.
209
 Thus, even in the traditional 
family context—despite strong support for the spouse—the participants wanted the 
children to be recognised in some way. It is difficult to conceive that this preference 
would be anything but stronger were the surviving spouse not the parent of the 
deceased’s children, but this important question went unexamined.   
 
At first blush, questions four and five, which focus on stepchildren, engaged with 
complex families. However, on closer examination, it is evident that the researchers 
again failed to focus on the first family/second family dynamic. In question four, 
participants were simply asked if the stepchildren should receive anything from the 
estate of a stepfather who, it would appear, had no other surviving family members.
210
 
Even question five, which asked whether a stepfather should treat his stepchild in “the 
same way” as his “own” children,211 arguably addressed the principle of equal 
treatment between siblings as much as the dynamic between first families and second 
families. The difficulty of generating meaningful data from such blunt questions on 
stepfamilies was recognised by the SLC. In its analysis of the findings, it 
acknowledged that participants might have had in mind a situation where a child had 
been raised by a step-parent since infancy.
212
 This is of course a legitimate avenue to 
explore, but without also considering those cases where the stepchild and step-parent 
have no relationship, it provides only very partial insight into attitudes towards 
stepchildren’s entitlement. 
 
The remaining question on intestacy addressed the surviving spouse’s entitlement to 
inherit everything where there are no children.
213
 The spouse’s entitlement to the 
whole estate in such cases is generally non-contentious and it was therefore 
unsurprising that 88% of respondents supported this proposition.
214
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The second group of questions in the 2005 Survey focused on disinheritance in testate 
succession. The questions invited participants to evaluate the relative importance of 
testamentary freedom versus family obligation. Once again, however, the researchers 
skirted the issue of first families and second families, preferring to concentrate on 
scenarios that placed the disappointed beneficiary in competition with charities. This 
seems unusual as studies suggest that only around 6% of Britons make a bequest of 
any size to charity, with some figures suggesting that this figure may be lower for 
Scotland.
215
 Furthermore, making a donation to charity does not mean that the charity 
is taking the whole estate; indeed, the median gift made by charitable bequest is 
£1000.
216
 As such, it would seem that the disappointed beneficiary is more likely to 
be in competition with a surviving spouse or another child than with a charity. It is 
unclear why the researchers chose this focus as it distracted from more contentious 
questions, such as situations where a child is excluded from a will at the expense of a 
second spouse. 
 
Nevertheless, four of the seven questions on disinheritance involved asking 
participants whether certain individuals should be entitled to displace the terms of a 
will bequeathing the deceased’s entire estate to charity. The researchers identified the 
woman’s husband, dependent children, adult children and young stepchildren as 
potential challengers.
217
 In all instances, the majority agreed that the surviving family 
members should be entitled to make a claim, although in all cases a minority believed 
that testamentary freedom reigned supreme.
218
 Overall, it is clear that the concept of 
automatic entitlements did not appear to perturb the participants, a point that the SLC 
clearly recognises:
219
 
 
The public attitudes surveys in 1979, 1986 and 2005 have consistently shown 
strong support for providing some protection from disinheritance for the 
deceased’s surviving spouse and children. Even where the deceased leave’s 
the whole estate to a surviving spouse, a substantial proportion…still thought 
that any children should be entitled to claim a share. 
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This raises questions as to why the SLC then chose to favour a model that will, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, effectively prevent children from claiming a share of 
their parent’s estate. 
 
Of the three remaining questions, one addressed the “duty” of the testator to treat his 
children equally.
220
 This important question generated extensive discussion in my 
discussion groups and will be explored in Chapter 4. A further question addressed the 
duty of the stepmother to treat her stepchildren as she would her “own” children,221 
while the last question placed the children in competition with their other parent.
222
 
These questions were also addressed in the series of questions on intestacy and the 
same conclusions can be drawn: the public displays strong support for stepchildren
223
 
and, even in a nuclear family context, there is support for the children being able to 
make a claim on the deceased parent’s estate.224 Thus, in general, the participants did 
not appear unduly attached to unfettered testamentary freedom and displayed 
considerable comfort with allowing the disappointed beneficiary to make a claim.  
 
In summary, the 2005 Survey provides some useful general data on attitudes towards 
inheritance in Scotland but its value is undermined by its failure to explore the 
complex question of first families and second families. Furthermore, despite having 
had the survey commissioned, the SLC appeared to disregard it almost entirely. While 
the questions on intestacy undoubtedly revealed high levels of support for the spouse, 
they also clearly demonstrated considerable support for the children. The SLC 
intestacy proposals, however, did not reflect this latter finding. A similar observation 
can be made with regard to the data on disinheritance. Although the public supports 
entitlements for spouses and all children in testate succession, only spouses are 
provided with a meaningful entitlement under the reform proposals. 
1.3.3 The 1986 Survey 
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It should be noted that, as part of the current review process, the SLC also relied on 
the opinion survey it commissioned from System Three Scotland in 1986. The survey 
sample was almost identical in size to that used in the 2005 Survey and was again 
representative of the Scottish public.
225
 The survey was also similar in structure in 
that a series of questions on intestacy was followed by a series of questions on 
disinheritance. However, although the 1986 Survey was also quantitative in nature, it 
was far more nuanced than its 2005 successor. For example, the participants were 
invited to consider whether their views on the respective parties’ entitlement would 
change depending on the deceased’s wealth.226 Furthermore, they were presented with 
various options for splitting the estate – entirely to his wife, mainly to his wife, half to 
his wife etc.
227—as opposed to simply being asked whether various family members 
should be allowed to receive “something”228 or a non-specified “fixed” amount.229 
 
Most importantly, the 1986 Survey also considered the possibility of a second 
marriage and concluded that it had “a considerable bearing on attitudes.”230 Although 
the second spouse was “still seen as the major beneficiary,”231 there was recognition 
that the deceased owed a duty to more than one family unit in such circumstances. It 
is unclear why this line of enquiry was not maintained in the 2005 Survey.  
 
Finally, although the SLC commissioned the 1986 Survey because it believed public 
opinion on the matter to be of the “greatest importance” given that succession law 
“affects every member of the community,”232 the research findings were not fully 
reflected in either the 1990 Report or the 2009 Report. While the 1990 
recommendations may be slightly more in line with public opinion insofar as the 
threshold sum was set at a lower level,
233
 the direction of change was set and the 
supremacy of the spouse confirmed. 
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1.4 Empirical studies in other jurisdictions 
 
In stark contrast to Scotland, England has provided a rich seam of studies evaluating 
public attitudes towards inheritance. In the last 15 years three major studies have been 
conducted, all of which will be referenced frequently in this thesis. This section will 
also provide an overview of the Australian study that features prominently in the 
thesis. 
1.4.1 Finch and Mason 
 
Finch and Mason undertook an inheritance project in the 1990s with a view to 
discovering how inheritance was handled in “ordinary” families. For the purposes of 
the study, the term “ordinary families” was applied broadly to include all families 
who had “not owned considerable wealth or land over several generations.”234 The 
study comprised three elements: the analysis of a randomly selected sample of 800 
probated wills; a set of 88 in-depth interviews with 98 people; and, a set of 30 semi-
structured interviews with solicitors and other professionals.
235
 The detailed findings 
of this important study will be explored in detail where relevant to my research. 
However, some general observations bear consideration at this juncture in order to 
provide an overview of the themes that will be discussed in subsequent chapters.  
 
Firstly, the researchers characterised the English system as one that privileges 
testamentary freedom, with restrictions being said to operate “very much at the 
margins of the system.”236 While the contention that the provisions of the Inheritance 
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 operate at the margins of the system 
can be questioned,
237
 the English system of testate succession is certainly different 
from the Scottish system in that it does not include automatic status-based 
entitlements. The question of the relative entitlements of children and spouses (one of 
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the questions at the heart of the SLC reform process)
238
 therefore relates primarily to 
intestate succession in the English legal context.
239
 Finch and Mason’s study, 
however, related primarily to testate succession. Nevertheless, although the study set 
out to determine inheritance practices in the context of will-making, it revealed a 
great deal not only about what people do, but also about what they feel ought to 
happen. Indeed, Finch and Mason used “the concept of narrative as a methodological 
and analytical device…to communicate accounts and scenarios that people recognize 
and, most notably, that they fear.”240 As the narratives primarily focused on scenarios 
participants actively sought to avoid, they did not represent “an empirical and 
generalisable reality of kinship,” but, rather, provided powerful insight into “people’s 
practices and moral reasoning.”241 Thus, the study provided a wealth of information 
as to people’s views on obligation between family members and, in doing so, 
illuminated our understanding of both testate and intestate succession.
242
 
 
The purpose of the study was not to evaluate options for legislative reform but, rather, 
to consider inheritance as a means both of studying and constituting kinship.
243
 Thus, 
the researchers concentrated on personal relationships and the way in which 
individuals use inheritance as a means of confirming these relationships. Regarding 
the parent-child relationship, the researchers made several key findings: firstly, 
inheritance practices which recognise the parent-child relationship (and indeed other 
relationships) are “relationally” more than materially driven;244 secondly, inheritance 
itself is viewed as a form of parenting, and “good parenting” practice in this context 
involves both the equal treatment of all children
245
 and reconfirming the relationship 
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at the end of the parent’s life;246 and, finally, while English kinship is, in general, 
highly flexible,  it is shot through by a “core thread of fixity” in the form of the 
continuing relationship between parents and children.
247
  
 
The study placed a particular emphasis on complex families and the empirical study 
began with a detailed case study of inheritance in such families. Complex families 
were held to be those with a history of “divorce, cohabitation following divorce, 
remarriage, step-relationships or a combination of these experiences.”248 The 
researchers found that, while it was clear that a spouse had to be provided for ahead of 
adult children,
249
 first and second marriages were viewed as “not quite equivalent” for 
inheritance purposes, with the second spouse’s claims on resources flowing from the 
previous marriage regarded as “somewhat ambiguous.”250 Thus, even in complex 
families, despite the legitimate claims of the second spouse, the parent-child 
relationship remained both “predictable and privileged”251 in relation to 
inheritance.
252
 
1.4.2 The NatCen Study 
 
The Law Commission of England and Wales commissioned the NatCen study as part 
of its law reform process
253
 with a view to gaining an understanding both of the range 
of views held by the public and the reasons behind them.
254
 Interestingly, the decision 
to mandate a study appears to have been motivated, at least in part, by the SLC’s 
earlier decision to conduct attitudinal research as part of its review of succession 
law.
255
 Clearly, however, the NatCen study raised the bar and proved to be far more 
comprehensive than the Scottish 2005 Survey. 
 
Unlike the 2005 Survey, which paid only scant attention to complex families, the 
NatCen study established the exploration of different attitudes between different 
                                                        
246
 Ibid, 59. 
247
 Ibid.  
248
 Ibid, 25. 
249
 Ibid, 31.  
250
 Ibid, 37. 
251
 Ibid, 59. 
252
 Finally, the researchers also carried out a case study to explore questions of ownership, in particular 
as they relate to financing old age.  
253
 2011 Report at para 1.31. 
254
 Ibid at para 1.32. 
255
 Consultation Paper 191 at para 1.43.  
 51 
groups—“particularly those with children from more than one relationship, step-
parents and cohabitants”—as one of its two overarching objectives from the outset.256 
The study comprised an initial quantitative survey followed by 30 in-depth qualitative 
interviews with people who had taken part in the survey.
257
 Like its Scottish 
counterpart, the survey was carried out as part of an omnibus survey, although the 
NatCen model then used a second wave of questions to boost the number of 
respondents in certain key groups. Consistent with the study’s stated aims, the second 
wave of questions focused, inter alia, on those who had children from a previous 
relationship, and those who had parents who had re-partnered.
258
  
 
The researchers found that attitudes towards entitlement in inheritance and intestacy 
were “largely framed by the bilateral relationship between the deceased and a 
potential beneficiary,” a relationship participants evaluated both on objective 
properties (type of relationship e.g. spouse) and subjective properties (e.g. emotional 
closeness).
259
 However, while the bilateral relationship was the cornerstone of the 
analysis framework used by the NatCen researchers, they also identified a number of 
non-relationship principles central to understanding how people viewed the relative 
entitlement of potential beneficiaries. These principles were categorised into four 
groups: responsibilities and expectations; definitions of fairness; practicalities; and 
personal autonomy.
260
 All four principles were also evident in my research project 
and will be central themes in all of the data analysis chapters.  
 
Crucially, in the NatCen study, as in my study, the views expressed were often in 
conflict with one another. For example, participants generally voiced support for the 
principle of personal autonomy, yet many retreated considerably from this principle 
when they believed the individual was exercising his autonomy unfairly.
261
 The lack 
of a single, consistent view—although unsurprising—is one of the reasons that the 
merits of the absolutist traditions of the current legislative framework (and of the 
proposed reforms) are not always self-evident. In some instances, a degree of 
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flexibility may allow the law to better meet public expectation, although this must 
always be balanced against the need for certainty. 
 
While the Finch and Mason study focused on attitudes to inheritance with a view to 
understanding kin relations, the NatCen study analysed attitudes to inheritance with a 
view to informing a reform process. Nonetheless, there was extensive commonality 
between the findings of the two studies, particularly with regard to complex families. 
Like Finch and Mason, the NatCen study also suggested that the claims of first 
spouses and second spouses were not equivalent (at least where the earlier 
relationship produced children). In cases where the surviving spouse was not also the 
other parent of the deceased’s adult children, only 15% of participants in the NatCen 
study stated that the surviving spouse should receive the entire estate,
262
 compared to 
51% for first spouses.
263
  Here too, however, the data in no way constituted a rejection 
of the second spouse receiving some, or indeed the majority of the estate, simply that 
some provision also had to be made for the first family, as represented by the issue.  
 
The unease expressed at the prospect of the second spouse inheriting the entire estate 
relates to another key finding: namely that where respondents with children had made 
their spouse the main beneficiary of their estate, it was usually assumed that the estate 
would eventually pass to the children.
264
 However, this belief was only held in 
situations where the surviving spouse was also the other parent of the deceased’s 
children. Where this was not the case, it was found that the second spouse could not 
be trusted to provide for the children and that separate provision was needed.
265
 It is 
exactly this concern that underpins the intestate models in jurisdictions such as British 
Columbia and Australia, as discussed above. 
 
While the NatCen survey did not address attitudes towards stepchildren, the question 
was raised by participants in the qualitative section.
266
 The attitudes expressed by the 
participants were unsurprising insofar as they were consistent with those expressed in 
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other studies: participants often distinguished stepchildren from a deceased’s own 
children, but it did not always follow that they wanted stepchildren to be excluded 
from any inheritance.
267
 Instead, participants tended to determine entitlement based 
on a series of factors such as whether the stepchild had been treated as part of the 
family unit.
268
  
 
Overall, the NatCen study found that inheritance was still centred on a narrow nuclear 
family model consisting of spouse and partner, children, parents, siblings and 
grandchildren.
269
 In this the study echoes Finch and Mason’s finding that the 
“inheritance” family is anchored in partnership and parenthood.270 The NatCen 
researchers were clear, however, that this nuclear family model is not necessarily 
predicated on a permanent relationship through an unbroken marriage between 
heterosexuals.
271
 The partners in the new family may be cohabitants or same-sex 
spouses, and one or both may have children from a previous relationship who may or 
may not live with the new family unit. Thus, while the researchers concluded that 
there was strong public support for law reform to address new family models, they 
argued that the new legislative framework should also ensure that the interests of 
children from the deceased’s current and former relationships should be recognised by 
the intestacy rules. Furthermore, the participants based their support for children’s 
entitlement on the close bond between parents and their children, as opposed to need, 
and made little distinction between young children and adult children.
272
 It is again 
worth noting that these findings in no way undermine the importance accorded to the 
spousal relationship, and the participants’ concerns cannot be interpreted as a call to 
favour the children at the expense of the spouse. 
1.4.3. The Rowntree study 
 
The third of the major English studies was commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation to address a perceived gap in knowledge as to public attitudes to 
inheritance.
273
 The study, which contained both quantitative and qualitative elements, 
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was conducted by Karen Rowlingson and Stephen McKay. The quantitative study 
was the centrepiece of the project and comprised 2008 interviews, 1066 based on 
random sampling and 942 based on quota sampling. This was followed by four focus 
groups with owner-occupiers.
274
 Unlike the previous two studies, the primary aim of 
this study was to address questions of economic policy, particularly with regard to 
asset accumulation and use in later life.
275
 Nevertheless, in asking how people 
planned to use their assets in later life, the researchers also generated important data 
on intergenerational solidarity, kinship and parenthood. 
 
The Rowntree study also provided insight into attitudinal differences based on age. 
The researchers found that “support for the concept of inheritance appears to be at a 
modest level among those aged 18-29” and at its lowest level for those in their fifties 
and sixties.
276
 Support for inheritance reached its peak level among those aged 80 or 
more. The researchers posited that this could be attributed to “an ageing effect”277 
which impacts on support for the notion of intergenerational solidarity. In essence, 
both young people and those who have young children tend to support 
intergenerational solidarity because they identify strongly either as a parent or a child; 
however, as people reach their fifties, their minds turn to their own retirement and 
they focus on the money they will need to maintain their own standard of living. Once 
they reach their seventies and eighties, and perhaps become closer to their families 
through grandparenthood or receiving care, a “resurgence of support for 
intergenerational solidarity” can be detected.278  
 
The researchers also found that those aged 45 and over who had not had children 
scored lowest both on their attitudes to intergenerational solidarity and on whether 
they would like to leave money behind.
279
 This is cited not to suggest that those who 
do not have children are inherently selfish, but rather to suggest that inheritance 
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appears to be “more important to those who have children”280 perhaps because, as 
Finch and Mason suggest, it is seen as an act of parenting.
281
 
 
Given the stated intention to explore the use of assets in later life, it is unsurprising 
that the study addressed the question of the state’s right to an older person’s assets, a 
question that is explored in this thesis.  
1.4.4 The AHURI study 
 
As mentioned previously, Scotland is not alone in facing socio-demographic shifts 
and, consequently, several other jurisdictions are also looking to reform both their 
succession laws and the way in which they fund elder care. Conscious that older 
people may need to use their housing assets to fund retirement, the Australian federal, 
state and territorial governments funded a study into intergenerational and 
intrafamilial housing transfers and shifts in later life. The study focused on two main 
questions: firstly, the experiences of mid-life and later-age Australians with regard to 
present housing tenure and future housing intentions, including the intergenerational 
transfer of assets; and, secondly, how older Australians expect those transfers to affect 
the economic and social circumstances of younger family members.
282
 The study 
comprised both quantitative and qualitative components, with a national survey of 
almost 7000 Australians being followed by eight focus groups and two internet chat 
room discussions.
283
 
 
The study explores family obligation in a nuclear family context. That is to say, while 
many of the participants may have been part of complex families, the study focused 
on participants’ sense of duty towards their children and grandchildren, as opposed to 
their relative sense of duty towards stepchildren or second partner’s children. In other 
words, the study placed the older adult in competition with both adult children and the 
state and did not directly consider competition between first families and second 
families. Nevertheless, the qualitative study revealed both high levels of hostility 
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between children of first families and second families and the expectation that the 
hostility would result in conflict over inheritance.
284
 
 
Despite setting out to address economic policy concerns, the study generated a 
significant amount of data about the parent-child relationship and the findings were at 
times surprising. In particular, the researchers were surprised at the high levels of 
hostility expressed by parents towards their children.
285
 The prospect of living with 
children in an intergenerational setting was almost universally viewed in a negative 
light and resentment and disappointment appeared to be the hallmark of many 
relationships.
286
 However, several factors may be at play: firstly, the study was not 
randomised and so those with a “story to tell” may have been more inclined to 
participate; and, secondly, vilifying their children may have been a means for 
participants to assuage their own guilt at not being able to leave an inheritance, an act 
that has long been considered to be “the done thing” in Australia.287 In particular, 
however, the anger seems directed at profligate baby boomers, as opposed to children 
in general.
288
 Indeed, while older Australians felt that their baby-boomer children 
were undeserving, they felt quite differently about their generation X or Y 
grandchildren.
289
  
 
Furthermore, regardless of the surprise outpouring of resentment, the researchers were 
careful to stress that a significant number of older adults (36%) had nonetheless 
provided their children and other younger family members with financial assistance to 
purchase a home,
290
 while most said they would like to leave something to their 
children.
291
 Finally, as in the Rowntree study, the presence of children was a factor 
that influenced people’s desire to pass on,292 again speaking to the role of inheritance 
in confirming the parent-child relationship. 
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1.5 Conclusion  
 
First and foremost, forced heirship provisions
293
 and the rules of intestate succession 
provide a system for distributing a deceased person’s estate. However, beyond this 
essential practical function, succession law also communicates an important symbolic 
message as to who “counts” in a person’s family. There is no question that socio-
demographic change can influence societal expectations as to whom the deceased 
owes an obligation upon death: as will be discussed in Chapter 6, adopted children 
and illegitimate children were not considered to be “rightful” recipients of their 
parents’ estate until relatively recently.294 Similarly, prior to 2006, a cohabitant had no 
recourse where his partner had not provided for him in her will.
295
 Recent years have 
seen social change continue and different family models gain increasing social 
acceptability and support. The question with which this thesis is seized, however, is 
whether the SLCs proposed changes can be justified by these societal changes. In 
short, have attitudes as to whom the deceased owes an obligation changed in recent 
years?  
 
As has been demonstrated, the Scottish attitudinal research failed to engage 
meaningfully with this question, in particular with regard to complex families, and 
attention was therefore turned to studies undertaken in England and Wales and, in one 
instance, Australia. Although England and Scotland (and Australia) may have 
different legal traditions, the studies spoke not to the specificities of the legal regimes, 
but to narratives of love, family, obligation and expectation. Given the shared cultural 
history of the three jurisdictions, it was expected that there would be considerable 
overlap between the attitudes and values revealed in these studies and those revealed 
in my own research. 
 
All four studies showed that, where resources allowed, people expected both to leave 
a bequest to their children and to receive an inheritance from their parents. In 
particular, the NatCen study and Finch and Mason’s study showed that, although 
primacy was accorded to the spouse in terms of entitlement to the estate, the parent-
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child relationship remained the “core thread of fixity” in the context of inheritance. 
While Finch and Mason attributed this primarily to “flexible” kinship and choice,296 
the NatCen researchers placed greater emphasis on obligation and “the sense of 
responsibility to one’s partner and one’s descendents” that persisted despite “changes 
in social attitudes and cultural practices.”297  
 
Additionally, while providing useful insight on kin relationships, the AHURI study 
and the Rowntree study provided particularly valuable information on attitudes 
towards assets, highlighting that housing is considered by many to be a source of 
pension funding and autonomy. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, this 
autonomy is perceived by some to be “threatened” by the spectre of paying for elder 
care. This in turn raises questions as to whether people have the right to maintain 
assets for a bequest and, if so, in what circumstances. 
 
While my own findings were not quantitative, and therefore cannot provide any 
statistical information as to the prevalence of the views expressed, they are bolstered 
by the similarities they share with the more extensive English studies, in particular the 
NatCen study. They are also bolstered by the SLC’s own acknowledgement that both 
the 1986 survey and the 2005 survey showed “strong support” for children receiving a 
share of their parent’s estate,298 a finding the SLC then largely disregarded.  
 
Over the course of this thesis, the findings of my research will be analysed and 
situated against the backdrop of other studies to build a clearer picture of public 
attitudes to inheritance and family obligation, with a particular emphasis on how 
individuals chart these responsibilities in complex families. It will conclude that the 
contemporary understanding of family remains “rooted in partnership and 
parenthood” and, equally importantly, that this understanding is “grounded in 
love.”299 As such, it will argue that there appears to be little justification to move 
towards a needs-based system that almost entirely obliterates the enduring parent-
child relationship from the inheritance landscape. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the SLC has commissioned two opinion surveys on 
succession law since 1986. Both were commissioned with a view to determining 
public opinion before issuing recommendations for reform. While they yielded some 
useful data, their potential was dulled by opportunities lost. In particular, the 2005 
Survey failed to address succession issues flowing from the contemporary socio-
demographic reality that has witnessed an increase both in the number of 
stepfamilies
300
 and in serial monogamy.
301
 In this, the 2005 Survey stands in stark 
contrast to the NatCen study
302
 commissioned by the Law Commission of England 
and Wales as part of its reform process.
303
 
 
The differences between the 2005 Survey and the NatCen study relate both to scope 
and to methodology. The NatCen study was clearly far more comprehensive, covering 
a broader base of issues.
304
 Its breadth was attributable at least in part to a different 
approach to research design and methodology: not only did the NatCen study include 
both qualitative and quantitative elements, but it was conducted in partnership with 
academic subject experts. The resulting research findings were, unsurprisingly, far 
more targeted and nuanced than those generated by the 2005 Survey. 
 
The 2005 Survey involved interviewing 1008 people,
305
 while the NatCen researchers 
interviewed 1556 people.
306
 Although the 2005 Survey interviewed a proportionately 
higher number of people, it is the absolute size of a sample, not its relative size, that is 
important and so the larger English sample is actually more precise for its particular 
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sample population.
307
 Furthermore, the questions in the NatCen study contained more 
variables—and offered participants more options to choose from—than did those in 
the Scottish survey. This greater degree of nuance is important as it is precisely the 
lack of “detail in the questions” and “differentiation in the range of responses” that 
have led some to question whether the 2005 Survey offers a reliable gauge of public 
opinion.
308
 
 
Perhaps the most important difference is that the NatCen study included a qualitative 
component, involving 30 in-depth interviews with people who had taken part in the 
omnibus survey. The questions in the qualitative component were not pre-set but were 
instead based on a topic guide to allow the questioning “to be responsive to the 
participants’ own contributions.”309 As well as giving the participants the opportunity 
to reflect fully on their experiences in relation to the core themes, this also allowed 
them to broaden the scope of the debate, exploring unanticipated but connected 
questions.
310
 Inspired by the success of this approach, and conscious that “some 
important questions”311 remained unanswered in Scotland, I felt that further research 
could make a valuable contribution to the debate and for that reason designed and 
implemented my own study. 
2.2 Research Design 
 
Research design “provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data” and, 
in turn, the choice of research design reflects the importance attached to the various 
dimensions of the research project.
312
 Not all research projects can be neatly pigeon-
holed into a specific category but, as I was interested in “patterns of association”313 
and “understanding behaviour in a specific social context,”314 key features of cross-
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sectional and case study design respectively,
315
 my approach anchored me firmly in 
these two frameworks.  
 
Bryman defines cross-sectional research design as follows:316 
 
A cross-sectional design entails the collection of data on more than one case 
(usually quite a lot more than one) and at a single point in time in order to 
collect a body of quantitative or quantifiable data in connection with two or 
more variables (usually many more than two), which are then examined to 
detect patterns of association. 
 
While cross-sectional design is most commonly associated with quantitative research, 
it has its place in the qualitative methodologies I planned on using. In keeping with 
Bryman’s definition, I planned to interview quite a large number of people at a single 
point in time and, by asking people to consider their past and current behaviour (who 
they had provided for in their will, who they would provide for etc.), as well as their 
current views on a range of issues, I would attempt to investigate “patterns of 
association.”317 Finally, although my study remains firmly qualitative in nature, there 
were elements that were quantifiable insofar as all participants were asked whether 
they agreed with a small number of central propositions. However, while the figures 
provide “an indication of preferences,”318 as with all qualitative research, they cannot 
be interpreted to be statistically representative. 
 
For its part, case study design entails “the detailed and intensive analysis of a single 
case,”319 although a case can be a single community as opposed to an individual. To a 
degree, Scotland could be considered a “case”: I was interested in Scotland as a 
“specific social context” and the fieldwork was undertaken in a single location insofar 
as it was undertaken in Scotland. However, to my mind, Scotland is not really “a 
focus of interest in its own right”320—that is to say my primary focus was not 
understanding Scottishness—and the case study design more properly came into play 
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in the last wave of interviews where there was a focus on stepfamilies and first 
families/second families as a “specific social context.”321 
2.3 Research Methodology 
 
Having decided on the framework for the collection and analysis of data, I then had to 
determine which methodologies to use to gather the data. Based on the literature 
review, I had an interest in qualitative methods, but wanted to consider the merits of 
quantitative and mixed methods research before making a final decision. As 
aforementioned,
322
 two quantitative attitudinal studies have been carried out on 
inheritance in Scotland in recent years. The one most directly related to the SLC’s 
proposed reforms was the 2005 Survey. The Scottish Government explains an 
omnibus survey in the following terms:323 
 
An omnibus survey is a survey that is carried out at regular intervals (usually 
weekly or monthly) and allows a range of clients to buy questionnaire space. 
Subscribers to an omnibus survey buy in on the basis of how many questions 
are to be asked of the sample, and the type of questions. 
 
While omnibus surveys undoubtedly offer advantages in terms of cost-effectiveness 
and fast results, they are also associated with a number of shortcomings. Most 
notably, perhaps, the Scottish Government feels they are unsuitable for “complex 
questions,” instead requiring questions to be “simple, unambiguous and self-
explanatory.”324 As such, they are considered ideal for questions of “immediate policy 
interest” and for “question testing and piloting.”325 This makes the omnibus survey an 
unusual choice on which to base policy reform—at least where no supplementary 
research is conducted—and one which suffers in comparison to the more substantive 
work carried out in England and Wales. 
 
Of course, not all omnibus surveys are formulated in the same way and, as the NatCen 
study clearly demonstrated, they can also be used to elicit more nuanced responses. 
However, even when detailed, carefully planned questions are asked, the survey 
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format commonly used in quantitative research is not the ideal means to explore 
adequately the interplay between attitudes to inheritance and attitudes to family—and 
family financial responsibility—particularly within complex families. Furthermore, as 
existing quantitative work had already provided some valuable insights into potential 
areas of conflict, complementary qualitative work to further examine potential flash 
points—as opposed to more quantitative work confirming the flash points—seemed 
likely to generate more valuable research findings. Finally, as my primary intention 
was not so much to quantify numbers of people who purported to hold a certain belief 
as to explore the range of attitudes that existed, qualitative research was an obvious 
choice. 
 
Qualitative research can be carried out using a range of methodologies of which the 
interview is the most commonly employed.
326
 In turn, interviews can be carried out in 
numerous ways, one of which is the focus group, which I decided to use to gather 
most of the data.  As the term focus group is widely used in both academic literature 
and common parlance it is, in the interests of clarity, worth beginning with a 
definition of the term. Bryman defines a focus group in the following terms:327 
 
The focus group method is a form of group interview in which: there are 
several participants (in addition to the moderator/facilitator); there is an 
emphasis in the questioning on a particular fairly tightly defined topic; and the 
accent is upon interaction within the group and the joint construction of 
meaning. 
 
The idea of group interaction was considered important as it was anticipated that 
people were likely initially to perceive inheritance in fairly black and white terms. I 
hoped that the presence of other views and perspectives would both open up more 
nuanced dialogue and provide an indication of what were considered socially 
acceptable views. Focus groups, as opposed to a lengthy series of individual 
interviews, also offered a relatively time-efficient means of meeting with a large 
number of people with a view to identifying those whose narratives were most 
relevant to this thesis.  
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Despite the obvious benefits of focus groups, I also planned to conduct a small 
number of interviews in the course of the project. These interviews were conducted 
with a view to gathering further information (including expert opinion) and exploring 
emerging theories. As group interaction was to be recorded in the focus groups, the 
goal in the individual interviews was to record a detailed account of particular 
experiences. In the case of the individuals selected from the focus groups, it was 
hoped that the participants would be willing to share information that they had 
perhaps held back in a group setting. 
2.4 Target group 
 
Once I had decided to proceed with a combination of focus groups and interviews, I 
next had to identify the target demographic. As this study was to be carried out by one 
researcher as part of a PhD thesis—and could not, therefore, hope to be as exhaustive 
as the Rowntree
328
 and NatCen studies—it was very important to focus on 
interviewing people whose life experiences would likely resonate with the questions 
at stake. In other words, resources were not available to interview those who might 
have had relevant experiences but who were, at first blush, less likely to have had 
such experiences. 
 
The life experiences that are of particular interest to this study are, in no particular 
order: having received an inheritance; having written a will; having re-partnered; 
having had children; having provided for adult children; having owned property; 
having looked after elderly parents and having planned for retirement. Recent studies 
suggest that that only 4% of those aged between 16 and 24, and 14% of those aged 
between 25 and 34 have a will;
329
 that those under 30 are the least likely to have 
received an inheritance;
330
 that the average ages at which Scottish men and women 
become parents are 32.7 and 30.1 respectively;
331
 and, that the average age of first-
time buyers in Scotland is 30.
332
 In addition, it was assumed that those under 30 were 
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less likely to have provided for adult children, looked after elderly parents or planned 
for retirement. It was therefore decided to exclude people under 30 from the study and 
focus efforts and resources on those who were most likely to have encountered, or at 
least contemplated, these issues.  
 
Although the focus on middle-aged and older people mirrors the approach used in the 
Rowntree study,
333
 this decision was not made lightly, as it does not follow that those 
who have not personally encountered a given situation have nothing to contribute to a 
discussion on it. In particular, excluding this age group excluded the experiences of 
younger people whose parents had remarried. However, my concerns were largely 
allayed by the fact that those who were living in their thirties or forties as children of 
divorced parents may also have been children of divorced parents in their teens and 
twenties. Furthermore, it was also anticipated that, while age may be a factor in 
individuals’ attitudes to their parents’ re-partnering, attitudes may also change over 
the course of the parent or parents’ second relationship. In other words, the age of the 
adult child was very unlikely to be the sole factor in explaining attitudes or beliefs. 
Finally, as there was no reason to assume that adult children in their twenties were 
any more likely to have recently divorced parents than adult children in their thirties, 
there was no compelling reason to include younger adults. 
 
A second persuasive reason to focus on an older population was that the SLC’s study 
was fairly heavily weighted towards a younger population: 163 of the 1008 (16%) of 
those surveyed by MRUK were aged between 16 and 24 while 232 (23%) were aged 
between 25 and 34.
334
 This means that 395, or 39%, were aged under 35. While this is 
not necessarily problematic, it is noteworthy that the 16-24 age group was often cited 
as being slightly out of step with the prevailing view,
335
 something certain 
commentators plausibly attribute to views changing over the course of the lifecycle.
336
 
If indeed views do change over our life course, it makes sense to give particular 
consideration to the views expressed by people as they reach an age where they are 
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actually making decisions, based on these views, that are likely to have long-term 
consequences: at 35 people may theoretically consider one day transferring ownership 
of the family home to their children, at 65 they are more likely to actually do so. 
2.5 Recruitment 
2.5.1 Recruitment: phase 1 
 
It was anticipated that recruitment of subjects would not be without difficulty, as I had 
to ask participants to sacrifice between an hour and an hour and a half of their time 
(plus travel time) in exchange for nothing more than a cup of coffee. Although a small 
qualitative study could never hope to be representative of the population, I did strive 
to recruit people with different backgrounds and life experiences. In particular, given 
that inheritance can be perceived as an elitist topic, I was keen to involve participants 
from a lower socio-economic background. While the 2005 Survey, the Scottish 
Consumer Council survey and the NatCen study all use a variant of the NRS social 
grade system,
337
 which provides some insight into the socio-economic background of 
participants, this option was not available to me. I did not have the resources to study 
the stratification of the Scottish population and, due to time constraints and people’s 
sensibilities, I did not feel it was appropriate to ask a full gamut of questions to enable 
me to attempt to attribute a socio-economic category to each participant. 
Nevertheless, the biographical questionnaire that was distributed did contain two 
questions that allowed me to gain some limited insight into the participants’ economic 
status.
338
 Based on the information gathered from the first six groups, I felt that I 
needed to focus more on groups with a lower socio-economic status, and so I 
approached a group that I believed matched this criterion and asked them to 
participate. 
 
In an effort to attract a general cross-section of people, I initially tried to recruit 
strangers. I attempted to do this by posting advertisements in three local 
supermarkets—each reputed to target a different demographic—and a hospital. I also 
requested permission to post a recruitment advertisement in a local bowling club but 
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this was denied. This approach yielded absolutely no response and I therefore began 
to recruit using a form of snowball sampling: I made contact with a small number of 
individuals relevant to the research topic and used them to establish contact with 
others.
339
 Given that inheritance is an issue that will affect us all, it was not difficult to 
select individuals relevant to the research topic and, as mentioned above, my only 
restrictions were that they were Scottish
340
 and aged over 30. 
 
It was determined that between 30 and 35 people would be a useful—and realistic—
number of subjects and, to this end, I aimed for six focus groups of approximately six 
people.
341
 This number reflected both practical considerations, such as the limited 
resources of a doctoral project, and content-driven considerations, such as the point at 
which little new information is generated.
342
 In the end, I ran seven focus groups: 
group one comprised four people; group two comprised four people; group three 
comprised six people; group four comprised five people; group five comprised three 
people; group six comprised two people and group seven comprised seven people. 
This provided a total of 31 people. I did not seek to set up any further focus groups at 
this point as I felt that, borrowing Glaser and Strauss’ concept,343 theoretical 
saturation had been reached. No group was intended to have only two or three 
participants and the small groups all reflect last minute cancellations. However, on 
balance, the small groups proved every bit as fruitful as the larger groups, confirming 
the view that smaller groups are appropriate where the topics are controversial or 
complex and the aim is to glean personal accounts.
344
  
 
I also approached the recruitment process with the view that it would be preferable 
that the participants were not known to one another. I anticipated that people would 
be reticent both to talk about financial vulnerability and to reveal family tensions that 
could cast them, the narrator, in a poor light, and I expected that this hesitation would 
be heightened where the parties were known to each other. To my surprise, however, 
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the opposite proved to be true, with the least successful focus group being made up of 
participants who were strangers or mere acquaintances. That said, both the formal 
location of that meeting, a university reception room, as opposed to the cafes and 
living rooms where other meetings were held, and the fact that one of the participants 
was a law professor, may have been contributing factors. Nonetheless, where natural 
groupings occurred, participants did appear to be particularly forthcoming. 
2.5.2 Recruitment: phase 2 
 
From the outset, I planned to ask two or three participants to partake in follow-up 
interviews if I felt their personal experiences particularly resonated with the research 
questions. In the end, three were selected on this basis: one was remarried with both 
children and stepchildren, and also had both of her parents in a care home; one was a 
stepchild with several experiences of inheritance who had also cared for an elderly 
relative; and one was a father of young children. The father had no particular 
experience of inheritance but I included him for two reasons: firstly, although mothers 
of young children emerged as particularly strong proponents of affording a share of 
the estate to the children, I had virtually no data from fathers of young children; and, 
secondly, in his focus group, he voiced a view that was somewhat silenced by two 
very dominant voices espousing an alternative view.  
 
In addition, I completed four face-to-face interviews with participants who had not 
participated in focus groups. One of these was with an individual who had had to 
withdraw from a focus group at the last minute and who offered to be interviewed at 
another time, and the remaining three were with participants I sought out to boost 
certain categories. The reason that I did so was to develop an emerging theory relating 
to stepfamilies. This is an example of what Glaser and Strauss term theoretical 
sampling,
345
 a key component of grounded theory (discussed at 2.9 below). This is 
defined as “the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst 
jointly collects, codes and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next...in 
order to develop his theory as it emerges.”346 As the emerging theory pertained to the 
particular behaviour of stepfamilies, I sought out three people who could be defined 
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as belonging to such: one was an individual who is still involved in a protracted 
inheritance dispute and who is also a stepchild; one was a divorced and re-partnered 
parent from a low socio-economic background; and one was a re-partnered widow 
with children from a previous marriage and a keen interest in the subject. 
2.5.3 Recruitment: phase 3 
 
Finally, at the end of the study, I interviewed two experts in the field of succession, 
chosen in consultation with my PhD supervisors. The first, Professor George Gretton 
(University of Edinburgh) was approached as he was a Law Commissioner at the SLC 
at the time the 2009 Report was published. The interview was conducted with a view 
both to discussing some of my research findings and to gaining further insight into the 
rationale underpinning the SLC’s recommendations. The second, Eilidh Scobbie, is an 
experienced practitioner in contentious executry estates and was approached with a 
view to gaining better insight into how complex families handle inheritance. 
2.6 Ethical considerations 
 
The subject matter at issue in the research project inevitably gave rise to certain 
ethical concerns. It was clear that the discussion would revolve around sensitive 
subjects, namely family, money and death. The project was subject to the approval of 
the Ethics Committee for non-clinical research involving human subjects (University 
of Glasgow, College of Social Sciences) and, in the course of the approval application 
process, a number of strategies were developed to mitigate the risk of harm to 
subjects.
347
  
 
Firstly, participants were made aware of topics that were likely to arise before they 
agreed to participate. This was achieved through the Plain Language Statement which 
was sent to participants alongside (or immediately after) the invitation to join the 
study. The Plain Language Statement set out the purpose of the study and explained to 
participants how they could expect the group discussion to unfold. This meant that 
those who felt they might be ill-at-ease in the discussion could simply decline to 
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participate. Apprising focus group members of the subject matter offered the added 
advantage of allowing participants to be prepared for the discussion. This contributes 
to what Hewitson et al. term a “deliberative approach,” which allows discussions to 
be informed and “outputs well thought-out and considered.”348 
 
Secondly, participants were given the opportunity to withdraw at any point in the 
process, without being asked to explain their decision. Participants were informed of 
this option both in writing through the Plain Language Statement and orally before the 
discussion group commenced its work. Participants were also assured that they were 
free to participate to whatever extent they chose, and could simply opt to listen rather 
than to participate actively. Additionally, in the small number of cases where the 
participants were relatively recently bereaved (or seemed likely to be imminently 
bereaved), they were reminded of the option not to answer questions on more than 
one occasion during the course of the discussion. 
 
Finally, steps were also taken to maintain confidentiality. Participants were asked to 
respect each other’s confidentiality by not disclosing confidences. In other words, 
while participants were obviously free to discuss the topics that arose in the 
discussion group, they were asked not to attribute comments to particular individuals. 
Furthermore, the participants’ right to anonymity is respected in the thesis (and any 
related publications) by the use of pseudonyms. It was explained to expert 
interviewees that, while they could choose to be identified by a pseudonym, the 
disclosure of their professional role
349
 could still result in their identity being 
revealed. Both expert interviewees agreed to be named. All participants were asked to 
sign a consent form indicating that they understood this process. 
 
While the most obvious form of harm was emotional distress, having conducted a 
thorough literature review—and whilst obviously careful to exercise caution—it was 
quite obvious that participants generally found the prospect of their own death 
relatively unproblematic. Death featured in the conversations as an inevitability, but a 
very distant one. Indeed, in my own study, when one of the oldest participants was 
asked to reflect on her potential care needs, she interpreted the question as referring to 
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her very elderly parents’ needs, seemingly incapable of considering herself as part of 
the relevant demographic. Nonetheless, the discussion must have prompted the 
participants to engage, at least fleetingly, with the prospect of their own demise; 
however, if they did so, it was with phlegm and humour and very little evidence of 
angst.  
 
The more emotive topics were families and kin relationships, but as this was exactly 
where Scotland had a real shortage of data, it was decided that the potential benefits 
outweighed the risks. Many of the participants chose to reveal moving stories of 
family conflict and they did so with candour and self-awareness. In general, debate 
and discussion were approached with enthusiasm and great interest. 
 
A final, unanticipated ethical consideration was that, on at least two subjects, the 
participants appeared to look to me for legal advice. An unexpected finding of the 
study was that many participants did not appreciate that, in leaving their estate to their 
spouse, they had no guarantee in law that their spouse would eventually pass it on to 
their children. As the participants came to the realisation that this was the case (or at 
least it was extremely likely that this was the case) several appeared anxious. The 
suggestion that anyone with concerns should ask their lawyer for clarification did 
little to assuage their unease; the participants clearly wanted clarification of the terms 
of their wills as quickly as possible. While I found this unsettling, in the vast majority 
of cases, the participants understood that I was not there in the capacity as a legal 
advisor and happily continued with the discussion. On reflection, I am confident that 
this could not have been handled differently, particularly as any comments would be 
purely speculative as none of them had their wills to hand.  
 
On the second matter, however, the Plain Language Statement could have been 
improved. A sizeable group of elderly men, ostensibly from a poor socio-economic 
background, volunteered to participate in the study. Within moments of the discussion 
group beginning, it became clear that they hoped to gain succession planning advice 
with a view to “protecting” the family home from being used to fund their old-age 
care. Given the demographic of the group was known ahead of time, it may have been 
wise to state explicitly in the Plain Language Statement that the discussion group was 
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not an information or advice session. Consideration will be given to this and similar 
questions in any future projects. 
 
2.7 Biographical questionnaire 
 
Participants were asked to fill out a short self-completion biographical questionnaire 
at the beginning of the focus group, as it was anticipated that views would be affected 
by socio-demographic factors such as age, gender, class, housing tenure, relationship 
status and the presence of children. In addition, it provided an ideal opportunity to 
record whether participants had made a will. While the temptation to issue a lengthy 
questionnaire was large, I wanted something that could be completed in less than five 
minutes so as not to further encroach on participants’ time. Beyond age and gender, 
the 12-question questionnaire sought to determine whether the participants had a will; 
whether they were married; whether they were in their first or second relationship; 
and, whether they had children. It also sought to garner a little information about their 
socio-economic status.  
 
Gathering information on socio-economic status was important, as has been 
discussed, as inheritance is often viewed as being the exclusive purview of the very 
wealthy. One potential interviewee, for example, turned down the request to 
participate as she felt that the subject matter did not, in her words, concern “people 
like me.” Indeed, even amongst those who had inherited, there was a general sense 
that “proper” inheritance was exclusively the realm of the one-percenters.350 For 
example, even amongst those who had inherited substantial amounts there was no 
sense that they believed themselves to be a privileged elite; this was always a term 
better reserved for others. By gathering socio-economic data, I hoped to illustrate that 
interest in—and often passionate interest in—inheritance was not merely the domain 
of the very wealthy.  
 
A second reason for attempting to collect this information was that attitudes were 
expected to vary according to socio-economic status: certainly, the 2005 Survey 
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found attitudes expressed by those in social group AB differed from those in other 
groups on several occasions.
351
 However, it must be noted that I was only able to 
gather economic data based on income and property ownership, and did not fully 
explore other factors relating to social status. It might be expected that income levels 
give an indication of socio-economic status, and its close cousin class, but it is not 
necessarily clear that this is the case. Indeed, as has been observed, “in today’s 
landscape...white collars are often frayed and many blue collars have designer 
labels.”352 That is not to suggest that there is no correlation between income and 
socio-economic class, but rather to underscore that other factors are at play.  
Regardless, my qualitative study did not use a comparable classification system to 
that used in the large-scale quantitative studies and no conclusions can be drawn 
about the beliefs of particular socio-economic groups based on this study. 
Nonetheless, the data gathered did prove valuable and correlations were noted 
between relative wealth and certain attitudes with regard to some questions. 
 
It should also be noted that, while the questionnaire did not specifically refer to class, 
a number of participants spontaneously identified themselves as working class or 
middle class in the course of the focus groups. While any discussion of class is 
inevitably fraught with difficulty, not least because we cannot clearly define what is 
meant by “working class” or “middle class,” certain views were shared by those who 
identified as belonging to a particular social class. The 2005 Survey,
353
 as well as the 
Scottish Consumer Council survey,
354
 understandably used objective classification 
but, according to a YouGov survey, there is often a “huge mismatch” between 
people’s “objective” social class and how they define themselves.355 It would be 
interesting to explore whether there is any closer correlation between self-classified 
social class (as an expression of a political ethos and belief system) and attitudes to 
inheritance than there is between objective social classification and attitudes to 
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inheritance. Such a question, while worthy of future research, remains beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
The final reason for gathering socio-economic data was to gain an understanding as to 
whether those who planned to bequeath money to friends and family were actually in 
a position to do so, or whether their comments simply reflected their dreams and 
aspirations. With this in mind, I asked participants both how much their home was 
worth and how much they owed on their mortgage. This was based on the assumption 
that, for most people, their house will be their most significant asset. I also asked how 
much people earned. These questions generated some helpful information but could 
only ever paint a partial picture. One participant, for example, with reference to the 
question about home ownership, asked for clarification as to whether I was referring 
only to the primary home or whether I also wished a note of other assets; with 
hindsight, I do not think that she would have been the only one to own more than one 
property. A second participant, with a comparatively modest home, reported 
(unprompted) more than £100,000 in savings. Finally, those who were retired 
reported relatively low incomes but were perhaps in a different position from 
somebody on a similar income with a large mortgage.  
 
In summary, the socio-economic data generated certainly showed that inheritance was 
a subject relevant to those from different economic backgrounds. While the sample 
did not include people living in the most abject poverty, it did include a cross-section 
of people with different life experiences and levels of wealth. However, it is again 
worth reiterating that the purposive nature of the recruitment means that the research 
cannot provide any statistical information relating to the prevalence of particular 
views, experiences or reflections in the general population,
356
 or indeed within 
particular social groups. As Hewitson et al. explain, “any attempt to provide 
numerical evidence of this kind would require a quantitative research 
methodology.”357 
2.8 Pilot study 
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The research project was preceded by a pilot study to test the questions and scenarios. 
I wanted to ensure both that the scenarios were easy to follow and that they would 
generate discussion. I also wanted to see whether the participants would be open to 
answering the more personal questions, both in discussion and in the questionnaire. 
Finally, I wanted to ensure that there would be sufficient time to address all of the 
topics that I hoped to cover. The pilot study comprised two participants who were 
interviewed separately. 
 
The pilot study was broadly successful in that both participants were willing and able 
to engage with the themes. Furthermore, I had no sense that participants were 
withholding information or reluctant to talk about personal matters. I did however 
find that, as expected, I had too many scenarios and, after two or three, participants 
needed a break from processing the information. I had initially planned scenarios with 
a degree of overlap in the hope that this would elicit further, more nuanced responses 
but, in reality, the participants were very forthright and virtually exhausted each 
subject as it was raised. This meant that subsequent scenarios on closely related 
subjects added little of value.
358
 Finally, I noted that one of the participants appeared 
at times to feel slightly intimidated by the questions, commenting frequently that she 
was not sure if she was giving me the “right” answer.  
  
As a result of the pilot study, I reduced the number of scenarios that I aimed to ask 
each group from five to two or three and tried to increase the level of reassurance I 
provided about there being no “right” answer. 
 
A separate pilot study was also conducted with a solicitor from a medium-sized non-
specialist law firm with a view to testing questions on how couples sought to protect 
their spouses and children. The interviewee responded well to the questions and no 
significant issues were uncovered. 
2.9 Analysis 
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The focus groups and interviews were all recorded and then transcribed verbatim, 
ready to be analysed.
359
 Although qualitative data analysis is not governed by the 
same clear-cut rules that guide quantitative data analysis, some general frameworks 
have been developed, of which the most widely used is grounded theory.
360
 Grounded 
theory has evolved considerably since it was first advanced by Glaser and Strauss in 
the 1960s,
361
 to the extent that there is now considerable controversy surrounding 
what it is and what it entails.
362
 This thesis is not the place for an exhaustive 
consideration of the polemic surrounding the subject and instead, I will adhere to 
Strauss and Corbin’s widely-accepted definition that holds grounded theory to be “a 
general methodology for developing theory that is grounded in data systematically 
gathered and analysed.”363  
 
Although Bryman contends that grounded theory is now the most widely used 
framework for analysing qualitative data, he does add the caveat that some believe it 
is “honoured more in the breach than in the observance.”364 By this he means that 
claims are often made that grounded theory has been used when in fact it has not. This 
may be because the “complexity and vagueness” of grounded theory discourages 
researchers from fully adopting it as an analytical approach.
365
 With this in mind, I 
focused my attention not on the nuances of the competing definitions of grounded 
theory but on what Bryman identifies as the tools of grounded theory
366
 to ensure that 
I was remaining faithful to the approach. 
  
Central to grounded theory is the notion of coding. Coding refers to “the development 
of concepts and categories and to the assignment of corresponding codes to the 
data.”367 The term “code” refers to the word or short phrase that denotes a particular 
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idea.
368
 The analysis begins with this piece of data and then progresses up the 
“conceptual ladder.”369 Thus, low-level concepts are built on data and then, in turn, 
form the basis for higher-level categories.
370
 For example, on rereading my transcripts 
and the data ascribed to each code, I noted that many participants regarded “passing 
on” to be part of parenting and, in particular, parental obligation. This then became a 
core category and I reread existing transcripts in that light to develop it further. I also 
explored this particular category further by conducting a supplementary interview.  
 
The codes are not, however, fixed, as they often are in quantitative data analysis, but 
rather in “a constant state of potential revision and fluidity.”371 This is because the 
data and the theory are in constant dialogue or, as Charmaz put it, the researcher’s 
interpretation of data shape his or her emergent codes in grounded theory.
372
 As the 
concepts become broader they “gain explanatory value”373 but lose specificity; the 
challenge lies in ensuring that the theory remains “grounded” while also moving away 
from the empirical material to a sufficient degree so as to avoid “mere 
reproduction.”374 
 
In approaching my own data, I undertook a form of what Charmaz terms “initial 
coding” (or open coding)375 whereby I noted a great number of codes in the margins 
of my transcripts. I did this, as recommended by other researchers, by advancing line 
by line through the transcript, asking myself questions about the meaning of what was 
being said.
376
 I then moved on to “focused coding” (or selective coding), which 
emphasizes “the most common codes and those that are seen as most revealing about 
the data.”377 I did this by selecting approximately six thematic codes and ascribing a 
colour to each code. I added to these codes as the project developed and strong sub-
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themes emerged, and ultimately assigned ten thematic codes.
378
 The process of 
selective coding allows for the identification of “core categories” which are central in 
“integrating, densifying, and saturating the theory.”379 An example of a core category 
in the research findings was tension between first families and second families. I was 
then able to analyse its relationship to other categories, such as parental obligation 
through a process of constant comparison. 
 
A second tool of grounded theory is theoretical sampling whereby “theory evolves 
during actual research ... through continuous interplay between analysis and data 
collection.”380 In my own research, while a claim of continuous interplay may be a 
stretch, I found that I recruited for my focus groups and interviews in two or three 
waves as I began to see particular patterns and associations emerge from the data. 
This moderated form of theoretical sampling is not atypical and Strauss and Corbin 
themselves recognised that “the ideal practice of theoretical sampling is often 
unfeasible”381 due to research constraints. 
 
A third, related tool identified by Bryman is theoretical saturation. Practitioners of 
grounded theory carry on collecting data until they achieve theoretical saturation, 
meaning that “successive interviews have both formed the basis for the creation of a 
category and confirmed its importance” so that there is no longer a need to continue 
with data collection on that front.
382
 While theoretical saturation was reached quite 
early in relation to some categories (half-siblings, long-term care funding) more data 
would be beneficial in other areas and avenues of further exploration are still open.  
 
The final tool identified by Bryman is “constant comparison” which involves 
“maintaining a close connection between data and conceptualization, so that 
correspondence between concepts and categories with their indicators is not lost.”383 
Strauss and Corbin argued that it is the making of constant comparisons that produces 
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“conceptually rich theory”384 as opposed to a mere string of discrete codes. Unlike 
Glaser and Strauss’ original approach, which “called upon researcher to ignore their 
theoretical knowledge,” Strauss and Corbin’s approach credits the researcher with the 
expertise to look for themes that coincide with previous knowledge.
385
 It is argued 
that “referring to existing literature throughout the research process contributes to a 
better understanding of one’s own empirical work.”386 This is the approach that is 
followed in this thesis and, to mitigate any bias, “sensitising concepts”387 were 
developed. Sensitizing concepts allow the researcher to identify potential points of 
bias and to ensure that the analysis gives them due consideration. For example, 
theoretical knowledge and anecdotal evidence influenced both my decision to 
examine tension between first families and second families and my interpretation of 
the data. Consequently, I approached the hypothesis that tension is rife between first 
families and second families “not as an assumption but as a sensitising concept”388 to 
allow me to analyse it in detail and revise if necessary. 
 
In summary, Strauss and Corbin use grounded theory as a means of generating theory. 
Coding produces concepts, the labels given to discrete phenomena, which in turn 
become the “building blocks of theory.”389 Theory is developed by identifying 
potential relationships amongst concepts and sets of concepts to create “systematic 
statements of plausible relationships.”390 The remainder of this thesis will discuss the 
theories developed through analysis of the data generated by my research project. 
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Chapter 3: A historical overview of family relationships 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The next four chapters will focus on the parent-child relationship in the context of 
succession law. In order to understand why the relationship has always been 
privileged in the Scots law of succession, this short chapter will, by way of 
introduction, examine both the purpose of the law of succession and the historical 
origins of the law of parent and child. In addition, given that the succession rights of 
children are intimately linked to the succession rights of spouses,
391
 consideration will 
also be given to the historical origins of the law of husband and wife.  
 
Beyond providing historical context, this chapter will specifically seek to address the 
nature and extent of the legal obligations that existed between parents and their 
children and will ask what function they served. Chapters four to seven will then 
consider how these obligations differ, morally and legally, in contemporary Scotland. 
The nature of contemporary family obligations will be analysed through a detailed 
examination of the data from my research study and the contextualisation of those 
findings in relation to other significant studies. Following this examination, I will 
argue that normative obligations between parents and their children have not lessened 
over time
392
 and, as such, there is no compelling reason to remove, or further dilute, 
children’s inheritance entitlement. Instead, legislative change should focus on 
responding to real societal change such as the increased heterogeneity of family units 
and the rise of complex families. 
 
Complex families raise a particular set of issues in an inheritance context because 
children’s inheritance rights in Scotland cannot be understood in isolation from 
spouses’ inheritance rights.393 This has become increasingly important in 
contemporary society because the spouse’s right and the children’s right share their 
origins in an understanding of family which is based on life-long monogamous 
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marriage, an understanding that is no longer fully adequate. Life-long monogamous 
marriage was never a universal experience, but this mattered little to children in an 
inheritance context as, provided they were legitimate, they inherited ahead of the 
spouse on intestacy.
394
 This meant that even if a father remarried, the children’s rights 
were unaffected. However, when prior rights were introduced—a welcome remedial 
measure to a system that treated spouses as lesser than children—the position of an 
intestate’s children was radically altered. In many cases, satisfaction of prior rights 
exhausted (and continues to exhaust) the entire estate, leaving nothing available for 
payment of legitim and the distribution of the free estate. In those instances where the 
surviving spouse is also the other parent of the deceased’s children, the change has 
been of little consequence; however, where this is not the case, the importance of 
“conduit theory” becomes more evident. 
 
Conduit theory states that surviving spouses occupy “a dual role” in that, as well as 
being the primary beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate, they are also “conduits” 
through which the couple’s mutual children will benefit.395 In short, conduit theory 
assumes that the deceased’s children will “eventually inherit any unconsumed 
portion” of the deceased’s property when the surviving spouse dies.396 However, 
where the deceased’s children are not also the children of the surviving spouse, 
conduit theory maintains that the surviving spouse is a “less reliable conduit” and 
cannot always be depended upon to pass on to the deceased’s children on his own 
death.
397
 In the Scottish context, the operation of conduit theory
398
 can perhaps 
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explain why children may be more likely to claim legitim in a testate estate “where 
the legatee is not the children’s parent.”399 
 
However, objection to a second spouse inheriting to the exclusion of the children 
from the first marriage is expressed not only by the “disappointed beneficiaries” but 
by society at large. Several empirical studies, including my project, have shown 
participants in general to be “particularly troubled” by resources “passing under the 
control of the second family and thence ‘out of the family.’”400 In the vast majority of 
cases, the participants’ consternation related not to notions of preserving the 
bloodline, but to ensuring that the deceased’s children from the first family were also 
recognised.
401
 
3.2 The family unit 
 
From the outset it should be stated that, while family will be discussed in this thesis as 
comprising adult partners and children, this reflects only the historical structure of the 
law, the parameters of the SLC study and the questions at the heart of this study. It in 
no way implies that other kin groupings or structures have a lesser claim on the term 
family.   
 
When the Institutional writers set down their treatises on Scots law, they agreed that 
the family comprised two pillars: husband and wife, and parent and child. In their 
essence these pillars remain unchanged: while today couples may be same-sex, 
unmarried and/or child-free by choice, committed adult partners and/or children 
normally feature in people’s definition of “my family,” where they have such 
relationships. Certainly, for succession purposes, an individual’s kin group almost 
always includes biological children and spouses.
402
 In spite of this, the SLC reforms 
advocate abolishing – or severely curtailing – recognition for the parent-child 
relationship, apparently on the ground that families have changed.
403
 However, this 
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thesis takes the view that, while families have undoubtedly changed, the main change 
has occurred in the diversity of relationships that can today fall under the two pillars 
of the family, as opposed to the pillars themselves. 
3.3 Marriage 
 
For the Institutional writers, the twin aspects of marriage were property and 
procreation. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, marriage was clearly a 
relationship designed to provide men with property and power, and women with 
support and security.
404
 However, it was also—and equally importantly—a prelude to 
family: marriage and children were two sides of the same coin. Marriage was the first 
step in founding a family and, while marriage law governed the property 
consequences for the family unit in life, succession law safeguarded the perpetuity of 
the family by ensuring that the father’s assets passed to the next generation. As Adam 
Smith observed, “the great effect of marriage is that children are looked on as 
legitimate and inherit from their father.”405 
3.3.1 Obligations between spouses 
 
The Institutional texts set down the obligations between spouses, both in life and in 
death, focusing primarily on the husband’s rights. In exchange for the husband’s 
extensive powers over his wife’s person and property, the husband406 had an 
obligation “to Aliment and provide for the Wife in all necessars, for her Life, Health 
and Ornament,”407 although Stair noted that only “the duties of Aliment and 
Intertainment”408 were enforceable. The obligation of aliment still exists today, 
although it is now a statutory duty enforceable against both husbands and wives.
409
 
 
Historically, due to the wife’s legal subservience to the husband,410 reciprocal spousal 
obligations were limited, but some did exist. These included the civilly enforceable 
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obligations of cohabitation, or adherence,
411
 as well as an oblique reference to those 
obligations “which are naturally in the minds and affections of each to other.”412 
These latter obligations were not elucidated by Stair, but presumably referenced 
notions of love and respect. A lack of detailed consideration of the emotional aspect 
of marriage is unsurprising in expository legal texts and does not mean that emotion 
was entirely absent from the Institutional writers’ conception of marriage. 
Nevertheless, marriage was a relationship based on duty and responsibility and it was 
not until the late eighteenth century that leading scholars began focusing on 
contemporary notions of romantic love and companionship in marriage.
413
 
3.3.2 Common property 
  
It cannot be ignored that marriage was a property-based relationship which, until 
relatively recently, affected women’s property rights.414 Indeed, as Erskine observed, 
marriage entirely subsumed a woman’s personhood:415 
  
The husband acquires by the marriage, a power over both the person and the 
estate of the wife. Her person is in some sort sunk by the marriage; so that she 
cannot act by or for herself: and as for her estate, she has nothing that can be 
truly called her own. 
 
This legal powerlessness was essentially attributable to the operation of the jus mariti 
and the jus administrationis that flowed from the contract of marriage. These rights 
lay at the heart of the Scots law of marriage until the nineteenth century and 
underpinned succession law. 
 
The jus mariti was the husband’s right in the wife’s moveable property and meant that 
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her moveable property became the absolute property of the husband upon marriage.
416
 
The jus administrationis was the husband’s right of administration over his wife’s 
heritable estate and her paraphernalia
417
 (her dress or habilements and her personal 
jewels or ornaments).
418
 This meant that, although the wife theoretically owned the 
property, she required her husband’s consent for any dealing with it. Furthermore, as 
the husband had “sole and unaccountable administration”419 of her property he was 
entitled to “sell, give away or even squander” it.420 These rights were absolute and 
prior to the eighteenth century there was no possibility of renouncing them by 
contract.
421
 The jus mariti was finally abolished by the Married Women’s Property 
(Scotland) Act 1881 and the jus administrationis with the enactment of the Married 
Women’s Property (Scotland) Act 1920.422 
 
The SLC has described the jus mariti and the jus administrationis as the dominant 
features of “a primitive system of community of goods,” also referred to as the 
communio bonorum.
423
 The communio bonorum is a controversial subject in Scots 
law, with some arguing that it was merely a foreign import and not truly an 
indigenous feature of Scots law.
424
 However, while there is little doubt that the 
Scottish conception of common property was indeed a “legal solecisim,”425 it cannot 
be denied that it was an accepted feature of Scots law—at the very least throughout 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—and that its longevity was in part related to 
the law of succession. This is because, while the jus mariti stripped the wife of her 
rights for the duration of the marriage, it gave her certain rights upon its dissolution. 
                                                        
416
 Scottish Law Commission, Matrimonial Property (CM 57, 1983), volume 1 at para 1.3, henceforth 
CM 57. 
417
 Paton, GCH, “Husband and Wife: Property rights and relationships” in An Introduction to Scottish 
Legal History (The Stair Society, Vol 20, 1958), 104. 
418
 Ibid, 100. 
419
 Stair, Institutions, 1.4.8. 
420
 Paton (1958), 100. 
421
 Prior to the decision in Walker v The Creditors of her Husband (1730) Mor 5841 antenuptial 
contracts whereby the husband renounced his jus mariti were thought to be ineffectual (CM 57 at para 
1.3.). Similarly, it was not until 1754 that the jus administrationis could be excluded by contract 
(Crawford, E and Carruthers, J, Study on Matrimonial Property Regimes and the Property of 
Unmarried Couples in Private International Law and Internal Law (2001)National Report: United 
Kingdom (Scotland), European Commission, JAI/A3/2001/03 at para 1.1.2.1).  
422
 Sutherland (2004) at para 542. 
423
 CM 57 at para 1.5. 
424
 See discussion in Gardner (1928) at 78. 
425
 Fraser v Walker 10 M 837, per Lord Kinloch, cited inter alia in Cameron, PH, Summary of the Law 
of Intestate Succession in Scotland: with a brief overview of the Law of Intestate Succession in England 
(2nd edition) (Bell and Bradfute, 1884), 90. 
 86 
As Stair explained, upon the husband’s decease, the wife received her “relict’s third 
or half of moveables...[as]...a division of that communion of moveable goods, that 
was competent to the married persons during the marriage.”426 This, he argued, meant 
that although the husband’s power had “the effects of property during the conjugal 
society,”427 it was not a “power of property” as it subsisted only as long as the 
marriage.
428
 
 
Although Bankton and Erskine also understood the wife’s jus relictae to be a share of 
the communion of goods,
429
 they were less generous than Stair in their interpretation 
of the jus mariti. Erskine recognised that the husband was in fact “truly proprietor” of 
the wife’s moveable goods, although he attempted to square the circle by claiming 
that, while the husband’s “absolute power...[...]...may be thought to be inconsistent 
with the notion of a communion of goods”430 it was simply a consequence of his 
“confessed superiority”431 over the wife, a superiority which required this particular 
partnership to be different from an ordinary contract. In other words, he adhered—not 
entirely convincingly—to the view that the communion of goods involved a genuine 
partnership, albeit an unequal one.  For his part, Bankton was even more sanguine 
about what the communion of goods actually entailed for the wife, observing that “it 
may justly be said, that “whatever falls under the communion of goods belongs to the 
husband, jure mariti, in the same manner as if it had been originally his.”432  
 
Viewed from a contemporary perspective, the communio bonorum was a hollow 
partnership and one that is well consigned to the annals of history. However, although 
the partnership created legally detrimental consequences for the wife, it does not 
necessary follow that the sentiment on which it was partially based—the view that 
couples pool their resources—is not valid.  Indeed, although marriage clearly no 
longer affects property ownership,
433
 it appears that a notion of common property still 
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exists in modern Scottish society. This is a view that the SLC confirmed in its 1984 
study on matrimonial property
434
 and one which was also very present in the 
empirical findings of this project. As will be shown, this view manifested itself in two 
ways: firstly, participants relied on this view to explain why they felt surviving 
spouses were entitled to a significant share of the deceased’s estate; and, secondly, 
where the surviving spouse was not also the parent of the deceased’s child, the view 
underpinned the commonly held belief that the children should get something to 
reflect their predeceased parent’s contribution to the recently deceased parent’s estate. 
This will be explored fully in chapters four and five. 
3.3.3 Marriage and parenthood 
 
Having considered the relationship between marriage and property, attention must 
now be turned to the role of marriage as the foundation of the family. As 
aforementioned, for the Institutional writers marriage was primarily a contractual 
arrangement that gave rise to certain rights and responsibilities. These rights and 
responsibilities meant that, at least theoretically, almost everyone was provided for: a 
man gained control of his wife’s resources and had to use them, together with his 
own, to ensure that his wife was provided for adequately.
 
Yet creating this unit was 
not simply for the benefit of the two contracting parties; crucially, it was also 
considered necessary to allow the next generation to flourish. From the Institutional 
viewpoint, without marriage, there was no society:
435
 
 
Marriage, as being the foundation of human race and society, and which 
commenced in the state of innocency, well deserves the first place among 
natural obligations.
 
 
Indeed, so closely intertwined were marriage and procreation, that marriages were 
held to be null where either party was incapable of procreation “for such 
marriage…[wa]s inconsistent with the propagation of mankind.”436 However, while 
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Bankton described procreation as the “principal design of marriage,”437 it may be 
more accurate to state that legitimising the children of the union was the principal 
goal. A child was filius nullius if his parents were unmarried, not even recognised as 
of his mother.
438
 But producing “legitimate” children did not in itself create “good” 
families: “the proper education of offspring,” central to “the happiness of mankind,” 
required that both parents provided “a constant…attendance for many years,”439 and, 
as such, it was generally accepted that the only “natural” end to marriage was 
death.
440
  
 
The extent to which the “nuclear family” was ever “a wholly accurate representation 
of Scottish life” is open to question, with historians pointing, for example, to high 
rates of lone motherhood during and immediately after the First and Second World 
Wars.
441
 Nevertheless, while evidence suggests that “the structures of family life that 
many people believe to be new since the 1960s
442…have a much longer history” than 
is often thought,
443
 it seems equally clear that the nuclear family model reflected how 
scholars and lawmakers thought people ought to be living. This was, at least in part, 
because, prior to the 1960s, marriage was conceptualised as a “public duty” rather 
than a “private arrangement”444 and it was on this understanding of normative duty 
that the law of succession developed.  
3.4 The purpose of succession law 
 
Simply put, “the chief concern of the law of succession, whether ex lege,445 testate or 
intestate…[is]…to identify the property which the deceased owned or controlled at 
his death and to bring about its distribution among those entitled to succeed.”446 
Beyond regulating the extent of a testator’s freedom to test, the law plays a minimal 
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role in testate succession: subject to the operation of legal rights, a testator is free to 
dispose of his estate as he sees fit.
447
 In contrast, in the case of intestate succession 
and ex lege provisions, legislators must decide both who should benefit from the 
deceased’s estate and how the entitlements of the various beneficiaries should be 
ranked.  
 
In making these decisions, lawmakers inevitably privilege certain beneficiaries over 
others, but justifying why a particular beneficiary should be favoured is not always 
self-evident. This is particularly true today as succession law strives not just to 
impose a normative view of what the deceased should do but also to reflect the 
choices people actually make in life.
448
 Typically, in defending their decisions, 
legislators and law reformers rely on variations of a few commonly cited 
justifications: the need to provide a social safety net;
449
 the duty to respect “common 
property” and common endeavour;450 the responsibility to reflect prevailing social 
norms;
451
 the requirement to reflect lifetime legal obligations;
452
 and the duty to 
respect the presumed intent of the deceased.
453
  
 
While none of these commonly advanced justifications is entirely unassailable,
454
 
together they have considerable merit and their value as guiding criteria in 
distributing an intestate estate is difficult to contest. In particular, the concept of 
“presumed intent,” which can be traced back at least as far as the Institutional 
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writers,
455
 appears to be the most common justification advanced in support of 
intestacy rules.
456
 This is unsurprising, as the term readily subsumes the notions of 
assumed duty and prevailing social norms from which it cannot truly be separated. 
That is to say, while redolent of personal choice, “presumed intent” derives at least in 
part from what the intestate ought to have intended
457
 and determining what people 
ought to have intended is informed, at least in part, from the legal obligations they 
have accepted in life. 
 
Thus, as conceptions of family and family obligation change, so too do conceptions of 
presumed intent. Indeed, as Reid et al. have observed, presumed intent has been used 
at separate times in history to justify both the descendants’ and the spouse’s “primary 
entitlement.”458 In more recent times, changing understandings of duty and intent 
have led to significant changes in the scheme of intestate distribution: the Succession 
(Scotland) Act 1964 was amended by the Civil Partnership Act 2004 to allow civil 
partners to inherit in the same way as spouses,
459
 while the Family Law (Scotland) 
Act 2006 introduced intestacy rights for cohabitants.
460
 Conceptions of family will 
continue to evolve and the concomitant changes in conceptions of presumed intent 
will likely be used to advance the rights of other putative beneficiaries in the future. 
Certainly, those who advocate for the inclusion of stepchildren in the intestacy 
framework have argued that to exclude them is to fail to give effect to the deceased’s 
testamentary intent.
461
 
 
Presumed intent does not, however, concern only who should be included in intestacy 
provisions, but also who should be prioritised. In this sense, recent family law reforms 
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have proved relatively straightforward: at the point of death, the deceased will have 
either an opposite-sex spouse or a same-sex spouse.
462
 As a result, there is little 
competition between the “original” beneficiary and the “new” beneficiary and no 
order of precedence has to be established between them: the entitlement of an 
opposite-sex spouse is entirely unaffected by the new entitlement of a same-sex 
spouse.
463
 
 
In contrast, the incremental improvements in the spouse’s position have had an effect 
on the children’s claim on intestacy. In the context of an intact family, even where the 
value of prior rights is high and the value of the estate low, this is relatively 
unproblematic: it is generally agreed both that the spouse would want to – and that the 
spouse ought to – provide for his spouse ahead of their mutual children on the 
understanding that the surviving spouse would pass any remaining assets to the 
children upon her death. However, these changes have not occurred in a vacuum, but 
at a time when there has also been a rise in separation and remarriage. This is 
important as, whereas the succession rights of spouses and children continue to be 
intertwined, marriage and parenthood can now be decoupled.
464
 In such instances, a 
surviving spouse may not make provision for the deceased’s children upon his death, 
and therefore it may no longer be appropriate to assume that an intestate would want 
the full estate to pass to the surviving spouse. 
 
Certainly, Reid et al. have argued that as “family patterns become ever-more 
complex” and the range of possible intestate succession outcomes “correspondingly 
ever-more wide” deciding who should benefit becomes “increasingly difficult and 
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contested.”465 However, while this observation is undoubtedly accurate as regards the 
potential entitlements of half-siblings, stepchildren and perhaps even cohabitants,
466
 it 
is less clear that the children’s entitlement is in anyway “difficult or contested.”  
Finch and Mason, for example, found that, while English kinship was “highly 
flexible,” the parent-child relationship was nonetheless “both predictable and 
privileged.”467 Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 1,468 the Canadian court in Tataryn 
opined that there was considerable less “uncertainty” than often thought surrounding 
conceptions of parental responsibility.
469
 It is not clear, therefore, that the increasing 
complexity of family relationships has affected the parent-child relationship in a way 
that would cause law reformers to struggle to determine whether the deceased would 
want his children to inherit. 
 
There is, however, no doubt that determining how the balance should be struck 
between the claims of competing beneficiaries does pose difficulty. Yet, as this 
tension speaks directly to the new socio-demographic realities
470
 the SLC sought to 
reflect in the reform process, it is difficult to understand why it chose to ignore the 
way in which these new realities affect children’s inheritance rights.471 Two possible 
reasons emerge: firstly, the pursuit of simplicity and ease of administration;
472
 and, 
secondly, deference to personal choice and individualism.  
 
Understandings of personal choice and individualism appear to have profoundly 
influenced the reform proposals with the “current relationship of choice”473 being 
favoured to the virtual exclusion of all others in both testate and intestate 
                                                        
465
 Reid et al. (2015), 448. 
466
 As will be shown in chapters 6 and 7, there is no clear consensus that automatically including 
stepchildren and half-siblings as heirs on intestacy would give effect to “presumed intent.” 
467
 Finch and Mason (2000), 59. 
468
 Ch 1, 1.2.2. 
469
 [1994] 2 SCR 807.  
470
 In the Introduction to the 2009 Report, the SLC stated that “the law has not kept pace with all the 
changes which are occurring” (para.1.3). 
471
 Indeed, when confronted by socio-demographic trends that have indirectly weakened the children’s 
position on intestacy, the SLC responded not by bolstering the children’s position but by further 
undermining it. 
472
 While recognising the merits of simplicity, allowing such an approach to supersede all other goals 
has its limitations. 
473
 Reid (2008) at 399. 
 93 
succession.
474
  Indeed, in a remarkable argument advanced in favour of abolishing 
legitim, the SLC stressed that while the prospective entitlement of a spouse can be 
terminated by divorce or dissolution, there is “no legal machinery available for 
parents to dissolve the parent-child relationship so as to prevent their children’s 
claims.”475  
 
However, while conceptions of self-determination and autonomy are undoubtedly 
central to contemporary family law, and in particular to adult relationships, they are 
tempered by equally important conceptions of obligation in the parent-child context. 
As such, although a parent may have no choice but to remain in a legal relationship 
with his child, the absence of positive consent to such a relationship cannot be taken 
as an indicator that he would not have intended his children to benefit from his estate. 
The remainder of this chapter will address the historical importance of the parent-
child relationship with a view to explaining why inheritance rights for children have 
so long been considered important. It will conclude that maintaining provision for 
children gives effect to presumed intent as shaped by societal expectation, particularly 
in the case of first and second families. 
3.5 The obligation between parent and child 
 
For the Institutional writers, the relationship between parent and child was the 
example par excellence of natural law.
476
 While money and property are discussed 
frankly in their commentary on marriage, the commentary on the parent-child 
relationship is cloaked in highly emotive language. However, in spite of this, money 
and property also remain at the heart of the historical conception of the parent-child 
relationship: parents and children had mutual financial obligations in life, obligations 
which, for parents, continued beyond the grave. Thus, a dual discourse emerged: on 
the one hand, the parent-child relationship was described in hallowed terms, a 
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relationship ordained by God and worthy of the utmost reverence; on the other hand, 
when the reverential language is stripped back, a more prosaic picture emerges 
whereby reciprocal parent-child obligations provided a form of social safety net. 
However, rather than being contradictory, these alternative discourses appear to 
reflect the difference that existed between the duty in life and the duty in death.  
 
Historically, the overarching duty that parents owed their children was the provision 
of aliment and education.
477 
In this there is nothing surprising to the modern ear: few 
parents would contest the existence of such a duty. Where the duty, as explained by 
the Institutional writers, began to deviate from our contemporary perspective was in 
the multitude of rules that emerged to create a family-based social security network. 
For example, there was a strict order to the list of family members on whose 
shoulders the burden of care fell if the father was unable to provide for his children. 
Erskine set out the position as follows:
478
 
 
It [the responsibility] is not limited to the father alone; though he, as the head of 
the family, and as the sole manger of the goods in communion, is bound most 
directly, and in the first place: but in default of the father, who is the ascendent 
in the first degree, either through death or incapacity, the burden of maintaining 
the children falls upon his father, or the childrens paternal grandfather, and so 
upwards upon the other ascendents by the father; and failing these, upon the 
mother, and the ascendents by her.
 
 
Although the duty to aliment and educate were initially placed on an equal footing, 
the duty of the family member substituting the father appears to have been limited to 
only the civilly enforceable duty of aliment,
479
 again underscoring the importance of 
ensuring that all were provided for without burdening the State.  
 
Finally, it should be underscored that, at the time of the Institutional writers, the rules 
regarding parental obligation addressed the father: the parent-child relationship, from 
a seventeenth and eighteenth century perspective, concerned the father and the child, 
to the almost total exclusion of the mother. As Clive points out, the children of the 
marriage were, “for purposes of guardianship, custody and access” the husband’s 
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children.
480
 This is, of course, unsurprising as the father was the “sole manager of the 
goods in communion”481 and, to all intents and purposes, the wife’s curator.482 
Furthermore, prior to the enactment of the Married Women’s Property (Scotland) Act 
1881, legitim could not be claimed from a mother’s estate,483 depriving her of even 
this limited means of providing for her children.
 
3.5.1. How long does the obligation endure? 
 
The question of the length of time the obligation between parent and child endures is 
important for this thesis insofar as its non-permanency is raised by the SLC to support 
the abolition of a fixed legal share for children.
484
 In its 2009 Report, the SLC 
advanced several reasons for abolishing legitim, including three that it related directly 
or indirectly to the obligation to provide aliment. Firstly, it stated that “the child 
should not be able to make a claim on his parent’s estate which the child could not 
have made during the parent’s lifetime;”485 secondly, it stated that “the obligation to 
relieve the needs of adult children rests on the state, not on the parent;”486 and, thirdly, 
it stated that “a child no longer has a legal obligation to aliment an indigent parent.”487 
The implication is that, whereas legitim was once justifiable based on a historical 
understanding of the mutual legal obligations between parents and their children, the 
changes in these obligations are such that legitim can no longer be justified. However, 
it is contended that these changes primarily address the obligations parents and 
children owed each other in life, not in death, and so have no impact on legitim. 
3.5.1.1 Parental obligation in life 
 
The general rule, as stated by the Institutional writers, is that the duty to aliment 
ended when the child reached majority:
488
 Erskine suggested that parents must care 
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for their issue during their imperfect age,
489
 and, viewing the question from a slightly 
different perspective, Bankton and Stair acknowledged that, although still present, 
parental power was “much diminished”490 when children were of full age.491 In this 
regard, the law remains largely unchanged: today the Family Law (Scotland) Act 
1985, section 1(1) and (5) provides that a parent’s obligation ends when the child 
reaches the age of 18, or 25 if engaged in further education.  
 
However, when the duty to aliment in life was first set down by the Institutional 
writers, the general rule was qualified and the entitlement was not simply coextensive 
with being a child. For example, while the duty to provide for the children fell on the 
parents in the first instance, they did not have to provide for them if another source of 
maintenance was forthcoming. As Stair observed, where children were “competently 
provided aliunde, the parents are not bound.”492 Equally, the duty could subsist longer 
if a child who had reached majority fell into a state of want. Erskine summed up the 
position as follows:
493
 
 
As soon as the children can subsist by their own labour or industry, the 
obligation ceaseth; for he who can earn his own bread, has no right or claim of 
maintenance from another…yet the obligation which lies on parents to maintain 
their indigent children is perpetual.
 
 
The SLC is obviously correct in stating that this duty no longer exists and that, 
instead, “the obligation to relieve the needs of adult children rests on the state.”494 
However, as it has always been possible to distinguish the duty in life from the duty in 
death, it is not clear that this change has any bearing on legitim.  
3.5.1.2 Parental obligation in death 
 
The duty in life, although more clearly defined than in previous centuries, has always 
been relatively unambiguous. Although Stair asserted that parents had certain 
obligations in life that arose from affection as opposed to legal obligation,
495
 his 
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commentary on lifetime obligations primarily related to those obligations that were 
legally enforceable. This is unsurprising as it was those enforceable lifetime 
obligations that ensured children (and their parents) did not become a burden on the 
state.  
 
In contrast, in elucidating the duty that existed in death, the Institutional writers 
focused as much on normative, moral duties as they did on legal obligations. Two 
different duties were identified: the overarching moral duty of the parent to make 
provision for his children upon his death, and the specific legal entitlement of the 
children to claim legitim. Indeed, the principal duty to provide in death, as described 
by Erskine, was in fact the normative duty. This duty is clearly an extension of the 
duty that existed in life:
496
 
 
A father is not barely bound to maintain his children during his own life; he 
ought to provide for all of them, that they may be able to live comfortably after 
his death: it is therefore his duty, either to make over by a deed inter vivos, or to 
bequeath to each of them by testament, such a patrimony or provision, in land, 
money, or other subjects, as is suitable to his circumstances.
 
 
However, while the duty to provide aliment in life was (and is) legally enforceable, 
Erskine stated that the duty to provide aliment in death was “one of those which is left 
entirely upon the conscience without being enforced by any civil sanction.”497 
Similarly, citing the Bible,
498
 Stair observed that “competent provision” must be 
arranged for the children, regardless of civil obligation, as “he that careth not for his 
family, is worse than an Infidel”.499  
 
The second duty, legitim is—unlike the general duty to make provision for one’s 
children—clearly enforceable; however, the rationale for this distinction is unclear. 
Two central views emerged, depending on different interpretations of the origins of 
legitim.  The first, advanced by Stair, held legitim to be a specific category of the 
parent’s general duty to provide. Stair held that legitim was “so called, because it 
flows from the natural Obligation of Parents to provide for their Children”.500 
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However, despite their shared origins, Stair understood there to be key differences 
between the duty in life and legitim. Firstly, whereas aliment was only available to 
adult children in certain circumstances, legitim was available to all legal children, 
regardless of whether they were in a state of want.
501
 Secondly, while the law 
recognised that an illegitimate child was entitled to aliment from his parents in life,
502
 
he had no claim to legitim prior to the implementation of the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions)(Scotland) Act 1968.
503
 This in itself does not explain why 
legitim is legally enforceable while the general duty to provide is not, but it is 
reasonable to assert that this allowed freedom of testation to be balanced with the duty 
to provide. As Kenneth Reid explained  “in earlier times” there existed a notion that 
moveable property (against which legitim is exercisable) was of little value.
504 
Accordingly, legitim was a legally enforceable minimum level of provision, which a 
“good” father would supplement with additional provision. 
 
For his part, while maintaining that legitim was a “natural right,”505 Erskine 
characterised it not as an extension or variation of the duty to provide in life, but as a 
deferred share of the community of goods:
506
 
 
It may be thought not reconcileable to the communion of goods, which is by 
our law consequent upon marriage, common to man and wife, should upon its 
dissolution be divided, not entirely between the two socii, to whom it 
belonged, but that a third party, the children, should also be entitled to a share 
of it. But it must be attended to, that by the law of nature itself, children have a 
right, upon their first existence, to some share at least of the goods which 
formerly belonged in common to their two parents, of whom they may, 
without impropriety, be reckoned a part. 
 
This is an easily accessible explanation—although not universally accepted507—and 
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one which serves to highlight the importance of the law of succession in the 
conception of the communio bonorum. 
 
Ultimately, the relative merits of these arguments are of little importance: whether the 
legal origins of legitim are rooted in a doctrine of community of goods
508
 or in the 
duty to aliment matters little in contemporary Scotland. Rather, what is striking is that 
both lines of thought persist today. As will be shown in chapters four to seven, the 
empirical study revealed many participants—while rejecting the prescriptive, 
moralistic language of the Institutional writers—to believe that parents “ought” to 
make some provision for their children, where they have the means to do so. 
Furthermore, and particularly where the surviving spouse is not the child’s other 
parent, many participants believed that the child should receive something from his 
deceased parent’s estate to reflect the other parent’s contribution to that estate. In 
other words, what once formed the legal justification for the existence of legitim (a 
lifelong duty to aliment and a conception of common property) now forms the moral 
justification for its existence.  
3.5.2. The filial obligation: an asymmetrical duty 
 
Although today we primarily think of family obligations as running unilaterally from 
the parent to the child,
509
 until as recently as 1985, children also had a legally binding 
financial responsibility towards their parents.
510  
In its 2009 Report, the SLC made the 
unusual assertion that legitim can be understood as the counterpart of that obligation, 
suggesting that as that obligation no longer exists neither should legitim.
511
 This 
conceptualisation of legitim does not correspond to those discussed above, but – more 
importantly – it also overlooks the fact that the obligation between parent and child 
has always been one of asymmetrical reciprocity. As such, lessening the child’s duty 
to the parent does not require a corresponding reduction in the parent’s duty to the 
child. 
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The Institutional writers identified two separate duties children owed their parents. 
Firstly, in certain circumstances, children were obliged to work for the benefit of their 
fathers. For Erskine, the father was “intitled to all the profits accruing from their 
labour and industry, while they continue in his family, or are maintained by him at 
bed and board.”512 Stair was of a similar view but went further than Erskine, arguing 
that a father could compel his child to remain within the family home:
513 
 
From this paternal power it follows, that the parents may contain and keep their 
children in their families; and that they are obliged to employ their services and 
work for the common interest of the family; and what doth always endure, till 
by consent of the parents, they become forisfamiliat.
514
 
 
For his part, Bankton adopted a third view, arguing that although a father could not 
compel an adult child to remain within the family home, he had “a right to their 
service for his entertainment, if they are not able otherwise to recompense him.”515 
  
The second duty identified by the Institutional writers was the duty to provide aliment 
to indigent parents:
516
 
 
This obligation for maintenance is reciprocal between parents and children; and 
hath as strong effects against the last as the first; for the tie of piety and 
gratitude, by which nature hath bound children, when they have a fund 
sufficient for it, to maintain their indigent parents, is supported by civil sanction.
 
 
Although Bankton
517
 and Stair
518
 were equally unequivocal as to the existence of this 
duty—arguing that children are under a “natural” obligation to maintain their parents 
in case of necessity—both were keen to explain that this did not fall foul of the 
Biblical command that “the children ought not to lay up for the parents, but the 
parents for the children.”519 This suggests that both were aware that a child providing 
for a parent is in some way counterintuitive and is one of several ways in which the 
duty of a child to provide for a parent was differentiated from the duty of a parent to 
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provide for a child.  
 
In general, the Institutional writers depicted the duty to provide for a parent as less 
onerous than the duty to provide for a child: the child did not have to provide for the 
parent if he predeceased him;
520
 the child did not appear bound to take the parent into 
his home;
 
the duty to provide for a parent arose only if the parent were indigent;
521
 
and there was no discussion of the responsibility passing to a remoter descendant 
were the child be unable to discharge the duty. This asymmetry has been recognised 
as a feature of the parent-child relationship throughout the ages and does not appear to 
have provoked ire or condemnation. Indeed, for Adam Smith, such an imbalance was 
essential to a flourishing society:
522
 
 
Nature, for the wisest purpose, has rendered, in most men, perhaps in all men, 
parental tenderness a much stronger affection than filial piety. The continuance 
and propagation of the species depend altogether upon the former, and not upon 
the latter. 
 
While calls to revive the obligation a child owes a parent may be heard in some 
quarters,
523
 parents generally conceive their duty towards their children to be stronger 
than any obligation their children owe them. Recognition of the asymmetrical nature 
of the relationship is essential to understanding why, despite the SLC’s misgivings, 
“there is little to suggest that Scottish parents would consider themselves currently 
under a ‘legal disability’524 in being unable to disinherit their children.525  
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In contemporary society, providing for the surviving spouse upon the death of the 
other spouse requires no justification: it is widely agreed that the surviving spouse has 
a strong moral claim on the deceased’s assets, which many people view as belonging 
to the couple as a unit.
526
 Similarly, providing for young children requires little 
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justification: few would contest a parent’s duty to provide for his children. However, 
providing for adult children on death is somewhat more complicated, and successive 
generations have struggled to define why children are felt to be entitled.  
 
Historically, legitim has been explained through references to common property and 
the parental duty to provide aliment, explanations that do not appear fully adequate 
today: the duty to provide aliment is no longer life-long and, while notions of 
common property undoubtedly persist, the legal concept of the jus mariti has long 
been abolished. However, legitim was only ever construed as a minimal level of 
provision and a “good” father was expected to provide for his children according to 
his means. This normative duty flowed not from a legally enforceable obligation but 
from the elusive duty written in the “hearts of parents”527 that has always featured in 
the parent-child relationship. 
 
Today, the presence of this duty written in the hearts of parents is arguably even more 
important than it was in previous centuries,
528
 and it is this duty, the duty to love 
one’s children and to recognise them upon death, that underpins the children’s 
entitlement to legitim in contemporary society. The importance of the duty is not, 
however, limited to ex lege succession, but also informs views on entitlements to 
intestate estates. As explained above, it is generally agreed that intestacy provisions 
should seek to give effect to the presumed intent of the deceased and, as parents are 
presumed to love their children, it is also presumed that they would want them to 
succeed to some of their estate. 
 
While it might be tempting to dismiss “presumed intent” as a meaningless term, open 
to unlimited subjective interpretation, it has been shown to be a great deal more than 
another “anodyne formulation.”529 It reflects society’s views both of what the 
deceased ought to do, based on assumed legal duties and understandings of moral 
obligations towards loved ones, and of what the deceased would want to do based, at 
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least in the case of parents, on the duty written in their hearts.
530
 In short, it “captures 
an essential truth”531 about what the law of intestate succession is trying to do in order 
to meet the needs of the society it serves. 
 
Although unequivocally determining what constitutes an acceptable understanding of  
“presumed intent” is not without difficulty in a heterogeneous society, it is also, at 
least in the context of parental obligation, less problematic than might be thought. In 
the course of my empirical study, I sought to understand how participants viewed 
parental obligation, giving them the opportunity to discuss both how they intended to 
provide for their children and what provision they felt other people should make for 
their family members. Without suggesting that children should be given an equal 
share to that granted to the spouse, it was clear that there was no appetite for children 
to be obliterated from the inheritance landscape. Thus, in order to give effect to 
presumed intent, it is important to provide meaningful provision for the children on 
intestacy, particularly where the surviving spouse is not also the other parent of the 
children. Further, it was shown that, for the majority of the participants, the strength 
of the duty “written in their hearts” was such that they did not feel that their inability 
to fully disinherit their children constituted a “legal disability.” 
 
The next four chapters will consider in greater detail how contemporary society views 
inheritance rights, particularly in “complex” family situations, and will address what 
other jurisdictions have done to reflect testamentary intent, and other considerations, 
in their succession law frameworks. It will conclude that, while family relationships 
may previously have been framed in the context of family duty, they are now 
understood primarily as “a project of the self.”532 However, while the project of the 
self undoubtedly reflects elements of choice and flexibility, obligation is both present 
and willingly embraced. 
                                                        
530
 Stair, Institutions,1.5.1. 
531
 Reid et al. (2015), 446. 
532
 Douglas et al. (2011) at 247. 
 104 
Chapter 4: Attitudes towards parental obligation 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this first of the four chapters addressing what my empirical study reveals about 
attitudes to inheritance, consideration will be given to what duty, if any, a parent has 
towards her children at the end of the parent’s life. The question arises because, as 
was explained previously, the SLC reforms seek to remove or severely curtail the 
protection from disinheritance Scottish law currently affords children.
533
 Technically 
speaking, disinheritance can occur only where the deceased has left a will
534
 and, as 
such, the majority of the discussion in this chapter will centre on testate succession.  
 
Throughout the focus groups
535
 and interviews, participants were asked to reflect on 
both their personal inheritance experiences and their testamentary intentions, as well 
as their views as to how other people had behaved in various real life and fictitious 
scenarios.
536
 This chapter will discuss the data generated by these discussions, 
focusing on broad central themes including expectation, obligation and testamentary 
freedom. 
4.2 Experiences of inheritance 
 
All participants were asked whether they had inherited and, where they answered 
affirmatively, they were then invited to expand on that experience. In most cases,
537
 
this was the first question asked of participants, with a view both to launching the 
discussion and to setting the participants at ease by having them control the 
narrative.
538
 However, although used as an “ice-breaker” the question was an 
important one: inheritance experiences – particularly negative ones – unsurprisingly 
appeared to shape the attitudes of the individuals involved, and their relaying of these 
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complex narratives at times served to soften the more rigid views expressed by some 
other participants.
539
  
 
The dialogue that flowed from this one simple question revealed thoughts on family 
property, parental duty, expectation, and autonomy, all of which will be explored 
more fully in the course of this and the next two chapters.  Firstly, however, the 
question revealed that the term “inheritance” is not clearly or uniformly understood, 
with participants expressing different views as to what constituted a “proper 
inheritance.” When asked whether they had inherited, 18 participants answered in the 
affirmative and 12 in the negative, while five gave no recorded answer and two 
claimed to be unsure. The uncertainty expressed by two of the participants was 
initially surprising, as such a straightforward question was expected to elicit a binary 
response. However, closer examination revealed that the participants’ doubts were 
anchored in two views that arose frequently in the discussions: firstly, that the word 
“inheritance” involves large sums of money and is consequently a concern of the 
wealthy; and, secondly, that property transmission is a family affair.  
4.2.1 Inheritance: a question of value 
 
Mary, a retired nurse from Greenock, expressed her uncertainty as follows: 
 
Mary: Well, I don’t know if it’s classed as an inheritance…my parents died. I 
suppose it was an inheritance…they had their house…it wasn’t worth a great 
deal, you know, it was nothing major or anything like that… 
Interviewer: Was that between you and your siblings? 
Mary: Yes, there were 5 of us so obviously…[…]…So I don’t really class that 
as an inheritance as such… 
 
Central to Mary’s doubt was that her parents’ house – and her eventual share of it – 
was worth little and so did not constitute a “proper” inheritance. It is also possible – 
although not fully explored – that Mary felt that people like her did not inherit; 
certainly, one individual turned down the invitation to participate in the study on the 
grounds that it was not for “people like me.”  
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Mary was not alone in the view that her inheritance was not a “proper” inheritance 
because it was not worth a substantial amount of money. Indeed, closer examination 
of the data revealed that two participants who stated that they had not inherited might 
actually have done so. When asked whether she had inherited, Catriona, an accountant 
from Edinburgh, replied, “no, not anything significant.” Similarly, Tom, a retired 
small business owner from Glasgow, stated that he had not inherited, before adding 
“[unless] you call getting a painting that was up on my mother’s wall…but I would 
say that’s not how I understand it.” Whether Tom acquired the painting by means of a 
specific bequest, or merely through the distribution of his mother’s estate on 
intestacy, Tom did technically inherit his mother’s property; however, the low 
monetary value of the inheritance meant that he did not perceive it as such. 
 
Tom’s response was particularly striking when compared to that of John, a fellow 
member of his group. John was the first member of the group to offer a response to 
the opening question, reporting that an “elderly aunt” had left him “something like 
£100” and remarking that he “thought that was really nice.” Similarly, Gordon 
reported having inherited £100 from a “social aunt,” while Carol recalled feeling 
“very special” when her grandfather left her £50 in his will. Unlike Tom, Mary and 
Catriona, these three readily categorised their bequests as an inheritance, despite their 
low value. This suggests that not only the amount, but also the relationship between 
the testator and the beneficiary influences how the inheritance is perceived. In the 
case of bequests from non-immediate family members, monetary value was 
inconsequential in determining whether the bequest was a “proper” inheritance: being 
chosen was all that mattered. In contrast, a bequest from a parent seemed to have to 
be more valuable in order to qualify, and extremely large in order to be in any way 
noteworthy. 
 
Indeed, while Carol fondly remembered her grandfather’s bequest, she appeared to 
find the much larger inheritance she received from her parents far less remarkable: 
 
Well, I’m an only child and my mother and father have both passed away. I 
inherited, not huge amounts, but I inherited a family home and some cash. 
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As a teacher and a single parent, Carol does not appear to be someone for whom 
money would be no object and so it is unclear why she would not consider a family 
home and money to be a substantial inheritance, other than because it came from her 
parents. Similarly, Simon, a media worker from Glasgow who had inherited his 
“parents’ estate…which included a house in Cornwall,” was in no doubt that he had 
inherited, but did not appear to view his inheritance as particularly significant. 
4.2.2 Inheritance: a concern of the wealthy 
 
Carol’s and Simon’s attitudes could also stem from the pervasive view that “proper” 
inheritance is the exclusive purview of society’s wealthiest and, as neither considered 
themselves to be part of this elite, it follows that they did not consider themselves to 
have properly inherited. Indeed, in Group 2, the discussion of disinheritance turned to 
the reputed testamentary intentions of celebrities such as Nigella Lawson and Sting, 
perhaps indicating where the bar was set in the minds of the participants. By 
presenting their own inheritances as a family affair, participants were able to distance 
themselves from those who, in the words of Gordon, “bundled up” privilege to pass 
on from generation to generation. 
 
In addition, a number of participants were quick to point out that they were “first 
generation middle class” or that they had grown up with nothing. It is, therefore, 
understandable that they experienced a degree of dissonance in classifying themselves 
as potential bequeathors, a group once considered an elite. This view is perhaps best 
reflected in a discussion between the seven participants in Group 7, all of whom were 
over 65: 
 
Bill: I think, the likes of masel’, I’m the youngest in my family and I’m just 
aboot 80 and my mither and faither just had nothin’, nothin’ to come to us. It’s 
different today because I would say wir generation have got somethin’ to be 
leavin’. 
Voice: Aye, that’s right. 
Interviewer: Yes, yes. I think that’s… 
Voice: That’ll be leavin’ something significant. 
Alec: Aye, that’s right. 
Bill: The likes of my mither, they left absolutely naethin’…well, not naethin’, 
but next door to it. 
Reg: Since the house purchasin’ came in. 
Voice: Aye, that’s right. 
Reg: That’s yir inheritance. 
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In all, 13 participants reported being aged 65 or over and, of this age cohort, only Ron 
reported having inherited from his parents
540
 in any meaningful way.
541
 Indeed, 11 of 
the other 12 participants in this cohort specifically referenced having grown up in 
relative poverty.
542
  
4.2.3 Inheritance: an expression of family property 
 
The difference between the way in which the participants experienced inheriting from 
their parents and inheriting from more distant friends and relatives also speaks to 
notions of family property. While Carol was pleased and surprised by the bequest 
from her grandfather, she clearly saw herself as the natural final recipient of her 
parents’ resources. In this, she is echoing Stair’s view that children have an “interest” 
in the “goods of their parents” that arises upon the death of the parents.543 It is this 
concept of a “deferred community of property”544 that would be entirely lost if the 
second of the SLC’s proposals – the suggestion that legitim be abolished and replaced 
with a right for dependent children only
545
 –were accepted.  
 
A second point relating to family property was raised by Caroline, another participant 
who was unsure whether or not she had inherited. Her comments spoke not to the 
interest individual children have in their parents’ property, but to the collective 
interest family members have in a deceased ascendant’s property: 
 
Officially? Like, in a will or…Like I have inherited some money when my 
grandmother died, but it wasn’t left officially to me, my mum just gave me 
some of the money that was left…so I suppose that was…I don’t know, it 
wasn’t…it was left obviously all to my mum and she just chose to give me 
some… 
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 Although Mary was of retirement age, she was not in the 65+ cohort. 
541
 Gordon and June reported small inheritances. June would have got a third of her father’s estate, 
which was instead distributed amongst his six grandchildren to the tune of “a few hundred pounds to 
each child.” 
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 The six other participants in Group 7 indicated that their experience was similar to that of Bill, while 
Joan, John, Gordon and Tom specifically made reference to their parents’ limited means.  
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 Stair, Institutions, 1.5.7. 
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 Hiram, H, “Reforming succession law: legal rights,” (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 81 at 84. 
545
 2009 Report at 3.65. 
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Unlike Mary, who felt that she had not inherited, Caroline felt she had inherited, even 
although she plainly had not. In a factually similar scenario, Laura stated categorically 
that she had inherited over £30,000 from her granny, before later clarifying that her 
grandmother had left her estate to be split equally between Laura’s mum and uncle, 
and that Laura’s mum had then chosen to share it with her children. In both cases, the 
simple fact of receiving money upon the death of an elderly family relative was 
experienced as inheritance, and was based on the view that the elderly relative would 
have wanted the resources to be used for the good of the family as a whole. Other 
participants echoed this view, but from the perspective of the person planning the 
bequest, conjecturing that they provided for their children on the assumption that it 
would benefit grandchildren as well. 
 
The perception that Carol, Simon and several others had, that their inheritances were 
unremarkable, provided valuable data about expectations and suggested that, despite 
what they may claim, people expect to inherit from their parents. In contrast to the 
surprise and pleasure the participants experienced at being “remembered” by other 
relatives, those who had inherited from their parents appeared regard it as a simple 
inevitability. 
4.3 Expectation 
 
The dialogue that flowed from the opening question in the focus groups raised many 
issues that became the “building blocks” of theories.546 These building blocks were 
generated through the process of coding, discussed in Chapter 2.
547
  As part of the 
first step in the process of data analysis, known as “initial” or “open” coding, many 
codes were noted in the margin of the transcripts. Words noted in the margins in 
relation to the opening question on experience of inheritance include: entitlement, 
family property, sharing, anger, disappointment, assumption, inevitability, 
expectation, and so forth. When this was complete, I moved on to “focused” or 
“selective” coding, whereby I assigned thematic codes or categories.548 One of the 
earliest and most commonly recurring codes to emerge was “expectation” and I 
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 Peters (2014) at 5. 
547
 Ch 2, 2.9. 
548
 See Appendix 3. 
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consolidated terms such as anger, disappointment, and entitlement under this heading.
  
The emergence of expectation as a key thematic code was unsurprising for two 
reasons: firstly, without expectation, no sense of disinheritance arises; and, secondly, 
expectation has already been shown to be a highly contentious issue in other 
studies.
549
 Rowlingson, for example, observed that participants demonstrated a 
“reluctance” to use the word “expect” in relation to inheritance, which, she posited, 
related to a view that people should not see inheritance as a right.
550
 However, while 
dominant social mores precluded participants from openly admitting to expecting an 
inheritance, many clearly did and expectation was a constant thread in the 
discussions.  
 
Stereotypically, expectation is viewed as residing in the “grasping” adult child, from 
whom the “vulnerable” parent requires protection. This trope is deeply entrenched 
and many participants were keen to distance themselves from it. However, without 
wishing to minimise instances of financial abuse of elderly relatives by family 
members,
551
 several studies have shown that adult children demonstrated no desire to 
see their parents curtail their living standards in order to leave an inheritance.
552
 
Instead, children’s expectations arise from the belief that, where assets remain, they 
have a claim on these assets.  
 
Finally, one of the key findings in relation to expectation was that it existed as much, 
if not more, in the minds of the participants who were parents, who were, for the large 
part, clear that they expected to be able to leave assets to their children. This was 
particularly evident when parents saw this expectation threatened, either by the 
prospect of paying for elder care or by the idea of a spouse remarrying. Both of these 
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 Rowlingson and McKay (2005), 4; Finch and Mason (2000), 60. 
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 Rowlingson and McKay (2005), 4. 
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 Financial abuse of elderly relatives is considered to be an under-reported phenomenon. See for, 
example, Equality Scotland, Elder Abuse – Raising Awareness, (2014), available at 
http://www.equalityscotland.com/5/22/News/Elder-Abuse-Raising-Awareness.html. 
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 See for example, Finch and Mason (2000), 120. 
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questions will be addressed later in this thesis,
553
 while this chapter will first 
concentrate on expectation from the perspective of the putative beneficiary.
554
 
4.3.1 Tacit versus explicit expectation 
 
As discussed above, inheriting from parents was viewed more as an inevitability than 
the result of an active bequest. Carol’s explanation of her inheritance (“well, I’m an 
only child and my mother and father have both passed away”) was mirrored by other 
participants explaining why they had – or had not (yet) – inherited. Consider the 
following excerpt from a discussion group comprising media professionals: 
 
 Interviewer: Have you ever inherited?  
 Simon: You mean from my parents, kind of thing? 
 Interviewer: From anybody really.  
Simon: Yes, yes. I was effectively an only child so I inherited my parent’s 
estate, 20 years ago or so, which included a house in Cornwall. 
 Interviewer: What about yourself? 
Gillian: No, I’ve still got my mum and dad but we’ve just gone through having 
to sell their house because they’ve both had to go into residential care. So 
whilst we’ve still got my mum and dad we’ve just waved our inheritance 
goodbye because basically they are allowed to keep 14k each. 
  
While the language used by these participants invited tacit acknowledgement of the 
inevitability of assets passing from parent to child, these same participants would 
likely be askance at the suggestion they expected or had expected an inheritance.  
 
Participants’ difficulty with explicitly acknowledging that they held expectations 
centred on an understanding of expectation as a byword for entitlement. This 
understanding proved difficult to displace and, despite attempts to ask participants 
whether they thought they might inherit – rather than whether they expected to inherit 
– they almost inevitably interpreted the question in terms of expectation. 
Consequently, it was often the case that, as soon as the discussion entered the terrain 
of how people thought their parents might dispose of their assets –or indeed how any 
parent might dispose of her assets – one participant would take the opportunity to 
                                                        
553
 See section 4.7 and Chapter 5 respectively. 
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 It is worth pointing out that since we are all potential beneficiaries, discussion viewed from this 
perspective, when not relating to individual cases, invariably means the perspective of wider society (a 
point made in Reid et al. (2015), 447). 
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assert her disapproval of expectation.
555
 In a discussion as to whether the parents of 
the disinherited child in scenario 2 had behaved fairly, Kathleen interjected to 
comment on her family: 
 
My mum and dad are late 70s, there’s three of us, and I don’t think it’s ever 
even been discussed. No-one cares, we just care about their health…It’s their 
money, they’ve worked, they’ve bought this house…One brother had a slight 
issue with it, but we just told him to shut it (laughter). They deserved it. 
 
Such statements had a powerful effect, often prompting other group members to 
convey that they too rejected the greed and cupidity that were felt to underpin 
expectation. For example, Gillian, who had previously remarked that she had waved 
her inheritance goodbye when her parents went into a nursing home, was quick to 
clarify that she certainly did not consider herself entitled to inherit: 
 
 Gillian: I don’t think anyone has a right to anything.  
 Simon: I think that’s absolutely spot on. 
 Kathleen: You are absolutely spot on, nobody has the right to anything. 
 
Clearly, while there is a difference between expecting a share of anything that is “left 
over” and expecting parents to forego their own happiness in order to provide an 
inheritance, the two were often confused in the minds of participants.   
 4.3.2 Direct personal experience 
 
It is noteworthy that those who condemned expectation the most roundly did not 
themselves appear to have had any experience of “missing out” on an inheritance. 
Moira, a financial officer from Glasgow, is a case in point. Moira recounted how 
upset her mother had been when Moira’s aunt left her entire estate to charity. Moira 
did not share her mother’s sense of having been wronged, and indeed seemed amused 
by her mother’s reaction: 
 
I know that one of my relatives decided that she would leave all of her money, 
including the value of her house, to the cat and dog home. And you just hear 
of these things happening and you actually don’t believe it ... it does. It was on 
my mum’s side of the family and she was livid. She was really livid. You 
know, there were people in the family who could have done with money... and 
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 This occurred in Groups 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.  
 113 
all that kind of thing ... and you are kind of going but it was hers! (laughs) and 
it was her decision to split it that way. You know, and if that’s what she 
wanted to do with it, then good on her.  
 
Not being directly involved, Moira simply viewed the story through conventional 
narratives that prize testamentary freedom and condemn expectation. 
 
In contrast, Maureen, who had had two difficult inheritance experiences, including 
one where she “lost out” to her father’s second wife, placed far more emphasis on the 
importance of “fairness” and the potential emotional fallout from thwarted 
expectations. In a follow-up interview, Maureen shared her reflections on her fellow 
participants’ reactions: 
 
I noticed that in my focus group. People seemed to talk about it as a detached 
thing, which is fine. You know, if your new stepmother takes all the rings and 
the money, well that would be her entitlement. They’ve clearly never had a 
stepmother take the money and the rings, you know (laughs). 
 
Participants like Moira and Simon appear to have inherited from their parents without 
incident and, as such, had not had to consider whether they harboured any 
expectations with regard to their parents’ estates or whether the rules were “fair.” In 
contrast, the experiences of participants such as Maureen provide meaningful insight 
into the potentially less desirable consequences of both the current legislative 
framework and the reform proposals.   
4.3.3 A generational divide 
 
A final point to be made with regard to expectation relates to whether a rejection of 
expectation – arguably also a rejection of family obligation – is particular to a specific 
generation. Moira’s tone in discussing her mother’s anger appeared to suggest that, to 
her mind, her mother’s outrage encapsulated the reactionary view of an older 
generation, a sentiment shared by Gordon. Having ensured that his only son – unable 
to work due to his bipolar disorder – would be adequately provided for, Gordon 
planned to leave the balance of his estate to charity, as opposed to other relatives. In 
discussing his decision, Gordon remarked that his mother would “really disapprove” 
of what he planned to do, as she had “a very narrow definition of where our caring 
should stop,” believing blood to be thicker than water.  
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As a qualitative study, this project was not designed to measure the prevalence of 
particular attitudes amongst particular generational cohorts. Nonetheless, Bill, who at 
80 was likely a member of the same generation as Moira’s and Gordon’s parents, was 
utterly incredulous that people were allowed to do as they wished with their money: 
 
Bill: I know an old lady the now, she stays along the road, according to my 
wife, she’s hersel’ and a wee dug. And I reckon that’s where her money’s 
goin’. The dog home. And I’ll tell you, she’s got a lot of money. Because she 
used to have a wee shop. We knew them personally when they had the shop. 
And I still know Ivy. Now, that goin’ to a dog home?! (incredulous)  
 
Of course, the difference in the worldview expressed by Bill (who would have 
preferred the money to go to a distant relative) and that expressed by Moira and 
Gordon, could be explained by factors other than the much-touted individualism of 
the babyboomer generation. Certainly, the desire to provide for family was not unique 
to the older generation, with parents of young children being amongst the least 
equivocal about the existence of parental duty to provide for children. This might 
suggest, as has been noted by Rowlingson and McKay, that attitudes reflect not only 
generational differences, but also the effects of the ageing process, with attitudes to 
the children’s entitlement ebbing and flowing in line with an individual’s priorities 
over the course of her lifetime.
556
 
4.4 Testamentary Freedom 
 
A second thematic code to emerge, and one that is closely linked to expectation, was 
testamentary freedom. The two are linked insofar as one of the principal objections to 
expectation was that it encroached on the individual’s right to choose how to dispose 
of her assets. A legal share for children gives legal force to expectation and can, 
therefore, be viewed as an affront to testamentary freedom. This was a significant 
concern for participants, as testamentary freedom was widely viewed in a positive 
light. In a sense, for many participants, their support for testamentary freedom was the 
corollary to their contempt for expectation. 
 
One of the difficulties in discussing testamentary freedom and forced heirship is that 
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they are often presented as being diametrically opposed. In their absolute form, 
testamentary freedom and forced heirship provisions are of course irreconcilable, but 
Scottish legal rights have only ever constituted a partial encroachment on that 
freedom.
557
 Furthermore, most people already accept limitations on their freedom to 
dispose of their assets: in life, few contest the duty to aliment children, or even to pay 
some form of income tax, while in death, spousal support through prior rights and the 
jus relicti/relictae has wide support. It may be more helpful not to view testamentary 
freedom and forced heirship provisions as opposites in constant tension, but to ask 
whether the two can co-exist in a manner that is acceptable to the majority of people. 
 
Overall, for the majority of participants these two competing concepts could be 
balanced. While testamentary freedom was prized, commitment to the concept varied 
significantly across a spectrum of contexts. This is not to suggest that the participants 
were fickle in their views, but rather that they were responsive to factors other than 
the inherent value of testamentary freedom. Two factors in particular influenced the 
participants in their decision-making process: their perception of the “fairness” of the 
outcome and their perception of the “deservingness” of the child. An “undeserving” 
child galvanised their commitment to testamentary freedom, while an “unfair” 
outcome saw some retreat from initially robust support. 
4.4.1 The “unfair” outcome 
 
Throughout the discussions, a number of participants struggled to reconcile their 
conceptions of “fairness” with their belief in testamentary freedom. This was 
particularly evident when they were confronted with real-life scenarios. A striking 
example of this is provided by a story Catriona related to her fellow participants in 
Group 5. Catriona’s mother in-law had acted as the executor for her aunt’s estate but, 
in fulfilling her role, engineered a change to the distribution of her aunt’s assets in 
order to achieve a “fairer” outcome. When the aunt died, pre-deceased by her own 
children but leaving behind two grandsons, she bequeathed the entire estate to one of 
the two grandsons. Catriona’s mother-in-law felt such an outcome was unacceptable 
and intervened to ensure that the estate was split equally between the two 
grandchildren: 
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 Interviewer: Did it cause a lot of bad blood then? 
Catriona: Well, Oliver’s parents managed to persuade the child that although 
that was their wishes that maybe wasn’t the right thing to do, so they 
eventually managed to find a way to explain to his brother that he was going 
to give him half of what he’d got…that was the outcome. 
 Interviewer: So it was settled rather than… 
Catriona: Rather than it being made explicit to one that he got nothing, they 
managed to kind of fluff over it. 
 Interviewer: Do you know why the grandparents did that? 
 Catriona: I think they just preferred him (laughs). 
 Sally: Wow.  
 Catriona: Hideous. 
 Lucy: Brutal. 
  
 
Although the participants in Group 5 later expressed support for testamentary 
freedom, the mother-in-law’s actions attracted no opprobrium: for these participants, 
when the testator failed to act fairly, she lost the right to have her wishes respected. 
This is not to criticise the participants, but to stress that, as families struggle to 
negotiate the vagaries of life and smooth the edges of conflict, theoretical principles 
seem less important.
558
  
 
In contrast, in speculating as to why a parent in a fictitious scenario had disinherited a 
child, it was virtually always assumed that the testator was kind and even-handed, 
untainted by human failing and impervious to the entrenched family politics of “real” 
families. Andy, for example, asserted that those who complained about not getting 
“their” inheritance were “being bitchy”; however, when recounting his own 
experiences, he later asserted that he was “very bitter” that his mother, who was 
separated from his father, had “ended up with about £15,000 more than I thought she 
deserved” at his expense.559 While reflecting on scenarios from which they were 
emotionally detached, testamentary freedom appeared an uncontroversial value; 
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 In the follow-up interview conducted with Maureen, she related that her aunt used different 
coloured stickers to designate which item was intended for which of her two children. Maureen 
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the operation of prior rights or through a family agreement, but the point remains that, when confronted 
with real life family disputes, participants were unsurprisingly less objective and their commitment to 
testamentary freedom depended on who they thought was in the right.  
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however, when reflecting on personal stories, the complexity of family relationships 
and old wounds came more readily to the fore and views were less absolute. It is 
precisely this sort of nuance that cannot be captured in a questionnaire-based survey, 
but which is invaluable in understanding societal expectations.  
4.4.2 The undeserving child 
 
The second factor to influence the participants’ attachment to testamentary freedom 
was the presence of a particularly undeserving child. The fictitious undeserving child 
assumed many guises, but most commonly presented as a drug addict, with several 
participants stating that it would be reasonable for parents to exclude an addict 
child,
560
 as “you know what they are going to do with it.” However, while the spectre 
of the undeserving heir loomed large, it appeared to be the exception rather than the 
norm: of the 37 participants, two related second-hand stories of addiction and one 
related a story of a “pure evil” stepbrother who had allegedly repeatedly “battered his 
dad, tried to kill him;” for others, family disputes appeared to cover the more prosaic 
territory of favouritism and jealousy.  
 
What was striking about the participants’ comments on testamentary freedom was that 
they defended not the parents’ right to dispose of their assets as they saw fit, but the 
right to have their superior judgment on matters relating to their children respected. 
With the exception of Simon, nobody suggested that parents might simply want to 
leave their assets to a charity or a friend. Instead, participants seemed to start from the 
premise that the parents would not have disinherited their children unless they had 
done something truly terrible or required protection from themselves.  
 
In scenario 1, for example, in which the testator left her entire estate to her second 
husband, the Group 2 participants did not focus on reasons that might have led the 
deceased to provide for her spouse, but instead on identifying why she had not 
provided for a child: 
 
Carol: I would wonder why a parent would cut a child out of a will. To me I 
would wonder why. 
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 118 
In other words, Carol could not conceive of this as an unremarkable decision, simply 
reflecting an average testator’s wishes. It deviated so far from her understanding of 
social norms that she could only conceptualise it as indicative of a severe relationship 
breakdown. In terms of potential triggers for such a relationship breakdown, the bar 
was set high, with Kathleen positing – half in jest – that it had perhaps been 
discovered that the child who had been disinherited in scenario 2 had been plotting to 
kill the parents.  
 
While the majority of the participants vacillated in their view depending on the facts 
at hand, three were prepared to adopt a categorical position. In Group 3, Simon and 
Kathleen were ardent supporters of testamentary freedom, and given that it enjoyed 
wide support, their view tended to ride roughshod over any dissent on the matter. The 
following is an excerpt from a discussion on scenario 2, in which the parents had 
disinherited one of their three children, whom they believed had hurt and humiliated 
them: 
 
 Interviewer: Do you think the parents behaved fairly? 
Simon: My answer is I’m not interested in judging whether they’ve behaved 
fairly. It’s none of my business. If that’s what they’ve decided and I think they 
should be allowed to decide how they wish. 
 Voices: Yes, yes. I agree. 
Kevin: I think if all children have a legal right to inheritance...Should that be 
overridden in circumstances like this? I don’t know (sounding unconvinced). 
 Voice: It’s a really difficult one… 
Gillian: Today I’ve fallen out with this daughter so I change my will. In five 
years time we’re all happy families again and I forgot to change my will 
back... 
Kathleen: Well, it’s your own fault. I just think the will stays. Honestly, I think 
you should give people more credit for what they choose and I don’t think 
children have a say in it. She’s highly successful, is that also extremely 
wealthy, and they know that, and the other two maybe aren’t. And she’s not 
been very supportive, then, no, sorry. 
 Simon: Go, Kathleen! (laughter) 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, John was the only participant to embrace forced 
heirship wholeheartedly. As will be discussed below, many participants ultimately 
came down on the side of maintaining a legal share for children, but not without first 
expressing some angst that their position offended the principle of testamentary 
freedom. John, however, was unconcerned by this:  
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Even if I did feel antipathy towards them I would hope, I would want it to be, 
that I would not be able to do anything against my wife, my children or my 
grandchildren, to exclude someone because of a dislike, that should not be 
allowed, you should not be allowed to disqualify a child or a grandchild...or a 
good friend from your will. 
 
What was particularly striking was that John suggested his views on family obligation 
stemmed from his lack of education. In response to comments Gordon made on the 
ills of inheritance, he remarked, “I know, I agree that I’m not an intellectual and 
therefore probably things bypass my thinking process.” 
 
The attitudes the participants displayed towards testamentary freedom were similar to 
those identified in the NatCen study. In their discussion of attitudes to testamentary 
freedom, the NatCen researchers identified support for three main views: complete 
testamentary freedom, the ability to challenge in some cases, and the ability to 
challenge in all cases. Those who supported absolute testamentary freedom felt that 
“free will was more important than relative need or the responsibility to provide for 
family;” those who supported circumstantial ability to challenge prioritised fairness 
and avoiding “hurt or harm;” and, those who accepted an ability to challenge in all 
circumstances prioritised “maintaining lineage” and retaining property within the 
family “as a way of keeping the family together.”561 
 
While these reasons are unsurprising, they differ slightly from those expressed in my 
research insofar as my sample included no reference to lineage and, as explained 
above, the participants in my study did not necessarily conceptualise free will as 
being more important than family obligation.
562
 There is no doubt that free will was 
important, but certain participants primarily saw it as a means of allowing testators to 
exercise their family obligations in a particularly judicious fashion, as opposed to 
allowing them free rein to do as they pleased. In this sense inheritance was an act of 
parenting: testators had to protect drug addicts from themselves and ensure that “bad” 
children were not rewarded for their misdemeanours.  
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legal systems: testamentary freedom in England is not tempered by legal rights and so testamentary 
freedom is absolute (subject to a claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) 
Act 1975. 
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Of course, while scenarios of abusive children (or indeed spouses) remain an 
important mental stumbling block to embracing automatic entitlements, a relatively 
simple solution does present itself. A number of jurisdictions, including Scotland, 
have provisions to prevent a killer inheriting from his victim.
563
 In some jurisdictions, 
this principle has been extended to include “lesser” crimes of neglect and 
abandonment, either towards children or towards vulnerable adults.
564
 Eight US states 
have also enacted elder abuse disinheritance statutes.
565
 While undoubtedly requiring 
further examination,
566
 such provisions have an obvious appeal insofar as they operate 
by automatically including children, excluding them only where justified, as opposed 
to excluding all children for fear of including an “unworthy” heir. This would 
preserve Scotland’s historic protection of children’s rights whilst mitigating the very 
real concern expressed by certain participants that automatic entitlements allow 
unworthy heirs to inherit.  
 
In conclusion, on close analysis, it appeared that most participants objected more 
strongly to the “wrong” child receiving an inheritance than they did to parents being 
forced to make some provision for their children. In light of this, ensuring that an 
undeserving child never inherits by removing inheritance rights from all children 
seems to be a somewhat extreme response.  
4.4.3 Legitim 
 
While the views discussed above relate to participants’ views on testamentary 
freedom in general, an attempt was made to focus on legitim in particular. Dot Reid 
has referred to legal rights as the “best kept secret”567 in Scots law and indeed few 
participants appeared to have heard of such a right. Certainly, there was no sense that 
this was an issue the participants had considered at length and, perhaps because of 
this, views were measured, even reticent. Furthermore, having explored the arguments 
for and against testamentary freedom, some participants appeared reluctant to 
                                                        
563
 Succession (Scotland) Act 2016 s.12.  
564
 See, for example, Uniform Probate Code s 2-114. 
565
 Hunt, T, “Disincentivizing elder abuse through disinheritance: revamping California Probate Code 
s259 and using it as a model,” (2014) 2 BYU Law Review 445 at 446. 
566
 As will be discussed in Chapter 6, there are not inconsiderable downsides to the use of discretion. 
567
 Reid (2008) at 396. 
 121 
comment on legitim, perhaps because they understood the system would, at times, 
inevitably deliver the “wrong” outcome. Given their obvious reluctance to pronounce 
a definitive opinion, it appeared unethical to press them to do so. 
 
Nevertheless, a handful of participants did engage directly with the question and, 
while some adamantly maintained that each case turned on its own merits,
568
 those 
who accepted the need for a generally applicable rule concluded, on balance, that the 
benefits of legal rights outweighed the disadvantages. Caroline’s comments are 
typical:
569
 
 
For every case that this is a good idea for, there will also be a couple it’s a bad 
idea for. Someone who has been a terrible, terrible child and done awful 
things, unfortunately they are still entitled to the money who should’ve been 
cut out. Sometimes you have to sacrifice a few cases where it’s not a good 
idea in order for it to be for most people. So it’s probably a good thing. 
 
For some participants, reaching this conclusion was more difficult. Ron reported that 
he had “a fairly hard attitude” on certain questions relating to inheritance, although he 
was confident in his assessments as he considered his views to flow from “objective 
fairness,” rather than emotion. Early on in the conversation, he stated his preference 
for testamentary freedom, saying that it was “always better if people can decide for 
themselves how they want it to be.” Nevertheless, when pushed to decide whether it 
was better to have some form of automatic share as opposed to unfettered freedom, he 
eventually came down on the side of a legal share: 
 
Interviewer: Given you have to have some rule do you think it’s fair enough 
that you have some provision? 
Ron: I fully understand the need for it because if you didn’t have it I think 
you’d have some pretty dire situations, but you’ve got remember that some 
people can handle things more rationally than others, you’ve got the situation 
where spite starts to come in, all sorts of thing. On balance, I think you do 
need a safety net but personally I would like to be in control of how things are 
disbursed. 
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Ron, like most people, viewed himself as best placed to regulate his own life. Indeed, 
for the majority of participants, the rule was needed for other people: all considered 
themselves to be even-handed and fair-minded. 
 
The above is not to suggest that every participant would support legal rights, there is 
certainly room to believe that Simon and Kathleen would reject the concept.
570
 
However, time constraints and the natural flow of conversation did not allow every 
participant to be asked to reflect on the question.  
 
In summary, it cannot be concluded that participants consider testators to have an 
absolute duty not to disinherit their children, but it is equally clear that few—if any—
of the participants would consider disinheriting their own children. Gladys, for 
example, observed, “I don’t know. I can’t conceive of ever cutting out my children 
completely,” while Ron remarked he couldn’t “imagine a situation where you would 
disown your own child to that point that you wouldn’t recognise genuine need.” In 
this my own findings mirror the conclusions that Dot Reid drew in her analysis of the 
available research, namely that “there is little to suggest that Scottish parents would 
consider themselves currently under a ‘legal disability’ in being unable to disinherit 
their children”.571  
4.5 The testator’s duty 
 
When expectation and entitlement were examined from the perspective of the 
potential recipient, two strands of consistent but conflicting thought emerged. Firstly, 
testators were free to dispose of their assets as they pleased and were under no 
obligation to curtail their spending in order to provide an inheritance. However, 
although almost all participants supported testamentary freedom, some also implicitly 
expressed the view that it should be respected only as long as it was exercised 
judiciously and fairly. This second narrative was based on an expectation that, unless 
there were sound reasons to do otherwise, parents would pass at least some assets to 
their children upon the death of the second parent. 
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This expectation exists in part as a corollary to the normative view that a parent has a 
duty towards his children. Historically, this duty was considered self-evident, with 
Stair freely condemning those who breached it as “worse than infidels.”572 However, 
in contemporary society, the language of duty was approached with considerable 
caution as, like forced heirship, duty is a concept that can offend personal autonomy. 
Furthermore, in recounting their personal decision to provide bequests for their 
children, most participants identified their motivations as love and a desire to provide, 
as opposed to any sense of duty. As what they felt was the “right” thing to do 
corresponded with what they wanted to do, the question of duty did not often 
explicitly arise in their retelling of their own will-making process. Nevertheless, a 
sense of duty clearly existed: while participants defended testamentary freedom, many 
also disapproved of the behaviour of the characters in the scenarios for failing in what 
can only be considered their implicit duty. 
 
Although it might have been anticipated that there would be as many conceptions of 
duty as there were participants, there was a great deal of commonality in the central 
views expressed. Four main duties were identified: the duty to make a will; the duty 
to treat all members of a given class of beneficiaries equally; the duty to provide for 
family; and, the duty to prioritise family. These duties, while enjoying wide support, 
were, of course, not unanimously agreed upon; however, where they were supported, 
they were often also viewed as part of the greater duty to be a good parent. 
4.5.1 The duty to make a will 
 
One of the first duties to emerge was the duty an individual has to take the time to 
make a will. A total of 24 (65%) of the 37 participants in the study had wills and there 
was a clear sense that this was the reasonable and responsible path to follow. While 
there was a general consensus that having a will was a “good” thing, a small but 
significant group were nonetheless relaxed about not having a will, as they were 
confident the “law” would sort it out for them. In stark contrast to this group, another 
similarly-sized group was quite stern about what they viewed as people’s 
irresponsibility in not having a will.  
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When Group 1 was presented with scenario 4 which involved a man dying intestate, 
survived by a wife he had met five years before his death and two adult children from 
his first marriage, the prevailing attitude was that the deceased would be upset by the 
exclusion of his children by the statutory regime but that he had only himself to 
blame.
573
 Consequently, they had little sympathy for him and were instead bemused 
as to how somebody could have allowed such a situation to occur: 
 
Tom: What’s sticking out a mile is that from two people who are supposedly 
switched on and have a bit of money, they should have been taking 
professional advice, they should be going to a meeting with the lawyer and the 
financial advisor and saying here’s the situation, we have children, and their 
question should be, do you want to make provision for the children. And the 
answer usually would be oh yes, so you write that into the will and you don’t 
have this scenario here where the children are having to make this challenge. 
That’s my take on it.  
  
Although fellow participant John was empathetic to the fictitious deceased, pointing 
out that people can get swamped by daily life without being negligent or foolish, his 
was the minority view in this group.
574
  
 
Maureen, having been in this situation herself, expressed a similar view, albeit in less 
strident tones. Her explanation of the details of her father’s will was unclear, but it 
appears that a will that was originally drafted to benefit his first wife—Maureen’s 
mother—ultimately benefited his second wife. Maureen expressed frustration that her 
father had not reacted to his changed circumstances and updated his will accordingly: 
 
There was £10,000 that my brother and I both got immediately, which was 
great, lovely, and the rest was in liferent and trust and it was really 
uncomfortable then and I think she [Maureen’s step-mother] felt really 
uncomfortable and we had some difficult conversations. She was very stressed 
about it, I was quite stressed about it as well. I thought my dad was very lazy 
and not paid attention to his business and I think he should have. 
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For Maureen, her father had failed in his duty: it was his duty, as a partner and a 
father, to anticipate and manage what she interpreted as having been a foreseeable 
problem.   
 
The participants all appeared to feel that writing a will was something they should do, 
with many expressing embarrassment that they had not yet done so. For example, 
despite all efforts to provide reassurance, Lauren admonished herself for not having 
written a will, insisting, “but it’s not good, you should have it sorted”. For some 
participants this related to control and to ensuring an unnecessary burden did not fall 
on surviving relatives; however, for many it also—and sometimes exclusively—
related to parenting. Indeed, while many participants discussed inheritance in terms of 
providing for their children, only two referenced the need to protect their spouse as 
well as their children. This is not to say that the other spouses did not care for each 
other, rather that they did not consider assets passing from one spouse to another as 
constituting an inheritance. Instead, they simply assumed that what once belonged to 
both parties would become the sole property of the surviving spouse.
575
 As such, for 
the participants, writing a will was primarily to control what would happen when both 
parties died and, in the case of all the participants in this study, this involved making 
sure it went to their children. 
 
While notions of parenting were present in the minds of older participants, providing 
for children was a particularly acute concern for younger participants. Sally, for 
example, explained how she and her husband were one day struck by the realisation 
that they needed to write a will to ensure their children would be provided for if they 
died: 
 
[A]nd we both thought, at exactly the same time, we might die tonight and we 
both thought we’ve got to do something about this as we’ll probably go off on 
our own more and more as the kids get older and so, just in case, the worst 
case scenario, we need to know that they are OK, well not OK, but as provided 
for as we can if that happened basically. It was horrible. 
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Ironically, this same desire to protect their children was also cited by some 
participants as a reason for not having a will. Sally was the only one of the seven 
participants in the 30-40 age bracket to have a will and, of the remaining six, three 
specifically stated that they did not have a will as they could not decide who to 
appoint guardian of their children: 
 
 Interviewer; Do you have a will at all? 
Catriona: No, it’s hilarious, we’re both chartered accountants. We don’t but 
the reason we’ve not really felt any urgency is that every time we’ve looked at 
what the default position would be we’re probably quite happy with that... But 
having said that, for some reason, Oliver in particular has delayed it because 
he seems to think we have to put in it who will look after the kids. 
Lucy: That’s exactly why we haven’t done ours! That’s exactly why we 
haven’t done ours! 
 Catriona: I don’t know, maybe that’s a barrier for a lot of people. 
   
 
Laura provided a similar explanation, citing a lack of time and endlessly “humming 
and hawing” over guardianship. 
 
Given that the discussion in Group 1 had focused primarily on the transmission of 
property, these comments—where assets were so clearly secondary to care—were 
initially surprising. However, the difference can likely be explained by the age of the 
participants involved: these women were all in their 30s and all had young children, 
whereas those with whom I had first spoken were in their late 50s or 60s. While the 
latter were more concerned with providing support and demonstrating affection, the 
former viewed a will first and foremost as a means of establishing who would assume 
the parental role.  
 
This is not to say that the transmission of property was absent from the minds of the 
participants in the younger age cohort. However, whereas they might have been 
expected to consider the role of property in providing aliment for their young 
children, they appeared to view it in the same way as the older parents, namely as a 
means of providing a financial cushion for the children when they reached adulthood. 
Caroline and Laura, for example, both stated that everything would be split between 
their two children, but they both specified that this would not be accessible to the 
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children until they reached the age of majority, appearing to presume that 
grandparents, aunts and uncles would assume the cost of raising them until that point. 
 
The commentary surrounding the duty to provide for young children is important as it 
suggests that the SLC’s proposal may be out of line with public attitudes. While there 
is no doubt that parents want to ensure that their dependent children are provided for, 
they see this being achieved through life insurance policies
576
 and appointing family 
members as guardians. The purpose of bequeathing assets to a young child is the same 
as bequeathing assets to an adult child: a token of love and a “cushion” against future 
financial hardship.  
4.5.2 The duty to treat children equally 
 
While Scots law provides siblings with equal baseline protection from disinheritance 
through legitim, no legal requirement mandates parents to provide equally for their 
children. Nevertheless, a strong normative requirement does appear to operate. 
Indeed, based on the findings of their English study, Finch and Mason reported that 
“the impulse to equal treatment” is “almost invariable” in relationships of direct 
descent.
577
 As will be discussed below, my research findings suggest that Scottish 
parents experience a similar impulse, with all of the participants who had children 
reporting either that their will already provided equally for their children or that, when 
they wrote a will, it would provide equally for their children. 
 
This does not mean that the participants felt that all parents had a duty to provide 
equally for their children. Certainly, when confronted with scenario 2, where one 
child had provided considerably more support to her parents than her sisters had, the 
majority of participants had no difficulty with the “deserving” child being given the 
lion’s share of the parents’ estates. However, although the participants respected the 
fictitious parents’ right to differentiate, they did not, in practice, grant themselves the 
same degree of latitude.  
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In this the results were similar to my findings on disinheritance where participants 
recognised that parents had a moral right to disinherit terrible children, but struggled 
to imagine a scenario where they would avail themselves of this discretion. While 
disinheritance is absolute – and it is therefore understandable that parents wished to 
avoid it – it is perhaps surprising that they were so reluctant to differentiate between 
children in their own family life. After all, at first blush, differentiation is not 
necessarily indicative of a broken relationship. Indeed, participants identified four 
categories of potentially acceptable reasons for differentiating between children, each 
of which is examined below. Nevertheless, while these grounds were prima facie 
uncontroversial, participants found it difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate 
between their own children.  
4.5.2.1 Equality of outcome  
 
Although equal treatment is the general rule for most people, equality of outcome is 
also commonly considered an acceptable means of achieving fairness.
578
  The 
following excerpt of a discussion between Tom and John provides examples of two 
opposing views on the question: 
 
John: I hinted at that. I think that in spite of that [referring to family dispute in 
scenario 2] children should still be treated the same. 
Tom: I take the opposite view. If someone’s been nasty to their parents and the 
rest of the family and is highly successful in their own right I would make 
proportionate differentials. End of story (Laughs). 
 John: That’s the business head talking 
Tom: It probably is actually. It’s probably a wee bit more hard-headed that 
what you’re saying about everyone getting treated equally. I don’t agree with 
that. For the same reason, if somebody has an illness or something, I’ve got 
something in my own family like that, I would think that I would make a 
provision on that side of things, knowing that their need was greater.  
John: How good or how bad your children are, that’s an opinion, and I 
wouldn’t like to trust my opinions too much so what I’m saying is treat them 
all equally. 
 
These two fundamentally disagreed, with John arguing that children should inherit 
purely based on status, in part to protect them from the whims of a vindictive or 
mistaken testator. Tom, however, viewed decisions on testation as the sole 
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prerogative of the testator and, when asked whether his children would understand his 
view, he replied “they’ll bloody well have to (laughs). I’m in charge. I’m in charge”.  
 
It is noteworthy that, although Tom placed the emphasis on being in charge when he 
spoke of his own family, his aim was not to establish his dominance, but to protect the 
interests of a vulnerable family member and to create a certain equality of outcome. 
He was motivated by his conception of good parenting, as opposed to signalling 
which child he preferred. Interestingly, although Tom stated that he would make more 
generous provision for a child with greater need—and acknowledged that he had such 
a situation in his family—he also stated that his own estate would be split equally 
between his children. This is not to say that Tom does not plan to amend his will, or 
that he has not made other non-testamentary provision, but simply to stress that there 
is a strong bias in favour of equal treatment which is not disregarded lightly even 
when there is valid reason for doing so. 
 
June and Gordon were also of the view that equality of outcome was more important 
than providing equal shares: 
 
June: Do you remember when my brother-in-law said to you, as if it were 
taken for granted, that he was going to leave his money equally to each of his 
three children and we said don’t do that. He’s got a son who’s a banker, he’s a 
director of Credit Suisse... 
 Gordon...ridiculous! 
June...and a wee girl who had an illness, in fact the other one...No, leave him a 
token something but it’s the girls that need the money. 
 
June and Gordon’s example is interesting as it touches not only on mitigating 
inequality of outcome based on disability or illness, but also inequality based on 
different economic success. 
 
While Gordon and June had no qualms about differentiating between children based 
on material wealth (regardless of illness), other participants flagged it as a question 
that could generate tension. Lucy related that her parents do not always tell her older 
brother – who has had a very financially successful career – about financial assistance 
they provide to her and her younger brother. She remarked that her brother had 
“always been kind of obsessed with exactly what’s fair”, refusing to accept his 
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parents’ belief that you “do not need to provide equally for people...[as long as]...there 
is an overall fairness.” Her brother instead believed that he had “worked hard to put 
himself in the position that he’s in” and should therefore “benefit equally” from his 
parents’ largesse.  
 
Perhaps the most surprising example of unequal treatment came from Lucy’s husband 
Chris. Chris was raised by his grandparents, who left their house to Chris and his 
father, making only a small cash provision for Chris’s uncle. The decision caused 
irreparable damage to family relations and Chris’s father and uncle have not spoken 
since the death of their parents, some 20 years ago. Chris, who throughout the 
interview showed considerable sensitivity to issues of family conflict, nevertheless 
seemed somewhat at a loss as to why a grudge had been held for so long. Although 
his uncle was left “something like £2000” while he and his father were left a house 
that was worth £160,000 15 years ago (and £600,000 today) he felt that has gran and 
granddad were “spot on” as his father’s economic needs were greater: 
 
Interviewer: Did it surprise you then that your dad didn’t give his brother 
money.  
Chris: Not really. I think my gran and granddad were spot on. Uncle Dave was 
in the army for 22 years so he has the army pension. So that was always their 
thinking. I can remember my granddad saying that to me. 
 Interviewer: And do you think your granddad said it to Uncle Dave. 
Chris: I don’t think so. I think it came as a bolt from the blue and I think they 
thought there was more money than there was...It was dead sad. But then 
again, I say it was dead sad and I find it sad from a kind of general point of 
view but at the same time my dad and my uncle are ten years apart so they 
were never close. They were never dead good pals or anything and my 
dad...Dave was 10 years older, in the army for 22 years, institutionalised, very 
very different character from my dad. My dad’s very laid back and likes sport 
and likes to drink and has drifted through life… 
 
Chris said that, to this day, his father remained “completely puzzled” by his uncle’s 
attitude and lamented his uncle’s refusal to discuss the situation, despite his repeated 
attempt to bridge relations. 
 
Chris’s story speaks again to the sense of expectation that children have that they will 
inherit, based on status alone, no matter how misplaced or “unreasonable” others may 
hold that expectation to be. However, his reaction to the story was surprising in that, 
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while the majority of participants approved of parents having the freedom to decide to 
“reward” one child, they also understood that the siblings who had “missed out” may 
not remain equanimous in the face of the perceived slight. Commenting on scenario 2, 
for example, Olga observed that if the family were already quite “divided” favouring 
one child could exacerbate tensions.  
 
An Australian study on family litigation suggests these concerns are not unfounded: 
in 2011, Vines found that cases in which disproportionate costs were found in 
succession litigation (generally cases where mediation had failed) were most likely to 
occur in disputes between siblings.
579
 This is unsurprising as “an unequal inheritance 
disrupts…what the disappointed beneficiary thought was a secure attachment 
relationship with their parent” and “marks out one child as a ‘loser’ in the ‘parental-
love competition.’”580 
4.5.2.2 Atone for prior wrong  
 
A second reason for differentiating between children was highlighted by Laura, who 
reported that her friend and her friend’s two siblings had been “disinherited” by their 
father in favour of the children of one of the two siblings. The friend and the other 
sibling did not have children. Laura reported that, even although the deceased was 
motivated by “a feeling that he never gave them (the grandchildren) anything, he 
never gave them any time or wasn’t a proper granddad,” her friend found it to be “a 
hard pill to swallow,” particularly as the friend was struggling financially while 
grandchildren were not.
581
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4.5.2.3. The deserving child 
 
Another reason for deviating from the standard practice of treating all children 
equally is to reward a particularly kind or hardworking child. As adult children are 
increasingly called upon to look after ageing parents, this may be seen as an entirely 
reasonable outcome. Certainly, when discussing scenario 2, numerous participants 
commented that it was reasonable for Ines to receive a larger share of the parents’ 
estate than her sisters. Carol made the following observation: 
 
I would have liked Ines to have got more than just an equal share with Karima 
because she was the one who was doing the caring on a daily basis and I think 
it’s a shame that the parents didn’t show their recognition of that. 
 
However, this view is not universal, and some studies also suggest a considerable 
degree of discomfort with attaching a monetary value to providing family care.
582
  
 
The question of the relative entitlement of the “hard-working” sibling was one that 
several participants had contemplated in their own families. Mary, for example, said 
that she had wanted her sister to have her share of her parents’ estate, as the sister had 
“been the one that’s been doing all the looking after, seeing they were OK, checking 
in on them all the time….”. Her sister, however, refused to accept this offer. 
Similarly, John wanted to see his siblings rewarded commensurately for the assistance 
they provided to his mother. However, in these instances, the proposed unequal 
distribution was directed not by the parent but was being negotiated sibling to sibling, 
as an expression of one sibling’s gratitude to another. 
 
In contrast to John and Mary, Catriona cast herself in the role of the hard-working 
sibling, explaining that her active involvement in the family business gave her a 
greater claim on her father’s estate than her “lazy” sister who “chose not to be 
involved”. However, although she felt resentment at having worked “for the jersey” 
she understood her father’s impulse to share his estate equally. She described the 
situation as “fair...but not fair” but seemed to draw comfort from her father having 
recognised that it was a difficult decision: 
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But equally my dad has said to me, you know, the tendency is to want to do , 
this and this and give you this but it won’t really matter what I do I know 
you’d do the right thing. 
 
While there was a general acceptance that helping parents was a good and noble thing 
to do, some were uncertain that this gave children a particular entitlement. This view 
was particularly strong amongst those who did not live near their parents. Caroline, 
who moved from Scotland to Canada, defended Karima’s entitlement, even although 
geography meant she did less for her mother than Ines. In Caroline’s mind, this did 
not reduce Karima’s entitlement and she saw any redistribution as a matter to be 
negotiated between the siblings: 
 
Well, it’s hard. Everyone makes their own life choices and you kind of have to 
accept the repercussions of your choices. Karima didn’t have to move, but 
there is nothing wrong with moving, she did have regular contact with her 
parents at least .... Maybe Ines might get slipped some money by Karima, who 
knows, but when you have children … you raise children to be individuals and 
if one of them moves away to the other side of the world that’s … you can’t 
really penalize them for that. That’s their choice. 
 
For her part, Sally expressed disquiet that her siblings may inherit more than her if 
they help her parents more simply by dint of their geographic proximity: 
 
It’s a funny one, because I would have a real issue because my brother and 
sister both live very close to my mum and dad … So I think I would have a bit 
of an issue if it was like oh actually to inherit as much as my siblings I have to 
live in Northumberland and be there every weekend and do that sort of stuff. 
And I sort of think, yeah … if that is part of the deal it has to be said before 
hand, because otherwise it’s like, oh, ok and then I’d have to drastically 
change my relationship with my parents in order to inherit. 
 
For Caroline and Sally, who are both in their late 30s, caring for elderly parents was 
still a relatively distant concern and their views may change over their life course. 
Regardless, with an increasingly globalised workforce and an ageing population, this 
could prove an increasing source of tension between siblings.  
4.5.2.4 Age 
 
A fourth ground for differentiating between children is age. This is particularly 
important in light of the SLC’s proposal to abolish legitim and replace it with an 
 134 
alimentary provision for dependent children.
583
 As was discussed above, a number of 
participants indicated that they did not view the purpose of inheritance as providing 
for the daily costs of raising children. This is not to say that anyone objected to 
dependent children being provided with support, but simply that this was not seen as 
the primary function of inheritance.
584
 Instead, the participants appeared to view it as 
a means of reinforcing an emotional bond between parent and child. For this reason, 
Caroline wanted to see siblings treated equally, irrespective of age: 
 
I don’t think one person should get more. I think it should be equal. She’s five 
now but eventually she will be 21 so I don’t think it’s fair to reward her for 
being young. I think probably it’s best to be fair. The one thing I would say 
though is that I would probably keep it in trust for a child until they were old 
enough to use it in a sensible, meaningful way. 
 
Not all participants shared this view and Simon, the staunchest supporter of unfettered 
testamentary freedom, appeared to support the SLC’s recommendation, suggesting 
that provision for minor children was the only acceptable ground on which to depart 
from testamentary freedom. 
 
Nevertheless, although the majority of the participants recognised that people could 
have sound reasons for differentiating between their children, Finch and Mason’s 
finding of equal treatment was the norm for these participants. Finch and Mason 
interpret the act of bequeathing to children as “the symbol of a lifetime’s commitment 
as a parent,”585  an observation that goes some way to explaining why people express 
hurt over being overlooked by a parent—or treated less favourably—even when they 
understand there is reason for doing so. Sally takes this a step further, arguing that 
inheritance is a symbol of love: 
 
because I suppose money does sort of like…it can equate, well when we’re 
talking about this, it equates with love in some ways 
 
Sally’s observation resonated with her group and encapsulates a well-established 
belief that parents are supposed to love their children equally. 
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4.5.3 Equal treatment at each class of relative 
 
Finch and Mason observed that the principle of equal treatment applies not only to 
children, but to grandchildren, and this finding was echoed in my study. This norm 
has already been discussed in relation to Catriona,
586
 and another example is found in 
a story related by Maureen. Maureen and her family looked after her mother-in-law 
for a number of years and, when she passed, the estate made provision for Maureen’s 
husband, Rob, his brother, his sister and his sister’s children. Although Maureen 
understood her mother-in-law’s rationale for providing for Rob’s sister’s children - 
the sister was considered to be irresponsible with money - she was hurt by it: 
 
And part of the problem was she’d lived with us for four years and we’d cared 
for her full-time in every sense of the word...I don’t resent that for a minute 
because I loved her dearly and it was a pleasure to have her in our lives for 
that length of time ... she has four [grandchildren] and, quite rightly I think, 
Rob’s mum and dad had made provision for her [the sister’s] children thinking 
they wouldn’t see any of the money, she would fritter it all away...But she 
didn’t do that for our ... for any of the other grandchildren, so there were some 
real issues over that, how it felt … But you have to kind of stop yourself 
because the intention behind it was really sound. She was very fair. But I’ve 
never told my children that because I thought, I don’t really want them to 
think .... So what I did was I just gave them some money to buy themselves 
something nice to remember their grandma by. Because I think they would 
feel quite upset about it ... 
   
4.5.4 The family safety net 
 
The duties to write a will and to treat children equally were considered by participants 
as part of a broader duty to be a responsible and just parent. For some participants, a 
third component of parental obligation was the duty to provide a family safety net, 
where resources allowed. Other studies have shown that participants were often 
divided between those who thought that the better parent is the one who teaches her 
children autonomy and those who argued that part of parenting is providing a safety 
net.
587
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Both arguments were rehearsed in my study, but the latter resonated more strongly 
with the participants, particularly those who saw themselves as members of the “lucky 
generation.” Although there was general agreement with Andy’s observation that 
“you can only make your own way in life,” some participants felt there was a duty to 
ensure a safety net for family: 
 
I see it also from another view point. We can’t be sure how well off our 
children/ grandchildren are going to be. This is why I like to pass on money or 
whatever. But the interesting thing, or corollary to that is that I had nothing as 
a kid, absolutely nothing. I’m not going to go on about how poor I was, but 
I’m just saying that I have very very deep memories of just how awful it was, 
missing out all the time...I don’t resent it but I’m aware that it’s there it 
probably influences how I think. You don’t know what’s round the corner… 
Listen, it’s like a wee safeguard. 
 
Lauren was even more forthright on this matter, stating that she did understand 
parents to have a duty. Her comments were made unbidden, in response to being 
asked whether she could envisage disinheritng her son: 
 
What could be that bad? Things happen in life. Unless they’ve committed 
murder or killed your cat or something (laughs)…  I think it’s your 
responsibility as a parent, even if you are not in that child’s life, that when you 
leave, if you’ve got anything to leave, there should be something goes to them. 
I think you should. They didn’t ask to come into this world, you chose, even if 
it was a fluke or an accident, but you still ... it’s your responsibility if there is 
anything left when you are going. I would say so.  
 
This again suggests that, contrary to the SLC’s opinion that parents are hobbled 
legally by their inability to sever ties with their children, parents voluntarily assume 
what has been described as a “no exit” relationship.588  
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Finally, it is noteworthy that both Lauren and John self-identified as having grown up 
with very little. While inheritance can be perceived as the purview of the rich, some 
of the participants who expressed the strongest attachment to notions of parental duty 
were those who came from families that had little, or had little themselves. Two of the 
participants, Malcolm and Gillian, tied their parents’ desire to leave a bequest to what 
they termed their “working-class” culture. Gillian explained her father’s view as 
follows: 
 
He worked for BT, he was your average Joe, as you would say, working class 
Glasgow man, but he was sensible with his money, you know, didn’t waste it. 
I think what upset my mum, not so much my dad as he didn’t particularly 
understand it by this point, but what upset my mum was the fact that, in their 
generation, as a working class family, it was that you worked hard and, you 
know, at the end of your days you had something to show for it and you gave 
it to your family. 
 
Any attempt to assign a particular worldview to a particular group in society is 
fraught with difficulty; nevertheless, it is worth noting that those who had spoken of 
financial difficulty in their life, or self-identified as a “working class” family—
whatever the term may mean to that individual—also seemed more willing to identify 
themselves as having a duty to their children. In contrast, opinions were more divided 
amongst those who appeared to speak from positions of relative affluence: some like 
Sally, Laura and Catriona were clear both in their expectations of inheriting from their 
parents and in their desire to provide for their children. However, others like Simon, 
Gordon and Tom were far less willing to accept notions of parental obligation or the 
inevitability of children receiving bequests, although all three planned to leave their 
estates to their children. 
4.6 Life-time parental support 
 
As has been discussed throughout this chapter, “passing on” from parent to child is 
highly symbolic. It is viewed as an expression of love and a means of reaffirming the 
parent – child relationship at the end of the parent’s life. While some of the 
participants anticipated bequeathing a relatively significant sum of money to their 
children, this was viewed not as maintenance but as a protection against the vagaries 
of life.  
 
 138 
However, participants also noted that providing a financial cushion for adult children 
was not an aspect of parenting that was relevant only at the end of a parent’s life, but 
one that was of varying degrees of importance throughout the parent’s life. As has 
been discussed by media and academic commentators alike, today’s parents provide 
their children with financial support “well into adulthood as fiscal pressures take their 
toll.” 589 Several participants discussed both funding (or receiving parental help for) 
tertiary education and contributing towards (or receiving a contribution towards) a 
house deposit. In addition, to large, one-off expenses, participants also spoke of 
parents and grandparents providing “drip feeds” throughout the child’s adult life. Tom 
explained his approach in the following terms: 
 
Well, I suppose you could call it the old Bank of Mum and Dad. The boiler’s 
burst and the family’s skint. They’ve got no hot water and no heating and two 
children and the father said I’ll go and borrow the money so I said what are you 
borrowing it at and I’ll give you a cheaper rate (laughter). And you help out and 
there you go and that’s fine because you don’t want to see them suffer and you 
see they really don’t have the money nor do you want to see them get into the 
hands of loan sharks and usury and all that sort of stuff.  
 
In a similar vein, John observed:  
 
You can give them something but what you mustn’t do is kill ambition. But, 
knowing that’s not the case…sometimes we put money towards holidays or give 
small sums of money for certain things. Actually our kids are relatively well off, 
but they have pressure the same as everyone else so sometimes you say give to 
the grandchildren. If we go and see them we give them some money, we maybe 
buy some shopping because we’re eating their food. They are ordinary things. 
You don’t sit and add it up. Helping them with cars, as Tom said, Laura needed 
a new car, she’d have to go and maybe borrow money and pay the interest on it. 
So we said how much do you need and we’ll give you that. 
 
Broadly speaking, this form of ongoing parental support intersects with succession 
law in one of two ways. In jurisdictions with family provision regimes, as explained 
by Conway, “there is always the possibility …of financial assistance being 
transmuted into some sort of dependency or ongoing “maintenance” which 
strengthens the case for a successful family provision claim by an adult child who is 
otherwise economically self-sufficient.”590 However, in the Scottish context, such an 
observation does not apply: eligibility for legal rights or intestate provision is 
established through proving the existence of a parent-child relationship, and is not a 
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matter for the courts to rule on.  
 
Instead, from a Scottish perspective, ongoing support intersects with inheritance 
insofar as it bolsters the assertion that parents willingly assume a degree of ongoing 
obligation. None of the parents in the study begrudged the support they gave to their 
children, nor suggested that this was a role the state should play instead. Furthermore, 
some interpreted it as a question of intergenerational solidarity:
591
 
 
We’re very aware of being the lucky generation. We bought houses when they 
were dirt cheap. When we first got married, we’ve had good careers...compared 
to kids coming up now... things look a lot tougher and harder (Gordon, group 1). 
 
Maintaining a fixed legal share for children allows the law to accommodate both 
testamentary freedom and the “no exit” obligation so clearly assumed by many 
parents. 
4.7 Other policy considerations: funding aged care 
 
Family provision claims under English law, where the courts consider (among other 
factors) the applicant’s financial resources, raise important policy questions as to 
whether “a dead parent’s estate should have to provide for a child in receipt of state 
benefits rather than the public purse.”592 However, this is of limited relevance within 
the current Scottish legal framework, where legal rights are available to all children, 
regardless of wealth. Furthermore, given that the children’s legal share is capped at a 
percentage of the parent’s moveable estate, and since the average total estate in 
Scotland is likely to be less than £100,000,
593
 it is unlikely that receipt of legal rights 
would obviate the need to receive state support. 
 
However, while participants did not meditate on a parent’s responsibility, versus that 
of the state, to provide for “needy” adult children, they did reflect extensively on the 
duty of the individual versus the duty of the state in the context of aged care. 
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Although the high levels of personal wealth among the older generation have led 
some to speculate that there will be unprecedented levels of wealth transfer,
594
 others 
have suggested that this money will be consumed by care costs as people live longer 
but with multiple health needs.
595
 This has created a new form of competition that pits 
the claim the state has on an older person’s assets to fund social care against the claim 
the older adult has to maintain her assets for personal use or for a bequest.  
 
Strictly speaking, this is neither an inheritance debate nor an example of competition 
between the state and the family. Where assets are sold to pay for elder care there is 
simply nothing to bequeath: any discussion of inheritance is therefore moot. In the 
same vein, it can be argued that the family is not “losing out” as the anticipated 
benefactor simply has less money than expected. A family would not be thought to 
have missed out (or a benefactor thought to have been cheated) if the elderly person 
dissipated her estate on a series of holidays.
596
 However, it appears that self-funding 
social care is seen by some sectors of society as a direct assault on inheritance and an 
interference with familial relations.  
 
Although social care was not discussed in the SLC’s 2009 Report, it is indisputably a 
topic that intersects with the inheritance debate. Indeed, the question has been 
addressed in several major inheritance studies,
597
 just as inheritance has arisen—often 
spontaneously—as a topic in social care studies.598 Given the burgeoning importance 
of competition for assets between the state and the family, a decision was made to 
explore the question further in my research project. Nevertheless, as elder care 
funding does not relate directly with the succession reform proposals at issue, it was 
included as a second tier question, to be raised as a topic with participants only where 
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time allowed. Furthermore, it was raised primarily with a view to generating 
supplementary data on parental expectation as opposed to being studied as a topic in 
its own right. Thus, the exploration focused on the question of if and why the state 
was perceived as wrongfully usurping the older person’s assets and did not consider 
the comparative merits of different funding models, although participants at times 
spontaneously offered their views on this question.  
 
The research question set out to pit the state against older people and their children, in 
their capacity as potential beneficiaries, with a view to determining whether the 
participants would perceive the state as usurping what rightfully belonged to the aged 
couple and/or their children. In the scenario,
599
 the couple was faced with the prospect 
of selling the family home—to which the adult children regularly returned as 
visitors—as their care home costs exceeded their pension income. Although the 
scenario gave no cause for concern at the pilot stage, it did not yield particularly 
useful data when presented to Groups 1 and 4. As is so often the case in a discussion 
on inheritance, the participants prioritised establishing that they were not the sort of 
people to expect vulnerable elderly people to go without in order to leave an 
inheritance for adult children.  
 
Nevertheless, in the course of general discussion, the participants engaged with what 
Croucher and Rhodes term the “natural right” to pass on.600 Passing on is for many an 
incontestable right, however, from an alternative view it is, “one of the greatest 
extensions of property we can conceive.”601 The right to pass on is well settled, but 
the right at issue here is a slightly different one: the participants defend not just the 
right to pass on available assets but the “natural” right to defend those assets against 
“unwarranted” claims from the state. This is an even greater extension of property 
rights and appears to be rooted in notions of family property and parenting. 
 
In employing the term “natural right,” Croucher and Rhodes were not making a case 
for the existence of such a right but, rather, were using it as a convenient handle to 
express the belief that people are entitled to keep some assets for a bequest. In other 
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words, the term was used to indicate that, for some people, the belief that they were 
entitled to pass on was so strong that it was experienced as an inviolable right, 
regardless of competing claims from the state. Croucher and Rhodes did not set out to 
give meaning to this right, but a broad view of their findings suggests it comprises 
two elements: the exercise of autonomy and the intention to benefit close family 
members. It is very telling that, although participants favoured autonomy and 
testamentary freedom as general concepts, no-one considered the obligation to pay for 
care to violate an individual’s autonomy where the “disappointed beneficiary” was a 
friend or charity. In other words, the “natural” right is intimately linked to the 
individual’s perceived right to provide for family. 
 
The discussion turned to social care costs in all but one of the discussion 
groups/interviews
602
 and the discussion of “real life” cases allowed the participants to 
focus on how individual families experienced this contemporary dilemma. In 
expressing why they felt the state was not entitled to all of the older person’s estate, 
the participants focused on four main themes: autonomy, fairness, family property and 
parenting, each of which will be examined in turn. 
 
4.7.1 Autonomy 
 
In many cases, participants focused on the older adult’s autonomy. In the context of 
wills, autonomy takes the form of freedom to test; in the context of social care, 
autonomy relates to maintaining control of assets that represent a lifetime of effort. 
Finch and Mason explored this question in detail, concluding that the most important 
point, a “point that subsumed all the rest,” was that “elderly people have an 
inalienable right to use their money as they wish.”603 This may be to pay for care, to 
do something “wild and wacky” or to leave an inheritance.604 This view was also 
expressed in my research, which revealed not only that people prized their autonomy, 
but that they were not willing to relinquish it. Malcolm, for example, made the 
following observation: 
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My mum and dad have already spoken to various lawyers about how they can 
try to protect their house for myself and my sister and my nieces and nephews 
… I don’t think the State can have a right to all of it. Part of it, fair enough, 
through taxation but certainly not take it all away. 
 
 
Malcolm’s view echoes the view expressed in other research studies.605 Indeed, 
Croucher and Rhodes found that “the main plank of many people’s strategies for 
funding their own long-term care appeared to be spending their assets to ensure they 
qualify for state support.”606 It was noted that “whilst it was known that these 
practices were socially frowned upon, protecting the individual against high costs and 
instead placing the burden on the State was seen by many to be acceptable.”607  
 
While children are often portrayed as being in conflict with the state, Malcolm’s 
comments, and those of other participants, suggest that it is the parents who are in 
competition with the state: it is the parents who want to decide when their property 
passes to their children and it is the parents who identify the children’s interest as 
being interfered with by the state. Croucher and Rhodes expressed a similar view, 
arguing that some people conceive older people as having a “natural right to pass on 
assets,”608 a right that was interfered with when they had to forfeit their homes to pay 
for care. The distinction between the older person’s right and the children’s right is an 
important one and further undermines the pernicious image of the adult child grasping 
at the parents’ assets.609 
 
4.7.2  Fairness 
 
The question of having paid tax, or having paid “into the system,” was raised by 
numerous participants who clearly expected to receive a return on their investment in 
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their later years. The participants in Group 7, the group that primarily comprised 
working class men in their 70s, were particularly vocal on this subject and their fury 
was at times palpable. Alec, who emerged as the spokesperson for the group 
repeatedly returned to the subject: 
 
Do you see what I’m getting at? Why, why should we have paid in everything 
that we should have paid into legally. National Insurance contributions, tax, 
everything, looked towards jobs where we get a wee pension and everything 
else to make our older age better. Why should we then have to pay to go into a 
care home? 
 
This rejoins the view expressed in other studies, namely that there is a difference 
between planning for normal living costs and planning for care costs: the former, as 
foreseeable costs, fall squarely on the shoulders of the individual whereas the latter 
are viewed simply as bad luck.
610
  
 
While the oldest participants were perhaps the angriest about the prospect of paying 
for care, they were not alone in feeling that any failure to provide for the “honest 
taxpayer” was a breach of good faith. Laura, a 40 year-old teacher from East Lothian, 
expressed a similar view: 
 
It annoys me that I’ll have worked all my life and been a public servant all my 
life and it will annoy me to have been taxed all that time, to have put money 
into the system for all that time and then at the end of it have everything taken 
off me and my children to pay for nursing care but someone else in the room 
next to me getting it for nothing having never worked a day. 
 
In her remarks, Laura moved seamlessly from the breach of the social contract to the 
question of penalising thrift, a question which, in turn, she intrinsically linked with 
fairness.  
 
Fairness was the most commonly cited reason for opposing self-funded elder care and 
was raised in all but three of the groups.
611
 Tom and Archie, men of a similar age but 
of quite different socio-economic status, offered representative views: 
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 Voice: But they’ll sell yir hoose tae keep you in there. 
 Archie: But see the person that hasnae got a home or nothin’.  
 Voice: A cooncil hoose. 
 Voice: They’ll no need to pay anythin’. 
 Archie: They’ll no need to pay anythin’. I think that’s gallin’. 
 
Tom: It’s a very contentious issue, because these people have saved up, got 
their house and all the rest of it. And they are in a care home. And in the next 
room to them, or bed, is somebody who has not made that provision, who 
doesn’t have any assets and who is getting the same amount of care and yet, 
the person who has made the provision is being forced to sell the asset so the 
kids don’t get anything, depending on how long the person lives. 
 
Tom’s response was typical in that he began by commenting on the penalisation of 
thrift but his real point was one of fairness. 
 
4.7.3 Family property 
 
One of the main reasons that self-funded elder care is perceived to be “unfair” is that 
it is seen to prevent people from leaving an inheritance for their family, and in 
particular their children. In their remarks on fairness, participants such as Laura and 
Tom (quoted above) both identified the children as the losers, and they were not the 
only participants to do so. Indeed, the discussion on this point proved very valuable 
as, while voicing their views on fairness, the participants indirectly revealed views on 
family property which, on the whole, did not chime with the dominant narrative that 
holds property to be owned and earned by the individual.
612
 
 
If asked outright whether children were entitled to inherit their parents’ property, the 
majority would likely have said no. However, when not directly considering the 
question of children’s entitlement, a different picture emerged. Tom lamented that a 
sale of assets would mean that “the kids don’t get anything,” while Laura worried that 
everything would be taken from “me and my children.” Tom clearly felt that this was 
unjust and, while this was likely in part attributable to his belief that such an outcome 
would not be in line with the typical parent’s wishes, this may not the only 
explanation.  
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As mentioned above, not a single participant raised concern about self-funded care 
preventing people from leaving bequests to the friends or charities of their choice, 
gestures that do not appear to be seen as the core function of inheritance. It may be, 
therefore, that the sense of injustice only fully emerges when parents cannot leave 
bequests to children. Certainly, while participants harshly judged the fictitious 
individuals in the scenarios if they suspected them of “expecting” an inheritance, they 
passed no judgment on individual accounts of people wanting to pass on to their 
children. This they accepted as both entirely understandable and inevitable. 
Furthermore, they expressed sympathy for children who “missed out” when care had 
to be self-funded, again suggesting that people do believe that children have an 
“interest” in parental (or familial) property and/or that parents have a natural right to 
pass on. 
 
Given that all of the participants in the research project appeared to enjoy good 
relationships with their children, their desire to bequeath assets to them could be 
construed simply as an exercise of autonomy, unrelated to notions of family property. 
More research would be needed to understand better whether the “natural right” to 
pass on – a right which involves preserving assets for inheritance - is also understood 
to exist for those who do not have descendants.  
 
Carol, the one participant who touched on this question, did not appear to consider all 
benefactors to have such a right. Although Carol stood to be the main beneficiary in 
her aunt’s will, she was unconvinced that the aunt should be allowed to pass her 
whole estate on:  
 
My aunt is an unmarried lady. No children ... I take a lot to do with her. She 
was a teacher, but she was very frugal, she’s invested it wisely, she hasn’t 
wasted it. So, money makes money and now that she’s an older lady she’s 
comfortable, not wealthy. And that’s what she says. I want it to go to you, I 
don’t want it to go to the government, I’ve worked hard all my life, I’ve paid 
my taxes. And I can see where she’s coming from but I also know as we all 
know that we are all living far too long and the country cannot support us all 
so we need to think about how that can be done. 
 
In the course of the discussion, Carol did not express her view as to whether similar 
limitations should be placed on passing on between parent and child, but she certainly 
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did not question having inherited her family home after her father died. Her father, it 
can be assumed, had a “natural right” to pass on to his children and she had an 
“interest” in the family property. In contrast, she considered both her aunt’s right to 
pass on, and her interest in the family property to be less certain.
613
  
 
It is also noteworthy that those participants who did try to articulate why parents 
should be able to pass on to their children did not speak of only love or choice, but of 
the “done thing.” In doing so, and without negating the importance of love or of 
choice, they also recognised a wider, normative societal value. Even more 
importantly, despite inheritance being commonly portrayed as the preserve of the 
wealthy, where passing on was identified as a societal value, it was also identified as a 
working class value. Two participants specifically identified it as a working class 
value,
614
 while a third identified it as the traditional or “old-fashioned” way of 
ensuring a better life for subsequent generations.
615
  
 
Of these three participants, one had first-hand experience of the devastating cost of 
elder care since both her parents were in residential homes at the time of the 
interview: one suffering from severe Alzheimer’s and one with advanced motor 
neuron disease. Gillian was clear that she would “gladly give every penny” to have 
her parents well cared for, but she spoke frequently of how upset her mum was to see 
her assets disappear in care costs when she had “worked hard” to be able to leave 
something to her family.  
 
A similar view was expressed by Malcolm when he spoke of his father’s desire to 
make provision for his grandchildren: 
 
I would take issue with Simon’s point from earlier, I understand what he is 
saying, nobody’s got a right to inherit anything and I appreciate there’s totally 
different ends of the scale, from leaving a multi-million pound estate to the 
average person, like my father, who’s working class, born in a tenement, 
brought up, he’s got his own house, it’s worth a quarter of a million 
pounds…he doesn’t want to see all that money disappear to the state, he wants 
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614
 Aileen and Malcolm. 
615
 Moira. 
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to use that for the good of his grandchildren—not necessarily me and my 
sister—when they grow up and go to uni.  
 
It is noteworthy that these views did not meet with dissent from other group members. 
While two participants, rightly, raised concerns about the effect of inherited wealth on 
social inequality, this was not considered to be an issue that applied to the “ordinary” 
people they doubtlessly saw themselves to be.
616
 
 
 While not self-identifying as working class, the participants from the most ostensibly 
working class group also appeared to hold the view that older people were entitled to 
protect assets to leave to their children: 
  
Archie: See the money we’ve got noo, what we’ve got in the bank and to leave 
wir kids, we’ve worked for it. 
 Voice: you’re right by the way 
Archie:  And we’ve knocked wir pan in to do it. And we still get penalised ... 
it’s no’ all aboot this... (referring to a digression in the debate into the terrain 
of the Scottish referendum) 
Tom: This meeting’s about these things, inheritance, nothin’ to do with 
Trident 
Archie: That’s oor inheritance. We’ve worked for oor inheritance and to gi’e it 
away, that’s ma point. 
 
None of these participants questioned that the money belonged to the older adult; but, 
equally, there was no question that the children and the grandchildren were perceived 
as the rightful end recipients.  
 
In light of this discussion, it may be helpful to revise our understanding of family 
property. A traditional understanding of family property privileges a linear 
transmission of intact property down through the generations. Based on this 
definition, Finch and Mason argued that their data revealed “weak or non-existent 
versions of the idea of family property”617 and the same could be said of my findings. 
As was the case with Finch and Mason’s participants, the research project participants 
were not concerned with transmitting the property itself, but with its monetary value. 
Similarly, they were not concerned with generational transfer in perpetuity but instead 
                                                        
616
 Simon, for example, railed against inequality but reported that he had inherited his father’s estate 
“which included a house in Cornwall”.  
617
 Finch and Mason (2000), 128. 
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had only a “limited” downward gaze.618 Yet this is only half the story. While there is 
no sense of family property in a traditional, aristocratic sense, there is every sense that 
the property, when no longer needed by its owner, should rightfully pass to the 
children. 
 
This sentiment gives expression to a very different type of family property, which 
might better be explained by a concentric circle model than a linear one. The assets 
belonging to the individual (and/or parental unit) sit in the inner circle, tightly ring-
fenced; the children (and sometimes the grandchildren) sit in the second circle, their 
own assets equally tightly ring-fenced. However, when the parent or parents no longer 
have any use for the assets they are subsumed into the children’s (or the 
grandchildren’s) circle.  
 
The idea of a concentric circle model is borrowed from Finch and Mason’s 
understanding of English kinship. They argue that the majority of contemporary 
empirical studies demonstrate that “most people operate with a concentric circles 
model of their own kin, with the relationships being most significant between those in 
the inner circle.”619 However, they also argue that their research revealed the most 
important facet of English kinship to be its flexibility, meaning that it is the quality of 
the relationship, not its status, that qualifies an individual’s inclusion in the inner 
circle. Nevertheless, they also found that “the only feature that is highly predictable is 
that the inner circle of intimate kin almost always includes ‘biological’ parents and 
children, however warm or difficult the actual relationship between the parties.”620  
 
The inheritance concentric circle model and the kinship concentric circle model are 
therefore very similar: just as any friend or relative can appear in the inner kinship 
circle, any friend or relative might inherit; however, just as children almost invariably 
appear in the inner circle of the kinship model, they (along with grandchildren) are 
also the only family members to benefit from the assumption that they are rightful 
beneficiaries, even when the relationship is not perfect.
621
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 Ibid, 133. 
619
 Ibid, 11. 
620
 Ibid. 
621
 See Chapter 4, 4.2.1 and 4.2.3. 
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A model of concentric circles is thus a more accurate way of reflecting the way in 
which the participants appeared to understand family property in an inheritance 
context. Although the participants in the research project often mentioned the desire 
to provide for grandchildren, the “downward gaze” went no further: there was no 
mention of preserving the family name or position forward through time. Instead, 
family property is an affair of children and grandchildren, people with whom the 
older person can be expected to have a close relationship.  
4.7.4 Parenting and the provision of a safety net 
 
My research project revealed the existence of the same two opposing parenting 
philosophies that were identified in other studies including the Finch and Mason, 
AHURI and Rowntree studies.
622
 In general, the view that passing on was part of 
good parenting was the more prevalent view, to the extent that it was seen more as an 
inevitability than an active parenting strategy. A minority of participants did 
nonetheless recognise the “dangers” of “spoiling” children, although none of the 
participants appeared to consider this to be a risk in their own families. Certainly, 
unlike some of the participants in the studies discussed above, none of the participants 
planned to leave their children out for this reason.
623
 Indeed, those who did express 
reservations about children inheriting too much were more worried about social 
inequality than they were about the prospect of raising feckless children.  
 
It is also noteworthy that those who expressed concern about the ills of passing on 
enjoyed, from the limited biographical data provided, a higher socio-economic status 
than those who embraced it. Certainly, when Simon and Gordon decried the dangers 
of inherited wealth, the two participants, Malcolm and John, who directly challenged 
them specifically identified as being from working class backgrounds. As was 
discussed earlier,
624
 having grown up in poverty, John had no illusion that financial 
hardship allowed people to test their mettle and was determined to provide his 
children and grandchildren with “a wee safeguard.”  In constructing inheritance as a 
social safety net, John echoed the views of the Institutional writers who identified a 
                                                        
622
 See Finch and Mason (2000), p. 124-125; Olsberg and Winters (2005),61-62, and Rowlingson and 
McKay (2005), p.14. 
623
 See for example Olsberg and Winters (2005),70. 
624
 Chapter 4, 4.5.4. 
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duty to provide at least a minimal level of support for family members.
625
 The 
question of the family as the social safety net is of course one of growing relevance in 
the current economic climate.
626
  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced some of the key thematic codes that will be explored 
throughout this thesis. Notions of expectation, autonomy, parental duty and family 
property have all been shown to shape how people decide who holds a legitimate 
claim to a deceased’s estate. More importantly, it has shown that people’s 
interpretations of these concepts are not fixed, but shift according to the facts at issue. 
This is not to suggest that the participants lacked cogent thoughts but that no formula 
exists to create the “right” outcome for all people at all times. However, while 
people’s views are not immutable, it would be equally untrue to suggest that they are 
in a constant state of flux. Where the parent-child relationship is not irreparably 
damaged, it is generally felt that providing a minimum share for children does not 
unduly undermine individual freedom.  
 
This does not mean that all participants supported this view: Simon and Kathleen 
clearly held testamentary freedom to be the most important principle in the context of 
succession law. Nevertheless, a significant number of participants either actively 
supported providing children with a guaranteed minimum level of provision, or at 
least accepted it as a compromise solution. Certainly, nothing suggested that 
participants – even those who generally supported testamentary freedom – were upset 
by the existence of legal rights, or angered by their inability to disinherit their 
children. Indeed, the strength of parental desire to provide an inheritance was one of 
the most important findings of the study and arose from a sense of love and the self-
imposed obligation that flows from that love. 
 
Finally, this chapter also illustrated the way in which the current economic context is 
pushing the issue of parental obligation to the fore. The contention that “generation-
                                                        
625
 Stair, Institutions, 1.5.7. 
626
 See generally Picketty, T, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, (Harvard University Press, 2014) 
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on-generation” economic progress has stalled627 resonated widely with participants, 
many of whom felt their children faced a bleaker economic future than did previous 
generations. As a result, many parents continued to provide children with some form 
of financial support well into adulthood.
628
 However, while parents were clear in their 
intention to continue to provide some form of support through a bequest, they were 
also aware that their assets could be “lost” to elder care costs. The strong desire to 
provide children with on-going financial support from beyond the grave, together 
with the perceived unfairness of the state’s claim on the assets that would allow such 
a bequest to be made, mean that inheritance is likely to remain on the political agenda 
for many years to come. 
  
                                                        
627
 Adam Corlett, As times goes by: shifting incomes and inequality between and within generations, 
Resolution Foundation, Intergenerational Commission Report February 2017, p. 3. 
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 This phenomena has been widely reported in other studies and in media reports. For example, 
according to the Centre for Economics and Business Research, parental assistance was present in 26% 
of all property transactions that took place in the UK market in 2017 (Centre for Economics and 
Business Research, “The Bank of Mum and Dad in 2017 will help buy homes worth over £75BN and 
fund more than one in four property transactions in the UK”), 2 May 2017. 
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Chapter 5: First and second families 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 examined the basis of children’s perceived entitlement to a share of their 
parents’ estates, highlighting conceptions of family property and obligation, as well as 
competing notions of autonomy and individual choice. The discussion focused almost 
exclusively on the normative expectations that operated in “intact” families, or in 
families where the parents were widowed or divorced, but had not formed subsequent 
relationships. In contrast, this chapter will focus on families where one (or both) of 
the parents has formed a second, or subsequent, relationship. This family formation 
will be referred to as one which creates a “first family/second family” dynamic, with 
the first family represented by the issue of the earlier union and the second family 
represented by the second (or subsequent)
629
 spouse.
630
 The families referred to by 
such a designation are those where the new spouses met when the children of the first 
union were already adults and have, therefore, never lived with the new spouses in a 
family unit. This family formation is distinguished – for the purposes of clarity – from 
stepfamilies,
631
 which, as will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 , are often understood 
to comprise children from an earlier union living in a family setting with their parent 
and the second spouse.
632
  
 
As was established previously,
633
 the SLC sought to reform the law of succession at 
least in part because of “the significant changes in Scottish society and the way in 
which people live.”634 The SLC considers the reported rise in stepfamilies (and 
presumably first family/second family dynamics)
635
 to constitute part of this change, 
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 Any use of the term “second spouse” can henceforth be read as meaning second or subsequent 
spouse.  
630
 This definition is based on that provided by Norrie (2008) at 80. 
631
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Nevertheless, some form of taxonomy is necessary to facilitate discussion and comprehension. 
632
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 Intro, p22. 
634
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 As will be discussed in Chapter 6, there is a dearth of information as to the number of stepfamilies 
in Scotland. Statistics on the prevalence of the first family/second family dynamic are even less readily 
available. The Scottish 2011 census, for example, did not include questions about whether spouses 
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and so it might be expected that particular consideration would be paid to these 
families in the Report.
636
 However, while the SLC recognises that “the balance of 
interests” in first family/second family situations may need to be “struck differently 
from the balance in those intra-familial competitions which will presumably be the 
norm”637 the quest to find that balance is dismissed before it even begins. 
 
The principal reason that the balance may need to be struck differently is that conduit 
theory
638
 is thought unlikely to operate in a first family/second family context, as the 
second spouse is unlikely to pass on wealth to the pre-deceased spouse’s children 
upon his death. It is also recognised that many people consider this to be in some 
sense unfair, perceiving the children to be “disinherited.”639 This chapter is dedicated 
both to analysing why such an outcome is considered to be unfair and to examining 
what aggravates or reduces the perceived injustice. Brief consideration is also given to 
alternative models that could mitigate this sense of unfairness. 
5.2 The research scenarios 
 
The tension between first families and second families was explored in my research 
study both by seeking out participants with personal experience of being part of such 
family groupings,
640
 and by presenting participants with research scenarios involving 
first and second families. Given the importance of the theme, three scenarios were 
designed to elicit debate on the topic;
641
 however, the pilot study suggested that 
participants would fully engage with the topic through the first scenario alone and, as 
                                                                                                                                                              
have children from previous relationships who are not living with them. The lack of available 
information is not unique to Scotland or the UK. In Canada, for example, Wu et al. commented that 
while “a growing proportion of individuals are re-entering the dating and marriage market in later life 
because of population aging and the increase in union dissolution …[…]… little is known about 
marital and non-marital union formation in later life.” (Wu, Z, Shimmele, C and Ouellet, N, 
“Repartnering after widowhood” (2015) 70 Journals of Gerontology, Series B: Psychological Sciences 
and Social Sciences 496 at 496).  
636
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family/second family dynamics. In paragraph 2.29 of the 2009 Report, for example, it employs 
reconstituted families as a synonym for stepfamilies, before illustrating a point about 
reconstituted/stepfamilies with reference to the dynamic between first families and second families.  
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such, it became the “core scenario,” with the other two presented only where time 
permitted.
642
 
 
Part A of scenario 1 addressed testate succession, while Part B addressed intestate 
succession. The decision was made to link the two scenarios in order to illustrate that 
the children of the first relationship “lost out” to both the second spouse and then 
subsequently to the second spouse’s children. However, the scenario was also 
intended to provoke discussion of testate and intestate succession as two distinct 
issues. In spite of this objective – and perhaps understandably – the participants did 
not proceed with a dispassionate linear analysis of parts A and B. Instead, they 
generally grouped the two parts together and focused on the “unfairness” of the 
outcome, relatively disinterested in whether that outcome was caused by the statutory 
regime or by what they felt to be questionable decision-making on the part of the first 
deceased (Kate).  
 
The participants’ responses to the scenario showed clearly that they considered the 
“disinheritance” of Mark and Lucy, the children from the first marriage, at the 
expense of the second spouse to be unacceptable; and, for some, the sense of injustice 
was heightened when the estate passed to the second spouse’s children in Part B. In 
all, 19 participants expressed an openly negative reaction to the outcome, either by 
voicing their opposition to what they perceived as a “wrong” or “unfair” outcome,643 
or by stating that it was not something they themselves would do.
644
 While this figure 
holds no statistically representative value, it mirrors findings recorded in other 
studies. In the NatCen study, for example, only 15% of respondents favoured the 
spouse receiving everything where the deceased had adult children from a previous 
relationship.
645
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 Focussing on one scenario also helped avoid participant fatigue. Appendix 1 contains a table 
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 Note that Gillian adhered fairly strongly to the principle of testamentary freedom and remarked 
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 NatCen study (2010), 49. 
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5.3 Factors underpinning the children’s entitlement 
 
Before considering why the children were considered to be entitled to a share of their 
deceased parent’s estate in a first family/second family context, it bears repeating that 
those who objected to the outcome of scenario 1 were in no way suggesting that the 
second spouse had no claim on the deceased’s assets, or even that her claim was 
secondary to the children’s claim. The spouse was almost always recognised as a key 
member of the family, with several participants pointing out that Kate and Dave had 
chosen to spend their lives together.
646
 Instead, the participants’ concern was 
primarily to ensure that the deceased’s children also received some form of 
recognition at the end of their parent’s life.  
 
The participants’ discomfort with the outcome of scenario 1 tended to be expressed as 
a variant of certain key themes, many of which were discussed in Chapter 4: the 
parental obligation to write a will (and to provide for children); the existence of 
family property; and, the need to reaffirm the importance of the parent/child 
relationship at the end of the parent’s life. However, in the context of the first 
family/second family, these points take on added significance, as there is no second 
opportunity for these obligations to be met. When an estate passes from one parent to 
another in an intact family, it does not matter whether the pre-deceased parent has 
made provision for his children as there is no expectation on the part of the children to 
inherit at that stage. However, in passing on the estate, the first parent also “passes 
on” to the surviving parent the duty to provide for the children; and, where those 
obligations are not met tensions can arise. 
 
In setting out reasons that could justify breaching the norms discussed above in the 
context of first families and second families, participants marshalled the same 
arguments that were explored in Chapter 4 in relation to intra-familial conflict: the 
importance of testamentary freedom; the relative needs of the actual beneficiary and 
the disappointed beneficiary; and, the quality of the relationship between the deceased 
and his children. However, in Chapter 4, testamentary freedom was primarily 
discussed in the context of a parent’s duty to treat his children equally and, in such 
                                                        
646
 Mary for example observed “she chose to marry him…that was her husband and she probably 
expected to live a long time with him, you know.” 
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instances, participants were willing to defer to the parent’s judgement, assuming it to 
be benevolent. In contrast, when testamentary freedom was considered in the context 
of first families and second families it gave rise not only to the question of what duty 
the testator owed his children, but also what duty he owed his pre-deceased spouse.
647
 
This important point will be explored in section 5.5.2 to 5.5.6 below. 
5.3.1 The duty to write a will and provide for children 
 
The general duty a parent has to provide for his children by writing a will
648
 was 
considered particularly important in first family/second family scenarios. While 
participants were not asked to comment on scenarios involving intact families, 
Catriona, Lucy and Laura – all of whom were in intact families themselves– 
spontaneously remarked that they were relatively unperturbed by not having a will as 
they were happy for their respective estates to pass to their spouses or children on 
intestacy.
649
 In contrast, when considering scenarios that involved a first 
family/second family dynamic, a number of participants remarked that the deceased 
had been remiss in not writing a will.
650
  
 
Indeed, when confronted with cases of intestacy, the participants focused not on the 
shortcomings of the statutory regime, but on the culpability of the parent who had 
failed to write a will. In relation to scenario 3, for example, Caroline commented: 
 
I suppose it’s more the fact that he died without consciously saying, I have 
two children, a son and a daughter and I want them to have this. It’s more the 
fact that he just deliberately ignored them. That’s kind of more the principle, 
more than the monetary value. 
 
The participants’ tendency to focus on the failings of the deceased meant that 
they did not use this scenario to consider if and how the statutory framework 
could be amended to better meet expectations. However, while more 
                                                        
647
 Reference is made to a pre-deceased spouse as opposed to a previous spouse, as it is more 
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one spouse dying before the other, and even less to the surviving spouse remarrying. As such, they 
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 158 
information on this may have been valuable, the objective of the research was to 
evaluate attitudes, and not to garner concrete suggestions for reform, and any 
“loss” of content was therefore relatively insignificant. 
5.3.2 Family property (items of sentimental value)  
 
The concept of family property emerged as a second – extremely important – reason 
underpinning the children’s entitlement to a share of their deceased parent’s estate. 
Two types of family property were identified in the data: sentimentally important 
items and financially valuable assets. The narrative surrounding both types shifted 
slightly in the case of a first family/second family dynamic, moving from one that 
focused simply on the children as the “natural” end recipients of their parents’ 
assets,
651
 to one that focused primarily on the contribution the first spouse had made 
to the family wealth. When items of sentimental value were involved, the children’s 
entitlement was in some ways even clearer: it was not just that the first spouse had 
contributed to accumulating the assets, but that they belonged to him and were in no 
way connected to the second spouse.
652
 
 
While scenario 1 focused on a financially valuable estate, several participants 
spontaneously offered views on articles of sentimental value in the course of the 
discussions: Reg referenced his father’s war memorabilia; Sally reported that certain 
items that her husband had received from his father would pass down his side of the 
family; and several others mentioned jewellery or other objects.
653
 In broad terms, an 
item of sentimental value can be understood as an object that “carries the memory of 
the person who owned it;”654 such items do not necessarily have monetary value but, 
instead, are given both their “meaning” and their “value” by the memories they 
invoke.
655
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It goes without saying that conflict as to who is entitled to a particular sentimental 
item is not limited to cases where a first family competes with a second family. Most 
obviously, conflict can arise at an intra-familial level between siblings.
656
 However, in 
my research project, the stories the participants told all involved instances where the 
“competitor” was an “outsider” in the form of a second-spouse, a stranger, or an in-
law. Yet, while different versions of the “outsider” peopled the participants’ 
narratives, they all created the same effect: by receiving the object at the expense of 
the disappointed beneficiary, they disrupted the ability of the object to function as a 
repository of memory for the “rightful” recipient.  
 
Maureen had a complex family history and shared several inheritance stories, 
including some on the subject of assets that held sentimental value. Her father had left 
the vast majority of his estate to his second wife although his sister had, through 
inheritance or otherwise, acquired his violin.
657
 Maureen was involved in caring for 
her father’s sister – her aunt Jess – during her decline but her aunt bequeathed her 
entire estate to “these people they’d went on holiday to visit.” Maureen was 
unperturbed by the financial “loss” but was determined to get the violin back: 
 
However, there were a couple of things that would have been my dad’s 
…[including]… a violin and I kind of wanted them ... I wanted them in 
principle ... so I asked for them. The woman by this point had taken five van 
loads of stuff out of the house. Very unusual. The solicitor was quite 
uncomfortable with that I think, primarily because he thought I’d been very 
responsible around property and all that … so he then put it to the people that 
benefited and they said yes, I’d get it back if I bought it. I think that’s really 
mercenary.  
 
Maureen eventually got the violin back although she described the time as “a horrible 
experience ... I hated every minute of it” and was shocked by what she perceived as 
the callousness of the beneficiaries, particularly, she felt, with regard to the violin that 
could not hold the same value for someone who was a stranger to her father. 
 
In contrast, Maureen spoke of her discomfort when her aunt Jess, who suffered from 
dementia, had tried to give Maureen some of her jewellery before her death. Maureen 
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 Maureen spoke at length of her inheritance experiences, but certain details nonetheless remained 
slightly unclear and it was not always appropriate to seek clarification. 
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did not want the jewellery, feeling that she was not entitled to it as she did not have 
the requisite bond with the aunt: were she to accept it she would be the outsider 
breaking the connection between the item and a more “natural” recipient:  
 
You know, my aunt was always trying to give us money or things you know, I 
don’t need these earrings anymore you have them. I was always incredibly wary 
because I would say no don’t give them to me because I felt compromised by that 
because we weren’t close. 
 
Maureen’s attitude demonstrated that, contrary to the popular narrative, feeling 
entitled to certain assets is not necessarily indicative of greed or cupidity: clear as she 
was that she was entitled to her father’s violin, Maureen was equally clear that she 
had no claim on her aunt’s jewellery.  
  
Another category of recipients whose entitlement to items of sentimental value was 
ambiguous was in-laws; and specifically daughters-in-law who inherited ahead of 
daughters.
658
 Lucy, while accepting her mother’s decision to pass on some of her 
jewellery to her daughters-in-law, felt slightly jarred by it; Gladys acknowledged that 
her daughter did not fully embrace her decision to leave jewellery to her daughter-in-
law; and Laura remarked that her sister-in-law had “felt very weird” about being 
invited to choose something from her husband’s grandmother’s jewellery, although 
she eventually took something as “a token gesture.” Although in-laws were family 
members, the participants did not readily accept that a daughter-in-law was equivalent 
to a daughter, who enjoyed a special status in the inheritance narrative. However, 
while the daughters saw themselves as more entitled than the daughters-in-law, they 
often ultimately accepted the daughters-in-law being included as they were standing 
in the shoes of the mother’s sons, as opposed to inheriting in their own right.  
 
Clearly, passing on items of sentimental value is an important way of reaffirming a 
relationship at the end of the parent’s life. Whether by design or by unintended 
consequence, this is something that has long been addressed by the Scots law of 
                                                        
658 While some of the discussion around sentimental items was gender neutral, a significant part of it 
related to jewellery being transmitted from mother to daughter, perhaps because it was primarily raised 
by women. With the exception of Reg, who discussed receiving his father’s war memorabilia, there 
was no “father-son” equivalent to this mother-daughter norm. Nevertheless, many mothers addressed 
this by offering the “son’s” share to their daughter-in-law. 
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intestate succession. While section 8(3) of the 1964 Act provides the surviving spouse 
with a right to receive furniture and plenishings up to a certain value, section 8(6)(b) 
excludes heirlooms from the definition of furniture and plenishings contained in 
section 8(6)(c): “any article which has associations with the intestate’s family of such 
nature and extent that it ought to pass to some member of that family other than the 
surviving spouse of the intestate”. Reid observed that Scotland is “possibly unique in 
retaining a legislative provision designed to ensure ‘heirlooms’… pass to a blood 
relative and not to the surviving spouse,”659 perhaps one of the reasons why the SLC 
decided to remove any trace of the provision from the proposed new legislation. In 
addition, eliminating the provision also accords with the shift towards both 
simplification and further spousal preference. 
 
Nevertheless, the data suggested that people continue to consider the children to have 
a strong claim on certain sentimental items. Indeed, while heirlooms could of course 
be claimed by family members other than descendants, the participants, with the 
exception of Sally, made no reference to the maintenance of the blood-line: the goal 
was to preserve objects of sentimental value for the deceased’s children. It is thus 
unfortunate that, in addition to reducing the children’s entitlement on intestacy, the 
reforms also remove a provision that serves both an important expressive function and 
a form of protection for descendants in first family/second family scenarios. 
5.3.3 Family property (entitlement to a share of the parents’ wealth) 
 
The second form of family property participants identified was the material value of 
the parents’ assets. Under the current rules of intestacy (and the proposed reforms), an 
individual’s entire estate will pass to his children in the absence of a surviving 
spouse.
660
 In families where the surviving parent has not remarried, this allows for the 
operation of conduit theory: the estate passes from “dad” to “mum” (or the other dad) 
and then on to their children. In such situations, the children can only be 
“disinherited” if the surviving parent actively chooses to do so.  As such, where a 
child is “undeservingly” disinherited in favour of another beneficiary, only the child is 
seen as having been wronged: for example, the only “victim” in scenario 2 was Aisha, 
who had been overlooked by her parents in what some participants felt was an unduly 
                                                        
659
 Reid (2015), 493. 
660
 1964 Act s 2(1)(a). 
 162 
harsh punishment. As the parents had acted in concert, neither was presumed to be 
unhappy with the outcome.  
 
However, in a first family/second family scenario, where the child “missed out” on an 
inheritance, the pre-deceased spouse was also viewed as having been wronged. The 
rationale underpinning this view was that half of the recently deceased spouse’s assets 
notionally belonged to his spouse, whose wishes should have been considered in 
disposing of them.
661
 It is unlikely, according to this line of thinking, that the pre-
deceased spouse would have favoured the surviving spouse’s new spouse or children, 
over his own children. Gladys’ comments on scenario 1 were fairly typical: 
 
See I would think that that £60,000 in savings were savings that she’s made with 
her first husband and the children shouldn’t miss out on that, because that is the 
hard work of their parents together.  
 
In Gladys’ mind, although legally Kate’s, the estate did not morally belong 
exclusively to her and, consequently, she should not have ignored what her pre-
deceased husband would have wanted. 
 
Ron, himself a widower, was the most forceful in making this point. Ron re-partnered 
in his early 60s, a few years after the death of his first wife, and was unequivocal that 
his estate must pass to his children, not his new partner: 
 
To bring it back to this. I tend to see half of what I have as being Susan’s [his 
pre-deceased first wife]. So that half if you like automatically goes to the 
children, rightfully. If you have your scenario, like there and it goes sideways and 
then to somebody else. I don’t think that’s right. That to me would be wrong. 
 
Ron’s comment was made in response to scenario 4, and he was particularly disturbed 
by the idea of his first wife’s notional half passing to his new partner’s children. This 
is not to say that Ron was indifferent to his obligations to his new partner, whom he 
stressed would be provided for both by his pension plan and a liferent on his estate. 
5.3.4 Later-life marriages 
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Closer examination reveals that Ron’s concern was not only for his first wife’s share, 
but also for his own half share. In a separate discussion,
662
 Ron explained that, in his 
first marriage, he viewed himself and his wife as the joint owners of their assets, as 
whatever they amassed was the product of their combined work, sacrifice and good 
fortune. In contrast, he appeared to view himself and his new partner as the individual 
owners of separate assets, which they may or may not choose to pool. As Finch and 
Mason pointed out, this separation is not necessarily reflected “on a day-to-day basis” 
but exists instead as a conceptual divide
663
 that becomes evident upon the dissolution 
of the relationship. While Ron did not comment on the daily financial management of 
his second relationship, the divide was clear in the context of succession planning: 
beyond the liferent, he chose not to share even his “share” of the assets from his first 
relationship with his new partner, favouring instead his children. This decision may 
reflect the fact that the partners met later in life and, were Ron’s notional half of his 
estate to pass to his new partner rather than his children, it may not be long before she 
too died and that property passed to her children.  
 
This point was also made by Group 6 participants as they reflected on Kate’s decision 
in scenario 1. In the following excerpt, Catriona and Sally discuss how they perceive 
a second marriage to be different, both because the spouses do not have a history of 
common endeavour and because they are less likely to have a long future of 
interdependence: 
 
Catriona: The decisions I would make now with my first husband and, at age 40, 
would be different from the ones I would make at age 62, in my second marriage, 
probably. I don’t know, I’m not in that situation, but I think I would be thinking, 
well actually I’m not going to be here for a very long time, is it right that 
someone who I’ve known for three years gets all the money I’ve earned over my 
entire life so I probably would, at that stage, be more likely to have included 
children. 
 Sally: And actually, you probably feel more separate by that stage. 
 Catriona: Yes. 
Sally: You would probably feel not in that first flush of sort of wanting to join 
everything quite that way. 
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While it certainly cannot be assumed first family/second family scenarios only ever 
involve spouses who met in their 60s, the rise in the number of divorces amongst the 
over 60s
664
 and the average age of widowhood mean that such situations are not 
uncommon.
665
 Furthermore, where the spouses are older, their age appears to be a 
factor in reducing their perceived entitlement to their spouse’s estate, at least where 
there are children from a previous union.
666
  
 
Although many participants simply objected to the children being excluded at the 
expense of the second spouse in a later-life marriage, for some the sense of injustice 
was heightened when the second spouse had children who were perceived as being 
the ultimate beneficiaries. Carol makes the following observations: 
 
But why would she want to disinherit her own children in favour of her new 
husband’s children, with whom she has no mileage, no connection … I think it 
would be OK if he had no children, it would ultimately come back to Mark and 
Lucy, that would be fair enough, but she would obviously have known that he 
had children so it’s a shame that she wasn’t more specific. 
 
Carol’s comments illustrate a number of points. Firstly, although the scenario made it 
clear that Kate’s children were “disinherited” in favour of Kate’s husband, Carol 
interpreted it as Kate having chosen Dave’s children over her own, a decision she 
found difficult to comprehend. Secondly, in an illustration of just how little people 
understand of succession law, Carol suggested that, had Dave had no children, his 
estate would have gone to Kate’s children. Thirdly, it underscores that Carol did 
recognise the legitimacy of the spouse’s claim, just not that of his children. 
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5.3.5 Relationship length 
 
The length of the parent-child relationship compared to the relationship between the 
new spouses was another factor that was seen to influence the respective claims of the 
spouse and children. As a general rule, the second spouse’s entitlement grew with the 
passage of time, although this did not necessarily negate the claim of the children 
from the previous marriage. Nevertheless in scenario 3, where the deceased had been 
in a relationship with his third spouse for 15 years, the participants were less shocked 
to see the spouse inherit than they were in scenario 1, where the spouses had been 
together for three years. Caroline, for example, who was unequivocal that Kate had 
been wrong to provide for Dave ahead of her own children in scenario 1, was more 
nuanced in her view of scenario 3. While speculating that the children may “feel 
angry with Anna,” she also acknowledged that “15 years is a relatively long time”.  
 
In contrast, in regard to scenario 1, while Mark stated that he hoped that the children 
would “want their mother to be happy and “not sackcloth and ashes for the rest of her 
life,” he added: 
 
I certainly don’t think they should miss out on things where there is a history. I 
think leaving that to Johnny-come-lately, that’s maybe a bit unfair, I think that 
would be a bit harsh. 
 
Other participants expressed similar views. Olga, for example, remarked that “three 
years is a very short time,” particularly as she had known the two adult children “for a 
long time;” while Lauren suggested a three-way split between Dave and the two 
children would be more reasonable, before adding “but even then, three years is not a 
long time is it.” 
 
The length of a marriage – particularly a second marriage – has been raised in other 
studies as a factor that influences conceptions of spousal entitlement.
667
 It is an 
important –and ostensibly problematic –point as spousal entitlement is based on status 
alone and it is difficult to conceive of any benefit being derived from attempting to 
measure the “commitment” or “worth” of a marriage by applying a matrix of external 
factors. However, although participants returned frequently to the length of the 
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marriage, closer examination reveals that this factor – like the age at which the 
participants met – is only relevant where children are also present. 
5.3.6 The presence of children 
 
While the presence of children from a previous relationship negatively impacted 
perceptions of spousal entitlement, active participation in bringing up these children 
slightly mitigated this effect. By way of example, Caroline observed that it “would be 
different” if Dave had been with Kate for 20 years as “he may have played a more 
fatherly role to the children.”  However, in Caroline’s view, where there was no 
opportunity for a parental-style relationship to have formed, the second spouse could 
not be relied on to pass on to the children.  
5.4 No children from a prior relationship 
 
Read in isolation, there is a danger that some of the data could be interpreted as 
indicative of an old-fashioned view: narratives to the effect that second spouses must 
“earn” their entitlement over time or by raising children sit uneasily with the modern 
understanding of family. However, close analysis revealed that this narrative emerged 
only when there were children from a previous relationship and, most importantly, 
spoke not to the new spouses’ relationship, but to the previously partnered spouse’s 
duty to balance his obligations to both his first family and his second family.  
 
This hypothesis emerged through what Glaser and Strauss term “theoretical 
sampling,” the process through which theory evolves through the interplay between 
analysis and data collection.
668
 In this instance, the theory began to develop through 
analysis of the first data sets, and an additional scenario was developed to test it 
further (scenario 7). In the new scenario, a second spouse inherited ahead of siblings 
upon the death of her husband, who did not have children. The spouses had been 
married for three years. The scenario was presented to the participants in Group 6, 
both of whom were entirely unperturbed by the outcome.
669
 The discussion was brief 
and straightforward: 
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 Gladys: I don’t have a problem with that 
 Mark: I don’t really have a problem with that either. 
 
In other words, absent the presence of children from a previous marriage, the spouse’s 
entitlement to inherit was absolute.  
 
This is not to say that a spouse – first or subsequent – inheriting ahead of siblings and 
parents never caused disquiet. Douglas et al. report that a very short marriage led 
some participants to conclude that the spouse was not entitled to the full estate;
670
 
similarly, in my study, although the topic was not approached directly, Mary related a 
story of siblings who had been upset when their brother left his estate to a woman he 
met and married six months prior to his death:  
 
The only one situation was my uncle, who was a bachelor for years. He retired 
and got married, right, when he was 65, 66. He was only married for six months 
and he passed away. He’d just changed his will.  And everything went to the wife 
and her children. You know I wasn’t upset, my mum wasn’t bothered but his 
other sister was quite upset about that.  
 
It is inevitable that no legal rule will create an outcome that is universally felt to be 
“just” in all circumstances. In general, the participants showed strong support for the 
spouse, a view that is echoed in other studies. Furthermore, this view is reflected in 
the reform proposals which, if implemented, will result in the spouse inheriting the 
whole of the net intestate estate where there are no children,
671
 as opposed to having 
to share it with the deceased’s siblings and/or parents as can happen under the current 
regime.
672
 
5.5 Factors reducing the children’s entitlement 
  
The focus of this chapter has thus far been on understanding why participants 
commonly felt that the wrong outcome had been achieved when the children in 
scenarios 1, 3 and 4 were “disinherited” at the expense of the spouse. However, while 
the participants, in general, operated on the assumption that some form of “sharing” 
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of the estate between the first and second family was desirable, they also identified 
three factors that could justify a departure from this norm: the relative wealth of the 
beneficiaries, the size of the deceased’s estate and the deceased’s testamentary 
freedom. Their understanding of testamentary freedom is particularly important as it 
differs significantly from the conventional understanding. 
5.5.1. Testamentary freedom 
 
Given the wide support that testamentary freedom enjoys,
673
 it is unsurprising that a 
number of participants felt that it trumped the claim of a disappointed beneficiary, 
even where that disappointed beneficiary was the deceased’s child. Olga, Lucy, 
Simon and Kathleen, for example, all pointed out that, as Kate, the protagonist in 
scenario 1, had made a will, it had to be respected, regardless of what they thought of 
her decision. However, as was discussed in Chapter 4, this respect for testamentary 
freedom was primarily rooted not in a sense that Kate could do as she pleased, but in 
a belief that she had made a just and informed decision that should not be supplanted 
by the judgement of a less informed third party. Olga speculated that Kate’s children, 
Mark and Lucy, were perhaps “very wealthy” in their own right, while Carol 
suggested that they may have received “their inheritance” before their mother died. 
For her part, Lucy expressed confidence that Kate had “probably considered Mark 
and Lucy,” but adding that she would “have a problem” with the outcome had David 
inherited the entire estate “in a default way.”  
5.5.2 The temporary nature of the spousal transfer 
 
However, when discussing their own testamentary intentions (as opposed to those of 
the fictitious testators) a very different narrative emerged, specifically in regard to 
first families and second families. Of the 24 participants who had wills, the 
overwhelming majority (22) were still in a relationship with the other parent of their 
children (although one also had another child from an extra- marital relationship) and 
intended for their estate to pass first to their spouse and then to their children. 
Furthermore these participants also viewed their wills as being inexorably linked to 
their partner’s. While conventional wisdom holds will-writing to be a highly 
individual act whereby people pronounce a final reckoning on friends and family, one 
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of the most surprising findings of the study was the extent to which couples with 
children viewed will-writing as a joint undertaking. 
 
This view manifested itself in two ways: firstly, in the language participants used to 
discuss their wills, a discourse replete with references to “our will” and “what we’ve 
done;” and secondly, in the common objective their wills expressed. While the 
question was not asked directly, no examples were found of couples where the 
partners had chosen entirely different beneficiaries. In this sense, the couples in the 
study saw their wills not as two distinct documents, but as a single document 
expressing their shared wishes. This is of course unproblematic where the spouses 
remained in a relationship or did not re-partner; however, where one spouse re-
partners, questions arise as to which obligations that spouse owes to the pre-deceased 
spouse. 
 
The question of obligation to a pre-deceased spouse arises in cases where the spousal 
transfer is regarded as both “conditional and temporary.”674 It is contended that, in 
most intact families, this is the case. While the participants generally provided for 
their spouses in the first instance, they intended their children (and in some cases their 
grandchildren) to be the final beneficiaries of their “joint” will.  This finding was not 
unexpected and has been documented in other studies.
675
 Munro, for example, 
observed that in cases where an individual is “assumed to form a single, lifetime 
partnership,” the initial transfer of wealth between spouses can be “considered a 
temporary and transitional stage, before that person dies and the wealth passes on to 
the next generation.”676 John expressed this view in the following terms:  
  
I mean when I go Lynne will get any cash that I have and the house also, 
obviously … It will all go to Lynne initially but there will be provision for our 
two daughters and then ultimately to the grandchildren. I can’t remember the 
detail … whether we’ve already made a formal arrangement for the grandchildren 
… but we did go to considerable lengths to make sure that as far as we 
understood things were relatively watertight and appropriate. 
 
                                                        
674
 Munro (1988) at 432. 
675
 See Finch and Mason (2000), 70 and 2009 Report at para 2.26. See also Chapter 4, 4.5.1. 
676
 Munro (1988) at 432. 
 170 
Other participants made similar remarks, with Moira, for example, saying “if I die 
first my husband would inherit from me and on his death my son would inherit.” In no 
sense did the spouses expect each other to conserve assets and income to pass on to 
the children, but they did expect that, where there were assets remaining, provision 
would be made for the children.
677
 
5.5.3 Agreements between spouses 
 
While the participants’ testamentary intentions were clear, how these intentions were 
to be implemented was often opaque since, as will be explained forthwith, a will 
(other than a mutual will) cannot bind a successor. Eight of the participants reported 
that, while their spouse was the “first” beneficiary, the estate would then pass to the 
children. Three of these eight believed that they had binding written agreements with 
their spouses,
678
 while five simply stated that the property would pass first to the 
spouse and then to their children,
679
 without explaining how this would be achieved. 
The following excerpt from Group 3 encapsulates some of the confusion and the 
(misplaced) certainty: 
 
 Interviewer: Could I ask you who you’ve provided for? 
Maureen: If I die first - my husband probably will, we’ll see how it goes (laughs) 
- but my four children. 
Interviewer: So as it stands at the moment it would go first to your husband 
and… 
 Maureen: Yes, and this is the advice of our solicitor, and then the four children.  
Interviewer: And between the two of you, you have an understanding then that 
the other one has to pass on to the children after that? 
 Maureen: It’s in the will. 
 Interviewer: Anybody else? 
Moira: My situation is similar. If I die first my husband would inherit from me 
and on his death my son would inherit. 
 David: We’re the same, each other and then the children. 
 
When the participants were pressed as to how this outcome would be achieved, a 
palpable sense of unease settled over the group, with jokes being made about going 
home to check what was in the will. 
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The situation arose again in Group 5 and, when Gladys was asked to confirm that she 
simply had a non-binding agreement with her husband, she too maintained that she 
had a binding agreement incorporated into the will:  
  
Interviewer: You mentioned a husband. Does your husband benefit as well or 
does it just go to the children? 
Gladys: No, to my husband. To my husband. Well to each other and then to the 
children. 
 Interviewer: And then you just sort of agree... 
 Gladys: That whatever is there will be split.  
Interviewer: And is that just what you have agreed with your husband or do you 
have something in writing... 
 Gladys: That’s what we have written down.  
 
These discussions presented an ethical dilemma: there was no reason not to take a 
group of educated people at their word and, without seeing the wills, it could not be 
definitively determined that their interpretation of their wills did not match the 
provisions that had been set down.
680
 Nevertheless, there is certainly room to wonder 
whether the participants were simply describing an informal agreement they had with 
their spouse, rather than a mutual will (explained forthwith).  
5.5.4 Mirror wills and mutual wills 
 
In discussing their wills, a number of participants employed the term “mirror will” or 
described their arrangements as “mutual,” and it appears that some participants felt 
this accorded their will a particular legal effect. Tom, for example, said that he and his 
wife had “mirror wills” and then later stressed the importance of being in concert with 
one’s spouse: 
 
The thing is you would have to agree that with your spouse and you would both 
have to be exactly of the same mind because one of you is going to go first and 
the whole estate is going to pass over to the other. So they’ve got to be able to 
have agreed these things so they are written in stone virtually. 
 
Tom was clearly proud of having his affairs well in order, but other than his “mirror 
will” he did not mention any other mechanism that related to having matters “written 
in stone.” 
                                                        
680
 It is possible that they had liferents or mutual wills (see 5.5.4 below). 
 172 
 
While Tom – and other participants – may have believed a “mirror will” to impose an 
obligation on the surviving spouse, it is simply a popular term denoting identical wills 
each benefiting the other. The standard pattern would be spouses making identical 
wills, benefiting each other, whom failing their children. However, either party is free 
to amend his or her will without seeking permission from – or even notifying – the 
holder of the other “mirror” will. In other words, a mirror will in no way binds the 
surviving spouse to provide for an alternative beneficiary on her death. 
 
It is also feasible that participants were confusing mirror wills with mutual wills. 
Unlike a mirror will, a mutual will is a legal instrument, albeit one that is largely 
considered moribund. In a 1986 Consultative Memorandum, the SLC described the 
mutual will in the following terms:
681
 
 
A mutual will is a deed by two or more persons in which each disposes of all or 
part of his or her own estate to the survivors or survivor. The deed may also 
contain directions as to the disposition of the estates on the death of the survivor. 
 
The SLC goes on to explain that mutual wills become contentious “when one of the 
persons concerned dies leaving a will inconsistent with the provisions of an earlier 
mutual will.”682 In such cases, the question is whether the mutual will can be regarded 
as “merely two wills in one deed, in which case revocation is competent, or as 
contractual, in which case revocation or alteration is incompetent.”683 While it is not 
beyond the realms of possibility that some of the participants had mutual wills, it 
seems highly unlikely given that, as far back as 1986, the SLC held that mutual wills 
had “ceased to be a feature of current practice.”684 Nevertheless, many participants 
spoke as if they had just such an agreement in place, convinced that the surviving 
spouse was bound to honour its terms.
685
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This question was explored further through discussion with the elite interviewees, all 
of whom were qualified Scottish solicitors. Lynne, the pilot interviewee for the elite 
interviews, had spent part of her career with a mid-size firm working in a generalist 
role. In discussing the issue of mirror wills, she made the following comments: 
 
I would explain, because people would ask for a joint will, and I would explain 
that no, they would each do their own and they would use that expression, a 
mirror will. And I would say that all that means is that you have done a will in 
front of each other but … one of you can go and change that will without the 
other one knowing … I did emphasise that you are relying on that spouse to 
always see the children right because they don’t get any of your money at that 
stage … but you have to stress once it passes over the first time you’ve lost it, 
you cannot then tell them what they have to do when they die. 
 
Lynne went on to add, however, that people rarely felt this advice applied to them: 
 
The trouble is you don’t need it at the time. They always just think well it’s 
fine, we’ll never fall out, nothing bad will happen … or they take it on board 
but they trust their partner to do right by the children even if he did remarry. 
But then it can be something as simple as just forgetting to change a will. 
 
Lynne’s point is an important one. While – as Sally claimed to be her experience in 
making a will – some solicitors may fail to inform their clients that they have no 
control over how the surviving spouse disposes of his estate, others may simply 
dismiss the information as not relevant to them, later confusing their own belief that 
everything would be “OK” with a solicitor’s assurance to that effect. 
 
The pilot project for the elite interviews provided very valuable data, particularly as, 
in Lynne’s words, she was involved in writing “bog standard” wills for “normal 
couples” rather than for the very well off. Her comments reinforce several important 
points that have been made thus far. Firstly, the term “mirror will” appears to have 
strong currency, although the people employing it often do not understand its lack of 
significance. Secondly, for many people, the spousal transfer is temporary and 
contingent in nature, with Lynne emphasizing that “people used to worry” about 
being unable to ensure their spouse would provide for their children. Finally, her 
comments stress that, contrary to the pervasive image of an elderly person calmly and 
thoughtfully putting his affairs in order, the reality is that will-writing is sometimes a 
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task performed by harried people in early middle life, happy to tick off one job and 
unlikely to revisit it in the future.  
 
Group 3 participant, Kathleen, ironically one of the strongest supporters of 
testamentary freedom, illustrated this last point well:  
 
 Interviewer: Would you mind me asking who benefits under that will? 
 Kathleen: Dependants.  
 Interviewer: Dependants? 
Kathleen:  Yes. Don’t ask me what’s in it. I worked for a big firm in Glasgow 
when we bought our last house. We’ve been there 14 years and one of the perks 
of the job was free conveyancing so I took that up and along with it you got the 
offer of a will so we did that as well. But as I say, my husband really dealt with it 
and it was 14 years ago. But it’s dependants though. 
 Interviewer: Just for clarification, does dependants mean your children? 
 Kathleen: Yes. 
 Interviewer: Does your husband benefit as well under it? 
 Kathleen: Yes, it’s mutual. 
 
The “one-off” nature of will-writing is an important point when it is considered that a 
common rejoinder to any criticism of the intestate succession regime is that “unjust 
results” can be avoided “through the simple expedience of making a will.”686 Indeed, 
Norrie expressed the hope that the “Scottish Government and the legal profession 
make serious efforts to advise, encourage and persuade far more people to make a will 
than do so currently.”687 However, while this is undoubtedly sound advice it does not 
address the issue of will-making not being an activity that people revisit.
688
  
5.5.5 Non-binding agreements. 
 
In contrast to the participants who believed their spouses to be bound by their mutual 
agreements, another group fully appreciated that any agreement they had with their 
spouse was not legally enforceable beyond death. In general, however, they 
considered this to be inconsequential as they viewed their morally binding agreement 
to be no less unassailable than a legal one. The sacrosanct nature of such agreements 
was referenced by Lauren in explaining her mother’s testamentary intentions. 
Lauren’s father died leaving his estate to his wife and, although Lauren’s brother is 
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 In my study alone, two remarked that their wills no longer reflected their testamentary intentions. 
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estranged from the family, her mother regularly reminds Lauren and her sister that her 
estate will be divided between the three children. Lauren attributed this decision both 
to the indestructible parent-child bond and to the agreement she had with her now 
deceased husband: 
 
Oh, it’s her boy, he’s her boy. And that was my dad’s, her and my dad’s wishes 
and dad’s not here so she has to follow it through. 
 
In Lauren’s view her mother’s moral obligation is no less binding than a legal 
compulsion. 
 
In addition to believing that testators were, in general, morally obliged to respect the 
pre-deceased spouse’s wishes, several participants stressed that, in their own case, 
they trusted their spouse to respect their wishes. This trust was unsurprising in a 
relationship between two people who expected to spend their lives together. However, 
it also reflected the fact that many people had simply not given much thought to the 
eventuality of their spouse repartnering and, upon doing so, perhaps also choosing to 
renege on their agreement. Sally was shocked when she was struck by the realisation 
that she would have no control over her estate if it passed to her husband, exclaiming, 
“Damn you! I’ll have to think about that now!”  
 
Fellow Group 5 participant, Catriona, was equally surprised: 
 
I hadn’t thought of that aspect because I’m sitting here thinking I’d trust Oliver to 
be with someone sensible who would look after my kids and if she turned out to 
be a monster then the grandparents would intervene, or family would at some 
point, but actually if he dies and it gets left to some psycho to have my money 
and my kids… 
 Sally: I’m with you! 
 
Although Catriona accepted the suggestion that the surviving spouse, the father of her 
children, may require the resources to bring up her children, Sally was troubled by the 
possibility of “losing control” of her estate for the remainder of the session and 
wondered why her solicitor had not raised the matter with her when the wills were 
being drafted. 
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Finally, some participants – or more precisely the mothers of some participants – 
were aware that the agreements they had with their spouses were non-binding after 
death and were consequently concerned that their partner would not implement them. 
Malcolm explained that, although his parents were still together and very united, his 
mother remained concerned about ensuring her children would be provided for: 
 
On the point of trusting your husband, my mum and dad have spent the last 15 
years trying to make a will. She’s been married for 48 years and she still doesn’t 
trust my father enough not to run off with a floozy in the event of her death and 
spend her children and her grandchildren’s inheritance … She’s trying to insist 
that there’s some sort of provision that, if she passed away before my father, a 
certain amount would have to be passed down to myself and my sister and the 
grandchildren. 
 
While this exchange provoked a degree of hilarity, presumably on the basis that the 
participants felt that Malcolm’s septuagenarian father was unlikely to embark on a 
new relationship if his wife died, older adults do form relationships in later life and 
there is no reason that Malcolm’s father would not find himself in such a situation. 
Indeed, as the conversation progressed, the group accepted Gillian’s view that perhaps 
Malcolm’s mother wasn’t “so daft” after all. 
 
Lucy also discussed her mother’s awareness of the fragility of any agreement 
brokered between spouses. Although Lucy’s parents had been divorced for over a 
decade, their wills still benefited each other. However, in order to mitigate the effects 
of her ex-husband reneging on their agreement, Lucy’s mother herself reneged on it, 
although at the expense of the ex-husband and not the children: 
 
My mum has just changed her will because … mum and dad have always had 
mirror wills. Basically, they used to be a couple who were together a long long 
time therefore they thought, you know, better that one of them lived the life that 
they thought they were going to have because it is a bit different to have to split it 
two ways. That was all very well and good: all the money would go to mum or all 
the money would go to dad and none of it would go to us at that point at all. And 
then my mum suddenly thought … you know what, you just can’t trust anyone, 
even if my dad didn’t want that to happen, who knows what a partner might try 
and do.  So my dad doesn’t know this yet, but she has siphoned off part of that 
and said this much will go to my dad but actually this much will go directly to the 
children because otherwise she’d be worried that we may end up with nothing.  
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5.5.6 Testamentary freedom between spouses 
 
The confusion surrounding will-writing and attendant obligations between spouses 
has been highlighted because it speaks volumes about the way in which couples —or 
at least couples with children—understand testamentary freedom. While several 
participants felt that it was hard to conceive of how a child could become absolutely 
undeserving, they did accept that parents could be justified in excluding their 
children. However, this was viewed as a decision the parents made together, prior to 
the death of the first spouse, and was not one the surviving spouse could make on his 
own without very good reason. Indeed, they disapproved strongly of those who did 
not honour informal spousal agreements, suggesting that couples understand their 
freedom to test to be mutually restricted.  In other words, while “they” as a couple felt 
it was important that “they” enjoyed at least some testamentary freedom, no one 
suggested that the spouses, as individuals, had the freedom to dispose of what at once 
been “theirs” (as a couple) in the manner that they (as individuals) saw fit. In this 
sense, their understanding of testamentary freedom clearly did not correlate with the 
conventional narrative of individual expression, as there was no sense the surviving 
spouse had carte blanche to do what he saw fit with the assets following the pre-
decease of the first spouse.  
 
Of course, no single factor can be taken in isolation and, while several participants 
clearly felt strongly about the surviving spouse’s obligation to the first spouse, they 
understood both that absolute rights and wrongs rarely exist, and that the vagaries of 
life might temper that obligation. David, for example, pointed out that circumstances 
could arise that would justify a departure from the spousal agreement: 
 
I would have thought that John could certainly have been criticized for not 
following through on the agreement, but with the qualification that a certain 
amount depends on his new wife’s circumstances. 
 
Maintaining a legal share for children allows the law to balance the testamentary 
freedom of the testator, while also recognising that, in many cases, the estate that 
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became the testator’s was given to him on the understanding that at least some of it 
would be passed on to the pre-deceased spouse’s children.689 
5.6 Balancing competing needs 
 
My research project started from the premise that the spouse’s entitlement to a share 
of the deceased’s estate is indisputable. However, while the spouse’s claim is 
considered virtually unassailable, this is not to say that it is considered to be the only 
legitimate claim. The findings discussed above demonstrate clearly that children are 
also considered to have a claim, albeit one that is deferred to the claim of the child’s 
other parent. The factors that underpin this claim, while potentially applicable in the 
context of “intact” families, assume a particular importance in first family/second 
family dynamics. 
 
In this sense, first marriages are different from second marriages in an inheritance 
context. This difference in no way speaks to a difference in the worth of the two 
marriages but is instead purely pragmatic: the deceased has ties to two family units 
and, given the normative expectations that exist, must take measure to provide for 
both. In cases of testamentary succession, this can be done by will-writing or by 
making the appropriate non-testamentary provision; in the case of intestacy, the 
responsibility of ensuring a “just” outcome falls on the state.  
5.6.1 Two intestacy regimes 
 
In some jurisdictions, attempts are made to balance the “entitlements” of first families 
and second families by creating a separate intestacy regime that operates when the 
surviving spouse is not also the other parent of the deceased’s children. The Canadian 
province of British Columbia is a case in point. British Columbia recently undertook 
extensive reform of its succession laws, and one of the principal changes means that 
the law now prescribes different divisions where the surviving spouse is not also the 
parent of the deceased’s children. Under the province’s new succession Act, where all 
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descendants are common to both the intestate and the spouse, the spouse’s preferential 
share is $300,000;
690 in contrast, where the surviving spouse is not also the parent of 
all of the intestate’s children, the preferential share is reduced to $150,000.691 The 
residue of the intestate estate is then split equally with one half to the spouse and one 
half to the children.
692 The spouse also has the right to purchase the spousal home if 
the fair market value of the deceased’s interest in the spousal home exceeds the value 
of the surviving spouse’s interest in the estate.693  
 
In the lengthy report accompanying the reform proposals this point—so contentious in 
the Scottish and wider British context—received scant attention. In explaining its 
rationale the Report stated simply that the preferential share should be reduced as “the 
natural children of the deceased could not normally expect to inherit from the spouse 
and should in fairness receive some of the estate.”694 Perhaps one of the reasons why 
this change was uncontroversial is that it has already been implemented in other 
Canadian provinces,
695
 as well as in those US states adhering to the Uniform Probate 
Code (UPC).
696 
 
In Australia, a similar approach was proposed by the National Law Reform 
Commission in 2007
697
 and has subsequently been adopted by New South Wales
698 
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and Tasmania.
699
 It should be noted that, unlike the British Columbian model, or that 
contained in the UPC, the spouse’s statutory legacy in the Australian National Law 
Reform model comes into play only when the surviving spouse is not also the other 
parent of the deceased’s children. The surviving spouse inherits the entire estate if the 
surviving spouse is the deceased children’s other parent, and the children are given a 
share of the residue where this is not the case.
700
 
 
The Law Commission of England and Wales also considered this option, albeit 
indirectly, by discussing whether the rules of intestacy should reflect the concerns of 
conduit theory. While the Law Commission ultimately decided not to address these 
concerns in its reform process, the reasons behind its decision are not unassailable. 
The Law Commission argued –correctly – that “even if the surviving spouse is the 
parent of the deceased’s children, he or she may remarry ... or simply fall out with the 
children potentially diverting ... the deceased’s wealth to a new partner or other 
beneficiary on … her death.”701 However, the fact that the intestacy regime will not 
come into play if the deceased has written a will is no reason not to incorporate 
conduit theory into the law of intestate succession. Furthermore, it is precisely 
because the deceased may remarry that it is important that the principle be reflected in 
the intestacy regime. 
 
Secondly, and more importantly, the Law Commission held that it was “wrong in 
principle for the entitlement of one spouse to differ from that of another because of 
the presence of children from other relationships.”702 This is a robust sounding 
statement yet it is one that is never elucidated. This is problematic when it is 
considered that other jurisdictions, such as those discussed above, clearly approach 
the question from the stance that it would be wrong “in principle” not to recognise 
that the spouse’s entitlement is different in such circumstances.  
 
In the Scottish context, the SLC argued that no distinction should be made between 
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“different types” of surviving spouse,703 as succession rights arise solely from the 
spouse’s legal relationship.704 This is true, but is not an immutable or universal truth: 
in some jurisdictions, automatic intestacy rights also exist for cohabitants.
705
 
However, and more importantly, the spouse’s rights in the BC and Australian models 
described above still arise from the spouse’s legal relationship; the distinction is 
simply between spouses who have other families and those who do not. For many 
people this is simply a fact of life rather than a legal slight against spouses who are 
not also the parent of their partner’s children.  
 
Furthermore, as the SLC recognised that such family configurations are increasingly 
prevalent, it seems inappropriate to cleave to a statutory regime predicated on the 
increasingly outdated model of the nuclear family. As this model becomes less 
common, testators (and the law) cannot simply approach inheritance as a “family” 
matter, but must approach the two strands of the family separately. If the deceased 
relates to his children and his spouse as two separate family units there is no reason 
why the law should not follow suit. 
5.6.2 Alternate models 
 
While the British Columbian model offers clear advantages, it is not a panacea. The 
threshold amount, although much lower than the one proposed for Scotland, still 
means that the children of those who leave only small estates will be left with 
nothing. This particular difficulty could be addressed by introducing a sliding scale, 
with an increase in the percentage awarded to the children according to the size of the 
estate. This would provide recognition of the parent-child relationship while also 
meeting the policy objective of ensuring the spouse does not suffer financial hardship. 
By way of example, the following shares have been proposed:
706
 
 
For instance, up to £100,000 just 1% or £1000 could be shared between any 
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children; and from £100,000 up to £250,000 (which takes the figures above the 
average estate) children could receive 5%; and thereafter rising to 24% or 30% 
for larger estates. 
 
It seems unlikely that, even in very modest estates, the loss of 1% would make a 
significant difference to the survivor’s wellbeing.  
 
A second option would be to incorporate principles of matrimonial property into the 
law of succession. As is discussed below,
707
 Scottish family law recognises a 
community of acquests principle for divorcing couples. This principle means that 
there is a presumption of equal sharing in assets acquired during the marriage with 
exceptions for gifts, inheritance and property previously owned by either party.
708
 
Incorporating this principle into the law of succession would offer “a rational system 
for apportioning family property between, for instance, the claims of a second spouse 
after a brief marriage in competition with children of a previous lengthy marriage, 
which had generated most of that property.”709  
 
A third partial solution – and the only one considered by the SLC – is to adapt the 
way in which the intestacy regime operates when a survivorship destination is in 
force. According to figures reported by the SLC, about three quarters of Scottish 
homes that are owned in common by spouses include a survivorship destination.
710
 
This means that, upon death, the deceased’s share passes automatically to the survivor 
and does not constitute part of the deceased’s estate. The SLC recognised that, in such 
cases, the policy objective of allowing the surviving spouse to remain in the family 
home is met and that the deceased’s issue would be unduly prejudiced if the surviving 
spouse were to get both the threshold sum and the deceased’s pro indiviso share by 
survivorship destination.
711
 Consequently, the draft bill proposed a clause reducing 
the threshold sum by the net value of the surviving spouse’s right under the 
survivorship destination.
712
 This is a laudable step, but does not address the 
consequences of the threshold sum being set as high as it is and does not, of course, 
provide any assistance in those cases where a survivorship destination is not in force. 
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It is unfortunate that these issues were not explored in greater detail as they could 
potentially have enabled the SLC to develop a model better suited to meet the diverse 
needs of today’s heterogeneous families. However, in order to determine the best way 
to strike an appropriate balance between the needs of first and second families, 
important questions must first be asked: does the current existence of legal rights 
significantly impact on poverty levels amongst widows? Are spouses being forced to 
leave their homes to meet claims for legal rights? At what level could legal rights be 
set to ensure that the majority of spouses would not see a drop in their standard of 
living? 
 
The answers to these questions require further research but are important in order to 
allow for an informed debate. While participants were unanimous that spouses should 
not be “left without a roof over their head,” it is not clear that this can only be 
achieved by leaving everything to the spouse.
713
 Furthermore, it is not clear that 
financial need is the only reason spouses want to resist claims for legal rights: Lynne, 
the pilot expert interviewee, recounted that the only time she had seen a claim for 
legal rights cause tension related not to financial hardship but to mutual personal 
dislike between the son from the first marriage and the second spouse. 
5.7 In-laws 
 
Although the focus of this chapter has been on first family/second family dynamics 
when the deceased is the common link between the two families, the participants in 
Group 7 also viewed the question from an alternative perspective: the “threat” posed 
when the deceased’s child – the intended beneficiary – had both a first family and a 
second family. Indeed, four of the seven participants in Group 7 expressed concern 
that their estate would in some way benefit their child’s ex-spouse. They raised two 
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related, but nonetheless distinct, concerns. Firstly, Jim was concerned that, if he died 
and passed on to his children, he would be unable to ensure that the estate would 
benefit his grandchildren rather than his son’s spouse, if at any time she were to 
become an ex-spouse. Secondly, Alec and Cyril were concerned that their respective 
children’s ex-spouses would be able to make a claim on their estates when they died. 
 
The first concern was not entirely unexpected, as I had previously heard it discussed 
anecdotally. Matrimonial law defines matrimonial property as all property belonging 
to either party that was acquired during the marriage, or before the marriage for use 
by both spouses as a family home or furnishing for such a home.
714
 Amongst the 
assets excluded from family property are assets acquired by way of gift or inheritance 
from a third party.
715
 However, if such “non-matrimonial” property is sold and used to 
buy something else then that item becomes matrimonial property for the purposes of 
dividing the assets upon divorce.
716
  
 
The second concern was more unexpected – as it was unfounded – but it was 
nonetheless a source of genuine and serious concern for the participants. These men 
were of an age and social background where they clearly considered divorce and 
separation to be a modern phenomenon, unconnected to their lives; as Alec observed, 
“I think young people nowadays, divorce is more the norm ... we would never have 
thought of divorce”. However, they were deeply concerned by their children’s 
divorces and the impact that they would have on their children’s and grandchildren’s 
inheritances. Although their concerns were unwarranted, they had a very strong fear 
that former sons and daughters in-law would have a claim on their estate.  
 
Alec and Cyril explained at length the steps they had taken with a view to preventing 
such a claim from being made:  
 
Alec: She hasnae got a claim. Well, she’s no goin’ to have a claim on anything 
because that’s been written in. Grace deals with the wills and believe me 
                                                        
714
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Grace has made sure that this will ... the guy came in from Glasgow ... and we 
made sure that nothing can go to the first wife of my son. Nothing. And it’s 
been written in such a manner ... I get very bitter thinking that my children’s 
previous partners could have a snippet of a chance ... very bitter. And I know 
for a fact that anything I’ve given ma grandchildren on my son’s marriage, she 
dips into to buy frigging motorbikes and things like that. And that’s where it 
gets very contentious. And I get very bitter about a will and I try to keep it as 
simple for me as I can.  
 
 
Similarly, Cyril stated: 
 
I was just going to say, when I went to the lawyer to make up my will. My 
elder daughter, she had been married twice, divorced once and separated, 
right, one child from the first marriage, right, so I went to make sure that her 
second husband that she’s separated from had no claim on anything there.. and 
that was my big concern. I know the first one’s oot the window because he’s 
remarried and got children, right, but as far as my elder daughter’s concerned, 
if I want to make sure that it’s my elder daughter, my two daughters, 
especially my elder daughter and also my grandchildren who benefit. No’ any 
part of his family to become involved.  
 
In these instances, Alec’s son and Cyril’s daughter had already separated and so the 
“relevant date” for the purposes of assessing the matrimonial property had also 
passed.
717
 As Alec and Cyril are still alive, any assets their children inherit from them 
in the future cannot therefore be considered matrimonial property of those 
relationships. Despite this, their concerns were very real. 
 
The men debated the point passionately and fell into an argument about the best way 
to address it. Jim was adamant that the best way to avoid an in-law who was likely to 
become an ex from leaving the marriage with any assets that formerly belonged to the 
testator was to make a direct bequest to the grandchildren. Neil supported this view, 
adding that the issue had prayed on his mind since the separation of one of his 
daughters. Neil and Jim’s views were however spiritedly rejected by Alec: 
 
To me it’s more simplistic to leave it to your children. Because my son has now 
got a son of nine months. And I’ve got a grandson from his first marriage of 21 
and one of 14. So it is better for him to decide how the money goes than for me 
to turn around and give it to the grandchildren because the first thing that I 
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would see is the mother of the first two boys getting into the kitty and that I just 
don’t want. 
 
Aside from highlighting the hazy understanding of inheritance law that the public has, 
these comments underscored many of the points made by other commentators. Here 
the participants were “constituting kin relationships”718 through the act of making 
testamentary provision; they were choosing to privilege the project of self to 
which ...[they]... attach most significance during their lives;
719 and they were 
expressing horror at the money “passing out” of the family.720 Even more strikingly, 
and perhaps somewhat harshly, they highlighted the centrality and permanency of the 
parent/child/grandchild relationship in contrast to the spousal relationship which, at 
least from the extended family’s view point, can evaporate as soon as the legal tie is 
severed.   
5.8 Extra-marital children 
 
In an unexpectedly candid discussion, Alec revealed that he had a child from an extra-
marital relationship. Here his dilemma was similar to that raised in a first 
family/second family scenario, but viewed from an alternative angle as the second 
family was represented by issue, not a second spouse. Alec was clear that he had a 
duty to the son, whom he loved, but he also realised that, had he not had this 
relationship, his wife would not be in the position of seeing her children (and Alec’s 
other children) being provided with less on his death due to the overall pot being 
shared with an “extra” person.  
 
As a result, Alec and his wife had made complex calculations to notionally divide 
assets into those belonging to his wife – that would be divided between their two 
children –and those that belonged to him, that were also available to the third child. It 
would appear that some assets were transferred legally into his wife’s name to ensure 
they were not available for legal rights: 
 
You see, I have a problem with that. When you read my piece of paper … I 
have a child outside of marriage, he’s 31. Now, although there would be 
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something left to Stuart, but because he’s been brought up down in England 
and I see him regularly, as regularly as you can from Scotland to England, and 
I love him dearly. But my children are my two children if you follow me. 
When we had something drawn up it was like doing the bloody lottery. You 
get a percentage of this and a percentage of that and Stuart got a sum of 
money that was based on a percentage of what my other two would get. In 
other words, if my other two were getting 40% of what I owned or what Grace 
owned depending on who died, Stuart would get 20% and that was drawn up 
in some sort of format … Is that good and proper?..… It doesn’t matter how 
much your wife loves you or thinks … you know … it becomes a wee bit … 
she only sees two children whereas I see three. Do you follow me? That’s 
where inheritance becomes contentious 
 
Alec’s dilemma was not purely about his duty to his children but also, and perhaps 
most importantly, to his spouse. As was discussed above, many spouses conceptualise 
their assets as belonging to the family unit and plan for them ultimately to pass to the 
children. By having an “extra” child, Alec had “wronged” his wife by diverting 
resources to another family, but found himself torn as he realised it would equally be 
“wrong” to ignore his responsibilities to the second family. 
5.9 Conclusion 
 
My research findings clearly indicate that, in all but the most exceptional 
circumstances, parents are considered to have a duty to provide for their children.  
This duty stems from the coalescence of multiple factors
721
 but, in its essence, reflects 
the desire most parents have to show their love and do “the right thing.”722 However, 
the research also indicated that giving effect to this parental obligation operates 
differently depending on family configuration: in the context of a second family 
formed following divorce or separation, each parent must independently take steps to 
fulfil the obligation; in contrast, in an intact family, the parental obligation to the child 
is “passed on” to the surviving spouse, becoming relevant only upon the death of the 
second parent. Of course, the line separating “intact” families from “complex” 
families is not inviolable and second families may also be created when a member of 
a formerly “intact” family re-partners after widowhood. This creates a new 
inheritance dynamic and, in such instances, the surviving spouse must “pass on” to 
fulfil not only his parental obligation but also his obligation to his pre-deceased 
spouse. 
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Succession law can give effect to society’s normative expectations of parents in 
second relationships in two ways. In the case of intestate succession, the legislative 
framework can be designed in such a manner as to reflect the deceased’s obligation to 
both of his family units, for example, by varying the spouse’s entitlement according to 
whether he is also the other parent of the deceased’s children. In cases of testate 
succession, the continued existence of legal rights would provide assistance by 
restricting otherwise unfettered testamentary freedom. This restriction is important 
since, as has been shown, when an estate passes to a surviving spouse it is often on 
the understanding that the survivor will subsequently give effect to the predeceasing 
spouse’s wishes. Preserving legal rights means that, even if the surviving spouse 
chooses not to respect the predeceased spouse’s wishes, the law will provide a remedy 
that balances testamentary freedom with the perceived entitlements of the first 
family.
723
  
 
However, despite the clear consensus that exists regarding the children’s entitlement 
in a first family/second family context, the SLC chose to disregard the issue. As the 
incidence of such family formations is on the rise, it is difficult to see in what way 
this decision will render the proposed succession regime more responsive to the needs 
of twenty-first century families. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
723
 As legal rights do not prescribe for 20 years after becoming enforceable (Prescription and 
Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 s.7, Sched. 1, para 2(f)), the children can, as Miss   pointed out, delay 
making a claim until the surviving parent re-partners and threatens the operation of conduit theory. 
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CHAPTER 6: RECONSTITUTED FAMILIES 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter examined the impact of the current succession regime and the 
proposed reforms on those who are part of a first family/second family dynamic. In 
such instances, the first family and the second family were viewed as two entirely 
distinct units: the children had never shared a home with the new spouses; the new 
spouse had played no parental role in the children’s lives; and, indeed, the children 
and the second spouse had perhaps never even met. However, there are also many 
instances where a parent re-partners when children are young, creating what is often 
referred to as a stepfamily. Moreover, as well as introducing new “parental” 
relationships, these family units can also give rise to stepsibling and half-sibling 
relationships. It is these reconstituted families that will be considered in this chapter, 
beginning with stepfamilies. 
 
Data on stepfamilies is notoriously difficult to gather.
724
 The National Records of 
Scotland pointed out that this is in part because of the “different ways in which 
families of this type classify themselves.” It contended that “the parents in many of 
these families are not married and, as a result of this and the negative imagery 
associated with step-parents, do not classify the children as stepchildren but either as 
their own children or unrelated.”725 Some information is nevertheless available. 
According to the 2011 Census, stepfamilies make up 8% of married couple families 
and 29% of cohabiting couple families in Scotland,
726
 and 10% of married couple 
families and 24% of cohabiting couple families in England.
727
 Overall, 11% of couple 
                                                        
724
 The Office for National Statistics (ONS), for example, noted that the 2001 Census was the first 
census to identify stepfamilies (ONS, Focus on families (2007), 5, available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/family-
demography/focus-on-families/2007/index.html).  
725
 National Records of Scotland, Other Households: Census Results 1981-2001, available at 
https://www.nrscotland.gov.uk/statistics-and-data/statistics/statistics-by-theme/housholds/occasional-
papers/household-change/scotlands-place-in-the-uk-and-ireland/other-households.  
726
 Scottish Government, Census 2011: Detailed characteristics on Population and Households in 
Scotland, Release 3E, (2014), available at http://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/news/census-2011-
detailed-characteristics-population-and-households-scotland-release-3e.  
727
 ONS, Stepfamilies in 2011 (2014), 5, available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_36
0784.pdf.  
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families with dependent children in England and Wales
728
 and 12 % in Scotland
729
 
were stepfamilies in 2011. 
 
However, even if all stepfamilies self-identified according to National Records of 
Scotland criteria, these figures would still offer only an incomplete picture. As the 
Census figures apply only to families “living in households” with dependent 
children,
730
 it is almost inevitable that they provide a conservative estimate. For 
example, they shed no light on the number of non-dependent children who are part of 
stepfamilies,
731
 or indeed the number of dependent children who are part of 
stepfamilies but who do not live with a step-parent, either because they live with their 
other parent in a lone parent family unit or because the step-parent and the parent 
have ended their relationship. 
 
Other questions abound: can adults become stepchildren; at what point is the step-
parent/stepchild relationship formed; and, perhaps most importantly, does the 
relationship exist independently of the step-parent and the biological (or legal) 
parent’s relationship, in the way that a parent/child relationship exists independently 
of the parents’ marriage, or is it a relationship that lives and dies by the success of the 
spouses’ relationship? These are some of the questions will be considered in this 
chapter. 
6.2 What is a stepfamily? 
 
In general, the definitions of step-parent and stepchild seem to be more tightly 
circumscribed than definitions of the term stepfamily. The Oxford English Dictionary 
offers only the tersest of explanations of step-parent and stepchild, defining a step-
father as “a man who has married one’s mother after one’s father’s death or divorce” 
and a stepson as “a son, by a former marriage of one’s husband or wife.”732 These 
limited and rather dated definitions, reflecting historical legal definitions that placed 
                                                        
728
  Ibid, 1. 
729
 Calculation based on figures provided in Scottish Government Release 3E (2014). 
730
 Scottish Government Release 3E (2014). 
731
 The 2001 census did provide some information on non-dependent children in stepfamilies, but non-
dependent children were narrowly defined as “children aged 16 and over living with their parent(s) 
who have no spouse, partner or child living in the household.” In other words, the definition did not 
include adult children who had formed their own family (ONS (2007), 3). 
732
 The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2017) (on-line version). 
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the onus on marriage as creating the steprelationship, stand in contrast to the more 
inclusive definition the dictionary provides for the stepfamily:
733
 
 
A family with one or more stepchildren; a family in which at least one of the 
adult partners has children from a previous relationship or marriage (though 
not necessarily living in the same household). 
 
The contrast between the narrowly delineated definitions of stepchild and step-parent 
and the broader, more amorphous definition of stepfamily encapsulates the tension 
between the way in which the law defines steprelationships and their broader social 
meaning. The divergence between the two meanings of the term will be discussed 
forthwith. 
6.2.1 The legal definition 
 
Despite the regularity with which the terms “stepchild” and “step-parent” feature in 
discussions about inheritance and family law, they rarely appear in Scottish statutes. 
Some of the limited examples include the Burial and Cremation (Scotland) Act 
2016,
734
 the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 (and its successor the Damages (Scotland) 
Act 2011)
735
 and the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007,
736
 none of which 
define the term. The traditional reference sources provide equally little assistance. The 
Law Relating to Parent and Child in Scotland,
737
 for example, does not discuss the 
question of step-parents while The Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia provides little more 
insight than the Oxford English Dictionary: it is unequivocal that a step-parent is 
someone who is “married” to the other parent738 but sheds no light on the gulf 
between the legal and social meanings of the term.
739
 Given the absence of any 
contrary authoritative examples, it must be assumed that the narrow, affinity-based 
definition is unassailable in law. The case law that has developed around the statutes, 
                                                        
733
 The OED’s definition of stepfamily is broad enough to encompass the definition of first 
family/second families included at 6.1, but a distinction will continue to be made between the two for 
the purposes of this thesis. 
734 Section 65(5)(b) stipulates that the stepchild of an adult is to be treated as the child of the 
adult for the purposes of subsection 3. 
735
 Section 14(2)(b) states that a stepchild is to be treated as a person’s child. 
736
 The Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007 includes several references to step-parents. 
737
 Wilkinson, AB and Norrie, KMcK, The Law Relating to Parent and Child in Scotland (3
rd
 edition, 
W. Green, 2013). 
738
 Sutherland (2004) at para 106. 
739
  Unlike the OED, Sutherland also extends the affinity-based definition to the term stepfamily, which 
she distinguishes from “cohabitation-based” de facto stepfamilies (Sutherland (2004) at 70). 
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however, illustrates the difficulty of adhering to this approach in contemporary 
society.   
  
These difficulties came to the fore in McGibbon v McAllister
740
 when the pursuer 
sued for damages under section 1(4) of the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 (the 1976 
Act) following the death of his de facto stepson in 2004.
741
 Although the statute 
specifically mentioned the term “stepchild” (but did not define it), it was the meaning 
of the term step-parent—a term not used in the Act—that proved problematic. Section 
1(4) of the 1976 Act
742
 provided for damages for non-patrimonial loss to be awarded 
to relatives of the deceased’s immediate family, “relative” being defined in Schedule 
1 to the Act.
743
 At that time, although “relative” included step-parents,744 
stepchildren
745
 and de facto stepchildren,
746
 it did not include de facto step-parents. 
 
This anomaly was corrected by section 35(5) of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, 
which added four new categories to the list of relatives who count as immediate 
family, including persons who accepted the deceased as a child of their family.
747
 The 
amendment was introduced with a view to changing the eligibility test for damages 
from one of affinity to one of acceptance. As Norrie explained, this was because the 
law in force at the time was both over-inclusive and under-inclusive:
748
 
 
It was over-inclusive in that it permitted pursuers to trace their claim through 
relationships of affinity even where there was in reality no genuine closeness with the 
deceased that would justify an award for non-patrimonial loss. And it was under-
inclusive in that it excluded persons who did have that genuine closeness through 
having accepted the deceased as a child of the family. 
                                                        
740
 2008 SLT 459. 
741
 For a detailed synopsis of the case see Mair, J, “Parents and parenting: McGibbon v McAllister” 
(2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 442. 
742
 Since repealed and replaced by Schedule 2 to the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011. 
743
McGibbon v McAllister at para 6. 
744
 Sch 1, s 1(b) provided that any person who was a parent or child of the deceased was classed as a 
relative while s 2(a) provided that any relationship by affinity was to be treated as a relationship by 
consanguinity. 
745
 Sch 1, s 2(b). 
746
 Sch 1, s 1(c). 
747
 Norrie, KMcK, “Rushed law and wrongful death” (2006) 51 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 
24. 
748
 Norrie, KMcK, “When parliament gets it wrong: Mykoliw v Botterill” (2011) 15 Edinburgh Law 
Review 103 at 104. 
 193 
 
Unfortunately, the amendment, which applied only to deaths that occurred after 4 
May 2006, was of no assistance to Mr. McGibbon whose de facto stepchild had died 
in 2004. Nevertheless, Mr. McGibbon was granted title to sue as an ordinary reading 
of the 1976 Act was found to be incompatible with the ECHR.
749
   
6.2.2 The social definition 
 
Although the marriage-based legal definition of the term step-parent seems utterly 
entrenched, wider society does not appear to adhere to this view. Indeed, although the 
question was not specifically tested in my study, the participants gave no indication 
that they held marriage to be the sine qua non of a stepfamily relationship. Similarly, 
government and policymakers do not appear to distinguish between marriage and 
cohabitation-based steprelationships. In the Scottish Government’s Social Attitudes 
Survey 2004, for example, the term stepfather was used to refer to both to a man who 
had married the biological mother and to a man who had treated the child as his own 
for five years.
750
 Likewise, in the Scottish Government’s summary of the 2011 
Census findings, the term stepfamilies referred both to married couple families and 
cohabiting couple families.
751
 Other stakeholder policy documents,
752
 law firm 
websites
753
 and regular press commentary appear to use the same wide definition.
754
 
 
The legal community is sensitive to this disconnect and, in its Report on Title to Sue 
for Non-Patrimonial Loss, the SLC argued that the existing definition of immediate 
family needed to be updated to “reflect the family structures found in contemporary 
Scotland.”755 In its analysis of the legal definition of the term stepfamily, the SLC 
highlighted the inappropriateness of treating all “reconstituted” families alike:756 
 
                                                        
749
 McGibbon v McAllister at para 22. 
750
 Scottish Government, Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2004: Family Module Report (2005) at para 
4.1, available at http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2005/08/02131208/12092.  
751
 Scottish Government, Release 3E (2014). 
752
 Capability Scotland, Together and Apart: Supporting Families Through Change” (2011), available 
at http://www.capability-scotland.org.uk/media/101061/about_families_report_2_change.pdf.  
753
 Wylie, K, (Morton Fraser website) “Adoption: The blend trend” (1 May 2014), available at 
http://www.morton-fraser.com/knowledge-hub/adoptionthe-blend-trend.  
754
 Cook, E, “I love him, but not his kids” The Guardian, 10 March 2007, 
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2007/mar/10/familyandrelationships.family1.  
755
 (Scot Law Com No 187, 2002) at para 2.10. 
756
 Ibid at paras 2.37-2.38. 
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On the one hand the concept of step-parent is wide. It includes any person who 
is married to the biological or adoptive parent of the deceased. We have no 
difficulty in regarding a step-parent as a member of the deceased’s immediate 
family when he or she has played a part in the upbringing of the deceased 
child. But that will not always be the case, particularly where the step-parent’s 
marriage took place when the child was an adult.  On the other hand, the 
concept is narrow, as the relationship is only constituted by marriage. In 
modern family structures, a person can often play a major role in a child’s 
upbringing even although he or she does not marry the child’s biological or 
adoptive parent. 
 
In essence, the SLC is highlighting the difference between a first family/second 
family dynamic, as discussed in the previous chapter, and a traditional stepfamily 
dynamic where an actual “parental” relationship exists. Recognition of this difference 
led the SLC to recommend changing the test for non-patrimonial loss from one based 
on the existence of an affinitive relationship to one based on acceptance of the 
deceased as a child of the claimant’s family.757 As will be discussed below, this 
analysis, which creates a distinction between two broad categories of stepfamilies, 
may provide some assistance in reflecting steprelationships in inheritance law. 
6.2.3 Stepfamilies and the 1964 Act 
 
Given the prevailing social mores at the time the 1964 Act was enacted, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that no mention was made of the terms stepchild, step-parent or 
stepfamily. While “it has been common throughout history for children to ... be 
looked after by people other than their natural parents,”758 at the time the legislation 
was enacted the nuclear family was both the norm and the ideal
759
 and disregarding 
stepfamilies was unproblematic. Furthermore, at common law, ties of both 
consanguinity and affinity had to be present for a child to inherit from her parent and, 
as a stepchild could not fulfil the former requirement, there would have been little 
reason to consider the place of stepfamilies in the 1964 Act.  
 
But this is no longer the case. The traditional marriage-based heterocentric family 
model is becoming atypical
760
 and although “most people still think ...[such a 
                                                        
757
 Ibid at para 2.41. 
758
 Coote, A, Harman, H and Hewitt, H, “Changing family structures and family behaviour” in 
Eekelaar, J and Maclean, M (eds), A Reader on Family Law (Oxford University Press, 1994), 43. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
 195 
model]... is (approximately) the best way for family life to be lived”761 other models 
have made important legal and social strides in recent years. Legislators are aware 
that “a credible legal system must serve the needs of the whole population”762 and so 
strive to reflect the changing face of the family in legislation. In terms of succession 
law, numerous changes have been implemented over the years to reflect new family 
models: illegitimacy is no longer a bar to inheritance;
763
 adopted children now inherit 
from their adoptive parents;
764
 cohabitants have some recourse on intestacy;
765
 civil 
partners inherit on the same footing as married couples;
766
 and marriage is no longer 
restricted to opposite sex couples.
767
 However, despite growing support for 
stepchildren to be recognised by succession law,
768
 the SLC ultimately recommended 
that no change be made to the status quo. The merits of the SLC’s arguments—and 
some carry considerable force—will be considered in Chapter 7, but attention must 
first be turned to the current statutory position.  
 
At present, a stepchild cannot claim legal rights or inherit from a step-parent on 
intestacy (a step-parent of course remains free to provide for a stepchild in a will). 
This is not stated in the Act but is acknowledged as true by all authorities.
769
 Section 
2(1) of the 1964 Act provides that “where an intestate is survived by children, they 
shall have rights to the whole of the intestate estate” and there is unanimous 
agreement that the terms “children” and “issue” have never been construed to include 
stepchildren.
770
 This thesis is in no way asserting that the term children ought to be 
construed to include stepchildren but it bears stressing that the term child is not 
immutable and has been construed—in an inheritance context—in different ways in 
recent history. 
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 Hiram (2007) at para 2.16. 
 196 
There are two examples of the definition of the term “child” being adapted to reflect 
new social mores. The Adoption Act 1950, re-enacting a provision of the Adoption of 
Children (Scotland) Act 1930, provided that “the expressions ‘child’, ‘children’ and 
‘issue’, where used in relation to any person in any disposition, shall not, unless the 
contrary intention appears, include a person or persons adopted by that person.”771 
However, this position became increasingly unacceptable and was consequently 
reversed by the 1964 Act which holds that “unless the contrary intention appears” in 
any deed “whereby property is conveyed or under which a succession arises” the child 
of the adopter shall be construed as, or as including, “a reference to the adopted 
person.”772 Indeed, the 1964 Act states that an adopted person shall be treated as the 
child of the adopter “for all purposes”773 relating to “the succession to a deceased 
person (whether testate or intestate).
774
  
 
The second example is that of illegitimate children. The common law “discriminated 
very harshly” against illegitimate children775 and, prior to the enactment of the Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1968, an illegitimate child was 
considered “an utter stranger in blood” to both the mother and the father.776 The 1968 
Act reversed this position by providing that the marital status of a person’s parents 
had no role in establishing the legal relationship between the parent and child.
777
 As 
with so many changes in family law, the amendment was the product of a shift in 
societal mores that had rendered the alienation of “illegitimate” children 
unacceptable. The last vestiges of illegitimacy in Scots law were removed by section 
21 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, which amended the 1968 Act to 
categorically abolish the status of illegitimacy.
778
  
 
Before illegitimate children and adopted children were granted full succession rights 
by statute, the common law did allow for them to inherit in certain circumstances and 
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the case law around this point is fascinating. In Hay v Duthie’s Trustees,779 for 
example, the court was asked to decide whether the pursuer, who had been adopted by 
the deceased, could be considered a child of the testator within the meaning of the 
language used by him in a trust disposition and settlement. From the vantage point of 
the present day, the certitude expressed in the court’s response seems misplaced. Lord 
Migdale opined that “there is no dispute that the primary meaning of the word 
‘children’ is natural legitimate children”780 and, in support of this, he cited M’Laren 
on Wills and Succession which held that the word “children” was uniformly construed 
as applying solely to lawful children.
781
 At advising Lord Sorn expressed a similar 
view:
782
 
 
It has long been settled that the word, in its primary meaning, does not include 
illegitimate children, and my impression is that the word has so long been 
accepted as designating legitimate children, i.e. children of the body, that it 
would be held not to include children by adoption. 
 
This raises two interesting, contradictory points: firstly, parenthood is rooted in 
biology; and, secondly, biology was not enough to counter the devastating effect of 
illegitimacy. This is particularly important, as there is a tendency to think that 
parenthood was traditionally about biology and is only now complicated by issues of 
assisted reproduction and complex families. Clearly, this was not the case. 
 
This point aside, the case—and others like it—is particularly interesting in terms of 
the arguments that were advanced by counsel in support of the pursuer. At one stage, 
for example, counsel argued that “the circumstances showed that the testator always 
treated the pursuer as if she had been his natural child.”783 This emphasis on the 
relationship between the deceased and the pursuer was similar to the arguments 
advanced in favour of the de facto step-parent in McGibbon.
784
 Aside from the 
obvious inconsistencies of treating an adopted child as a child of the adopter for all 
purposes other than succession, the law reformers must surely also have been 
motivated by a desire to change the potentially offensive message communicated by 
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the then legislative framework. It is equally possible that the implication that 
stepchildren are “lesser” than biological or adoptive children could be construed as 
offensive by some and the demand for stepchildren to be recognised, in some limited 
circumstances, may grow in future years.
785
 Certainly, existing evidence suggests that 
there is already public support for including stepchildren in intestacy statutes where a 
family relationship exists.
786
 
6.3 What is a parent? 
 
As has been shown, the legal and social definitions of the terms child and children 
have expanded over the years. As a corollary, so too have the legal and social 
definitions of “parent”. The terms are interrelated, insofar as the meaning of the word 
parent is anchored in its relationship to the term child and, to understand the 
relationship between the two, it is important to consider both parts of this symbiotic 
whole. This discussion is particularly important in the context of reconstituted 
families because the changing understanding of the term parent also informs our 
understanding of the term “step-parent.” 
 
It was argued in Chapter 3 that the parent-child relationship was one of asymmetrical 
reciprocity,
787
 and this is particularly evident in a discussion of inheritance. For the 
purposes of the law reform process, the primary question is not whether the step-
parent should be entitled to inherit from the stepchild’s estate (although this question 
could arise) but whether the stepchild (and society) have a legitimate expectation that 
a stepchild will inherit from a step-parent’s estate, either upon intestacy or through 
legal rights in a testate estate. Crucially, this question must be viewed not just through 
the eyes of the stepchild, but also through the eyes of the step-parent. As has been 
repeatedly stated, expectation in regard to inheritance does not exist solely in the 
“grasping” beneficiary, but equally in the parent who wishes to cement the parent-
child relationship at the end of her life. As such, it must also be asked whether it can 
                                                        
785
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be assumed that step-parents would want their children both to inherit on intestacy 
and to be able to claim legal rights on a testate estate. In other words, is being a step-
parent the equivalent to being a parent for inheritance purposes? 
6.3.1 The historical definition 
 
To answer the question, attention must first be turned to what is meant by the term 
“parent;” this, however, is no easy task. Any attempt to answer this ostensibly simple 
question becomes quickly mired in complexity as it becomes evident that “there is no 
consensus on either what parents are or what they should be.”788 In times gone by, the 
answer was intimately linked to marriage: in a period when scientific knowledge did 
not allow for genetic paternity testing the (still relevant) presumption, pater est quem 
nuptiae demonstrant, reigned supreme.
789
 However, parenthood was not linked to 
marriage simply because the husband, by dint of “access”790 to his wife, was the most 
likely father, but because marriage conferred legitimacy on the child. The relationship 
between the parent and the child was in a sense secondary to the relationship between 
the parents: if the parental relationship was not in the designated legal form, then the 
relationship between parent and child was not legally recognised. 
  
This is not to say that the biological tie had no importance. Although legitimacy was 
the ultimate trump card, it was assumed that what was being legitimised was a 
biological relationship. In other words, the presumption implicitly operated to 
establish biological paternity, although an element of doubt could always be present. 
In the case of maternity, although establishing biological parenthood was rarely an 
issue,
791
 legal maternity also depended on marriage since, as aforementioned, an 
illegitimate child was “an utter stranger in blood” to both the mother and the father.792  
 
In terms of a historical definition of parenthood, a final point to note is that, while 
families have always looked after other people’s children, statutory adoption is a 
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product of the twentieth century, there having been no formal recognition of such a 
process until 1926 in England and 1930 in Scotland.
793
 In other words, parenthood 
was historically extremely tightly circumscribed, confined to a biological tie 
legitimised by marriage. 
6.3.2 A contemporary definition 
 
While a definitive modern definition of “parent” may prove elusive, it can be agreed 
that the term has evolved significantly and is likely to continue to do so. Advances in 
medical science, coupled with shifting social values, mean that courts and legislators 
are now confronted with a range of possible answers when they ask who—and indeed 
what—is a parent. In the remainder of this section, an attempt will be made to provide 
a taxonomy of the term “parent,” a hotly contested and highly politicised designation. 
In this endeavour, the starting point will be the authoritative classification provided by 
Baroness Hale in Re G,
794
 a definition that has since been reproduced in textbooks and 
judicial decisions alike,
795
 although not always without criticism. In her definition, 
Baroness Hale identified three types of parenthood: genetic parenthood; gestational 
parenthood; and, social and psychological parenthood. These will be considered in 
turn. 
6.3.2.1 Genetic parenthood 
 
Baroness Hale described genetic parenthood as “the provision of the gametes which 
produce the child,”796 a definition which appears unassailable. Although genetic 
parenthood is presented by Baroness Hale as a category of natural parenthood, it is 
used by others as a synonym for natural parenthood. Similarly, it is often—but not 
entirely accurately—used interchangeably with “biological” parenthood by judges 
and legal commentators.
797
 The ideology behind equating biological and genetic 
parenthood with “natural” parenthood will not be explored in any detail, but the fact 
remains that, for some, biology is the defining feature of parenthood. Indeed, despite 
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progress in destigmatising alternative forms of parenthood, the biological link is 
rarely entirely displaced. For example, in Re G, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead 
observed that “in the ordinary way the rearing of a child by his or her biological 
parent can be expected to be in the child’s best interests.”798 
 
At first blush, it is tempting to dismiss Lord Nicholls’ comments as typical of a 
reactionary judiciary, out of touch with contemporary social mores. Yet in light of the 
emerging consensus around the importance of knowing one’s genetic origins (see 
discussion below at 6.3.3) his comments are not entirely misplaced, particularly when 
read in context. Unfortunately, however, when read in isolation, there is an easily 
reached inference that the biological parent is always to be preferred. Ultimately, the 
difficulty lies in the need to acknowledge the general or common experience, while 
simultaneously resisting the facile assertion that its prevalence stems from some ill-
defined but inherent superiority. Many children will be raised by at least one 
biological parent but any suggestion that this norm is “natural”–and the concomitant 
implication that alternatives are “unnatural”—is offensive to those who do not 
conform to this model. Unfortunately, however, the temptation to establish a 
hierarchy with a view to establishing “who has the most legitimate claim to the title of 
‘parent’”799 is one that many fail to avoid. 
6.3.2.2 Gestational parenthood 
 
The second type of parenthood Baroness Hale identified was gestational parenthood, 
defined as “the conceiving and bearing of the child.”800 This aspect of her taxonomy 
has been criticised,
801
 perhaps with particular reference to the statement that carrying 
a child creates, in most cases, “a relationship which is different from any other.”802 
However, such criticism may be unwarranted. After all, surrogacy laws currently 
designate the gestational mother, not the genetic mother, as the legal mother,
803
 
suggesting a recognition of the bond created through this experience. Furthermore, 
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she spoke only of the vast majority of cases, not of a universal truth, although by 
striving to reflect common experience she inevitably risked alienating those whose 
experience deviates from this norm. 
6.3.2.3 Social parenthood 
 
Thus far, the definitions of natural parenthood discussed have been unsurprising: few 
would contest genetic or gestational parents being termed “natural” parents. Indeed, 
many understand the terms genetic, gestational and natural (along with biological) as 
interchangeable. However, although science now allows us to establish a child’s 
genetic parents with certainty, “the legal status of parent is no longer necessarily 
established by proving a genetic parental link between persons.”804 For example, a 
court-issued adoption order establishes a parent-child relationship in law
805
 between 
parties with no genetic link. In a similar vein, section 35(1) of the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act provides that, where a woman becomes pregnant following “the 
placing in her of an embryo” at a time that she was “a party to a marriage,” the other 
party to the marriage shall (if the embryo was created with sperm that was not his) 
“be treated as the father of the child” unless it is shown he did not consent to the 
process.
806
 Thus, Norrie concludes, “society no longer sees parenthood solely in terms 
of the genetic connection, and neither does the law.”807 This is an important and 
positive step and reflects the experience of many families.  
 
Social parents who have become parents through adoption or assisted reproductive 
technology (ART) are indisputably also legal parents, being designated as such by 
statute, and, in such circumstances the inclusion of social parenthood as a category of 
natural parenthood is entirely understandable. As the term “natural” is so prized, 
placing parents who have become parents through ART or adoption beyond the 
term’s semantic reach could seem inappropriate, implying as it might that they are 
somehow lesser parents. However, the decision to classify social parents in general 
under the heading of “natural” parents is somewhat more surprising.  
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Baroness Hale defined social parenthood as follows:
808
 
 
The relationship which develops through the child demanding and the parent 
providing for the child’s needs, initially at the most basic level of feeding, 
nurturing, comforting and loving, and later at the more sophisticated level of 
guiding, socialising, educating and protecting. The phrase “psychological 
parent” gained most currency in the influential work of Goldstein, Freud & 
Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973), who defined it thus: 
A psychological parent is one who, on a continuous, day-to-day basis, through 
interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfils the child’s 
psychological needs for a parent, as well as  the child’s physical needs. The 
psychological parent may be a biological, adoptive, foster or common law 
parent. 
 
The difficulty of including social parenthood as a category of natural parenthood lies 
in the very broad definition Goldstein et al. provide. They maintained that a 
psychological parent may be a biological, adoptive, foster or common law parent and, 
in today’s context, “step-parent” could equally be added to the list. However, it is not 
immediately clear that society has the same expectations of a step-parent (or foster 
parent) as it does of a biological or adoptive parent.  
 
The Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2004 provided some insight into this question. 
While most participants thought that step-parents should “exercise some degree of 
financial responsibility for the stepchildren with whom they lived … nearly three 
quarters of respondents thought that a step-father should not be expected to continue 
beyond separation to provide financial support for a stepchild.”809 The law, however, 
does not necessarily agree and if a step-parent has accepted a child as a “child of the 
family,” the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 confers on her the same liability to 
aliment the child as a biological parent.
810
  
 
In this survey, despite the participants’ reluctance to see erstwhile step-parents 
burdened with the obligation of aliment, over three-quarters of the respondents 
expressed the view that a stepfather should have the same rights to contact as a 
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“natural” father.811  Thus, the researchers concluded that the data formed a “mixed 
picture about what public opinion is about the obligations a step-parent should 
assume, or that society more widely should expect of them.
812
 Nevertheless, while the 
data undoubtedly revealed conflicting views, opinions on aliment suggest that, at least 
for some, a step-parent stops being a step-parent when the relationship between the 
“natural” parent and the step-parent breaks down. Thus, it could be argued that step-
parenthood does not contain the same “no exit” obligation that has been held to exist 
in the conventional parent-child relationship.
813
 This is one of the reasons that 
categorising all social parents as natural parents risks being over-inclusive. 
 
This question assumes particular importance in an inheritance context: if stepchildren 
were given some claim on a step-parent’s estate, would that claim be dependent on 
the step-parent dying while still in a relationship with the child’s “natural” or legal 
parent? Equally important is the question of when a step-parent becomes a parent: 
biological/gestational parents are widely regarded as becoming parents the moment 
the child is born and the legal status of parenthood most often follows;
814
 similarly, 
adoptive parents become parents at the moment the adoption order is granted. 
However, as will be discussed below, the process of becoming a step-parent is 
different. While the legal status of step-parent may follow marriage, the social process 
is far less clearly delineated and subject to negotiation between the step-parent and 
stepchild. This is particularly problematic in the context of the “absolutist”815 tradition 
of succession law. 
6.3.2.4 Legal parenthood 
 
Baroness Hale began her analysis of natural parenthood by asserting that it was 
distinct from legal parenthood. Unfortunately her judgment contained no exposition 
of legal parenthood, a term that often gives rise to confusion. To add to the 
complexity, contemporary family law is more concerned with parental rights and 
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responsibilities (the power to act as a parent),
816
 than it is with categorising parents as 
legal, natural or both. Furthermore, while many parents will be both legal and natural 
parents, and hold the full suite of parental rights and responsibilities, it bears repeating 
that this is not always the case.
817
 Equally, a person who is neither a natural parent nor 
a legal parent, such as a grandparent, can hold parental responsibilities and rights. 
 
In many instances, however, the legal parent will also be the genetic parent. In the 
English context, Bainham states that “the establishment of genetic parentage will 
generally result in the attribution of legal parenthood”818 and the same is true of 
Scotland.
819
 Nevertheless, while genetic parenthood, in most instances, establishes 
legal parenthood, it does not always trigger the full complement of parental 
responsibilities and rights. However, crucially, it does trigger both the obligation to 
aliment the child and the right of succession.
820
 In other words, even if a parent has no 
parental rights or responsibilities, as long as her genetic parenthood has not been 
transferred to a second legal parent (as in the case of adoption or surrogacy), she 
remains the legal parent and succession rights ensue. 
 
Legal parenthood thus carries an important symbolic weight. While genetic, 
gestational, adoptive parents and parents under the terms of the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act can all lose their parental rights and responsibilities, their legal 
parenthood is inalienable
821
 and this is perhaps why it is described as “the most 
fundamental relationship between parent and child.”822 Legal parenthood is a 
“permanent, non-alienable” relationship which “has legal consequences for the 
individual through life, not just during childhood.”823 When legal parents lose parental 
rights and responsibilities, they remain legal parents; in contrast, when social parents 
lose parental rights and responsibilities they are left with no status. Furthermore, 
whereas legal parenthood can currently be held by only two individuals at any one 
time, parental responsibility can be “conferred on a succession of different social 
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carers.”824 Finally—and importantly in the context of succession law—legal 
parenthood, not parental responsibility, “makes the child a member of a family, 
generating for that child a legal relationship with wider kin going well beyond the 
parental relationship.”825 
 
The traditional link between legal parenthood and succession law thus militates 
against granting stepchildren succession rights. Furthermore, while some 
commentators advocate in favour of greater parental rights and responsibilities for 
step-parents in some circumstances, not all are convinced that the wider status of legal 
parenthood should be conferred upon them.
826
 However, while an automatic 
entitlement would seem difficult to justify, this does not necessarily preclude a 
discretionary entitlement where the step-parent is also an “accepting” parent.827 
6.3.2.5 Intentional parenthood 
 
A final type of parenthood, and one that was not considered by Baroness Hale, is 
intentional parenthood. Intentional parenthood is a term that is gaining currency,
828
 
although its origins reach back several decades: for example, the importance of 
intention has been recognised “in the process of adoption and more recently in the use 
of donated gametes in assisted conception techniques.”829 However, while intent 
undoubtedly has its place in these circumstances, Douglas has cautioned against using 
it as the main criterion for legal parenthood:
830
 
 
 Basing parenthood on intention implies a preparedness to recognise the free 
 alienability of parental responsibility and hence the acceptability of surrogacy  
 agreements. It comes closer to characterising children more openly as a form  
 of property which can be transferred to others. 
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The term has particular importance in the context of surrogacy, but also overlaps with 
society’s conceptualisation of some forms of social parenthood. While it is not self-
evident that all parents who intentionally assume the role of a social parent also wish 
to assume full legal parenthood, intent nevertheless plays a central role in defining the 
extent of the parental relationship that exists between a step-parent and a stepchild. 
Parental intent will be discussed further in Chapter 7, in relation to both three-parent 
families and the accepted child model. 
6.3.3 Parenthood and the biological trump card 
 
Ironically, now that biological or genetic paternity can be readily established, there is 
a move away from biology as the bedrock of parenthood. However, this new context, 
in which intentional and social parenthood enjoy enhanced status, exists in tension 
with a drive for “genetic truth.”831 This can be seen, for example, in the move towards 
open adoptions
832
 and the loss of anonymity for sperm donors.
833
 Furthermore, while 
Baroness Hale placed social parenthood on an equal footing with biological 
parenthood in Re G, a closer reading suggests that biological parenthood retains 
particular importance: biology is, as Norrie has observed, “a trump card.”834 The 
position remains that “it is neither a presumption nor a principle that children are best 
left with their biological parent, but is ... recognition of a widely held belief based on 
practical experience and the workings of nature.”835 
 
The biological trump card also applies in relation to succession law. The Succession 
(Scotland) 1964 Act applies only to legal parents, the majority of whom are also 
genetic/biological parents. On the one hand, this restriction is perhaps entirely 
appropriate. Prior to her judgment in Re G, Baroness Hale argued that the step-
relation is not the same as the “normal” family constituted within marriage and 
“perhaps we should not pretend that it is.”836 On the other hand, some step-parents 
will have full parental rights and responsibilities and so their reality closely mirrors 
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that of many legal parents. Indeed, one of the few factors that distinguishes them from 
legal parents is that their stepchildren, unlike their legal children, will not succeed to 
their estate. The question of how different commentators propose accommodating this 
reality in contemporary succession law will be considered in Chapter 7. 
6.4 The 2005 Survey 
 
The Scottish Law Commission included two questions on stepchildren in the 2005 
Survey. The first question related to intestate succession and involved a man who had 
been married twice dying intestate, survived by two stepchildren whom he had 
accepted as children of his family. Participants were asked to what extent his 
stepchildren should be entitled to receive something from his estate. The participants 
were next told to imagine that the deceased also had children from his first marriage, 
and then asked whether his stepchildren should be treated in exactly the same way as 
his biological children for the purposes of sharing his estate. 75% of participants felt 
that his stepchildren should be entitled to receive something from his estate, while 
68% felt that the man’s stepchildren should be treated in exactly the same way as his 
own children for the purposes of sharing the estate.
837
 
 
The participants were next asked to consider stepfamilies in the context of testate 
succession. Here they were told that a woman who had been married twice died, 
leaving two young stepchildren whom she had accepted as children of her family. The 
woman had left her entire estate to charity and the participants were asked whether 
the stepchildren should be entitled to claim on her estate. Mirroring the pattern in the 
previous question, they were then told that the woman also had children from her first 
marriage and were asked whether they agreed that the stepchildren should be treated 
in exactly the same way as her own children for the purpose of sharing her estate. 
Here 65% of participants felt that young children should be entitled to something and 
66% felt that her children and stepchildren should be treated as equals.
838
 
 
Overall, the SLC found “considerable public support” for granting stepchildren 
“rights in respect of their step-parent or acceptor’s intestate estate.”839 However, the 
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SLC was concerned that the participants had a very particular view of the stepfamily 
in mind when they answered the question, one where a young widow remarries and 
the stepfather becomes the father.
840
 In other words, a situation where the step-parent 
replaces the parent, rather than co-existing with him or her. There is little doubt that 
such scenarios do occur but they are not the predominant experience and Bainham has 
argued that it is important to distinguish between different scenarios:
841
 
  
The SLC is right to express caution about the findings generated by the question, as it 
is not clear that they can be extrapolated and applied to other stepfamily models.  
Unfortunately, however, the question provided no insight into how the public view 
alternative stepfamily models. This is in many ways unsurprising as stepfamilies were 
not a stated focus of the Report.
842
 Nevertheless, as stepfamilies are an important 
feature of the “new” Scottish family landscape, this important topic deserves further 
attention. It was with this in mind that a question on stepfamilies was included in my 
research project. The findings of this research question will be considered in Chapter 
7. 
6.5 Other family relationships 
 
As aforementioned, reconstituted families do not create only a new parent/child 
relationship but, in many cases, also engender new sibling relationships. This section 
will focus on the inheritance rights of siblings on intestacy. 
 
Sibling relationships fall into three categories: full siblings; half-siblings and 
stepsiblings. Half-sibling relationships merit analysis since the SLC reform proposals 
seek to change the inheritance entitlements of half-siblings by aligning them with 
those of full siblings.
843
 This raises questions both as to which obligations and 
entitlements exist between full siblings in an inheritance context and whether these 
obligations and entitlements are the same as those that operate between half-siblings 
(and indeed stepsiblings).  
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Half-siblings are traditionally defined as children who share one biological parent,
844
 
often as a result of relationship infidelity (as was the case with Alec in Group 7)
845
 or 
of parental re-partnering (as was the case with Chris in Group 10).
846
 However, the 
reference to a shared biological parent is unhelpful, as it can be both over-inclusive 
and under-inclusive. For example, if both partners in a female same-sex couple had a 
child using the same sperm donor those children would be half-siblings biologically, 
although they would be full siblings functionally.
847
 Similarly, if a man had an 
adopted child from a previous union and then fathered a child in a subsequent 
relationship, the children would functionally (and legally)
848
 be half-siblings, although 
they would not share a biological parent.
849
 However, while the definition of the term 
“half-sibling” merits further consideration, participants in the study appeared to limit 
their consideration to half-siblings who were biologically related
 
. 
 
Half-sibling relationships commonly, although not exclusively, arise in stepfamilies. 
Studies suggest that a mutual child is believed to “cement” a stepfamily850 and it 
might therefore be expected that the number of half-sibling relationships would rise in 
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line with the number of stepfamily relationships.
851
 A number of commentators assert 
that half-sibling relationships are increasingly common; however, due to a dearth of 
data, concrete figures remain elusive.
852
 It should be noted that the lack of available 
data on half-siblings is closely related to lack of information on stepfamilies: more 
detailed information on stepfamily composition would likely, indirectly, also generate 
more information on half-sibling relationships. 
 
It would not be impossible to gather such data. In Canada, for example, the national 
statistics agency, Statistics Canada, analysed census data and identified two kinds of 
stepfamilies: simple and complex. A simple stepfamily is narrowly defined as one 
where only one spouse has children who were born or adopted before the current 
union.
853
 A complex stepfamily can arise in two circumstances: firstly, the term is 
used in relation to stepfamilies where both spouses have children from a previous 
union living in the household; and, secondly, it is used when at least one parent has 
children from a previous union and there are also children born into the new union.
854
 
 
 It is this second circumstance that gives rise to half-sibling relationships and, at least 
in Canada, such relationships appear to be on the rise. Statistics Canada found that 
while the proportion of parents living in a stepfamily has remained fairly stable, the 
proportion of parents in simple stepfamilies has declined while the proportion of those 
in complex families has grown.
855
 Furthermore, the growth in the proportion of 
parents in complex stepfamilies was found to be primarily attributable to an increase 
in the number of parents in those families who have had children together.
856
 In 2001, 
34% of all parents in stepfamilies had one or more children together; in 2011, the 
proportion was 43%.
857
 These figures do not include stepfamilies where the children 
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from the previous union do not live with the couple and do not, therefore, reflect the 
half-sibling relationships that arise in the first family/second family context. 
 
While caution must be exercised in applying data from another jurisdiction to the 
Scottish context, there appears to be a consensus that this trend is matched both in 
Scotland
858
 and in the US.
859
 Certainly, half-siblings are often considered to be a 
feature of “modern” families and, as the SLC is rightly interested in contemporary 
families, it is unsurprising that it chose to review this area of the law. Of course, as 
with stepfamilies, identifying commonality of experience and expectation amongst 
half-siblings can be fraught with difficulty. In some instances, half-siblings will have 
little or no contact, and may not even know of each other’s existence. Equally, 
however, others may enjoy a close relationship and may have been raised in the same 
household for at least some of their childhood. Finally, if the half-sibling is born as a 
result of the mother’s extra-marital relationship, the half-siblings may even believe 
they are full siblings. Great diversity can exist in relationships between full siblings as 
well; nonetheless, studies suggest that “people…tend to feel closer to, and have more 
contact with, their full-siblings … compared with their half-siblings”.860 Certainly, as 
will be shown in the next chapter, the research findings from this project suggested 
that full siblings enjoy a status-based entitlement to inherit from their deceased 
sibling’s estate that half-siblings do not.861 
 6.5.1 The current law and the existing research 
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reconstituted families at issue included half-siblings (2009 Report at para 2.37). 
859
 Multiple-partner fertility (the name used to designate the demographic trend of adults having 
children with more than one partner) scholarship in the US often focuses on issues relating to child 
poverty and development; however, it also indirectly provides insight into the prevalence of half-
sibling relationships. A 2011  study, for example, found that, by age ten, 60% of first born children of 
unmarried mothers have a half-sibling, while the researchers noted that other studies had found that 
multiple-partner fertility “is not rare” amongst married partners either (Cancian, M, Meyer, D, Cook, S, 
“Stepparents and half-siblings: a child’s perspective” (2011) 11 Fast Focus 1 at 2, available at 
https://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/fastfocus/pdfs/FF11-2011.pdf.  
860
 Tanskanen et al. (2017) at 32 (discussing and summarising several sibling studies). 
861
 This point also emerged clearly in both the SLC 1986 Survey (see 7.2 below) and in the NatCen’s 
findings: while some people in both surveys felt that siblings should inherit everything, nobody in the 
Scottish survey argued that the half-sibling should inherit everything, while only 1% of respondents in 
the NatCen survey argued the half-sibling should be given priority (NatCen study (2010), 65).  
 213 
Section 2(1)(c) of the 1964 Act provides that where no descendants survive the 
intestate siblings take one half of the estate between them while parents take the other 
half.
862
 If the deceased has no surviving children or parents, siblings inherit the entire 
estate.
863
 In its current form, intestacy law distinguishes between full and half-
siblings. While section 2(2) states that “references in the foregoing subsection to 
brothers or sisters include respectively brothers and sisters of the half blood as well as 
of the whole blood,”864 this is qualified by stating that “the collaterals of the whole 
blood shall be entitled to succeed thereto in preference to the collaterals of the half 
blood.”865 
 
In its 1990 Report, the SLC recommended that the current rule be changed to allow 
collaterals of the half-blood to inherit equally on intestacy with collaterals of the full-
blood,
866
 and this view is reiterated in the 2009 Report.
867
 The SLC cited two reasons 
for maintaining its 1990 recommendation: firstly, it argued that there is now an “even 
greater prevalence of reconstituted families;” and, secondly, it stated that there 
“continues to be unanimous support for this recommendation among our 
respondents.”868  The first of these two reasons has been examined above but the 
second merits further consideration as, without doubting the integrity of the SLC’s 
assertion, it is not immediately clear from the 2009 Report who these respondents are 
or the grounds for their support. 
 
The first point to note is that the respondents referred to were not participants in an 
attitudinal study but rather consultees who submitted written comments on the 2007 
Discussion Paper. A cursory glance at the list of consultees suggests that the large 
majority were legal professionals.
869
 While expert opinion is often both valuable and 
necessary, it is not immediately clear that the consultees’ specific professional 
expertise qualified them to evaluate the similarities between different types of sibling 
                                                        
862
 While siblings (and parents) rank above the spouse in the order of succession, the spouse receives 
prior rights and legal rights before the intestate estate is distributed. Under the proposed reforms, where 
the deceased has no children, the spouse will receive the entire estate.  
863
 1964 Act s 2(1)(c). 
864
 Ibid, s 2(2).  
865
 Ibid, s 3.  
866
 1990 Report at para 2.23. 
867
 2009 Report at para 2.37. 
868
 Ibid. 
869
 2009 Report, App B. 
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relationship. Wider public consultation might have provided a desirable complement 
to the consultative work. By contrast, the consultees who contributed to the English 
succession law reform process were of the view that “particular weight should be put 
on public opinion” on the question of half-siblings.870 
 
This observation is secondary to another criticism, namely that the consultees were 
not actually called upon to engage fully with the question of half-siblings. Instead, 
they were simply asked to express their view on a previously formulated 
recommendation based on the findings of a study conducted in 1986, some 21 years 
previously.
871
 No analysis was provided of the study and no consideration appears to 
have been given to whether the attitudes purportedly underpinning the 
recommendation would have changed between 1986 and 2009. Furthermore, the 
recommendation was not even presented to the consultees as a stand-alone 
consideration, but alongside five other recommendations from the 1990 Report that 
the SLC believed “should stand.” Consultees were asked whether they agreed with the 
list of recommendations as a whole and,
872
 although respondents were obviously free 
to disagree with any or all of the six recommendations, this does not seem a 
particularly robust way to develop policy on such a nuanced issue. 
 
In the 1986 survey, participants were asked who should benefit from the estate of an 
unmarried man, survived by a sister and a half-sister.  Although the results revealed 
that the sister was thought to have a stronger claim than the half-sister, with 39% 
stating that the estate should go entirely (15%) or mainly (24%) to his sister, the 
majority (58%) supported equal division between the two. It is this finding that 
appears to form the basis of the SLC’s 2009 recommendation. Interestingly, whereas 
the SLC showed sensitivity to the shortcomings of its question on stepchildren’s 
entitlement, positing that participants were imagining a very specific type of 
stepfamily, it appears not to have considered the same nuances with regard to half-
siblings.
873
  
                                                        
870
 LC 2011 Report at para 3.23. 
871
 1986 Survey. 
872
 DP136 at para 2.87. 
873
 In its 1990 Report, the SLC merely observed that “it is impossible to generalise about the family 
situation of half brothers and sisters” before concluding, for unspecified reasons, that “to exclude them 
… where there has been a close family relationship with the deceased is … likely to give rise to a 
greater feeling of injustice than to include them … where there has not been a close family 
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This oversight is unfortunate and further contributes to the sense that the question was 
not adequately explored. While it might be expected that half-siblings who have 
grown up together would have a strong bond, it is not clear that the same bond would 
exist if the children had never met, or if the children of the first family resented the 
parent re-partnering. In this sense, the heterogeneity of the half-sibling relationship 
appears comparable to that of the step-parent/stepchild relationship previously 
discussed:
874
 there may be a relationship equivalent to a “nuclear family” relationship 
but, equally, there may be no relationship at all. 
 
As this diversity in sibling relationships was not considered, and as the reasons 
underpinning participants’ attitudes in the 1986 study were not explored, it seems 
premature to have issued a recommendation to change the existing law. Such criticism 
is not to suggest that the SLC must be wrong in its conclusion; there may well be 
demand for the proposed reform, but the evidence presented does not convincingly 
make this case and more exhaustive reflection would have been desirable. Prompted 
by the inadequacy of the SLC’s consideration of the half-sibling relationship – and a 
desire to better understand how people experience this relationship in today’s society 
– a decision was made to include a question on half-siblings in my research study.875 
 
The next chapter will address the findings of my research questions on stepfamilies 
and half-siblings. In addition, it will give consideration to the models that other 
jurisdictions have considered in relation to these questions in order to further explore 
the ways in which family relationships are conceptualized in other western 
jurisdictions. 
  
                                                                                                                                                              
relationship”. (1990 Report at para 2.21) In contrast, the Law Commission of England and Wales 
considered the point in considerably more detail (2011 Report at para 3.20).  
874
 Chapter 6, 6.2.2. 
875
 Appendix 1, scenario 5 (Part A).  
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CHAPTER 7: ATTITUDES TOWARDS RECONSTITUTED 
FAMILIES   
7.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter established that stepfamilies – an important subset of today’s 
blended families – are an increasingly important feature of the “new” Scottish family 
landscape. In addition, it showed that the impact of re-partnering and remarriage is 
not limited to the formation of new “parental” relationships, but also results in the 
formation of new sibling relationships. This chapter will consider my research 
findings in regard to these relationships and argue that perceptions of both 
stepchildren and half-sibling entitlement depend largely on whether the deceased and 
the putative beneficiary had a “family-like” relationship.  
 
The same research scenario was used to evaluate stepchildren and half-sibling 
entitlement.
876
 Part A addressed half-sibling relationships while Part B addressed 
stepchildren entitlement. In designing the scenario, a deliberate choice was made to 
include a “young” stepfamily, where the stepchild had been raised by the deceased, in 
order to present a family grouping at the opposite end of the spectrum from the one 
presented in scenario 1 (first family/second family).
877
 The objective was to explore 
whether attitudes were different towards stepchildren in close family units than they 
were towards stepchildren who were such through affinity alone in a first 
family/second family dynamic. By creating a scenario where the deceased had adult 
children from a previous relationship, I was also able to explore the dynamic between 
half-siblings who had not grown up together. Consideration will first be given to the 
findings in relation to stepchildren. 
7.2 The entitlement of stepchildren to inherit from step-parents 
 
The research scenario involved a woman, Laura, who died and left her estate to be 
divided between her husband, their daughter and Laura’s two children from a 
previous marriage.
878
 She did not make any provision for her seven year-old stepson, 
Kris, who had lived with the couple since he was two years old. Participants were 
                                                        
876 Appendix 1, scenario 5. 
877
 Appendix 1. 
878
 See appendix 1, scenario 5, (Part B). 
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asked whether the stepson should be able to claim legal rights and to explain what 
motivated their view. The participants were not as supportive of the stepchild as 
might have been anticipated given the findings of the 2005 Survey.
879
 Indeed, 10 of 
the 17 participants who were presented with the scenario opined that the outcome was 
acceptable and that the child did not need to be protected by a legal entitlement.
880
 
Nevertheless, even those who found the outcome to be reasonable did not necessarily 
wholeheartedly endorse the deceased’s decision, with Catriona remarking that “you’d 
have to be a real nasty piece of work to have a child living with you and not (provide 
for them).” 
 
The figures from my research project cannot be generalised, but it is perhaps 
unsurprising that support for stepchildren appeared to be lower in this study than in 
the 2005 Survey as, given the open-ended nature of the questions, participants were 
able to express far more nuanced views. Indeed, many participants expressed views 
that shifted in the course of the conversation, often retreating somewhat from their 
original position. Three, for example, proclaimed that no distinction should be made 
between stepchildren and “natural” children, but later went on to qualify their 
statements: two argued that no distinction should be made as long as the children 
were minor children,
881
 and two argued that no distinction should be made as long as 
they had lived together as part of a family unit.
882
 The remaining eight participants 
were unwilling or unable to make a definitive judgment,
883
 arguing that many factors 
would have to be taken into consideration. Overall, however, while many participants 
could see good reasons for stepchildren inheriting in certain circumstances, no 
support was expressed for all stepchildren automatically inheriting from their step-
parents.
884
 In discussing why they considered a stepchild to be entitled or not their 
reasoning tended to cluster around four central arguments: the status-based 
                                                        
879
 See discussion in Chapter 6, 6.4. 
880
 Carol, Joan, Olga, Mona, Andy, Maureen, Gladys, Mark, Lucy and Catriona. A further two 
participants, Sally and Caroline, appeared undecided, three expressed no opinion, and two favoured 
equal treatment. Of the four Group 3 participants who expressed a general view on stepchildren, two 
leaned towards equal treatment (Gillian and Malcolm) while two accepted differential treatment 
(Simon and Kevin). 
881
 Malcolm and Laura. 
882
 David and Laura (Laura advanced both arguments). 
883
 Some of these participants argued both positions, without appearing to have a stronger preference 
for a particular argument. 
884
 As mentioned above, David did initially make this statement, but then qualified it. The support for 
stepchildren expressed by Mary, Laura and Malcolm appeared to be based on an understanding of a 
stepfamily where the step-parent is a substitute parent, and Gillian spoke only to her own situation. 
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entitlement of a legal child; the inevitability of the parent-child transfer; the age of the 
stepchild; and the quality of the relationship between the stepchild and the step-
parent. 
7.2.1 Status 
 
In general, the participants did not question the entitlement of biological children to 
inherit. Views differed as to how robust an entitlement children should have, but there 
was little outright hostility to children being able to claim on a parent’s estate. As 
discussed earlier, several reasons for this were cited, all of which alluded, directly or 
indirectly, to the “special” relationship between the parent and the child. Two central 
observations can be made about the parent-child relationship: firstly, it exists from the 
moment the child is born (or perhaps even conceived) and does not have to be earned; 
and, secondly, it is a “no-exit” relationship.    While these are not universal truths, they 
nonetheless hold true in many cases. For many participants, this status was not 
extended to stepchildren. Gladys, for example, was unequivocal that a line had to be 
drawn separating the biological children from the stepchild: 
 
He has his father to provide for him and his mother to provide for him, 
although she doesn’t seem to be in the picture very much. Maybe a small 
bequest to him. But I don’t think it should be the same share as to her 
biological children. 
 
For her part, Catriona did not condone the stepmother’s decision to exclude the 
stepchild entirely, but, echoing Baroness Hale, argued that it was “fair enough” to 
love—and to treat—stepchildren differently. For these participants—and perhaps for 
the others in their groups who offered no rebuttal to the positions expressed by 
Catriona and Gladys—the biological (and presumably adopted) children were 
considered as entitled simply by dint of being biological children. Stepchildren were 
not viewed as having the same status-based entitlement. 
 
One participant, however, stood out in emphatically rejecting this position: 
 
David: My mind would be not to distinguish between stepchildren and 
biological children. Because if the argument is that there should be an 
automatic inheritance for family members, and a stepchild is typically a 
member of the family. It may be that a stepchild has very little family contact 
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because the parental relationship is formed when the child is 16, 18, 30, but 
exactly the same thing happens with biological children. They’re not brought 
up, especially with men, it’s not an uncommon scenario for men to have 
children by three or four different women … so I just think that all the 
children, including stepchildren, should have legal rights, as a general 
presumption. Possibly you might want to add some sort of rider to it, you 
might want to add that the stepchildren must have lived in the family home 
because they might not have if the relationship was formed late.   
 
In a sense David’s argument is perfectly cogent and intellectually appealing: not all 
biological children are close to their parents and equally not all step-parent/stepchild 
relationships are fraught; a case could therefore be made for including everyone. 
However, his final comment—suggesting that the stepchild would have to have lived 
in the family home—contradicted his initial remarks and realigned him with those 
who argued that there is a difference between the biological children and the 
stepchildren. 
 
David’s desire to over-include rather than under-include is understandable in order to 
avoid the “harsh anomalies” that exist when all stepchildren are excluded.885 The 
question is whether the inclusion of stepchildren as automatic beneficiaries is likely to 
deliver the “right” outcome in more cases than excluding them. In order to assess this, 
more information would be needed as to the make-up of Scotland’s stepfamilies. In 
the absence of such information, and given that such information is very unlikely to 
be definitive, other options such as discretion or different rules for different types of 
stepfamilies should be considered. 
7.2.2 The inevitability of the parent-child transfer 
 
In her dismissal of the stepchild’s claim, Gladys touched on a second reason for 
continuing to exclude stepchildren that was commonly advanced by the participants. 
The stepchild, she argued, has his father and his mother to provide for him. This was a 
persistent view and 10 out of the 15 participants
886
 who commented on the stepchild’s 
exclusion in the scenario stated that it did not matter that he was not provided for as 
he would be provided for by his surviving parent: 
 
                                                        
885
 DP 136 at para 2.73. 
886
 Caroline, Carol, Joan, Mona, Maureen, Andy, Mark, Gladys, Catriona, Lucy. The scenario was 
presented to 17 participants, but two did not comment on it.  
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Carol: My first reaction is that that’s OK, because she has not just left it to her 
three biological children, she’s left it to her three biological children and her 
husband and I presume she’s thinking that in due course her husband’s share 
will pass to Kris. 
 
The symbolic value of inheritance was also at the forefront of the concerns 
participants expressed about not making a provision for the stepchild.  Laura 
suggested that the stepmother should not “cast out” the stepchild while Sally felt it 
would be a terrible “blow” to the child. This may have been exacerbated as the 
stepchild did not have a strong relationship with his own mother. The participants’ 
discomfort may have been all the greater as it is considered “unnatural” for the 
mother (or mother figure) to reject her child.
887
 
7.2.3 Age 
 
The stepchild in the scenario was seven at the time of the stepmother’s death and 
several participants were asked to consider whether his age affected their view. Laura 
felt that it did, but it was not only the age of the child at the time of the step-parent’s 
death, but also the age of the child when the step-parent assumed the parental role. 
 
No that doesn’t seem reasonable there. Because she’s taken on a mother’s role 
and he’s been living with them for five years, which is as long as her own 
daughter. He is, just what I was saying before, part of the family unit. I think 
he should inherit.  
Interviewer: Would you think an older stepchild who hasn’t lived as part of a 
family would have the right to inherit?  
Laura: That’s a hard one, isn’t it? I think if you are under 16, you are a child, 
you should be treated equally to the other children ... If he was an adult who 
hadn’t grown up as her child then that’s different. It’s to do with how the 
bonds are formed and the relationships, I think. If you have a mother/son 
relationship you shouldn’t be casting them out after you’re dead. That could 
be pretty damaging psychologically, isn’t it, whereas an adult, you’re like, I’ve 
never lived with her, only related through marriage, you are out on your own 
in the world, you have to be a bit more bullet proof by that point.  
 
For Sally the inherent vulnerability of youth also exacerbated the harshness of the 
decision:   
                                                        
887
 It should also be noted that most co-residency stepfamilies involve the legal mother and a step-
father (ONS Focus on Families (2005), 4 available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/family-
demography/focus-on-families/2005/index.html) and, as such, it may have been appropriate to 
construct the scenario to reflect this. 
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I suppose it doesn’t seem unfair but I suppose the bit that I went to is oh my 
God Kris has lived with them for five years and so to not feel … because I 
suppose money does sort of like … it can equate, well when we’re talking 
about this, it equates with love in some ways, so it’s like, you might have lived 
with me for five years but I don’t love you as much as my own children 
 Catriona: But that’s fair enough as well, don’t you think? 
Sally: It is, but when you are seven, what a blow! Obviously, she didn’t know 
she was going to die when he was seven. 
  
Interestingly, although the participants wanted to “protect” young children, they did 
not advance needs-based or aliment-based argument but instead focused on the 
emotional damage of being left out by the “mum” figure in your life. 
 
In a scenario such as this, where a mother/child relationship has clearly been 
established, the participants’ concerns were understandable. In Group 3, where 
participants were simply asked if stepchildren should have legal rights, there appeared 
to be no obvious “right” answer, even when children were young: 
 
Malcolm: I don’t know, if you get remarried when the kids are 14 and they’ve 
only been children for four years, if you like, if they’re in that new 
relationship, then ... if it’s four months, four years, does it really matter. They 
are children at that point in time. 
Kevin: What if they then split up with the partner? Should they retain any kind 
of rights? Should that be the cut-off? Maybe that’s where the cut-off comes. 
 
This raises the question of whether it is age alone that is the decisive factor or 
whether, in fact, it is a belief that the younger the stepchild is when the relationship is 
formed, the more likely the stepchild and step-parent are to form an enduring 
relationship similar to that perceived to exist between parents and their children.  
7.2.4 The existence of a family relationship 
 
While youth rendered stepchildren vulnerable in the minds of some participants, 
closer examination suggests that their views were primarily shaped by the fact that a 
younger child was felt more likely to have experienced the stepchild/ step-parent 
relationship as a parent-child relationship: 
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Simon: I can see there is some merit in the law having a say in a situation 
where there are stepchildren who have been part of a family … then that’s 
obviously a bit tricky. How long have they been part of the family? What age 
were they when they came? All these factors come into play and I think that is 
tricky. 
 
This was perhaps the clearest message to emerge from the data: a stepchild who was 
raised as a child of the family should not be discriminated against because she does 
not have a blood-tie to the person who fulfilled the parental role in her life.
888
 This is 
felt to occur when the step-parent was involved in the child’s life from her youngest 
years and is still involved in an ongoing relationship with her at the time of the step-
parent’s death. Although such circumstances may arise when the child’s second 
parent has died, this is not the only case in which such relationships develop. 
However, equating step-parenthood with parenthood is more fraught when there is a 
second legal parent in the child’s life. Unfortunately, consideration of how a second 
parent, who was no longer living with her child following divorce, would feel about 
the step-parent’s claim to the title of “parent” is beyond the scope of the study.  
7.3 Stepfamilies in practice 
 
A number of participants had experience of being either a stepchild or a step-parent. 
Those in a step-parent relationship were Ron, Gillian and Lauren. A further four 
participants had experience of being stepchildren. All seven participants had very 
diverse experiences of being part of a stepfamily, none of which resembled the 
archetypal version depicted in the scenario. This diversity was extremely useful in 
exploring not only the range of attitudes towards step-parents, but also the range of 
experiences lived by step-parents and the expectations of stepchildren. 
7.3.1 Being a step-parent 
 
Of the three step-parents only one was a step-parent under the legal definition of the 
term although, as her stepchildren did not live with her, it is not immediately clear 
that they would necessarily be classed as “accepted” children of Gillian’s new family 
                                                        
888
 Miss Scobbie noted that, when preparing their wills, many clients sought to exclude potential step-
grandchildren and adopted grandchildren. However, once such children became part of their family 
unit, their views sometimes changed, even among those who had been firm in their initial position.  
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unit.
889
 All three became involved in stepfamily situations at different life stages and 
all three were at different places on the family formation continuum. Ron was a re-
partnered widow and a de facto step-parent. He and his new partner met in their 60s 
and both had adult children from previous relationships; the couple’s wills provided 
for each other through liferents and pension allocations, but the beneficiaries under 
both wills were their respective children. Ron enjoyed a close relationship with his 
partner’s children but had made no testamentary provision for them. One cannot guess 
at all the reasons underpinning the decision not to include his de facto stepchildren, 
but the lack of a parent-child relationship, coupled with the existence of his own 
children, would seem obvious factors.  
 
If Ron were married, his partner’s children would be his stepchildren, which could 
raise complexities if stepchildren were given an automatic entitlement. This is exactly 
the type of family unit the SLC sought to exclude from claims for non-patrimonial 
loss, and it would seem equally reasonable to exclude such claims in a succession 
context. Certainly, in scenario 1, where a mother’s estate passed to her second 
husband and then, upon his death, to his children on intestacy, nobody felt that second 
husband’s children had any “right” to inherit what had belonged to Kate, his pre-
deceased spouse, as they had not been part of her life for long and she was considered 
to have greater responsibilities to her own children. The potential for over-inclusion 
that could arise in Ron’s situation is one of the reasons that potential stepchildren’s 
rights should not arise based on the legal, affinity-based definition of step-parenthood. 
 
The second example of a step-parent, Lauren, was divorced and in a new relationship 
with a man who had children from a previous relationship. Lauren also had a young 
son and was contemplating having another child with her new partner. She had no 
will but stated that her will would benefit her son and any future children. When 
asked whether she would include her stepchildren in her will, she was more cautious 
as she did not yet consider herself a stepmother:  
 
I guess you would. It’s hard for me to say because I’m no’ in that mindset 
right now. It’s still really early, we don’t even live together, I only see his kids 
                                                        
889
 Gillian’s new family unit would, however, still be classed as a stepfamily in the Census, as her son 
lives with the couple and is a stepson in relation to Gillian’s husband. 
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every now and again. But I guess you would. If we’re living together and he’s 
there looking after Brooklyn, he’s there full time, Gavin’s there full time and 
his kids are over when they are over I suppose you would. It brings up some 
sort of question though doesn’t it? 
 Interviewer: It does ... 
Lauren: Or does his go to his and does mine go to mine. But what about ours 
together? 
Interviewer: Exactly. Explains legal rights. Explains stepchildren do not 
currently have a claim. Do you have a view on that? 
Lauren: I think I would need to live in that for a while but instantly, if you are 
asking me now, for me not living in it, I would say you would have some sort 
of responsibility to do that. I would hope Gavin would think that for Brooklyn, 
and I would think I would definitely think that for Lewis and Ella. I would 
think so. I would (not entirely convinced). 
Interviewer: Do you think it would depend on the age of the children or 
whether you lived together? 
Lauren: I suppose it does depend how much you see them, how much they are 
actually in your life. You’re not going to give your money away to strangers 
are you? You’re not. I wouldn’t. It would go to my boy. But if they are in my 
life two three times a week, absolutely I would feel, I would feel that I would 
want to. I wouldn’t feel as if it would be the law, but I’d feel as if I’d want to. 
 
Lauren’s view on the entitlement of stepchildren contrasted sharply with her view on 
the entitlement of children. She was one of the staunchest supporters of the child’s 
right to the parent’s estate, speaking of the “responsibility” that was incumbent on 
parents who had chosen to bring a child into the world. Her comments suggest that 
she believed stepchildren may “earn” the right to a share of the estate through a 
sustained, close relationship with the step-parent.  
 
Gillian offers a third view based on the traditional, affinity-based conception of step-
parenthood. Gillian was the only participant to fall within the legal definition of a 
step-parent and she referred to her husband’s daughters as her stepchildren. However, 
even Gillian’s family model did not correspond to the model outlined in the 2005 
Survey, whereby the step-parent replaced the original parent. Gillian had never lived 
with her stepdaughters and while she first stated that she was “close” to the girls she 
later admitted that the relationship with one was very fraught. Although the children 
were around nine years old when Gillian began her relationship with their father she 
did not appear to have a parental role in their regard. 
 
Gillian did not have a will but had a verbal agreement with her husband that their 
respective property would pass to the survivor and, upon the death of the second 
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spouse, would be divided equally between the children on a per capita basis. In a 
sense, Gillian’s son “lost out” as he will receive a third share rather than a half (her 
husband has two children) of the couple’s assets, but for Gillian this was unimportant. 
However, when it was put to her that this decision reflected the important relationship 
between the step-parent and the stepchild she dissented: 
 
And it is more difficult when they live with their mum because you don’t have 
that family unit, although I’m close to the girls but as far as I’m concerned it’s 
more to do with the fact that they are Martin’s daughters. 
 
It is noteworthy, however, that while she clearly perceived marriage as a greater 
commitment than cohabitation she did not necessarily view the stepchildren’s 
entitlement as flowing directly from marriage; rather, she framed their entitlement in 
terms of the strength of her relationship with her second husband.  
 
Gillian was proud of the success of her second marriage and suggested that her ex-
husband would not follow the same format with his new partner: 
 
Well they are not married, they don’t have the best relationship, they’ve got an 
OK relationship. From what I can gather my ex-husband has no intentions of 
getting married again. Very much it’s his house. She’s in the home that I lived 
in, how she can do that I don’t know. I’d have it sold and we’d buy something 
together. But she’s probably got common law wife status, she’s been living 
with him for so long. I think my first husband will probably - he wouldn’t see 
her out of a home - but I think, you know, it will go to Liam. She’s got a 
daughter but I think it’s quite separate. Her stuff to her kid and his to Liam. I 
think that’s how it will be. 
 
For Gillian, her ex-husband’s decision was interpreted not on the basis of him being a 
good parent, but rather on being a poor partner. This is starkly contrasted with her 
own relationship where “we share” both in life and “when we’re not here.” Providing 
for the stepchildren is merely a testament to the strength of her marriage. 
 
Gillian also implicitly recognised that her sense of responsibility to her son, and 
confidence in her husband to share that responsibility, had evolved over time. When 
she separated from her first husband she took out a life insurance policy to benefit her 
son and has never changed the beneficiary: 
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It’s just, it was just ... I wasn’t long married and I just thought, you know 
what, I want to protect, not that I thought Martin (ex-husband) would take it 
all or whatever, that’s not what was behind it, but it was still very much that he 
was my boy and he was still young, he wasn’t working, he was at college or 
university, and I thought if anything happens to me I want to make sure that he 
is looked after. It was more to do with that. 
 
This once again confirms the view that the step-parent role, and status, evolves and 
deepens over time. 
7.3.2 Being a stepchild 
 
The experiences of the four participants who were stepchildren were also varied and, 
again, did not conform to the traditional image of a new family unit where the 
stepchild regards the step-parent as a substitute parent. None of the participants who 
were stepchildren had an expectation of inheriting from their step-parent.  
 
Caroline’s mother was a widow who had a long-term life partner, although the couple 
maintained separate residences. Caroline fully expected to inherit from her mother but 
found the notion of inheriting from her mother’s partner absurd, as while the 
relationship was warm it was “by no means parental.” Maureen and Andy appeared to 
have had more fraught relationships with their step-parents and laughed at the idea of 
receiving an inheritance. 
 
 Interviewer: Does anyone have any experience of stepfamilies? 
Andy: I’ve got a step-dad so if you’re getting the law changed I’d have a bit 
(laughter). 
 Maureen: I’ve got a step-mum. 
Interviewer: You’ve got step-parents. Would you anticipate that your step-
parent would provide for you?   
 Maureen: No, not at all. I would know that. 
 Interviewer: Did either of you grow-up in a family home with the step-parent? 
 Andy: No 
 Maureen: For a couple of years, but no. 
 
Neither participant divulged any more about their relationship with their step-parent, 
but there was no sense that it was any way familial. Furthermore, Andy suggested that 
provisions allowing stepchildren to make a claim would simply be open to abuse: 
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I think that opens up ... because your ageing mother might remarry and all of a 
sudden you’ve got a step-dad who you’ve got no relationship with and if they 
change it to you have a legal right then, you know, two people are going to get 
rich: stepchildren and lawyers. If you’ve got a legal right to it then there’s 
gonna be some chancer who will test the law.   
 
Chris offered yet another version of the stepfamily. Chris was raised by his 
grandparents although he maintained good relations with his parents, both of whom 
remarried. Chris’s mother had been married to her second husband for over 25 years 
when he died unexpectedly, intestate. The entire estate passed to Chris’s mum and, 
while Chris acknowledged that the deceased “probably should have left provisions for 
his kids” (Chris’s stepsiblings), he had no expectation that his stepfather would 
provide for him.  
 
The question of his stepfather’s children being entitled to a share of their deceased 
father’s estate resurfaced when Chris’s own mother died. Chris spoke candidly about 
his initial intention to share his inheritance from his mother with his stepsiblings from 
her former marriage in recognition of their deferred claim on their deceased’s father’s 
estate. However, when the estate was significantly depleted in a protracted inheritance 
dispute with his mother’s third partner, Chris’s position changed: 
 
But I felt a certain moral duty to do it, but I think in a very selfish ... not a very 
selfish way ... but in a selfish way you look after your own family first. And 
when there was £200,000 odd coming to us I was thinking, yes I think it’s 
right to give them some but when you see that sum dwindling away and you 
worry about your kids’ education and things you want to do to your house. I 
think if you had got the full amount then I would have given them some, but I 
think that idea I had changed as the money dwindled away. 
 
Chris’s decision was also influenced by the discovery that Anastasia, one of his 
stepsisters, was not in fact his stepfather’s daughter, but the child of an extra-marital 
affair. Although Anastasia was raised by Chris’s stepfather, the discovery that she 
was not his genetic daughter appears to have — in Chris’ mind — further diluted the 
legitimacy of her claim. 
  
In summary, none of the stepchildren had any feeling of being entitled to their step-
parent’s estate and only one step-parent planned to provide for her stepchildren. 
Furthermore, while several of the participants (Caroline, Lauren, Andy) alluded to the 
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nature and quality of the relationship between the step-parent and the stepchild, the 
one step-parent who does plan to provide for her stepchildren was motivated purely 
by her duty to her husband.  
 
To a certain extent, the stepchild versus biological (or adopted) child argument is 
analogous to the married versus cohabiting argument. Rightly or wrongly, there 
appears to be a general acceptance that biological children and spouses gain rights 
from the moment the relationship is formed — regardless of the quality of the 
relationship — whereas stepchildren and cohabitants have to “earn” rights. In the case 
of the step-parent/stepchild relationship, this distinction is not necessarily attributable 
to a reactionary worldview that prizes the sanctity of the nuclear family. Instead, it 
reflects a view that, unlike the immediate, no-exit relationship formed between parent 
and child, the step-parent/stepchild relationship is one which is negotiated over time, 
and which may or may not outlive the relationship between the natural parent and the 
step-parent. Certainly, this was the personal experience of the participants who were 
part of stepfamilies, and it was also an idea that resonated with those who had no 
direct experience of stepfamilies.
890
  
7.4 Half-siblings 
 
As aforementioned, scenario 5 also addressed half-siblings. As time was limited in 
both the interviews and the discussion groups, and as the question related to a 
secondary theme of this thesis, the scenario was presented to only four groups and 
three individuals. However, presenting the scenario to only a limited number of 
participants was unproblematic as the point of “theoretical saturation” was reached 
fairly quickly and it was not felt that further data was required to “illuminate the 
concept.”891 Overall, while it cannot be said that the respondents were unanimously 
against equal sharing between siblings and half-siblings – the wording of the question 
did not readily allow such a response – there was unanimous agreement that the status 
quo was acceptable, or as one participant put it, there is no “obvious grievance” with 
the current regime. 
 
The scenario was devised both to allow for the exploration of different types of half-
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sibling relationships and to evaluate the factors the participants used to calculate 
entitlement to inherit on intestacy. In the scenario, Jack and Emma were of a different 
generation from their half-sibling Charlotte and had not been raised together although 
there was no animosity between them. Nevertheless the “first” family and the 
“second” family were not a family unit. This scenario was chosen as the SLC had 
expressed concern that, when discussing stepfamilies, participants had a particular 
type of very close-knit family in mind and that this influenced the opinions 
expressed.
892
 In an effort to avoid participants considering only those “blended” 
families that mirrored “nuclear” families the decision was made to focus on half-
siblings who had not lived together. 
 
The participants were first asked whether they thought the current position, where the 
half-sibling did not inherit, was reasonable. This was often enough to spark a 
conversation but, where they did not expand on their original answer, they were also 
asked why they thought it was reasonable (or unreasonable) and whether their opinion 
would be different had Charlotte grown up with Jack and Emma. Two main views 
emerged: firstly, Charlotte was not entitled to inherit from Jack as she had not grown 
up with him
893
 (but would have been entitled had they grown up together); and, 
secondly it was her mother’s responsibility to look after her in terms of inheritance. 
There was remarkable consistency in the views expressed and the conversation that 
unfolded in Group 5 encapsulated the dominant narrative well: 
 
Sally: It seems … it seems as reasonable as you can get. I suppose it would 
feel weirder if Jack and Charlotte were closer in age… 
 Lucy: I was just thinking that. 
Sally: So actually it would be more, Charlotte would have more sense of 
losing a brother rather than possibly somebody who is closer in age to an 
uncle, almost. It would just feel weird that her sister … again it would feel like 
a sister … would get money and she wouldn’t. It would feel different. 
 Interviewer: So if they’d grown up at the same… 
Sally: Yea, at the same sort of level, with a different relationship … but, I 
mean again, what can you do, you can’t really sort of pick out all these 
different variations. That does seem like a pretty reasonable thing to do.   
 
Laura and Gladys, participants from two separate groups, expressed a similar view 
but focused specifically on the notion of a first family and a second family:  
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Laura: No, no, especially as she’s five. She’s a child. She’s not got any 
relationship with him. There’s no, you know, he’s got a relationship with his 
sister, they are a family unit and then she’s kind of gone on to have another 
family unit, separate to that. I would say definitely it should just go to the 
mother and the sister. I think that’s right. 
 
 
The second view to emerge from the discussion was that Charlotte’s mother was 
responsible for ensuring she was provided for in terms of inheritance. This was 
initially surprising, as the question had not been framed to elicit views on parental 
obligation; nevertheless, it serves as an important reminder that the parental duty to 
provide is a well-entrenched social norm. While the participants all recognised that 
the current rule could create “unfair” outcomes, they all concluded that any injustice 
would be mitigated by what they perceived as the inevitability of the mother 
providing for Charlotte, either sharing with her in life or passing on to her in death. 
The following are just two of the many excerpts that illustrate this point: 
 
Mark: I really don’t have too much of a problem with that especially since the 
mother’s getting some, you know, of the estate anyway and presumably 
Charlotte would benefit from it, you know.  
 
Moira: I don’t think so, she’s only five. I think the mother would. There’s a 
line, isn’t there, in my head anyway, there’s a line, an inheritance line. 
 
The influence that the mother’s presence had on the participants’ attitudes was 
unanticipated and, with hindsight, it may have been preferable to use a scenario which 
considered siblings and half-siblings in isolation. Of course, from an alternative 
perspective, the data also illustrates the multiplicity of factors that come into play in 
determining “entitlement,” particularly in blended family situations. 
 
When pressed as to why they held the views that they did, the participants were clear 
that the lack of a meaningful relationship between the half-siblings was problematic 
and could not be overcome simply by any status derived from a shared parent. As 
such, they were equally clear that their views would likely be different had the 
children grown up together:   
 
Gladys: I think that probably would make a difference. You would then have a 
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better chance of a good relationship. Maybe. 
Laura: Yes. If they’d lived together, grown up together, if they were a family 
unit then that would be  different. And I think then yes. But there is no 
relationship there. There has to be an established relationship there you know to 
have a feeling that you should be inheriting something. 
 
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the scenario: Charlotte has no obvious 
entitlement as she did not grow up with Jack in a “family unit;” Charlotte would 
likely have had an entitlement had she grown up with Jack as part of the same family 
unit; any need Charlotte experiences will be met by her mother who will either “make 
a provision” for Charlotte, if she feels it necessary, or pass Jack’s estate on to her 
indirectly when she herself passes. Of course, it must be recognised that, had the 
scenario been worded differently, with the half-siblings being inseparable, responses 
(or at least initial responses) may have been different, with more emphasis on equal 
sharing.  
 
However, the participants did consider alternative circumstances where the half-
siblings were close and ultimately appeared to conclude that, in the case of half-
siblings, the emotional connection and family-like relationship were more important 
than a blood tie. It is difficult for objective legal rules to address  “closeness” between 
siblings and it is, therefore, difficult to see how the situation could be satisfactorily 
resolved.  
7.5 Alternative models 
 
The approaches favoured by the SLC with regard to stepchildren and half-sibling 
entitlement appear out of step with public attitudes. On the one hand, the SLC 
acknowledged that there was considerable support for step-children
894
 but did not 
adequately develop how this support could be recognised in succession law; on the 
other hand, while there appears to be no obvious dissatisfaction with the status quo in 
relation to half-sibling entitlement,
895
 the SLC opted to propose change. 
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The challenges the SLC faced were not insignificant:   there is little doubt that a 
blanket inclusion of stepchildren in succession law would create as many – if not 
more – injustices than the current situation. However, the rise in number of these 
families means that the question cannot be ignored. In a similar vein, excluding half-
sibling when full siblings are present undoubtedly produces injustices, yet it is not 
clear that the proposed remedy will produce an overall benefit. 
7.5.1 The accepted child of the family 
 
The current statutory framework does not recognise the step-parent/stepchild 
relationship and consequently the relationship gives rise to no legal obligations in the 
context of succession. This is not necessarily problematic as providing an entitlement 
for all step-children would likely be overly inclusive. However,  
“the social phenomenon of step parenthood” is recognised and taken into account in 
other areas of the law through the concept of “child of the family.”896 Two 
formulations exist: “accepted” as a child of the family and “treated” as a child of the 
family, with treated now being the more commonly used of the two.
897
 As Norrie has 
remarked, “treatment is an act” and “acceptance is a state of mind, so it “may well 
follow…that treatment is easier to prove than acceptance, being susceptible to direct 
evidence.”898 However, he also recognised that “each case is so dependent on 
individual facts that much the same evidence would be led in either case.
899
 This 
model could perhaps be considered in relation to step-families. 
 
Given the obvious difficulties in ensuring a fair and consistent approach, it is worth 
considering what factors are relevant in assessing whether “acceptance” has occurred. 
Norrie stated, unsurprisingly, that “simply tolerating a child living under the same 
roof does not suggest acceptance.”900 It is easy to imagine that such situations occur 
not infrequently and, certainly, the descriptions of stepfamily life provided by Andy 
and Maureen hinted more at tolerance than acceptance. Norrie also stated that 
“acceptance as a child of the family probably requires an intention for the 
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arrangement to be permanent, or at least indefinite.”901 In this Norrie references the 
fifth category of parenthood, intentional parenthood, identified in 6.3.2.5 above. 
While concerns about reducing parenthood to “intention” are understandable, the 
concept of “intention” in the step-parent/stepchild relationship might prove useful in 
distinguishing between different types of relationship.  
 
An obvious difficulty in using the “accepted child” model in a succession context is 
that the deceased cannot express any view on the matter. While in an aliment case the 
putative acceptor can put forward his case, in a succession case it would be for the 
acceptee to argue that the acceptor had accepted him or treated him as a child of the 
family. While the approach is clearly not without difficulties, it would nevertheless 
translate into law an idea expressed by many participants in the study; namely, that a 
stepchild who was part of the family unit ought to be treated differently from a 
stepchild who was a stepchild by affinity alone.  
7.5.2 Stepchildren in other jurisdictions 
 
The question of how, if at all, succession law should reflect the stepchild/step-parent 
relationship has gained particular traction in the US. In 2008,
902
 the Uniform Probate 
Code was amended to include step-descendants as intestate heirs where the 
descendent leaves no other heirs.
903
 While it might be argued that any recognition of 
the step-parent/stepchild relationship carries an important expressive function, it is not 
clear that including stepchildren as the heir of last resort acknowledges the 
importance of the step-relationship in some contemporary families. As such, the 
provision suffers from the same risks of under-inclusion and over-inclusion identified 
in relation to stepchildren in cases of non-patrimonial loss.
904
 It therefore seems 
unlikely that this would prove an effective means of approaching the question. 
 
Some commentators have pointed out that the exclusion of stepchildren from many 
US succession statutes has a disproportionate effect on same-sex couples. This is due 
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to “a combination of state marriage laws and adoption statutes” which forces most 
same-sex couples to designate one parent as the legal parent.
905
 The coalescence of 
these two factors is not limited to parental determination but has a “trickle down” 
effect on children’s inheritance rights on intestacy:906 where the law does not allow 
the second (same-sex) parent to adopt the gestational or biological child of her 
spouse, the child cannot inherit from her second parent. This concern has not escaped 
the attention of commentators in Canada, despite the country’s more progressive 
stance on same-sex marriage and adoption. Perhaps reflecting historical inequities, the 
2011 Canadian census found that while 12.5% of opposite-sex couples with children 
were stepfamilies, close to half (49.7%) of same-sex couples with children were 
stepfamilies.
907
 This has led to the suggestion that current Canadian intestacy 
provisions have an adverse impact based on sexual orientation.
908
  
 
In 1983, perhaps in response to marriage inequity, California became the first US 
state to enact legislation treating the step-parent/stepchild relationship as a parent-
child relationship for the purposes of intestate succession.
909
 The Californian model 
sets out a two-pronged test, requiring that (i) “the relationship began during the 
child’s minority and continued throughout the joint lifetimes of both the stepchild and 
stepparent”; and (ii) that the stepchild has established that the stepparent would have 
adopted the child but for a legal barrier.”910 Reflecting the asymmetrical nature of the 
parent/child (or step-parent/stepchild) relationship, the statute provides only for the 
stepchild (or step-descendants) to inherit. 
 
While the legal barrier branch of the test might provide assistance to same-sex 
spouses who are unable to adopt each other’s adopted or biological/gestational 
children, it has not been without criticism. In particular, it fails to “recognise that a 
meaningful parent-child relationship may exist without the intent or desire to legally 
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recognise the relationship through adoption.”911 This of course recalls Bainham’s 
exhortation
912
 that a distinction should be drawn between the post-divorce (or post-
death) step-parent and the step-parent who is the only parent the child has ever 
known. Nevertheless, even where the step-parent/stepchild relationship is not 
considered to be absolutely analogous to the parent/child relationship, some families 
will want to recognise it upon the step-parent’s death. Thus, while the second branch 
of the Californian test would seem to have little application in the Scottish context 
(particularly since the advent of marriage equality), the first branch of the test 
encapsulates a view expressed by many participants and could perhaps serve as a 
starting point in determining whether or not a stepchild should inherit. 
7.5.3 Half-siblings in other jurisdictions 
 
The entitlement of half-siblings to succeed on intestacy has also been addressed by 
law reform bodies in other jurisdictions in recent years and, as a result, several 
jurisdictions either no longer distinguish between full and half-siblings or have 
“pending recommendations” to remove any distinction.913  In Australia, for example, 
the New South Wales Succession Amendment (Intestacy) Act 2009
914
 abolished the 
distinction between half-blood and full-blood siblings
915 
while the Tasmanian 
Intestacy Act 2010 redefined a person as a brother or sister of another person if they 
have one or both parents in common.
916
 Similarly, in Canada, the Wills, Estates and 
Succession Act of British Columbia allows for half-siblings to inherit from the 
deceased in their capacity as “descendants of the intestate’s parents or parent”,917 and 
identical provision is made under section 4(4) of the Manitoba Intestate Succession 
Act (1990).
 
 
Nonetheless, some jurisdictions do preserve differential treatment between half and 
full siblings: Quebec, for example, provides for half-siblings but accords them a lesser 
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share. The distribution of an intestate estate involving half-siblings is neatly 
illustrated by the following example provided by the Quebec Justice Department: 
 
 Ralph dies without having made a will 
 He is married to Pauline and has no children. 
He has three brothers: Louis and Roger, who have the same parents as Ralph, 
and Peter, who has the same mother but whose father is the mother’s second 
spouse. 
 
The division of the estate is explained as follows:
918
 
 
Louis and Roger are whole-blood brothers of Ralph (the deceased) and Peter is 
a uterine brother of Ralph. Since Ralph was legally married to Pauline, the 
family patrimony
919
 will first be partitioned and then the matrimonial 
regime
920
 will be liquidated. Ralph’s succession consists of the remainder. Let 
us say the succession amounts to $45,000; this is how it would be divided: 
 Pauline, his spouse, receives 2/3 of the succession, or $30,000. 
The remaining 1/3, or $15,000, is divided in equal shares among the brothers 
in the paternal line ($7,500) and the brothers in the maternal line ($7,500). 
There are two  brothers in the paternal line, Louis and Roger, and they each 
receive one half of the portion passing to that line, or $3,750. There are three 
brothers in the maternal line,  Louis, Roger and Peter, and they each receive 
one third of the portion passing to that line, or $2,500. Since Louis and Roger 
are in both lines, they share in the portion passing to each line so they each 
receive $6,250. Peter’s share in the succession is $2,500. 
 
This solution has the merit of providing recognition for the half-sibling, while 
simultaneously acknowledging that the relationship is not necessarily equivalent to a 
full-sibling relationship. This does not guarantee that it will provide a satisfactory 
outcome in all cases: for example, Ralph may see no difference between his half-
brother and his full brothers or, at the other extreme, he may have had no relationship 
with Peter and consequently may have wished him to be entirely excluded. 
Nevertheless, it might be thought to be a reasonable compromise for those who reject 
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any form of judicial discretion in succession law. According to the Law Commission 
of England and Wales, which also studied the question, this option was also favoured 
by “a couple” of its consultees.921 
 
The conclusions on half-siblings contained in the Law Commission’s 2011 Report 
were based partly on the findings of the NatCen study.
922
 The NatCen survey asked 
participants what should happen to a man’s property where he died leaving only a 
brother and a half-sister. The participants had to select from a range of options and the 
results showed that 53% favoured the brother,
923
 either leaving it all to him (18%) or 
by giving him priority (35%), while 45% favoured equal sharing.
924
 Ultimately, 
however, the Law Commission decided not to recommend amending the current 
English legislation for a number of carefully considered reasons.  
 
Firstly, the Law Commission made the important point that reform would not change 
the distribution in a large number of estates as the number of people dying who leave 
no spouse, descendant or parent, but both full and half-siblings is likely to be fairly 
low.
925
 It is thought likely that the same observation could be made in relation to 
Scottish decedents. Secondly, when considered together with the Law Commission’s 
other principal argument, the lack of a “strong majority opinion,”926 the wisdom of 
maintaining the status quo seems clear. Simply put, the situation does not arise 
frequently and, where it does, it is not clear that there is an obvious “right” answer 
enjoying widespread support.
927
 
 
Interestingly, while both the SLC and the Law Commission consider the entitlement 
of half-siblings, neither appears to address stepsibling entitlement. As succession law 
is historically based on ties of consanguinity, this is unsurprising; however, excluding 
such a key relationship creates a noticeable gap in the policy debate. The decision not 
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to consider stepsiblings is particularly unusual in that a family unit may comprise 
siblings, stepsiblings and half-siblings. In such circumstances, it may happen that the 
sibling and the half-sibling inherit,
928
 but the stepsibling does not purely due to the 
lack of a blood tie. There is no doubt that the presence of a biological relationship is 
still important in determining inheritance entitlement, as was evidenced by the 
discussion around the right to know one’s genetic origin,929 but it is no longer the sole 
factor that merits consideration. In the interests of completeness, it may therefore 
have been appropriate for the SLC to address stepsibling entitlement more fully. 
7.5.4 Discretion 
 
No discussion on the inclusion of stepfamilies can be held without addressing the 
question of discretion. In its 2009 Report, the SLC stated that there was “an 
overwhelming consensus among our consultees that a court-based discretionary 
system must be avoided” regarding both spousal provision and provision for 
children.
930
 Other commentators have endorsed this view. Professor Vines, for 
example, has written extensively about the pattern of disproportionality in Australian 
family provision estate litigation, whereby a high proportion of estates are consumed 
by costs in protracted disputes.
931
 Closer to home, Ilott v The Blue cross and others, 
described as having taken an “unconscionable time” to reach resolution, serves as a 
cautionary tale against the use of discretion.
932
 In the elite interviews conducted in 
this project, Miss Scobbie expressed the view that discretion was unlikely ever to 
prove popular in Scotland while Professor Gretton expressed his support for a rules-
based system, citing concern about cost and delay.
933
 
 
However, while these concerns are not easily dismissed, unqualified rejection of 
discretion may simply no longer be tenable. The “absolutist” traditions of succession 
                                                        
928
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law may have been appropriate when only narrowly circumscribed categories of 
relationship were deemed “worthy,” but this is no longer the case. As such, other 
commentators have argued that a degree of discretion may be appropriate. Sheriff 
Cusine has argued that “the system of legal rights…ought, on occasion, to have its 
rigidity tempered by a discretion vested in the courts,”934 while Cremer has argued 
that a “mechanical test, although easily administrable, lacks viability, as the 
complexities involved in a relationship would be oversimplified and would likely fail 
to meet the intent of the step-parent and stepchild.”935 Finally, Gary has cautioned that 
“ease of administration and predictability” now appear to “supersede intent and need 
as goals of intestacy statutes” in the US,936 a shift that means succession law may no 
longer meet public expectations. 
 
Despite hostility towards the use of discretion, it is already employed in other areas of 
family law
937
 and, as such, the courts should not encounter undue difficulty applying 
it in the context of succession law. In the US context, Gary proposed “a relatively 
straightforward intestacy statute (excluding stepchildren), with a rebuttable 
presumption that the statute applies.”938 Where the presumption did not apply, the 
court would turn to the “categories of potential heirs” in the statute and consider the 
relevant list of factors in order to determine whether a person should qualify for an 
intestate share.
939
 This would have the clear advantage of avoiding “trying to pin 
down every possible variation, which inevitably results in over-inclusion in some 
cases and under-inclusion in others.”940 
 
It is noteworthy that the SLC, while opposing discretionary rules for spouses and 
children, accepts discretion for cohabitants.
941
 Section 22 of the Draft Bill set out a 
two-pronged test whereby the court would first determine whether the surviving 
partner had been “living with the deceased in a relationship which had the 
characteristics of the relationship between spouses or civil partners” before then 
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determining to what extent the applicant should be treated as a spouse or civil partner 
for the purpose of the rules of succession.
942
 It might be thought that a similar system 
could be employed for stepchildren, perhaps relying on similar wording to that used 
in the first branch of the Californian test. Both the Californian test and the test 
proposed by the SLC in relation to cohabitants are very general in nature and seek to 
include relationships that are analogous to their officially sanctioned counterparts – 
marriage and legal parenthood – while excluding those where no functionally 
equivalent relationship exists. 
 
If the model were also to include similar criteria to those proposed for determining 
whether parties were cohabitants, such as whether they were (or had been) members 
of the same household, whether they enjoyed a stable relationship and whether they 
appeared to be members of the same family,
943
 the risk of over-inclusion, so evident 
in a purely rules-based system, would be avoided. Beyond the obvious benefit to the 
individuals involved, including a discretionary claim for certain categories of 
stepchildren would “create long-term positive effects by increasing the accuracy of 
intent effectuation in intestacy statutes and by providing support for a greater number 
of members within a blended family.”944 
 
The same arguments that have been advanced in support of discretion in determining 
stepchild entitlement could also be employed to support limited judicial discretion in 
cases of half-sibling entitlement. Certainly, Gary’s comments as to the futility of 
trying to create legal rules for all classes of kin relationships are as relevant here as 
they were in relation to stepchildren:
945
  
 
As drafters try to address more possible scenarios…the number of scenarios 
continues to expand. An intestacy statue has always been a one-size-fits-all 
proposition, and even with the increasing numbers of provisions that try to 
fine-tune the application of the intestacy code, the statue might be less likely 
than more likely to match what the decedent wanted. However, as it is not 
thought likely that many people will die intestate, survived only by both 
siblings and half-siblings, the need to reform the law on half-siblings (and 
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indeed stepsiblings) is less pressing than the need to address the step-
parent/stepchild relationship.
946
 
 
7.6 Future trends: the three-parent family? 
 
One of the fundamental features of the status of legal parenthood is that, in 
relationship to any given child, it cannot be held simultaneously by more than two 
individuals. This legal reality reflects what appears to be a deeply-held belief that 
children are “not entitled to more than two parents.”947 Bainham argues this 
entrenched position raises “deep philosophical questions,”948 but it would appear that 
these questions have thus far gone unnoticed in the Scottish legal community. Indeed, 
an attachment to this belief appears to underpin much of the objection to stepchildren 
inheriting. Norrie made the following observation:
949
 
 
Perhaps an even more serious objection to giving stepchildren and accepted 
children right on intestacy is that the class of children would then be entitled to 
two (or perhaps even more) inheritances: the more a family is reconstituted, 
the more disparate will be the claims of children depending on their life 
experiences. 
 
The SLC makes a similar point, arguing that provision for stepchildren would put the 
accepted child in a better position than an adopted or biological child.
950
 This is a 
perplexing argument as differences already exist: children in rich families will be in a 
better position than children in poor families, while children in large families will fare 
worse than an only child when a similar sized estate is available. Furthermore, the 
purpose of an intestacy regime is generally considered to be to give effect to the 
deceased’s supposed intent,951 rather than to ensure equality across the general 
population, an aim an intestacy regime seems ill-fitted to achieve.  
 
The unassailability of this idea has, however, been challenged by some U.S. 
commentators, and some U.S. states already recognise the concept of three-parent 
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families in specific circumstances. The Uniform Probate Code provides that “if the 
spouse of either genetic parent” adopts a child, the child will still be able to inherit 
from and through the parent who is no longer a parent. As Gary explained, the statute 
provides for asymmetrical inheritance, in favour of the child: while the child can 
inherit from her mother, father and step-father, only the mother and step-father and 
their relatives can inherit from the daughter.
952
 In a similar vein, Pennsylvania’s 
intestacy statute maintains a link between the adopted child and her genetic family in 
very narrow circumstances. The adopted child has a claim on the estate of a member 
of her genetic family if the deceased “maintained a family relationship with the 
adopted person.”953 
 
In British Columbia, a more radical approach has been introduced. Presumably in 
recognition of new family realities, British Columbia already allows three parents to 
become legal parents of the same child. BC’s Family Law Act allows the “potential 
birth mother, a person who is married to or in a marriage-like relationship with the 
potential birth mother, and a donor who agrees to be a parent together with”954 them 
to be the parents of the children. This change may have been driven by same-sex 
couples but could, theoretically, apply to opposite-sex couples.
955
 According to one 
prominent Vancouver-based lawyer, the shift reflects changes in the way in which 
British Columbians conceptualise parenthood and family:
956
 
 
In the old days, we looked at biology and genetic connections. And that’s no 
longer true. We now look at the intention of the parties who are contributing to 
the creation of the child, and intend to raise the child. And that’s a really, 
really big shift. 
 
While to suggest that intent replaces biology and genetic parenthood (or indeed social 
parenthood) is perhaps to overstate the case, it is clear that it does play a role. It seems 
that the British Columbian model was primarily designed to address the needs of 
                                                        
952
 Gary (2012) at 801. 
953
 Ibid at 802. 
954
 Section 30(b)(ii). Note that section 30(b)(i) provides for the same outcome, but where the birth 
mother is the “third parent,” rather than a member of the couple. 
955
 An opposite sex couple might also use ART and wish to confer parental status on the birth mother 
who carries the child. 
956
 McCarthy, T, “This baby is the first in British Columbia to have 3 parents listed on her birth 
certificate” Huffpost 2 November 2014, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/11/baby-
with-3-parents-birth-certificate_n_4767402.html. 
 243 
same-sex couples who intended, from the outset, for their child to have three “equal” 
parents in the eyes of the law. However, as Cremer observed, a three-parent model 
can develop in stepfamilies to the extent that a child has three meaningful parent/child 
relationships: relationships with the legal father, legal mother, and step-parent.
957
 
 
Although the BC Act does not explicitly reference inheritance rights, it allows 
parentage rights to be conferred on three parents “for all purposes of the law of British 
Columbia.”958 This includes inheritance rights as, simply put, “a child’s legal parent is 
the person under the law from whom a child would inherit.”959  This means that 
children whose parents have availed themselves of this provision will inherit from 
three parents. Further research would be required to determine whether demand for a 
similar model exists in Scotland; however, it this model, where there are three co-
parents from the outset, may be less controversial than “mum” or “dad” feeling their 
position threatened by the arrival of a new step-parent post- divorce or separation.  
7.7 The SLC’s objections to providing recognition for stepchildren 
 
Although stepchildren are dealt with only briefly in the 2009 Report, they were 
discussed at length in the SLC Discussion Paper that preceded it, with a primary focus 
on intestate succession. Ultimately, the SLC rejected introducing any provision for 
stepchildren; however, given they were choosing between extending rights to all 
accepted children and stepchildren or no accepted children and stepchildren, the 
decision was perhaps sound. Nevertheless, if the assumption that discretion is 
undesirable is set aside, meaning that rights could be extended to some stepchildren 
and not to others, the SLC’s conclusion is less robust.  
 
The first argument advanced by the SLC is that intestate succession is traditionally a 
matter of blood relationships.
960
 This is unquestionably true, but it is also a tradition 
that has already been modified better to reflect contemporary values: prior to the 
enactment of the 1964 Act, a surviving spouse was not an heir on intestacy (and 
consequently had no entitlement to a share of the free intestate estate) as she had no 
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blood relationship to the deceased. The introduction of the right to succeed to the 
estate under section 2(1)(e) of the 1964 Act was considered “one of the more radical 
departures from the common law,”961 but from a contemporary perspective is wholly 
uncontroversial. There seems little reason why a further adaptation could not be made 
to bring the law into line with new contemporary reality and social values. While 
blood relationships remain important, they remain important only insofar as most 
people love their children and most people have a blood tie to their children: 
questions of lineage, purity and tradition did not appear to be foremost in people’s 
minds during the discussion groups. Given the recognition of social parenthood in 
other areas of the law, it seems unusual to close the door entirely to the possibility of 
allowing it to form the basis of a succession claim in some circumstances.  
 
A second problem highlighted by the SLC is the perceived difficulty “in establishing 
whether or not the deceased had accepted a child to the required extend” if the 
deceased died many years after the child had left home.
962
 This is an understandable 
concern but one which is not insurmountable, as evidence of an on-going relationship 
akin to a parent-child relationship could still be led. 
7.8 Conclusion 
 
The right to succeed to a parent’s estate has always been treated as an important right 
in law. As discussed above, it is a right that exists regardless of whether the parent has 
parental rights and responsibilities. The SLC was therefore rightly concerned that 
conferring succession rights on stepchildren “would be to give acceptance to a legal 
status equivalent to the much more formal procedure of adoption.”963 This is a 
compelling argument when it is considered that not all parents who accept a child as a 
child of the family want to take on a full “no exit” parental relationship. It would, 
therefore, seem inappropriate to provide automatic inheritance rights, either on testacy 
or intestacy, to all stepchildren. 
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However, stepfamilies or blended families are becoming the new norm.  Cremer 
estimates that in the US more than half the population belongs to a blended family
964
 
and such a significant demographic cannot simply be ignored. Including a provision 
that allows for stepchildren to inherit not only provides comfort for individual 
children on the death of their step-parent, but clearly signals an acceptance of the idea 
that stepchildren can be full family members too. As Gary explained:
965
 
 
Intestacy statutes serve as a statement of what society considers family to be, 
because they define who counts as a family member. This expressive function 
is important in validating family members’ relationships. 
 
As has been observed, not only can heirship statutes reflect social norms and values, 
they also shape those norms and values by recognising and legitimising 
relationships.
966
 For this reason, a rebuttable presumption excluding stepchildren, but 
with the possibility of some level of provision where certain criteria apply, merits 
further consideration. While stepchildren may in some – even many most – instances 
be awarded less than legal children, the relationship would still be given some 
recognition. In the interests of consistency, there appears to be no obvious reasons 
why such provision would not be available in cases of both testate and intestate 
succession.
967
 Certainly, the SLC has proposed that the discretionary provision 
currently available to cohabitants under section 29 of the FLSA be extended to testate 
estates.
968
 
 
With regard to half-siblings, there seems little option but to accept that, as with any 
legal rule, there will be winners and losers: if the distinction remains some half-
siblings may be devastated to find themselves left out; if the distinction is abolished 
some half-siblings will be felt to have inherited “undeservedly.” Fundamentally, one 
solution will not fit all. Thus, while it is undoubtedly true that the SLC had unanimous 
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support for the specific question it asked stakeholders in its consultation process,
969
 it 
is not clear that this can be translated into unanimous support for the proposal at a 
nationwide level. My own research indicates that there is no real dissatisfaction with 
the current system and, in the absence of further, more conclusive research, it seems 
that there would be some merit in following the English stance
970
 and maintaining the 
status quo. 
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Conclusion 
 
In its 2009 Report, the SLC proposed significant changes to the Scots law of 
succession. This thesis has argued that these changes are misguided insofar as they 
are out of step with public attitudes. Although the SLC set out to address the 
increased diversity of contemporary family formations,
971
 the solutions it proposed 
were silent on stepfamilies and retreated from any attempt to address meaningfully 
the needs and expectations of those who are part of a first family/second family 
dynamic. Instead, and without any apparent justification, the parent-child relationship 
became a focal point of the reforms. 
 
The misalignment between the identified social shift and the reform proposals 
suggests that, as Dot Reid has argued, ideological factors are at play.
972
 As the law is 
inherently political, this is both unsurprising and entirely reasonable; nevertheless, it 
is equally reasonable to expect that the ideology the law expresses is broadly 
consistent with the norms that govern people’s lives.973 Attitudinal research 
undertaken by Finch and Mason, NatCen and the Rowntree Foundation, allowed for a 
clear articulation of the way in which these norms operate in relation to inheritance in 
England and Wales; however, no such research had been undertaken in Scotland. It 
was in light of this vacuum that my empirical study of public attitudes towards 
inheritance and parental obligation was developed.  
 
Contemporary family formations display considerable diversity and are no longer 
defined exclusively in terms of biology or long-term monogamy. Nevertheless, this 
thesis started from the premise that the two pillars of the family identified by the 
Scottish Institutional writers (husband and wife, and parent and child)
974
 continue to 
occupy a central role in the lives of many Scots. Although today’s couples may be 
same-sex, unmarried and/or child-free by choice – and while parents may or may not 
be biologically related to their children – committed adult partners and/or children 
normally feature in people’s definition of my family where they have such 
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relationships. Of these two key relationships, this thesis focussed on the parent-child 
dyad, the relationship that is the primary target of the reform process. 
 
In studying the parent-child relationship, consideration was given not only to 
inheritance norms in intact families, but to the degree to which these norms were 
affected by parental re-partnering. Furthermore, attention was turned to some of the 
many new relationships that arise in complex family units, specifically stepchild/step-
parent relationships, stepsibling relationships and half-sibling relationships. Finally, 
consideration was also given to expectations between spouses with regard to any 
obligation the surviving spouse owes the pre-deceased spouse.  
 
A qualitative project was chosen as the best means of exploring the complexities, 
nuances and contradictions in public attitudes to succession. The cursory quantitative 
research carried out by the SLC in 2005 – and the more nuanced quantitative research 
conducted in 1986 – demonstrated strong public support for children receiving a share 
of a deceased’s person’s estate (both on testacy and intestacy);975 but, for reasons that 
were never adequately explained, the SLC chose largely to ignore these findings. 
Even more importantly, the participants in the SLC’s surveys considered only very 
simple scenarios: they did not engage with what people felt to be fair in different 
circumstances and they did not contextualise individual relationships against wider 
family dynamics. My project addressed these gaps in knowledge and illuminated the 
interplay between the multiple factors that inform people’s views on inheritance. 
 
The findings of my study echoed those of the NatCen and Finch and Mason studies in 
many respects, affirming that children enjoy a privileged position in the inheritance 
narrative, both in cases of testate and intestate succession.
976
 This does not mean that 
the children’s entitlement is viewed as stronger than the spouse’s entitlement; instead, 
the two are viewed through different lenses. The spouse’s entitlement flows from a 
conceptualization of marriage as a partnership, whereas the children’s entitlement is 
an affirmation of love at the end of the parent’s life.  
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Nevertheless, the children’s entitlement is not absolute, but depends on the interplay 
between a host of factors. While these factors were diverse in range, a number of 
guiding principles can be identified to explain when and why children are considered 
entitled to inherit. As was the case in other studies,
977
 the participants relied on the 
various principles in at times inconsistent or contradictory manners, with particular 
tension existing between the principles of testamentary freedom and parental 
obligation.  However, although testamentary freedom and forced heirship provisions 
are often presented as irreconcilable values, the majority of participants sought a 
means to reconcile both freedom and responsibility.  
Principles underpinning attitudes to inheritance 
 
1. The parental obligation principle 
The study suggested that participants considered parents to have a life-long, “no exit” 
obligation towards their children. The obligation was not primarily conceptualized in 
financial terms: parents were not viewed as having a duty to alleviate financial need 
in adult children or to conserve assets to pass on to their children. However, 
participants, the vast majority of whom were themselves parents, did perceive parents 
to have an obligation to love their children and to reaffirm the parent-child 
relationship at the end of their life by including them in the final disposition of their 
estate.  
 
This obligation, given legal effect through the operation of legitim, was willingly 
assumed by parents and did not depend on the children providing their parents with 
the same level of reciprocal support. Certainly, there was little hint that legitim is 
perceived as a “legal disability”978 to be overcome. Finally, and contrary to the SLC’s 
proposed reforms, participants made virtually no distinction between the entitlement 
of adult children and that of young children. This is because inheritance is not viewed 
as a source of aliment but as an expression of love and affection and a marker of good 
parenting. 
 
2. The relationship principle 
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As explained by the NatCen researchers, attitudes towards entitlement in cases of 
inheritance are framed largely by bilateral relationships between the deceased and the 
potential beneficiary.
979
 In some instances, entitlement flows from a putative 
beneficiary’s status as a member of a particular relationship dyad: for example, 
spouses and children are normally viewed as automatically entitled.
980
 In other 
instances, subjective factors, such as a close and loving relationship, were central to 
establishing entitlement.  These subjective factors were particularly important in 
assessing the entitlement of stepchildren and half-siblings, relationships that flow 
from reconstituted or complex families. Nevertheless, subjective factors were at times 
relevant when evaluating status-based entitlement insofar as an obvious lack of an 
emotionally close relationship could, in certain cases, reduce a child’s entitlement. 
 
3. The fairness principle 
Fairness was an abiding preoccupation for the participants and was generally viewed 
through the lens of equal treatment. As has been discussed by several 
commentators,
981
 the normative duty to treat children equally is not easily displaced 
and, in the context of children and grandchildren, is adhered to “almost invariably.”982  
Nevertheless, participants noted that in some instances – for example, where one child 
was affected by long-term illness or disability – equality of outcome was a more 
important objective than an equal division of assets.  
 
4. The autonomy principle 
A fourth principle underpinning attitudes to inheritance was autonomy, which arose in 
various contexts. Most obviously, the older adult was free to spend his money how he 
saw fit and was under no obligation to conserve money to leave an inheritance. 
Equally, however, many participants articulated the concept of autonomy as one that 
conferred upon older people a “right” to leave a bequest, as opposed to having to 
dissipate their resources on care costs. Both of these conceptions of autonomy were 
evidenced in other studies.
983
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In addition, the principle of autonomy was regularly drawn upon in discussions on 
testamentary freedom. While testamentary freedom was highly prized and jealously 
guarded, it quickly became evident on deeper analysis that, for many participants, 
absolute testamentary freedom was secondary to conceptions of fairness and parental 
(and spousal) obligation. Where participants expressed concern about forced heirship 
provisions, their primary fear was not simply that the testator’s wishes would be 
disregarded, but that the law would supplant the superior judgement of the testator 
and reward an undeserving heir; as a corollary, support for testamentary freedom 
often floundered when a testator was believed to be acting unfairly. Certainly, with 
one exception, no support was voiced for testators who simply decided to favour one 
child, or disinherit all of his children, on grounds of simple preference. 
 
Finally, despite the widely-accepted narrative that holds will-writing to be an 
expression of individual autonomy, my research findings demonstrated clearly that for 
couples with children, will-writing was not viewed as the act of an individual, but as 
an expression of joint intent and mutually binding obligation. Many of the participants 
in the study spoke of “our” will, rather than “my will” and clearly expected the 
surviving spouse to follow through on what they had drafted together. While the 
surviving spouse was under no obligation to conserve assets for a bequest, it was 
clearly understood that any eventual bequests had to give effect to both spouses’ 
intentions. Although some spouses were clear that this was merely a private, moral 
commitment between spouses, a surprising number were aghast to discover that such 
agreements were not binding on the survivor. 
 
5. The family property principle 
 
As explained in Chapter 4, the findings of my study did not suggest that property was 
transgenerationally owned insofar as children had no claim on a parent’s property 
during that parent’s lifetime.984 Moreover, participants demonstrated no interest in 
preserving the family name or position forward through time.  However, children (and 
to an extent grandchildren) are assumed to be the “rightful” end recipients of 
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property, even when the relationship is not perfect. In this sense, a limited notion of 
family property exists. 
 
Conceptions of family property were particularly important in complex families. In 
the context of an “intact” family, parental obligation towards the children is largely 
deferred until the death of the second parent: while the first parent to die may mark 
his relationship with his child by passing on sentimental items, there is no expectation 
that financially significant bequests will be made until the second parent dies. 
However, in the context of first family/second family dynamics this obligation cannot 
be deferred and each parent must individually assume his or her duty. Moreover, in 
cases where the first spouse has pre-deceased, the surviving spouse’s duty involves 
not just his duty to his child but also his duty to his pre-deceased spouse: the 
participants held the view that the pre-deceased spouse had contributed towards the 
estate the survivor inherited and believed that contribution had to be reflected in any 
subsequent bequests.  
Normative expectations 
 
The operation of these principles was evident through the expectations participants 
expressed in regard to each other’s behaviour and the behaviour of the fictitious 
characters in the scenarios. There was a clear normative expectation that “right 
thinking” people would make some provision for their children at the end of their 
lives if they were able to do so. Where people did not conform to this behaviour 
pattern, participants were either swift in their condemnation, or sought to explain why 
the deviation may have occurred.  
 
The normative expectations differed depending on the relationship and family 
configuration at issue. With regard to a biological or legal parent-child relationship, 
the expectation that provision would be made for children was so entrenched that 
some participants struggled to imagine how else an individual would dispose of his 
estate. In addition, many parents considered placing the full burden of social care 
costs on an individual’s shoulders as an unacceptable interference with their right to 
leave a bequest for their children.  
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Perhaps most strikingly, the parent-child transfer was viewed as so inevitable in the 
minds of the participants that a parental bequest was often not perceived as an 
inheritance. Whereas participants felt flattered to receive a bequest from family 
members such as aunts and cousins, a bequest from a parent was rendered significant 
only in its absence. Indeed, where a child was not provided for, participants generally 
assumed that the decision reflected a catastrophic breakdown in the parent-child 
relationship. In the alternative, they assumed that some other provision had been 
made for the child in lieu of a bequest. They did not entertain the possibility that the 
testator had simply preferred to nominate an alternative beneficiary. 
 
These expectations and assumptions speak to the enormous symbolic value 
inheritance holds in the context of the parent-child relationship. As Finch and Mason 
observed, a bequest from a parent to a child is “an expression of attachment” and “the 
symbol of a lifetime’s commitment as a parent.”985 Simply put, the parental transfer 
“equates with love;”986 thus, if a child is excluded, either at the expense of another 
sibling or another family unit, the message that the child is loved less is almost 
impossible to avoid. The weight of this blow is the harder to bear as it is the final 
communication between the parent and the child and cannot be explained or 
remediated.  
 
In the context of complex families, while re-partnering did not change the essence of 
the parent’s duty to his children, it did change the moment at which the parental 
transfer occurred: it was no longer deferred until the death of the second parent. 
Equally importantly, the formation of new family units gave rise to other relationships 
and other potentially entitled beneficiaries. Each of these new relationships raised a 
range of questions and engaged a new process and new norms for evaluating 
entitlement. 
 
In a first family/second family dynamic, there was concern that the children of the 
first family would “lose out” to the new family and an expectation that measures 
would be taken – either by the state or the individual – to avoid such an outcome. In 
regard to stepfamilies, the children’s entitlement was viewed from an alternative 
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 Finch and Mason (2000), p. 86. 
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 As observed by Group 5 participant, Sally See Chapter 4, 4.5.2.4 
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perspective: rather than considering whether children of the first family “lost out”, the 
question was whether stepchildren were perceived to “lose out” unjustly if they were 
not provided for in a will or on intestacy. There was considerable unanimity in the 
norms expressed by participants and two main arguments emerged. On the one hand, 
a child who was a stepchild by marriage alone had no right to inherit; however, on the 
other hand, where a parental relationship had been established between the step-
parent and the stepchild some recognition of that relationship was expected.  
 
That said, even where recognition of the step-parent-stepchild relationship was 
expected, entitlement did not arise automatically but instead depended on the 
presence of certain factors.  Chief among these factors was a relationship that was 
either functionally equivalent to the parent-child relationship or very close and 
familial. Such a relationship is not status-based, but is instead gradually acquired. 
Furthermore, the stepchild/step-parent relationship is not a “no exit” relationship and 
the obligations it entails may slacken or dissolve if the adult relationship that 
underpins it ends. As such, the stepchild/step-parent relationship sits uneasily with a 
strict rules-based system, which often creates either under- or over-inclusive 
outcomes in such a context. 
 
Ambiguity towards non-nuclear family-based relationships was also displayed in 
relation to half-siblings. The SLC favours bringing Scotland into line with other 
jurisdictions and treating half-siblings as full siblings for inheritance purposes.
987
 
However, the participants in my study did not support this option, stressing that 
entitlement flowed from the quality of the relationship and not through status. As in 
the case of stepchildren, half-siblings were considered entitled to inherit only if they 
were part of the family unit and not simply because of a shared “blood” tie. 
  
Potential areas of reform 
 
Following the approach adopted by the Rowntree Foundation, NatCen and Finch and 
Mason, this thesis set out to examine public attitudes to inheritance, rather than to 
propose law reform measures. Nevertheless, the findings clearly illuminated areas 
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where both the existing law and the reform proposals are out of sync with the public 
attitudes established in this study. While law reformers must obviously consider 
public policy reasons other than public preferences, areas where a strong disconnect 
exists between public expectations and the law clearly warrant further attention. 
 
In cases of intestate succession, my findings added weight to the already preponderant 
body of evidence demonstrating that there is strong public support for children being 
recognised in intestate statutes, particularly where the surviving spouse is not the 
child’s other parent. As was discussed in Chapter 1, other jurisdictions have adopted 
intestacy statutes that reflect the reality of today’s complex families by setting a lower 
preferential share for surviving spouses who are not also the other parent of the 
deceased’s children. Although the Law Commission of England and Wales held such 
an approach to be “wrong in principle,”988 it does not appear to have caused 
consternation in other jurisdictions. While there is undoubtedly room for further 
empirical research to explore how these regimes are experienced by those who are 
subject to them, the introduction of parallel intestacy provisions applicable in cases 
where the surviving spouse is not also the parent of the deceased’s children would 
seem to be consistent with public norms and expectations.  
 
As well as raising issues relating to the protection of children in first families, the 
increased presence of complex families raises questions as to if and how new 
categories of kin should be recognised. The enactment of the Burial and Cremation 
(Scotland) Act 2016 suggests that law makers have already begun to grapple with 
these questions: section 65(5) of the Act provides that the stepchildren of an adult are 
to be treated as his children for the purposes of making arrangements for an adult’s 
remains to be buried or cremated. While the provision is in some sense surprising, 
insofar as it risks being over-inclusive, the desire to recognise that stepchildren can 
play an important role in a stepparent’s life is likely to become an increasingly 
important consideration in future law reform processes. 
 
Although the Burial and Cremation (Scotland) 2016 Act favours a rules-based 
approach, the existing research on the rights of stepchildren on intestacy demonstrates 
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that, unlike legal and biological children who have a status-based entitlement, a 
stepchild’s entitlement is based on a combination of factors and, consequently, a strict 
rules-based approach risks being either- under or over – inclusive. For this reason, 
academics such as Gary and Cremer have called for the limited used of discretion in 
such circumstances.
989
  
 
Although judicial discretion is used widely in succession law in other jurisdictions, it 
garners little support in Scotland; however, defining a role for limited discretion to 
accommodate the needs and expectations of complex families may become a 
necessity and is worthy of further consideration.  Indeed, while cognisant of the 
difficulties related to judicial discretion, the SLC nevertheless implicitly recognizes 
its worth.  Whereas section 29 of the FLSA currently applies only to intestate 
succession, the SLC proposes extending the new regime governing awards for 
cohabitants to cases of testate succession.
990
 Given that the SLC is comfortable 
charging the court with deciding “to what extent the surviving cohabitant deserves to 
be treated as the deceased’s spouse or civil partner for the purposes of the rules of 
succession,”991 it does not seem unreasonable to suggest the court would be equally 
well equipped to evaluate other relationships arising from complex family formations. 
 
In terms of testate succession, there is no doubt that legitim can appear to encroach on 
testamentary freedom. However, as Gardner has pointed out, “the more correct view” 
is to realise that in Scotland the power of testing has never extended to the whole 
estate.
992
 Regardless of the view one favours, there is no doubt that, even if legitim 
does constitute an encroachment on testamentary freedom, it has only ever been a 
partial encroachment and one that appears to enjoy widespread acceptance. While it is 
clear that the costs of wills variation and family provision claims have raised concerns 
in other jurisdictions,
993
 such models have never been part of the Scottish experience. 
Instead, as a fixed legal share, legitim provides an administratively straightforward 
means of recognising the parent-child relationship. While there is room to debate 
whether legitim should be exigible against only the moveable estate, the basic model 
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of a fixed share is sound and received widespread support from the public in this 
study. 
 
Finally, while it would be fair to assume that a significant number of step-parents will 
intentionally – and reasonably – exclude their step-children from their will, there 
could also be cases of genuine oversight. There is, therefore, merit in also considering 
a discretion-based entitlement for step-children in testate succession, similar to that 
proposed by the SLC in regard to cohabitants. By at least opening the door to this 
possibility, the law can recognise that the relationship some children have with their 
stepparent, or their de facto third parent,
994
 can be as meaningful as the relationship 
they have with a biological or legal parent.  
 
In conclusion, analysis of the data from my research project allowed a number of 
themes to be developed and a deeper understanding of public attitudes to inheritance 
to emerge. The interplay between these themes revealed complex and at times 
contradictory narratives unified around the central question of parental obligations 
and, while there was diversity in conceptions of these obligations, there was equally 
much common ground. Above all, inheritance remains an obligation written in the 
hearts of parents,
995
 “grounded in love”996 and willingly assumed. 
 
This does not mean that the parent has responsibilities only – or even primarily – to 
their children or that wealth transfers should not be taxed. Nevertheless, where a 
parent-child relationship exists there is a strong expectation that it be recognised at the 
end of the parent’s life. Meeting this expectation in an era of increased diversity of 
family formation is not, however, without difficulties and a one-size-fits-all solution 
based on consanguinity and affinity is no longer fully adequate. Parliament must take 
into consideration the needs of stepfamilies and children whose parents have re-
partnered before this “once in a generation”997 opportunity is lost. 
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Appendix 1: Scenarios and questions for empirical study  
1. Scenarios 
 
Scenario 1 
Part A 
Kate dies aged 62. She leaves behind her second husband of three years, Dave, and 
two adult children from her first marriage, Mark and Lucy. Her estate is worth 
£300,000 and comprises the home that Kate and Dave lived in and £60,000 in 
savings. The house had been purchased outright by Kate before she met Dave. She 
leaves her entire estate to Dave. 
 
(i) Do you think that Kate has behaved fairly?  
(ii) What could change your opinion on this? How would you feel if... 
 Dave was the father of Kate’s children? 
 Dave was not the father of Kate’s children but had been in a relationship with 
her for 20 years? 
 Kate’s adult children were experiencing financial difficulty whereas Dave was 
well-off? 
 Dave had just been made redundant but Kate’s children were well-off? 
 Kate’s estate was worth only £15,000 or £50,000? 
 the £60,000 in savings were the proceeds from a life insurance policy that 
Kate had been paid when her first husband – her children’s father – had died? 
(iii) Under the current law, Kate’s children would be able to claim legal rights. In our 
case, this means that Kate’s children would be entitled to claim a one-third share of 
the £60,000 in savings. This one-third share would be shared between the two 
children, meaning that Mark and Lucy would get £10,000 each. What are your views 
on this entitlement?  
 
Part B 
Eight months later Dave is tragically killed in a car crash. His children from his 
previous relationship inherit his full estate, including, obviously, what he had 
inherited from Kate. 
 
(i) How do you feel about this outcome? 
 
Scenario 2 
Jamila and Ahmed are killed in a car crash, aged 65. Prior to her death Jamila had 
been suffering from Parkinson’s disease and had required an increasing amount of 
support in her day-to-day living. They leave behind three adult children. The family 
had once been close but tensions had grown over the years. Their eldest daughter 
Aisha has become a highly successful and widely-read blogger writing primarily 
about her childhood and what she feels was her parents’ failure to adequately 
protect, support and nurture her. Their middle daughter, Karima, moved to Australia 
ten years ago, aged twenty. She has regular contact with her parents but has only 
been home twice since she left. Ines, the youngest daughter, lives near her parents 
and sees them on a daily basis to provide care and support. Hurt and humiliated by 
Aisha’s blog, which they and their other children view as a fabrication, Jamila and 
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Ahmed excluded her from their wills and directed that their estates be divided equally 
between Ines and Karima. 
 
(i) Do you think this is fair? 
(ii) What, if anything, could change your opinion? For example… 
 What if Jamila and Ahmed had in fact subjected Aisha to years of emotional 
abuse? 
 What if Karima were extremely wealthy but Ines struggled to make ends 
meet? 
 What if Ines had given up her job to be her mother’s carer? 
(iii) Aisha is legally entitled to claim her legal rights (the right we discussed earlier). 
Do you think she is morally entitled to do so? Does this mean the law is wrong? 
 
Scenario 3 
Malcolm dies unexpectedly aged 65. He had not got around to writing a will. He 
leaves behind his third wife, Anna, to whom he had been married for 15 years, and a 
son and a daughter, aged 27 and 25, from his second marriage. When Malcolm 
separated from his second wife, the children remained with her in Edinburgh while 
Malcolm moved to Aberdeen to live with Anna. Malcolm was the sole owner of the 
house in Aberdeen where the couple had lived for the sixteen years they had been 
together. It turns out that due to a number of factors - the value of the house, the 
savings available etc. - Anna will be entitled to exactly £366,000. There is nothing left 
over for the children. 
 
(i) Is this fair? 
(ii) What, if anything, could change your view? For example, 
 What if the estate were worth £500,000, meaning that the children would 
inherit something? 
 What if Anna owned three other properties and had no need for the inheritance 
to put a roof over her head? 
 What if Anna had no other property and a poorly-paid job? 
 
Scenario 4 
Lynne and John were married for 30 years. Lynne died at 55 following a long illness. 
Lynne left her entire estate to John. She was clear that John should live the rest of his 
life to the full and do all that they had dreamed of doing when they retired. They 
agreed that, when John’s time came, he would pass on whatever was left to their two 
children. John remarried five years later, aged 60. John’s children were pleased that 
their father was happy. John died unexpectedly aged 68. He had not written a will 
and due to a number of factors – the value of the house, the savings available etc. – 
the entire estate passed to his second wife. 
 
(i) How do you feel about this outcome? 
 
Scenario 5 
Part A 
Georgios and Laura live in Glasgow and have one daughter, Charlotte, aged 5. 
Laura has two adult children, Jack and Emma, from a previous relationship. Jack and 
Emma live in Leeds, where they grew up, and have very limited but nonetheless 
courteous contact with Laura and their half-sister Charlotte. Jack dies in a hiking 
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accident and, as he has no will, his estate is shared between Laura and Emma, as the 
law requires. 
 
(i) Do you think that Charlotte should have received something when the estate was 
divided up? 
(ii) Would your answer have been different if Jack had shared a family home with 
Charlotte, or just even been closer to her? 
 
Part B  
Imagine now that Jack (the son) does not die, but Laura (the mother) does and… 
As well as Laura’s children, Georgios has a son from a previous relationship, called 
Kris. Kris is seven and had lived with Laura and Georgios from the age of two, rarely 
having contact with his own mother. Laura dies and leaves her estate to be divided 
between her husband and her three biological children. She does not make any 
provision for Kris. As the law currently stands, step-children are not entitled to claim 
legal rights. 
  
(i) Should Kris be able to claim legal rights? 
(ii) Would your answer be different if Kris were now an adult? 
(iii) If the estate were small, whose claim should take priority?  
 
Scenario 6 
Henry and Mavis are both eighty years old and have been married for sixty years. 
They have lived all of their life in their family home on Arran but must now move into 
a nursing home. The home is worth £150,000 and the couple have no other assets. 
Henry’s pension does not cover the full cost of the nursing home. Their four children, 
all of whom have children of their own, live in different cities around Scotland. Every 
summer, the children and grandchildren return to Arran to spend time in the family 
home with Henry and Mavis. Henry and Mavis will struggle to meet their nursing 
home bills but they are determined to leave the house in Arran for their children and 
grandchildren to enjoy. Two of the children are financially comfortable and two 
struggle to make ends meet. 
 
(i) Who should pay for the cost of the nursing home? 
 
Scenario 7 
Mike and Diya met and married when they were 45. They had both been married 
previously. Although they both came from large, close families – Mike had three 
siblings and Diya two – neither had had children with their first spouses and they did 
not have any children together. Diya was killed in a road traffic accident three years 
later. Her will provided that her entire estate was to go to Mike. 
 
(i) How do you feel about this outcome? 
 
2. Non-scenario-based questions 
 
1. Have you ever inherited? 
 Do you anticipate inheriting 
 Who from? 
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 Have you ever not inherited when you thought that perhaps you might 
have inherited? 
2. Do you have a will? 
 If so, who have you included and why? 
 If not, who would you include and why? 
 Have you discussed your will with the beneficiaries or those not 
included 
 Did it cause offence? 
 If you have not yet discussed it with the beneficiaries, do you 
anticipate that it might cause offence? 
 How do you feel about your family’s reaction/potential reaction? 
3. Have you seen your parents struggle to afford their retirement/ aged care 
 If so, did you feel that you had in some way “missed out” or that the 
decision was in someway unfair or unkind? 
 Have you had to help them out financially? Do you feel that you have a 
responsibility to do so? 
 Did you parents or elderly relatives find planning their finances for 
later life a source of anxiety? 
 Did they come under pressure from family members to act in a specific 
way – be it in terms of writing their wills or signing over their house to 
somebody else? 
 
3. Scenarios: Frequency of use 
 
 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  
Pilot 1 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Pilot 2 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Group 1 Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Group 2 Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Group 3 Yes Yes No No No No No 
Group 4 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Group 5 Yes No No No Yes No No 
Group 6 Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Group 7 No No No No No No No 
Group 8 Yes No No No No No No 
Group 9 Yes No No No Yes No No 
Group 10 No No No No No No No 
Group 11 Yes No No Yes No No No 
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Appendix 2 : Participant profiles 
 1. Basic biographical information 
 
Group Name Age Marital 
Status 
Presence of 
children 
Presence of 
a will 
Home 
Owner 
Pilot 1 Caroline 30-40 Married Yes No Yes 
Pilot 2 Mary 50-65 Married  Yes Yes Yes 
Group 1 John 65+ Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 1 Gordon 65+ Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 1 June 65+ Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 1 Tom 65+ Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 2 Carol 50-65 Divorced Yes Yes Yes 
Group 2 Joan 65+ Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 2 Olga 50-65 Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 2 Mona 50-65 Married Yes No Yes 
Group 3 Malcolm 40-50 Married Yes No Yes 
Group 3 Gillian 50-65 Married Yes No Yes 
Group 3 Simon 50-65 Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 3 Kathleen 40-50 Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 3 Jane 50-65 Married Yes No Yes 
Group 3 Kevin 40-50 Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 4 David  50-65 Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 4 Maureen 50-65 Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 4 Moira 50-65 Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 4 Andy 40-50 Divorced Yes No No 
Group 4 Claire 30-40 Single Yes No No 
Group 5 Catriona 40-50 Married Yes No Yes 
Group 5 Lucy 30-40 Married Yes No Yes 
Group 5 Sally 30-40 Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 6 Gladys 50-65 Married Yes Yes No 
Group 6 Mark 50-65 Divorced No No Yes 
Group 7 Alec 65+ Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 7 Neil 65+ Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 7 Jim 65+ Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 7 Reg 65+ Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 7 Cyril 65+ Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 7 Bert 65+ Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 7 Bill 65+ Married Yes Yes Yes 
Group 8 Lauren 30-40 Divorced Yes No Yes 
Group 9 Laura 40-50 Married Yes No Yes 
Group 10 Chris 40-50 Married Yes No Yes 
Group 11 Ron 65+ Re-
partnered 
Yes Yes Yes 
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Sample size: 37. 
All names are pseudonyms. 
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2 Analysis of biographical information 
2.1 Gender 
 
The study involved 18 men and 19 women. 
2.2 Age  
 
Participants were asked to select one of four age cohorts. Upon reviewing this 
data, it was immediately obvious that an error had been made in listing the age 
cohorts, as each tranche offered the potential for overlap with the next 
incremental level. As this study was not quantitative, this error had no real 
impact. 
 
Age group Number of participants Share of sample (%) 
30-40 5 13.5 
40-50 7 19 
50-65 12 32.5 
65+ 13 35 
 
The age cohorts can also be examined from a gender perspective: 
 
Age group # of women % of age 
cohort 
# of men % of age 
cohort 
30-40 5 100 0 0 
40-50 3 43 4 57 
50-65 9 75 3 25 
65+ 2 15 11 85 
 
While there was an equal gender balance, that balance was not equal across age 
cohorts. Those in the youngest group were all women while those in the oldest 
age group were primarily men.  
2.3 Relationship status 
 
Relationship status Number of participants Share of sample (%) 
Married/cohabiting in 
my first relationship 
29 78 
Married/cohabiting in 
my second relationship 
3 8 
Single following 
divorce/separation 
4 11 
In a second relationship 
but does not live with 
new partner 
1 3 
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2.4 Presence of children 
 
36 of the 37 participants had children (97%). 
30 of the 36 parents were still in a relationship with the other parent of their children 
(83%). 
Three participants had children from a previous relationship and were in a new 
relationship. 
These same three participants had partners who also had children from a previous 
relationship. 
None of the participants had both children from a current relationship and children 
from a previous relationship. 
Three participants with children from a previous relationship remained single. 
One participant had a child from an extra-marital relationship. 
 
2.5 Presence of wills 
 
 Number of Participants Share of sample (%) 
Yes 24 65 
No  13 35 
 
These figures can also be broken down according to age cohort: 
 
Age group Number of 
Participants 
Share of age 
cohort (%) 
30-40 1 20 
40-50 2 29 
50-65 8 67 
65+ 13 100 
 
These figures are fairly similar to those generated by the Scottish Consumer Council 
study which found that 14% of participants aged between 25 and 34; 30% of 
participants aged between 35 and 44; 40% of participants aged between 45 and 54; 
52% of participants aged between 55 and 64 and 69% of participants aged over 65 
had a will (O’Neill (2006), 6). 
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3. Financial information 
3.1 Annual personal income 
 
 
Income (£) Number of 
Participants 
% share of 
completed 
responses (36)* 
Less than 10 000 4 11 
10 000 – 24 000 12 33 
25 000 – 39 000 11 30.5 
40 000 – 59 000 4 11 
60 000 + 2 5.5 
Decline to disclose 3 8 
Response 
discarded 
1 N/A 
 
* the percentage is calculated as a total of the number who responded to this question (n=36) rather than 
the total number of participants(n=37) 
 
One response was discarded as it was unclear which box the participant had intended 
to select. In all, 36 participants gave a clear response, although 3 declined to disclose 
their personal income. 
3.2 Annual household income 
 
Income (£) Number of 
Participants 
% share of 
completed 
responses  
% share of 
overall sample  
Less than 10 000    
10 000 – 24 000 6 17 16 
25 000 – 39 000 9 26 24 
40 000 – 59 000 7 20 19 
60 000  10 29 27 
Decline to disclose 3 8 8 
Response 
discarded 
2 N/A 5 
 
Two responses were discarded as it was unclear which box the participants had 
intended to select. In all, 35 participants gave a clear response, although 3 declined to 
disclose their household income. 
3.3 Housing tenure 
 
34 of the 37 participants were home-owners (92%). 
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3.4 House value 
 
House value (£) Number of 
participants 
Share of 
homeowners (%) 
Share of overall 
sample (%) 
Less than 99 000 2 6 5 
100 000 to 149 
000 
3 9 8 
150 000 to 190 
000 
3 9 8 
191 000 to 249 
000 
3 9 8 
250 000 to 299 
000 
8 23 21.5 
300 000 to 350 
000 
8 23 21.5 
351 000 plus 5 15 13.5 
Not specified 1 3 3 
Unknown 1 3 3 
Rent 3 N/A 8 
 
The interviews and focus groups were conducted in 2014. At that time, the 
average house price in Scotland was £163,563 (Registers of Scotland, House Price 
Information: Annual Market Review 2014, available at 
https://www.ros.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/11338/Calendar-Year-
Report-2014.pdf).   
 
3.5 Percentage of house owned in full 
 
Percentage of 
home owned (not 
subject to a 
mortgage) 
Number of 
Participants 
Share of 
homeowners (%) 
Share of 
overall sample 
(%) 
100 21 62 57 
75-99 1 3 2.5 
50-74 4 12 11 
25-49 3 9 8 
0-25 0 0 0 
Not specified 4 12 11 
Unknown 1 3 3 
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4 Questionnaire 
 
The following questionnaire was distributed to all participants. 
 
 
 
The following questions are designed to generate background data for the 
research project. All information provided will be treated in strict confidence. 
While your cooperation would be greatly appreciated, you are under no 
obligation to answer all, or any, of the questions. 
 
1. Are you: 
a) Male 
b)Female 
 
How old are you? 
30-40 
40-50 
50-65 
65 + 
 
How would you describe your relationship status? 
I am single 
I am married/cohabiting/in a civil partnership in my first 
marriage/cohabitation/civil partnership 
I am married/cohabiting/in a civil partnership in my second, or subsequent, 
marriage/cohabitation/civil partnership 
I am in a relationship but we do not live together 
I am divorced 
I am a widow/widower 
 
Do you and your current partner have children together? 
a)  Yes 
No 
 
Do you have children from a previous relationship? 
Yes 
No 
 
Does your partner have children from a previous relationship? 
Yes 
No 
 
Do you have a will? 
a)  Yes 
b)  No 
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8. What is your annual income? 
less than £10 000 
£10 000- £24 000 
£25 000 - £39 000 
£40 000 - £59 000 
£60 000+ 
 
9. What is your household’s annual income? 
less than £10 000 
£10 000- £24 000 
£25 000 - £39 000 
£40 000 - £59 000 
£60 000+ 
 
10. Are you a home owner? 
Yes 
No 
 
11. Approximately how much would your house or houses be worth? 
 
12. How much, if any, do you still owe on your mortgage or mortgages? 
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Appendix 3: Coding 
 
THEMATIC CODE INITIAL CODE 
Expectation Anger, disappointment, entitlement, 
surprise. 
Autonomy Respect a choice; “earned” right to 
decide how to spend assets; wrong to 
manipulate. 
Parental obligation Parent chose to have children; bank of 
mum and dad; the inheritance line; 
safeguards. 
Equal treatment Equality of outcome; avoid showing 
preference; avoid hurt; fairness. 
Good parenting Don’t spoil; show love; safeguards 
Fairness Treat children equally; treat citizens 
equally; respect contribution of pre-
deceased spouse; avoid causing hurt. 
Relationship quality Closeness, parental, brought up 
together. 
Longevity of parent-child relationship Contrast with short marriage; 
continuity through grandchildren; 
recognition of “good” years even when 
soured. 
Family property Pre-deceased spouse’s contribution; 
inevitability of parent-child transfer; 
dubiety of an outsider’s claim. 
Social contract Paid tax; worked hard; contributed; 
kicked when down.  
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Land reform, inheritance rights and
unintended consequences
Dot Reid and Nicole Sweeney*
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The Scottish government is currently consulting on a radical programme of reform of
succession law. This article demonstrates that the reforms are part of the government’s land
reform strategy, aiming to make Scotland fairer and to treat children equally by ending the
distinction between different types of property in an estate. However, the authors show that the
proposals will bring about unintended consequences and in the vast majority of cases will result
in the children of a parent who is married at the time of death inheriting nothing. It is argued
that inheritance law should concern itself mainly with ordinary families of average wealth
rather than being distorted by the uncertainties of the housing market. The reforms are
contextualised with reference to research studies examining how modern families operate in
terms of rights and obligations, and the results of a recent qualitative study of Scottish public
attitudes to inheritance are introduced.
Land reform and succession law
In the aftermath of Scotland’s referendum on independence in September 2014 it came as no
surprise to find that land reform was a key part of Nicola Sturgeon’s new legislative programme
(and her first as First Minister) for the remainder of the Scottish Parliament’s term.1 There has
been growing pressure for land reform over the last decade thanks to the success of land
campaigners such as Andy Wightman2 in bringing the issue to the attention of the public. The
assertion that ‘Scotland has the most concentrated pattern of private land ownership in the
developed world’3 has attracted the attention of journalists and opinion makers across
Scotland, which in turn has led to criticism of government inaction on the issue. A confident
Scottish National Party, intent on delivering progressive policies as the party of government,
grasped this particular nettle and made land reform central to its legislative programme.
More surprising was the inclusion of succession law in that programme. It is not a burning
issue, as evidenced by the long slow road to the enactment of the Succession (Scotland) Act in
19644 and, more recently, the languishing of discussion papers and reports by the Scottish Law
* Dot Reid is a Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Glasgow; Nicole Sweeney is a doctoral student at the
University of Glasgow. The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
1 One Scotland: the government’s programme for Scotland 2014–15 (2014), available at: www.gov.scot/Resource/0046/
00464455.pdf.
2 A Wightman,Who Owns Scotland (Canongate, 1996); A Wightman, The Poor had No Lawyers: Who Owns Scotland (and
How They Got It) (Birlinn, 2nd edn, 2013). See also his well-visited blog, Land Matters: www.andywightman.com/about.
3 J Hunter, P Peacock, A Wightman and M Foxley, 432:50 – Towards a comprehensive land reform agenda for Scotland: A
briefing paper for the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee (2013), at para 2.1, available at: www.parliament.
uk/documents/commons-committees/scottish-affairs/432-Land-Reform-Paper.pdf.
4 For the tortuous history leading to the 1964 Act see K G C Reid, ‘Intestate Succession in Scotland’ in K G C Reid, M J de
Waal and R Zimmermann (eds), Comparative Succession Law, Volume II: Intestate Succession (Oxford University Press,
2015), at pp 380–388.
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Commission (SLC) in the government’s bottom drawer.5 The Scottish government is explicit
that the main impetus for reform of succession law is the land reform agenda. There is to be a
radical overhaul of succession law ‘so that all children are treated equally when it comes to
inheriting land’.6
Succession is a significant issue for land reform because of the way in which the current law of
succession is structured. Scotland has never fully embraced freedom of testation: theoretically,
‘legal rights’,7 a term of art in Scots succession law, can be claimed on every estate, testate or
intestate. Legal rights operate as a protection against disinheritance for both spouse (and now
civil partner)8 and children of the deceased.9 Solicitors administering an executry must be
careful to separate the estate into immoveable (or heritable) and moveable property10 because
of legal rights. If the deceased is survived by both spouse and children, each can claim one third
but only from the net moveable estate; if only one of those categories survives they are entitled
to claim half. And here is the link with land reform: legal rights cannot be claimed on
immoveable property, namely land and buildings. The Scottish Government wants to remove
the distinction between different types of property, thus making the whole estate available for
succession claims by the immediate family.
The Land Reform Review Group (LRRG) was set up by the Scottish Government in July 2012
to consider the structure of land ownership and to ‘develop innovative and radical proposals
that will contribute to Scotland’s future success’.11 Section 6 of its final report,12 delivered in
May 2014, is devoted to succession law. The exclusion of heritable property from the legal
rights regime is deemed to be outdated and to represent the last vestiges of Scotland’s feudal
system.13
The consistent recommendation of the SLC, from its work in the 1980s to the present day, has
been to treat the deceased’s property as a whole, always in the face of strong opposition.14 The
LRRG Report holds ‘agricultural and landed interests’15 responsible for much of that
opposition and for denying to the deceased’s spouse and children the automatic right to inherit
immoveable property, which will usually be the most valuable asset in an estate. It recommends
that the distinction be abolished as ‘a straightforward matter of social justice based on the
current disadvantaged position of spouses and children’.16
5 The Scottish Law Commission produced a report in 1990, none of which was implemented, see Report on Succession, Scot
Law Com No 124 (HMSO, 1990). For the most recent proposals see Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on
Succession, Scot Law Com DP No 136 (TSO, 2007) and the subsequent Report on Succession, Scot Law Com No 215
(TSO, 2009).
6 One Scotland: the government’s programme for Scotland 2014–15 (Scottish Government, 2014), at p 77.
7 The umbrella term ‘legal rights’ includes the legitim of children and the jus relictae or jus relicti of female and male spouses
respectively.
8 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s 131. To avoid repetition, ‘spouse’ is used in this article to include both a spouse and a civil
partner.
9 More correctly the term ‘issue’ is used in succession law and includes children or their descendants, for a pre-deceasing child
can be represented by her descendants in intestate succession and in any claim for legal rights (Succession (Scotland) Act
1964, s 11).
10 Broadly corresponding to the distinction between real and personal property in English law.
11 www.gov.scot/About/Review/land-reform.
12 LRRG, The Land of Scotland and the Common Good, Report of the Land Reform Review Group (2014), available at:
www.gov.scot/Resource/0045/00451087.pdf.
13 The feudal system of landholding was finally abolished on 28 November 2004, Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc (Scotland)
Act 2000.
14 LRRG, above n 12, at 6.2.
15 Ibid, at 6.4.
16 Ibid. The LRRG recognises that the impact of the change on larger landed estates may not be significant since they are often
held by companies and trusts. However, breaking the link between land and succession is still considered to have ‘symbolic’
importance (ibid).
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The connection between land reform and succession reform has been explained at some length
to underline the fact that land campaigners have understood that succession law can help them
to achieve their aims and have been successful at elevating it onto the political agenda. If legal
rights, which take priority over the provisions of a will, can be claimed on land, they would be
a mechanism for overcoming the elitism of land ownership by allowing ‘all children of
whatever age to inherit in equal measure all heritable and moveable property’.17 Opening up
heritable property to claims for legal rights could potentially alter the land economy of
Scotland. As one commentator explains, children ‘would have the right to have land –
potentially very large tracts of land – factored into their legal rights’.18 However, this may be a
pyrrhic victory. If the reforms become law legal rights will, in theory, be much more valuable
than under the current law. That will certainly be the case for the children of a person who is
unmarried at the point of death. However, taken as a whole the reform package will have
unintended consequences (unintended at least by the land campaigners): if a parent is married
at the time of death the vast majority of Scottish children will inherit nothing, either on
intestacy or as legal rights.
The Scottish Government’s stated justification for change is grounded in justice, equality and
meeting the public’s expectations of succession law:19
‘As part of this modernisation the distinction between movable and immovable property
would be removed to give children, spouses and civil partners appropriate legal rights over
both forms of property. This should ensure a just distribution of assets among a deceased’s
close family to reflect both societal change and expectations.’
This article will suggest that the proposed package of reforms is unlikely to meet those
objectives: the reform proposals will not benefit children; they do little to reflect social change;
and they run contrary to what we know about public expectations. The proposed law of
succession may even exacerbate conflict in families experiencing bereavement.
The Scottish reform proposals
The Scottish government is currently consulting on a radical programme of reform,20 having
adopted the recommendations of the SLC’s 2009 Report.21 One of the current authors has
previously criticised the SLC’s apparently antagonistic treatment of children’s rights on the
grounds that its underlying rationale is out of step with public attitudes towards inheritance
(the fact that most parents want their children to inherit), with the reality of family life and
with social policy objectives.22 The Scottish government has substantially adopted those
proposals, almost unaltered except for the fact that it has compounded the problems previously
identified.23
The two elements of the proposals which will most affect children are the rules of intestacy and
changes to legal rights.24 These are examined separately but, unlike under the current law, they
are now structurally linked and many of the consequences flowing from the intestacy rules
apply equally to legal rights.
17 Ibid.
18 http://lallandspeatworrier.blogspot.co.uk/2014/11/the-buggers-are-out-to-get-us.html.
19 One Scotland: the government’s programme for Scotland 2014–15 (Scottish Government, 2014), at para 11.
20 Scottish Government, Consultation on the Law of Succession (Scottish Government, 2015), available at: www.gov.scot/
Publications/2015/06/7518/downloads.
21 Report on Succession, above n 5.
22 D Reid, ‘From the Cradle to the Grave: Politics, Families and Inheritance Law’ (2008) 12 Edinburgh LR 391 and
‘Inheritance Rights of Children’ (2010) 14 Edinburgh LR 318.
23 In particular, the threshold sum, see below.
24 There are many other issues under consultation, including rights of cohabitants and stepchildren, and whether there should
be a special regime for agricultural units. This article is limited to commenting on the parent–child implications of the
proposals. It is worth noting, however, that the factors to be taken into account by courts in assessing the new discretionary
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Reform of intestate succession
The SLC recommended that children begin to share in a parent’s estate on intestacy only if it is
worth more than the ‘threshold sum’. Where the deceased is survived by both spouse and
children, the spouse would receive the first £300,000 of the estate (the threshold sum), and any
balance would be shared equally between spouse and children.25 It has been pointed out26 that
a threshold sum of £300,000 would result in the children of only the wealthiest 2% of Scots
inheriting on the death of an intestate parent. The SLC accepted that this was the case,27 and
acknowledged that the question of children’s inheritance rights was a controversial issue,
particularly where the surviving spouse was not the parent of the deceased’s children. One of
the Commissioners at that time took the unusual step of dissenting from the recommendation,
stating that £200,000 would be a more appropriate threshold.28 In the end the SLC took the
view that this was a political matter and was for Parliament to decide.29 The Scottish
Government’s response is to consult on a range of values for the threshold sum in which the
lowest figure is £335,000 and the highest £650,000.30
The threshold sum
The rationale behind the threshold sum proposed by the SLC lies in the current law. The 1964
Act created a statutory right (referred to as ‘prior rights’) for the protection of widows on
intestacy (the rhetoric at the time always envisages a widow, although the Act is gender
neutral).31 Prior rights have three elements: a housing right, a right to furnishings and a cash
right, with the policy aim of allowing the spouse to remain in the furnished family home with a
cash sum besides. However, while recognising that spouses required increased protection, the
Act was careful to balance those needs with the claims of an intestate’s children. The spouse’s
prior rights are, therefore, the first claim on an intestate estate, followed by the legal rights of
spouse and children, after which any remaining balance goes to children under section 2 of the
Act. Up until 2005, the spouse was likely to inherit all of a modest intestate estate and the
children would benefit most in a larger estate. However, in 2005 that balance was significantly
altered when the values of prior rights changed. The sums that could be claimed for prior rights
had been raised fairly modestly since 1964, the levels being set by statutory instrument.
However, in 2005 the housing element (the highest of the three entitlements) was increased by
250% from £130,000 to £300,000,32 and then again in 2011 by a further 150% to
£470,000.33 Since the house will usually be the most valuable asset in the average estate, in
most cases it will pass entirely to the spouse. Since 2005, therefore, Scottish children have been
likely to inherit little or nothing from a married parent who is intestate, although it is doubtful
if many members of the public are aware of this change.
The fundamental problem with prior rights is that they were conceived in an era dominated by
a nuclear family model. Ensuring that the surviving spouse was able to continue living in the
furnished family home was (and still is) a relatively uncontroversial step when the model family
right proposed for cohabitants exclude consideration of the effect of any award on the deceased’s children (unlike the
current law): Consultation on the Law of Succession, above n 20, para 4.11.
25 Report on Succession, above n 5, at paras 2.6–2.15.
26 D Reid, ‘From the Cradle to the Grave: Politics, Families and Inheritance Law’ (2008) 12 Edinburgh LR 391, at 413.
27 Report on Succession, above n 5, at para 2.14.
28 Ibid, at para 2.15, n 32.
29 Ibid, at para 2.14.
30 Consultation on the Law of Succession, above n 20, at paras 2.13–2.26.
31 Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, ss 8–9. Unlike many European jurisdictions, Scottish prior rights only arise on intestacy.
32 Prior Rights of Surviving Spouse and Civil Partner (Scotland) Order 2005 (SSI 2005/252).
33 Prior Rights of Surviving Spouse and Civil Partner (Scotland) Order 2011 (SSI 2011/436).
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is predicated on a stable parental relationship. Commonly inheritance to the next generation is
postponed while the second parent is alive, but there is nevertheless a widespread expectation
that children will inherit in due course.34
However, modern family life is much more complex: an increasing number of families are
‘reconstituted’ through second marriages, resulting in stepparent and stepsibling relationships.
As a result, prior rights are increasingly likely to benefit a second spouse and, if s/he also dies
intestate, his or her biological children, at the expense of any children from a first family. Scots
succession law makes no attempt to address these social changes, one of the reasons stated both
by the Scottish Government and the SLC for reform. And yet there has been steadfast resistance
to the possibility of a different intestacy regime where the surviving spouse is not the parent of
the deceased’s children on the ground that the law of intestacy must be simple.35 It is
questionable whether this is an adequate justification.
Lies, damned lies and prior rights
The current values of prior rights are highly relevant to the level of the threshold sum in the
reform proposals, but the issue is bedevilled by discussion of house prices, housing market
trends over time and the oft-cited value of the ‘substantial city house’ in Aberdeen which
belonged to a law professor at the time the 1964 Act came into force.36 Never have more
statistics been available to public servants and yet they seem less than helpful in clarifying the
issues.
There are many stated aims in this reform process, both by the SLC and the Scottish
Government: the ‘primary purpose’ of intestate succession law is that it should be fair37
(although it is not clear how fairness is to be assessed), but the rules should also be simple.38 A
repeated policy aim is that the surviving spouse should remain in the family home,39 regardless
of whether it is a first or second spouse or the length of the marriage, which in turn leads on to
discussion of property values and the Scottish housing market.40
In 2005 the Scottish Executive had originally suggested a modest increase in the housing
element of prior rights from £130,000 to £160,000, but this was increased to £300,000 on the
recommendation of the Succession Committee of the Law Society of Scotland. The Order was
passed with no parliamentary discussion, no consultation and no media attention. The second
uprating in 2011 had limited consultation41 on the government’s proposal to increase the
housing element in line with the average Scottish house price between 2004 and 2009. This was
calculated to represent an increase of 57%, hence they arrived at the figure of £470,000. This
figure was said to capture over 95% of Scottish properties, and whilst acknowledging
significant variation across Scotland, was deemed a suitable figure ‘so not as to [sic] prejudice
against those surviving spouses living in [high-value] areas where the dwelling is in fact not
“exceptional” by relative standards’.42
34 K Rowlingson and S McKay, ‘Attitudes to Inheritance in Britain’ (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2005), pp 7–11, available
at: www.jrf.org.uk/publications/attitudes-inheritance-britain.
35 Report on Succession, above n 5, at paras 2.26–2.30; Consultation on the Law of Succession, above n 20, at para 2.21.
36 There appears to be some fondness for using Professor Meston’s rule of thumb for the housing element, namely that the
figure used in the 1964 Act was approximately three times the value of his substantial Aberdeen house at that time: see
Consultation on the Law of Succession, above n 20, at para 2.23; also Report on Succession, above n 5, at para 2.12, n 27.
37 Report on Succession, above n 5, at para 2.3; Consultation on the Law of Succession, above n 20, at paras 1.9 and 2.12.
38 Report on Succession, above n 5, at para 2.3; Consultation on the Law of Succession, above n 20, at para 2.10.
39 Report on Succession, above n 5, at paras 2.4 and 2.9; Consultation on the Law of Succession, above n 20, at para 2.9.
40 Report on Succession, above n 5, at paras 2.8–2.13.
41 Scottish Government, Succession Law in Scotland: Review of Financial Limits of Prior Rights and Confirmation to Small
Estates: A Consultation Paper (Scottish Government, 2011), available at: www.gov.scot/resource/doc/342116/0113827.pdf.
42 Ibid, Annex A, p 2.
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There are a number of flaws in these arguments. The fundamental flaw is to assume that the
2005 uprating was appropriate and to apply the percentage increase to an already inflated
figure. Even if it is accepted that the housing market is taken to be a reliable indicator for
succession rights, the consultation stated that the average price in 2004 was £103,943 and in
2009 £163,231, amounting to a 57% increase. The consultation paper uses the average
increase between those years, but does not explain why a figure of three times the average
house price is needed. There is also an assumption of perpetual growth in the housing market.
However, according to the Office of National Statistics House Price Index, Scottish housing
prices have not yet recovered from their peak in June 2008.43 The limits for prior rights were,
therefore, set without taking account of the economic downturn or the deflation of the housing
market in Scotland. In addition, a fairly arbitrary period of time was chosen in which to
measure the percentage increase. Assessing housing market trends twelve months later would
have led to a significantly different result.
In its response to the consultation Consumer Focus Scotland, one of the few bodies which can
claim to represent the interests of the public,44 pointed out that most children were likely to
receive nothing from a parent’s estate even under the current limits and took the view that ‘the
limits should be increased only on the basis of evidence that the increase is in the wider public
interest, taking public attitudes and expectations into account’.45 The uprating went ahead
nevertheless.
Unintended consequences
In the current reform proposals the SLC chose the figure of £300,000 as the spouse’s threshold
sum using the current prior rights entitlement (at that time the housing right was £300,000) as
the starting point. However, there is no real equivalence because all of the limitations which
were built into prior rights no longer apply to the threshold sum. The housing element could
only be claimed on a house, only on the net value of that house, and it was a maximum figure
which would rarely be claimed in full.
If, for example, a couple jointly owned a property worth £300,000 with an outstanding
mortgage debt of £100,000, the net value of the property would be £200,000. However, if they
are joint owners (which would now be the usual practice for couples purchasing a house) the
spouse already owns 50%, so of the current £470,000 maximum entitlement the spouse will
only need to claim £100,000 as the deceased’s net share. Since the most recent (2014) average
annual house price in Scotland is £163,56346 few co-owned homes will require anywhere close
to the maximum prior rights entitlement in order for the spouse to acquire it. The SLC counters
this argument by claiming that only 42% of homes are jointly owned in Scotland.47 Aside from
the fact that this figure does not include ownership by parties with different surnames, it is
43 Office for National Statistics, House Price Index June 2015, available at: www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/hpi/house-price-index/
june-2015/stb-june-2015.html#tab-House-price-index-by-country. See also a comparison with other parts of the UK:
www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/hpi/house-price-index/april-2014/info-hpi-comparison.html.
44 Evidence to the Scottish Government from Consumer Focus Scotland, May 2011, available at: www.consumerfocus.org.
uk/scotland/files/2011/05/CFS-response-to-law-of-succession-prior-rights-limits.pdf.
45 Ibid.
46 There are considerable regional variations, for instance in Scotland’s major cities the figures were: Aberdeen £213,717;
Edinburgh £226,551; Glasgow £131,213 and Dundee £126,426. Registers of Scotland, House Price Information: Annual
Market Review (Registers of Scotland, 2014), Table 1.
47 Report on Succession, above n 5, at para 2.10.
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asserted on the basis of a very small sample, less than 0.01%.48 A further limitation on prior
rights is that the spouse must be ‘ordinarily resident’ in the house, thus excluding a spouse
living apart from the deceased.
However, the new threshold sum has no such limitations. It is predicated on the value of
housing but does not apply specifically to immoveable property in the way that prior rights did.
If it were to remain at £300,000, the result of applying that figure across the whole estate,
regardless of its composition, will be the exclusion of an even greater number of children than
those excluded by prior rights. The removal of the distinction between immoveable and
moveable property for all succession rights will, therefore, have this unintended consequence:
on intestacy children will be further disadvantaged because the spouse’s threshold sum is no
longer property-specific.
Comparison with English reforms
It is instructive to compare the Scottish proposals with those recently enacted in the Inheritance
and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014. The Law Commission took a similar stance to that of the SLC,
prioritising the need to ensure that a surviving spouse could remain in the family home.49
Initially the Law Commission linked the statutory legacy (currently £250,000) to house price
inflation, but was persuaded that the Retail Price Index was a more reliable measure because
the significant regional variation in house prices ‘would not reflect the reality in many areas’.50
As in Scotland, an alternative regime for a second spouse was rejected as being too complex.51
The Bill was introduced under the House of Lords procedure for Law Commission Bills, which
is designed for non-controversial measures. Indeed the Minister of State for Justice and Civil
Liberties in the recent coalition government (Simon Hughes) specifically stated:52 ‘This Bill is
not controversial’. Lord McNally, introducing the Bill in the House of Lords, outlined that the
rules of intestate succession aimed to ‘reflect the shape of contemporary society and replicate
what most people think is an appropriate division between family members’.53 He also claimed
that the prioritisation of the surviving spouse was supported by empirical research,54 although
this may be a questionable interpretation of the results.55 Examining the various legislative
stages of the Bill, there was only one question acknowledging that there may be difficulties for
first and second families.56 This contrasts starkly with previous attempts by the Law
Commission to improve the position of the spouse at the expense of children, which were
considered ‘contentious’ and were ultimately rejected by Parliament.57 Attitudes may have
changed and a different generation of parliamentarians brings a different worldview to the
issues. However, the British public may not have changed so very much.
48 Ibid, at para 2.10, n 20. One hundred and forty property titles were sampled from a database of 1.5 million on the Land
Register, which itself contains 58% of all Scottish properties: www.ros.gov.uk/about-us/land-register-completion/land-
register-completion-faqs.
49 Law Commission, Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on Death, Law Com No 331 (TSO, 2011), at para 2.122.
50 Ibid, at para 2.123.
51 Ibid, at para 2.78.
52 Hansard, HC Public Bill Committee, 12 March 2014, available at: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/
cmpublic/inheritance/140312/am/140312s01.htm.
53 Hansard, Lords Debates, col GC337 (22 October 2013).
54 Ibid, col GC336.
55 A Humphrey et al, Inheritance and the family: attitudes to will-making and intestacy (National Centre for Social Research,
2010), see Executive Summary and tables 4.7 and 7.3. See also R Kerridge, ‘Intestate Succession in England and Wales’ in
Comparative Succession Law, above n 4, at pp 337–340.
56 Hansard, Lords Debates, col GC354 (22 October 2013), by Lord Beecham.
57 For discussion of the Law Reform (Succession) Bill see Hansard, Lords Debates, vol 561, cols 502–511 (13 February 1995).
For commentary see R Kerridge, above n 55, at pp 335–337.
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Reform of legal rights
As outlined above, the threshold sum is the single most significant element in the proposed
reforms because it not only determines rights on intestacy, but it is also the baseline for the new
‘legal share’, the proposed replacement for legal rights which can be claimed on both intestate
and testate estates. Originally in its discussion paper the SLC recommended the removal of a
legal share for all but dependent children,58 thereby removing the ‘legal disability’ in Scotland
of not being able to disinherit your children.59 By the time the subsequent report was published,
the SLC had taken criticism on board and now presented two alternative options: first, that all
children should receive a ‘legal share’ fixed at 25% of what they would be entitled to on
intestacy (ie the intestacy proposals are used to calculate legal share);60 and a second option
reiterating their original position that only dependent children should be protected from
disinheritance.61
The SLC and the consultation document treat intestacy and protection from disinheritance as
two separate issues, but in reality they are intrinsically linked by means of the threshold sum.
And while it is acknowledged that in virtually all intestate estates children will receive nothing
when a married parent dies, it is not made clear that the same will be true for the proposed
legal share in a testate estate. If the legal share is to be a percentage of a child’s entitlement on
intestacy and the proposals result in no entitlement on intestacy, then logically there will be no
entitlement to legal share. This has not been made explicit, but it ought to be. In principle the
fact that legal share can be claimed on the whole of an estate ought to be a more generous
provision than legal rights were, hence the reason land campaigners have advocated for the
change. If a parent is unmarried at the time of death that will be the case and children will
equally share 25% of the estate. However, very few children of a married parent will receive
anything as their legal share. The spouse is also to be given a legal share amounting to 25% of
their entitlement on intestacy. Given that the spouse will take all of an intestate estate in most
cases, this is a generous provision for a spouse who has not been provided for in the deceased’s
will.
Who is succession law for?
This somewhat puzzling attitude to children’s inheritance rights raises a wider question: who is
influencing government policy in succession law? Agricultural and landed interests have already
been identified by the Land Reform Review Group. However, there is arguably an even more
influential group in Scottish society which is antagonistic towards legal rights: the Scottish legal
profession. Lawyers are not identified as a lobby group, rather they are embedded in the
process of law reform and consultation, forming the Advisory Group which shaped the initial
SLC proposals and a majority voice in both SLC and government consultations. It is not
unusual for the legal profession to be involved in and consulted on law reform projects.
However they appear to have had an unusually strong influence on succession law. It was on
the recommendation of the Succession Committee of the Law Society of Scotland that the 2005
large increase in prior rights came about. There are no committee minutes that can be consulted
in order to understand the reasons why this might have been proposed. However, press
comments by a committee member may provide a clue. He warned that the effect of prior rights
were that ‘[i]n some cases the surviving spouse will get the house and a cash payment, but the
58 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Succession, Scot Law Com DP No 136 (TSO, 2007) at paras 3.78–3.100.
59 Ibid, at para 3.100.
60 Report on Succession, above n 5, at paras 3.16–3.38.
61 Ibid, at paras 3.56–3.70.
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children will scoop the rest’. He goes on to give a concrete example, which perhaps illustrates
the kind of family lawyers have in mind when they register opposition to legal rights:62
‘People dying without making a will, who own their house, have a holiday home, a
portfolio of shares worth half a million – the surviving spouse may get less than half of that
and people just don’t realise.’
Lawyers understand that the way to defeat legal rights under the current law is to increase the
value of prior rights so that there is nothing left to claim, and this appears to be the policy the
Scottish Government has adopted since 2005. The proposed level of the threshold sum fulfils
the same function and may also have been influenced by the legal profession. The consultation
is strongly influenced by ‘informal pre-consultation dialogue with stakeholders’63 but there is
little transparency about who the stakeholders are other than the fact that they are ‘members of
the legal profession’, a number of whom had concerns about the SLC Report.64 It seems likely
that the sums being consulted on have once again been elevated at the prompting of lawyers.
Their motives may not be ignoble, their resistance based on concern for the surviving spouses of
wealthy clients and the possibility of well-drafted wills being upset by the claims of children.
However, the solution to the problem is not to distort the law of succession to suit the
wealthiest families. It is surprising, therefore, that in its recent response to the current
consultation the Law Society of Scotland has taken the view that the proposals may unduly
affect children because the proposed threshold sum is too high, perhaps indicating a change of
position.65
This begs a wider question – who should intestacy law be designed for? Although 67% of Scots
have not made a will, those over 65 who are homeowners and of substantial means are the
most likely to have done so.66 Research undertaken in 2006 found that the most significant
factors in determining whether someone had made a will were age, social class67 and home
ownership.68
Those who need the law of intestate succession are likely to have fewer assets to leave behind.
Research conducted in 1990 found that the value of intestate estates was less than half the
value of testate estates.69 On the most recent available figures for 2013–14,70 the average
confirmed71 estate in Scotland was £196,34372 and between 2008 and 2014 averages have
varied between £173,000 and £211,000. There is also considerable regional variation: the
62 G Rose, ‘Warning on “outdated” Scots inheritance law’, The Scotsman, 26 January 2014, available at: www.scotsman.com/
news/politics/top-stories/warning-on-outdated-scots-inheritance-law-1–3281647#ixzz3lTcQIjg7.
63 Consultation on the Law of Succession, above n 20, at p 3 (Ministerial Foreword). These stakeholders are referred to more
than 20 times in the proposals.
64 This was stated by the Minister for Community Safety and Legal Affairs in answer to a Written Parliamentary Question, see
13 June 2012, Question S4W-07665, available at: www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_ChamberDesk/WA20120613.pdf. A
recent response from the current Minister (Paul Wheelhouse) confirmed the same position.
65 The consultation response is available at: www.lawscot.org.uk/media/593616/ts_succession_consultation.pdf.
66 Scottish Consumer Council, Wills and Awareness of Inheritance Rights in Scotland (Scottish Consumer Council, 2006),
available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090724135150/http:/scotcons.demonweb.co.uk/publications/reports/reports06/
rp10wrep.pdf.
67 Only one-fifth of respondents in socio-economic category DE (those in semi-skilled or unskilled jobs and those not in
employment) said they had a will, compared to 58% of those in category AB (those in professional and managerial
occupations), ibid at pp 6–7.
68 Ibid. 50% of home owners had a will compared to 15% of non-home owners.
69 H E Jones, Succession Law, Scottish Office Central Research Unit Papers (1990), p 15, Table 2.
70 Scottish Government, Civil Law Statistics in Scotland: Supplementary tables 2013–14, Table 6, available at: www.gov.scot/
Topics/Statistics/Browse/Crime-Justice/Datasets/DatasetsCJS.
71 Confirmation is the process whereby an executor is appointed by the court to administer the estate, broadly equivalent to a
grant of representation in England and Wales.
72 The average ordinary estate was £214,952 and the average small confirmed estate (where the value is £36,000 or less) was
£24,100.
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highest average is in Lothian and Borders at £256,568 and the lowest in Glasgow and
Strathkelvin at £144,732.73 However, even these figures are inflated: the real average across the
population is much lower. The available statistics include only confirmed estates, which
represent half of all deaths in Scotland; the other half are too small to require confirmation and
are likely to be intestate.74 The true average is probably less than £100,000.
As currently formulated this is intestate succession for the rich. Arguably it should principally
be for those of modest means. Using the value of the average estate seems a more logical way to
pursue that aim than the vagaries of the housing market.
Finally, it is worth examining again the item at the top of the policy agenda: ensuring that the
spouse can remain in the family home regardless of all other considerations. This could be done
by way of a life interest while the spouse is alive. However, it appears from discussions the
authors have had that this is not an attractive option for the very reason that it attaches to a
particular property. Many people as they grow older and children are independent want to
‘downsize’ and move to a smaller property. This is also true after the death of a spouse when
the survivor may want a smaller house to maintain or simply a change of location. Surely the
policy aim ought to be to ensure that the surviving spouse is comfortable rather than specifying
that intestate succession must be able to cover the value of the current family home. The
Scottish Government has reiterated the same policy aim, agreeing ‘that there should be no
change to this policy aim as it is most likely to reflect a deceased spouse or civil partner’s
wishes’.75 This is questionable. As examined below, if the aim was really to reflect the wishes of
the deceased, his or her children would be a very much higher priority.
The modern family and inheritance
Enormous social changes have taken place in the UK since the law of succession was last
conceived in Scotland in 1964. Family units are less predictable and less permanent than they
were for previous generations, part of what Francis Fukuyama famously labelled the Great
Disruption, evidenced by, among other things, ‘the decline of families and kinship as a source of
social cohesion’.76 Freedom has been the watchword, whether it be freedom to end relation-
ships and re-partner; freedom for women to be economically independent and make their own
choices, including whether or not to bear children; or freedom to express a different sexual
identity. The decline in traditional family values is thought to have been supplanted by a growth
in self-seeking individualism and the quest for personal fulfilment.77
One manifestation of the emphasis on freedom and choice in family policy has been the
liberalisation of the rules governing marriage and divorce. Couples can choose to marry and
then to separate with relative ease and with little social disapproval. Post-separation and
divorce the policy focus has turned to children of the relationship, or the vertical relationship:
disputes over contact and residence; the regulation of child support; debates about the merits of
shared parenting; and at times the trench warfare of women’s groups and men’s groups in
asserting their parenting rights.78 Patrick Parkinson suggests that it is time to recognise that the
73 Data provided to the authors by the Scottish Justice Analytical Unit.
74 Report on Succession, above n 5, at para 2.1, n 2.
75 Consultation on the Law of Succession, above n 20, at para 2.9.
76 F Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (Free Press, 1999), at p 60.
77 For helpful summaries of this complex debate and its associated literature see J Eekelaar, ‘Personal Obligations’ in M
Maclean (ed), Family Law and Family Values (Hart Publishing, 2005), at pp 11–16; J Eekelaar and M Maclean, ‘Marriage
and the Moral Bases of Personal Relationships’ (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society 510, at pp 510–515; L Jamieson, F
Wasoff and R Simpson, ‘Solo-Living, Demographic and Family Change: The Need to Know More about Men’ (2009) 14(2)
Sociological Research Online 5, at paras 1.3–1.9, available at: www.socresonline.org.uk/14/2/5.html.
78 For an insightful analysis see P Parkinson, Family Law and the Indissolubility of Parenthood (Cambridge University Press,
2011), at pp 3–15.
412 Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol 27, No 4, 2015
lives of divorced parents remain intertwined in terms of parenting (and often financial)
arrangements, and that ‘family law has changed to recognise the indissolubility of parent-
hood’.79
Succession law appears to be moving in the opposite direction, favouring horizontal relation-
ships over descendants. From the perspective of individual choice it follows naturally that
spouses be given priority as marriage is the ultimate relationship of choice. However, even if
this viewpoint is accepted, it does not preclude ‘choosing’ to embrace fully the parent–child
relationship, which may last considerably longer than the marriage and with ties of love and
affection that are no less powerful for many people. The arguments made here defending the
position of children in inheritance do not imply a lack of wholehearted support for recognising
the important position of the spouse in the deceased’s family. However, it is by no means clear
why the increased protection of the spouse has to be accompanied by an obliteration of the
place of children in the inheritance family. Jane Lewis has commented that the prioritisation of
spouse over children represents a trend towards ‘… the increasing separation of marriage and
parenthood, which constitutes a more profound shift than the 1960s separation of sex and
marriage’.80
In light of the supposed disintegration of traditional families, important work has been done by
British scholars seeking to understand family behaviour, in particular the relationship between
personal choice and personal responsibility. The picture that emerges has a degree of
consistency81 and within many, if not most, families, research studies have found implicit
obligations of care and support82 which operate in a reciprocal way: children attend to elderly
parents; parents care for and support their children, even into adulthood. Indeed, it has been
suggested that the very idea of family could be said to be ‘synonymous with the existence of a
sense of obligation’.83 For most functional families these self-imposed obligations of care exist
both in life and in death. Inheritance rights symbolise the desire of most people to ensure that
their children and their spouse, the parties to whom the deceased has been bound in a
reciprocal obligation of care, are not cast out on death.
Attitudes to inheritance
The law of intestate succession is often described in legal literature as attempting to replicate
the ‘presumed will’ of the deceased, or ‘the law’s best guess as to what a typical deceased would
have done had he or she taken the trouble to make a will’.84 In the last 15 years three major
studies have been carried out in England and Wales evaluating public attitudes towards
inheritance, and one smaller study in Scotland.85 These studies represent more than a ‘best
79 Ibid, p 15.
80 J Lewis, ‘The Changing Context for the Obligation to Care and to Earn’ in M Maclean (ed), Family Law and Family Values
(Hart Publishing, 2005), at p 64.
81 See in particular J Finch and M Mason, Negotiating Family Responsibilities (Routledge, 1993); C Smart and B Neale,
Family Fragments? (Polity Press, 1999); J Lewis, The End of Marriage? Individualism and Intimate Relationships (Edward
Elgar, 2001); J Eekelaar and M Maclean, ‘Marriage and the Moral Bases of Personal Relationships’ (2004) 31 Journal of
Law and Society 510.
82 See J Finch and J Mason, ‘Obligations of kinship in contemporary Britain: is there normative agreement?’ (1991) 42 British
Journal of Sociology 345, at pp 356–359; J Finch and J Mason, Negotiating Family Responsibilities (Routledge, 1993), at
pp 18–21.
83 J Eekelaar, ‘Personal Obligations’ in M Maclean (ed), Family Law and Family Values (Hart Publishing, 2005), at pp 11–16.
84 See K G C Reid, M J de Waal and R Zimmermann, ‘Intestate Succession in Historical and Comparative Perspective’ in
Comparative Succession Law, above n 4, at p 446.
85 J Finch and J Mason, Passing On: Kinship and Inheritance in England (Routledge, 2000); K Rowlingson and S McKay,
Attitudes to Inheritance in Britain (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2005), available at: www.jrf.org.uk/publications/
attitudes-inheritance-britain; A Humphrey et al, above n 55; Scottish Executive, Attitudes Towards Succession Law:
Findings of a Scottish Omnibus Survey (Scottish Executive, 2005).
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guess’ and can provide some guidance for the framing of the law. All have found a consistent
thread: most people want their children to inherit ‘something’ from their estate.
Finch and Mason undertook an inheritance project in the early 1990s with a view to
discovering how inheritance was handled in ordinary families.86 The researchers concentrated
on personal relationships and the way in which individuals use inheritance as a means of
confirming these relationships. In particular, inheritance was revealed as a means of active
parenting whereby the paramount importance of the parent–child relationship was reconfirmed
at the end of the parent’s life.87 This question was brought to the fore in situations where the
deceased left both a first family and a second family. While it was clear that a spouse had to be
provided for ahead of the children, first and second marriages were viewed as ‘not quite
equivalent’ for inheritance purposes and the claims of the second spouse on the resources
flowing from the second marriage were held to be somewhat ‘ambiguous’.88 Finch and Mason
found that in complex families the parent–child relationship is both predictable and privileged,
and this is manifested in their attitudes to inheritance.
When the law was recently reformed in England and Wales the Law Commission commissioned
a large scale survey of public attitudes,89 even if it did not fully implement the findings in the
subsequent Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014.90 This study had a specific focus on
how different groups – in particular those with children from more than one relationship,
stepparents and cohabitants – might vary in their attitudes towards defining family and kin for
inheritance purposes.91 Although there was considerable support for spouses, again a distinc-
tion was drawn between first and second spouses in cases where the deceased had children from
the first marriage. The qualitative component of the study92 suggested that the distinction was
based on the view that a second spouse could not necessarily be trusted to provide for the
deceased’s children in every case and, consequently, in such instances children ought to inherit
directly.93 In the case of young children, entitlement was founded partly on their perceived need
but participants also stressed the emotional relationship between parent and child, a factor that
underpinned adult children’s entitlement:94
‘Showing one’s love and doing the right thing, ultimately, underpins people’s views on how
property should be passed on.’
Scottish attitudes to inheritance
Although legislators do not generally ask the public what their views are before legislating,
there are good reasons for doing so in the case of succession. Inheritance touches the lives of
every member of the public: we will all die, leaving behind family members; and we are all
children of parents who will one day die. The SLC did conduct a survey in 200595 which
suggested that there was strong support for a fixed share of a deceased’s estate to pass to
86 For details of the methodology employed see Passing On, ibid, pp 183–188.
87 Ibid, at p 59.
88 Ibid, at p 37.
89 A Humphrey et al, above n 55; see also G Douglas et al, ‘Enduring Love? Attitudes to Family and Inheritance Law in
England and Wales’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 245.
90 See R Kerridge, ‘Intestate Succession in England and Wales’ in Comparative Succession Law, above n 4, at pp 337–340.
91 A Humphrey et al, above n 55, at p 14.
92 For methodology see above n 55, pp 16–17 and pp 95–99.
93 Ibid, at p 84.
94 G Douglas et al, ‘Enduring love: attitudes to family and inheritance law in England and Wales’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law
and Society 245, at p 247.
95 Scottish Executive, Attitudes Towards Succession Law: Findings of a Scottish Omnibus Survey (Scottish Executive, 2005).
1008 people aged 16 and over were sampled. An omnibus survey was also conducted in 1986, summarised in Scottish Law
Commission, Intestate Succession and Legal Rights, Consultative Memorandum No 69 (1986) App II.
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children of any age, weaker where there was an existing will in favour of the spouse. However,
the survey did not ask some important questions, such as whether respondents would feel
differently if the deceased was poor or wealthy; or if the spouse was not the parent of the
deceased’s children.
Private lawyers are not known for their interest in empirical research, least of all in relation to
succession, the blackest of black letter law. However, prior to embarking on reform of almost
all other areas affecting families the government has conducted social policy research to inform
that process. It is, therefore, surprising that no recent work has been done to inform the current
proposals.
Given the dearth of information about public attitudes96 and an impending reform process, one
of the authors designed a research study to explore attitudes towards inheritance, particularly
first family and second family dynamics and children’s inheritance rights.97 Thirty-seven
individuals participated in the study,98 31 of whom took part in one of seven focus groups
conducted in July and August 2014.99 A further six individuals were interviewed individually.
While the study does not claim to be representative of the general population, it is the first
study exploring these issues with members of the Scottish public and as such it offers a more
in-depth understanding of the attitudes expressed and the motivations behind them.
A biographical questionnaire distributed at the beginning of the focus groups revealed that
seven participants lived in houses they valued as being worth less than the current Scottish
average (£167,765),100 while a further three reported that they were not home owners. In
addition, six participants reported a household income of between £10,000 and £24,000, less
than, or in line with, the Scottish median income of £24,000,101 and four households reported
family income in excess of £60,000.
The gender distribution of the participants was split evenly with 18 men and 19 women. The
age range was also well balanced, although there was a deliberate focus on older participants
(68% were over 50), and participants under thirty were excluded on the basis they were less
likely to have personal experience of the central research issues, such as re-partnering,
parenthood and property ownership. A high number (36) of the participants were parents, 30
of whom remained in a relationship with the other parent. Following efforts to boost the
number of participants having experience of first and second family dynamics, the study was
able to record the views of three people who had formed second families and four who had
experience of being a stepchild.
96 See, however, S O’Neill, Wills and Awareness of Inheritance Rights in Scotland (Scottish Consumer Council, 2006).
97 This research was conducted as part of the second author’s doctoral thesis, of which the first author is a supervisor.
98 Recruitment was carried out via a form of snowball sampling. The author approached acquaintances who in turn recruited
through their social and professional networks. Efforts were made to include people with different backgrounds and life
experiences. Cognisant of grounded theory and the principles of theoretical sampling, three further waves of groups/
interviewees were conducted after the initial round in response to particular patterns and associations that were emerging
from the data. Data collection was halted when theoretical saturation was reached. All interviews were recorded and
transcribed verbatim. The process of analysis is ongoing and coding is being used to generate concepts and theories. Further
details are available from the authors.
99 While undertaking both quantitative and qualitative research would have been valuable, obvious constraints meant that
only one option could be pursued. A combination of individual and group interviews was chosen as a recognised means of
providing researchers with access to others’ ‘experiences and perceptions’ (L Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical
Legal Research’ in P Cane and H Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University
Press, 2010), at p 936). As is conventional in qualitative research, the study aimed to produce findings that were
‘representative in the sense of capturing the range or variation in a phenomenon [attitudes to succession], but not in the
sense of allowing for the estimation of the distribution of the phenomenon in the population as a whole’ (ibid, at p 934). As
a useful point of comparison, the study conducted on behalf of the Law Commission for England and Wales comprised 30
interviews, although this was done in conjunction with quantitative work.
100 Registers of Scotland, Statistical News Release, July 2015, available at: www.ros.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/
22277/RoS-Statistical-Release-Apr-Jun15-Final2107151.pdf.
101 A National Statistics Publication for Scotland Poverty and Income Equality in Scotland (2013/14), at p 3.
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A selection of the themes that emerged from these conversations is presented below as having
particular relevance to the current reform process.
The parent–child relationship
Finch and Mason found that children remain ‘the core thread of fixity’ in inheritance,102 a view
borne out in this study in that most participants view their children as the ‘end point’ in their
inheritance narrative. Participants posited a variety of reasons to explain the privileged position
of children: the longevity of the parent–child relationship; the love between parent and child;
and the self-fulfilment which the relationship offers to the parent. The parent–child relationship
was clearly viewed as a ‘no exit’103 relationship, one which, despite its ups and downs, had to
be viewed over the lifecycle and which could only be broken in the most exceptional cases.
Crucially, this does not represent a burden for the parent, but rather is conceived as the
realisation of what Douglas describes as the ‘project of the self to which people attach most
significance during their lives’.104 Parents drew obvious pleasure from envisaging leaving a
token of their love and affection, a token which in some cases would also provide a financial
cushion.
This stands in contrast to the discourse of the grasping adult child coveting the parent’s estate.
Indeed, one of the perennially difficult topics to broach in any discussion of inheritance was the
question of expectation. While dominant social norms precluded any participant from openly
admitting to expecting an inheritance, many clearly did anticipate that, should their parents
have any unused assets, they would be the most likely recipients. But the question of children’s
expectations distracts from the central message that parents expect to be able to leave an
inheritance for their children. This point was thrown into sharp relief in discussion of the state’s
entitlement to a share of an elderly person’s assets to pay for care. In recounting her mother’s
distress at being forced to sell the family home, Gillian observed – without disputing the state’s
legitimate claim – that her mother’s expectation of leaving a modest bequest to her daughters
had been thwarted:
‘but what upset my mum was the fact that, in their generation, as a working class family, it
was that you worked hard and, you know, at the end of your days you had something to
show for it and you gave it to your family.’
(Gillian, remarried, financial officer, Glasgow)105
The strength of parental desire to provide an inheritance was one of the most important
findings of the study and arose from a sense of love and the self-imposed obligation that flows
from that love. Thirty-six of the participants in the study were parents and all of them had
provided, or planned to provide, for their children in their will. As one participant remarked:
‘I think it’s your responsibility as a parent, even if you are not in that child’s life, that when
you leave, if you’ve got anything to leave, there should be something goes to them. I think
you should . . . even if it was a fluke or an accident . . . it’s your responsibility . . . I would
say so.’
(Lauren, divorced, hairdresser, Glasgow)
102 J Finch and J Mason, Passing On: Kinship and Inheritance in England (Routledge, 2000), at p 59.
103 A L Alstott, No Exit: What Parents Owe their Children and What Society Owes Parents (Oxford University Press, 2004),
at pp 51–52.
104 G Douglas et al, ‘Enduring love: attitudes to family and inheritance law in England and Wales’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law
and Society 245, at p 247.
105 Fictitious names have been given to all participants in order to protect their identity.
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Participants were willing to accept that there may be exceptional circumstances under which
the parent–child bond could be destroyed, but without evidence of this the expectation was that
right-thinking parents would leave a bequest for their children because, as one participant
expressed it, ‘money . . . equates with love in some ways’.
First families versus second families
The problem of the spouse versus the child in the context of succession arises most acutely in
cases where the deceased has two families: one comprising a second spouse and any children of
that relationship and one comprising children from a prior marriage. As Reid points out, the
1964 Act which moved Scotland from ‘a “dynastic” model of intestate succession . . . to one in
which . . . the surviving spouse is allowed to take all or the bulk of the estate’106 is largely
accepted as long as the spouse can be relied upon to pass on the estate to the children of the
deceased.107 The data from this study suggests that most people want to see children recognised
in some form, particularly where a first family/second family dynamic is involved.
The tension between first families and second families was explored in the research study by
discussing a scenario in which the deceased bequeathed her entire estate to her second husband
of three years at the expense of her adult children and, following his untimely death, the entire
estate passed to his children on intestacy. A total of 29 participants were presented with the
scenario, with 24 recorded as providing some commentary. Nineteen (79%) expressed an
openly negative reaction to the outcome, either by voicing their opposition to what they
perceived as a ‘wrong’ or ‘unfair’ outcome, or by stating that it was not something that they
themselves would do.108 This is not to say that all participants contested the testator’s right to
act in such a way, simply that the outcome sat uncomfortably with them. Although the first
part of the scenario relates to a testate scenario, the findings are also relevant to a discussion on
intestacy. If there was discomfort about the outcome where the testator had chosen how to
dispose of her estate, participants would be unlikely to consider the outcome any fairer where it
was the result of intestacy provisions.
The reasons underpinning their views focused heavily on the potentially hurtful nature of the
deceased’s actions and the unfairness of depriving children of a share in what their parents had
created together. By disinheriting the children, the deceased had breached not only the social
norm of providing for children, but the moral obligation she owed her first spouse to honour
his contribution to their joint assets. One of the participants in the project identified closely
with the research scenario, having formed a second relationship following the death of his first
wife. He explained his objections as follows:
‘I tend to see half of what I have as being June’s. So that half if you like automatically goes
to the children, rightfully. If you have your scenario, like there and it goes sideways and
then to somebody else. I don’t think that’s right. That to me would be wrong.’
(Ron, re-partnered, retired engineer, Inverurie)
It is important to point out that participants did not consider second marriages to be
qualitatively inferior to first marriages. In response to a second scenario designed to test this
hypothesis, the participants were unperturbed by a woman’s estate passing entirely to her
second husband at the expense of her adult siblings. However, they considered relationships
106 K G C Reid, ‘Intestate Succession in Scotland’ in Comparative Succession Law, above n 4, at p 395.
107 Ibid.
108 These findings mirror those recorded by other studies. In the most recent study only 15% of respondents favoured the
spouse receiving everything where the deceased had adult children (A Humphrey et al, above n 55, at p 37). See also J
Finch and J Mason, Passing On: Kinship and Inheritance in England (Routledge, 2000), at p 37.
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with children to be qualitatively different from those without, insofar as spouses who were also
parents had obligations not just to each other but also to their respective children. The
competing obligations did not require that the second spouse and the children be treated
identically in terms of inheritance provision, only that each party be recognised and treated
‘fairly’.
The discussions which took place around these topics (which are confirmed by other empirical
studies of inheritance) suggest that while the reform proposals prioritise the spouse over all
other family members, members of the public seek a more even-handed approach that would
allow for both the spouse and the children to be recognised. It is suggested that the Scottish law
reform proposals in this case lag behind the insights scholars have provided.
Protection from disinheritance
Attitudes towards the protection of children from disinheritance in testate succession were
more nuanced. Participants still saw the children as entitled but had to balance this with the
competing belief that the testator was best placed to decide how to dispose of his estate.
However, while most supported testamentary freedom, analysis of their commentary suggests
that commitment to that principle was not absolute.109 This manifested itself in several ways: a
readiness to make exceptions; a willingness to ignore testamentary provisions in certain cases;
an acceptance of the need for a legal share; and the particular case of the limited testamentary
freedom of parents. Only the last point will be explored below.
Parenthood, testamentary freedom and the temporary nature of the spousal
transfer
While all of the parents in the study stated that they had or would include their children in their
wills, this was by no means at the expense of the spouse, at least not where the spouse was the
other parent of the participant’s children. Although participants provided explanations such as
the closeness of the spousal relationship in support of the spouse’s claim, the belief that spouses
owned their assets jointly emerged as the foundation on which their views rested. Married
couples were perceived as having worked together to build up any assets the couple had and,
for this reason, spouses rarely considered assets passing from one spouse to the other to
constitute an inheritance. This confirms similar findings by other studies. Finch and Mason
found that inter-spousal transfer is regarded as a separate process110 whereby inheritance to the
next generation is postponed while the second parent is alive, with an expectation that children
will inherit in due course.111 A study of Scottish wills found that an initial transfer of property
between spouses was ‘a temporary and transitional stage’ with an expectation that it would
ultimately flow to the next generation.112 In this study, 10 of the 22 participants who had wills
(and who remained in a relationship with the other parent) had to be prompted to remember
that their will primarily benefited their spouse, not their children. Although this is an important
point, it is nonetheless subordinate to the second point to emerge from the data; namely,
parents who remain together view their will as a joint undertaking and not as an expression of
their individualism.
This view manifested itself in two ways: first, in the language participants used to discuss their
wills, a discourse replete with references to ‘our will’ and ‘what we’ve done’; secondly, the
109 The recent English study also revealed conflicting attitudes to testamentary freedom depending on the circumstances
presented: A Humphrey et al, above n 55, at p 34.
110 J Finch and J Mason, Passing On: Kinship and Inheritance in England (Routledge, 2000), at p 71.
111 K Rowlingson and S McKay, Attitudes to Inheritance in Britain (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2005), at pp 7–11.
112 M Munro, ‘Housing wealth and inheritance’ (1988) 17/4 Journal of Social Policy 417, at p 432.
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common objective their wills shared. While participants generally provided for their spouses in
the first instance, they intended their children (and in some cases their grandchildren) to be the
final recipients of their estate. In other words, the spousal transfer was a temporary step
preceding an eventual transfer of any remaining estate to the children. John explains his will in
the following terms:
‘I mean when I go Lynne will get any cash that I have and the house also, obviously . . . It
will all go to Lynne initially but there will be provision for our two daughters and then
ultimately to the grandchildren. I can’t remember the detail . . . whether we’ve already
made a formal arrangement for the grandchildren . . . but we did go to considerable lengths
to make sure that as far as we understood things were relatively watertight and
appropriate.’
(John, married, retired, Glasgow)
While participants’ testamentary intentions were often clear, how these intentions were to be
implemented was more opaque. Eight of the participants reported that while their spouse was
the first beneficiary, the estate would then pass to the children. Three of these eight believed
they had binding written agreements with their spouses, while five simply stated that the
property would pass first to their spouse and then to their children, without explaining how
this would be achieved. A sense of unease fell over certain participants when they were pressed
as to how their spouse was bound to implement their wishes, while others expressed surprise as
they realised their agreements may not be legally enforceable after one of them had died: ‘Damn
you! I’ll have to think about that now!’.
Other participants were fully aware that the agreement they had with their spouse was not
legally enforceable. For some, this was inconsequential as they viewed their morally binding
agreement to be no less unassailable than a legal one. Lauren, for example, explained that her
mother would provide equally for her and her estranged brother because ‘that was my dad’s,
her and my dad’s wishes . . . [and] she has to follow it through’. However, while several
expressed their absolute trust that their spouse would implement their agreement, a handful did
reveal themselves – or more accurately their mothers – to be more circumspect:
‘On the point of trusting your husband, my mum and dad have spent the last 15 years
trying to make a will. She’s been married for 48 years and she still doesn’t trust my father
enough not to run off with a floozy in the event of her death and spend her children’s and
her grandchildren’s inheritance.’
(Malcolm, married, IT worker, Glasgow)
The data generated by discussion of shared testamentary intentions and the moral obligations
that bind the surviving spouse to give effect to the agreed intentions of the couple, was amongst
the most significant the study produced. The couples with children almost all appeared to
accept that their own testamentary freedom was circumscribed in a unique way. While they
were free to set out their wills as they (as a couple) saw fit, once the first spouse had died the
last mutual agreement had, within reason, to be implemented. This suggests that for parents
who remain in a relationship with the other parent of their child the moral obligation between
spouses trumps the principle of testamentary freedom.
Equality between children
As discussed above, the interest of land reformers in succession law stems from a desire to end
the concentration of private landownership in Scotland. It is also fascinating to see succession
law, so often associated with maintaining privilege, being characterised as a vehicle for social
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reform that could lead to ‘land . . . [being] . . . distributed more equitably across society’.113
Sharing an estate equally between the children and the spouse (through their respective legal
shares) is a question of equity. While the participants in the study, with one notable exception,
made no mention of land reform, fairness and equity were watchwords. All of the participants
who were asked whether they would divide their estate equally between their children
responded in the affirmative, although some suggested that appalling behaviour on the part of
the child could change their view. A handful also reported that they could support distributing
an estate to achieve greater equality of income, as opposed to distributing it in equal shares, but
none appeared to have followed through with this. As one participant observed, ‘I would have
a big issue with putting something on paper that said someone was unequal to someone else’.
Once again, the data echoes other studies: Finch and Mason found that ‘the principle of equal
treatment of children reigns supreme when it comes to the division of major assets,114 while the
recent study in England and Wales revealed a ‘strong view that where children were to inherit,
the estate should usually be divided equally between them’.115 Maintaining a legal share for all
children equally appears to be a point where the views of land reformers and public opinion
converge.
Conclusion
The Scottish Government recognises that there may be ‘unintended consequences’ in these
reform proposals and that they ‘will not work for everyone’.116 It has been argued that
succession law should be for ordinary families, for those of average wealth. Based on the
findings of the studies outlined above, we would suggest that they also need to embody the
social norms of ordinary people. The current raft of proposals is not in keeping with the views
that emerge in study after study that children are a very significant, perhaps the most
significant, recipient in the inheritance narratives of parents.
This begs the question of whether there is an alternative. If public attitudes are taken seriously
it seems clear that children should almost always receive something from the estate of a parent.
It need not be financially significant, but it may be emotionally and psychologically so. Intestate
succession could operate on a sliding scale, with a percentage increase according to the size of
the estate, thus ensuring that the spouse takes almost all of a modest estate, but children are
generously treated in a larger one. This would be in keeping with the policy of the current law,
although not since the changes that occurred in 2005. For instance, up to £100,000 just 1% or
£1000 could be shared between any children; from £100,000 up to £250,000 (which takes the
figures above the average estate) children could receive 5%; and thereafter rising to 25% or
30% for larger estates.
Another alternative would be to create a different, and less generous, regime where the spouse
is not also the parent of the deceased’s children. No attempt has been made to address this
complex issue, although much could be learned from other jurisdictions which have a separate
intestacy regime in those circumstances. For instance, in British Columbia there is a signifi-
cantly smaller spousal share (half) where all the children of the deceased are not also children of
the spouse;117 likewise in the USA in the provisions of the Uniform Probate Code.118 The desire
for succession law to be simple is arguably of less importance than the goal of being fair and
113 A Wightman, The Poor had No Lawyers: Who Owns Scotland (and How They Got It) (Birlinn, 3rd edn, 2015), p 369.
114 J Finch and J Mason, Passing On: Kinship and Inheritance in England (Routledge, 2000), at p 77.
115 A Humphrey et al, above n 55, at p 9.
116 Consultation on the Law of Succession, above n 20, at para 2.4.
117 Wills, Estates and Succession Act SBC 2009, ss 21(3) and (4).
118 Sections 2–102. In a recent comparative study at least seven jurisdictions are identified as having separate provisions, see
R Kerridge, ‘Intestate Succession in England and Wales’ in Comparative Succession Law, above n 4, at p 340, n 95.
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meeting expectations. Jurisdictions which have made a distinction where the deceased leaves a
first family and a second family do not appear to have found it beyond the wit of lawmakers to
draft a suitable law.
As for the question of disinheritance, despite the combined efforts of landed interests and
lawyers, there is no evidence that the Scottish public would support removing the current
protection for spouses or children of any age. It is certainly arguable that the legal share should
not be structurally linked to the amounts that can be claimed on intestacy if a substantial
threshold sum is to be maintained. The sliding scale suggested above could operate for the legal
share of children, and could be revised in line with the figures for the average estate. Taking the
latter as the baseline is a more logical approach than movements in the Scottish housing
market.
Finally, there may be some merit in considering a discretionary scheme for the highly unusual
circumstances in which a parent may have strong grounds for disinheriting a child or altering
an equal allocation of legal share: for instance, where there has been abuse or criminal activity;
where it would lead to the ruin of a business (as some farmers have argued); or where a
particular child has particular needs. However, in general succession law should reflect the
standard case and not the exception and should, therefore, seek to ensure that most children
inherit something from the estate of most parents.
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